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ABSTRACT 
Auditing provides an important role supporting the function of financial 
markets where information asymmetry exists between shareholders and 
management. The audit market for the largest publicly listed UK companies, 
those within the FTSE 350, has however come under scrutiny following a number 
of financial scandals and, driven both by quality and competition concerns as the 
largest audit firms, the “Big 4” are dominant. Auditor tenure and long periods 
without competitive tenders have been recurrent concerns and yet how 
companies select their auditors is under researched. 
This study examines the influences on the complex decision process 
underlying auditor selection in FTSE 350 companies during an important period, 
namely that between the acquisition of Arthur Andersen by Deloitte in August 
2002 and the introduction of the September 2012 UK Corporate Governance 
Code by the Financial Reporting Council.  
Based on a social constructionist philosophical perspective and adopting a 
grounded approach, the study covers 60 auditor selection decisions (over half of 
those identified in the research period) and includes in depth interviews over a 
period of two years with those who had recently been involved in a FTSE 350 
auditor selection process; both from the buy-side and the sales-side.  
A conceptual model is developed which illustrates five factor groups that 
this research identified as influencing auditor selection in typically 
comprehensive proposal processes. These were: Relationships at the start of the 
proposal process, Service design, Capabilities and competences of the bidding 
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firms, Behavioural influences during the proposal process and Final decision 
making. It also identifies interrelationships between these factor groups. 
These results are important because they inform theory and practice at a 
time when auditor change is becoming a statutory requirement.  The study also 
has implications for other complex purchases of intangible services, particularly 
other professional services, and potentially for complex decision situations more 
generally. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
AUDITOR SELECTION: THE REGULATORY AND PRACTICE 
BACKGROUND  
1.0. Introduction  
This study explores the auditor selection decision during an important 
period of evolution of audit and regulation in financial markets following a 
research approach which has been designed to answer the research question: 
What are the factors affecting the auditor selection decisions of            
FTSE 350 companies? 
This first chapter 
explores the context of the 
study. The next chapter 
then sets out the literature 
review which considers the 
auditor selection decision 
including supplier 
selection literature and 
aspects of decision theory 
and other relevant 
literature. 
After setting out the research methodology in Chapter 3, the findings of the 
three phases of the research are set out in the next three chapters prior to 
Discussion and conclusion. 
Figure 1: The three phases of the research within 
the whole approach 
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1.1. The audit market and regulatory context 
This first chapter summarises the practical and regulatory background 
relevant to the auditor selection decision. Those making auditor selection 
decisions do so within a regulatory, legal, market and professional framework 
which it is important to recognise as an influence and a contextual background. 
The role and importance of auditing to financial markets is considered first 
and then the more recent historical context; including the events which have 
given rise to a substantial change in the auditing profession and how the 
regulatory regime has evolved during the period covered by the study. 
Market concentration and its influence on auditor choice is then 
considered including the findings of a number of market investigations which 
took place before and during the period of study. The regulatory investigations 
and developments and those relating to competition are considered separately 
in Sections 1.2 and 1.3.  
This chapter also considers three other influences relevant to auditor 
selection namely: the presence of cross directorships and networks across FTSE 
350 company boards, the frequency of auditor tenders and longevity of auditor 
appointments and the nature of audit tenders once underway. 
This chapter therefore provides the essential contextual background to the 
audit market position and for the current study. 
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1.2. Auditor appointment a high profile decision 
The audit of public companies has come under closer and closer scrutiny 
in recent years prompted at least in part by a series of financial scandals; most 
recently the financial crisis which followed the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 
2008. Although the audit continues to play an important role in supporting 
confidence in financial markets, the regulatory regime has evolved considerably 
and those making auditor selection decisions have increasingly been doing so in 
a much tighter regulatory environment. This section discusses some of the 
events that have brought audit into public focus, why this is important because 
of the special nature of audit and how the regulatory environment has evolved 
as a backdrop to audit and auditor selection. 
1.2.1. The impact of financial scandals 
The global banking and financial crisis, which came to a head with the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008, focussed attention on corporate 
governance in the UK’s largest listed companies.  But in reality this latest 
market crisis followed a series of scandals affecting “UK plc”. These have 
included the widely publicised collapses of BCCI, Maxwell Corporation and 
Polly Peck in the early 1990s and Barings in 1995, Enron in 2001 (and the 
subsequent collapse of Arthur Andersen in 2002) and the administration of 
Parmalat in 2003. These events have been significant not only because of the 
financial losses that shareholders, creditors, affected staff and others have 
incurred, but also because they represented failures in corporate governance; 
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thereby having a damaging, and in some cases highly damaging, effect on 
confidence in financial markets and their effective operation. 
Whilst most of these events involved fraud and have generally been agreed 
to represent failures in financial controls and corporate governance more 
generally (including the roles and responsibilities of directors, the conduct and 
constitution of Boards, the maintenance of adequate internal accounting control 
procedures and the information reported to shareholders) they have inevitably 
also brought into question the quality of statutory external audit.   
Audit quality has been defined as “the market assessed joint probability 
that a  given  auditor  will  both  (a) discover a breach in the client’s accounting 
system, and  (b) report the breach” (DeAngelo, 1981, page 186).  With problems 
with the financial markets came a perception for some at least that there were 
failings in audit quality and therefore something wrong with the scrutiny and 
selection affecting auditors. For problems not to have been brought to light 
earlier, some argued that by inference either auditors had not discovered them 
(which could prima facie amount to shortfalls with the quality of work they were 
undertaking), or they were in some way complicit in not bringing them to the 
attention of shareholders (potentially implying over familiarity as a result of 
long periods of tenure). These financial problems each appeared to be a 
surprise, at least to some extent and especially to those outside the companies 
concerned. Questions have therefore arisen as to why problems were not 
identified and/or if identified not reported. 
 Chapter One  
Auditor selection: The regulatory and practice background 
 
 
 
5 
 
These questions are fundamental to the auditing profession because the 
statutory audit has always been (and remains) a critical part of the effective 
overall operation of financial markets, particularly given the information 
asymmetry which exists between managers of public companies and their 
shareholders. This is discussed next. 
1.2.2. Information asymmetry and the important role of the 
auditor 
With the separation of ownership from the management of public 
companies and the resulting agency position comes information asymmetry (see 
for example, Adams et al., 2005).  An agency position results from directors of 
public companies managing a business on behalf of shareholders who in many 
cases are not involved in the day to day running of that business. Information 
asymmetry follows because the information publicly available to shareholders is 
significantly less than that available to management who are charged with the 
day to day operation of the business. Management who have day to day 
oversight of the business typically manage numerous amounts of data. This 
includes detailed day to day information relating to the business, its progress 
and performance, accounting controls and weaknesses etc. which it would be 
impractical and/or undesirable to make public for a number of reasons, not 
least competitive commercial advantage. In a world where detailed financial 
management information is not generally put in the public domain should 
detailed financial information about any individual company be put into that 
public domain, competitors would be able to more effectively refine their 
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strategies and approaches so as to compete more successfully with the company 
concerned. 
The rights of shareholders, designed to protect them in this agency 
relationship and recognising information asymmetry, are well developed and 
the role of the auditor is a critical element within them.  
The auditor is in normal circumstances formally appointed each year by 
shareholders at an annual general meeting by a shareholder vote on a resolution 
containing a recommendation by the relevant company’s Board. As part of their 
responsibilities, the auditor formally reports to shareholders each year on the 
truth and fairness of the financial statements presented to them by the relevant 
company (and on certain other matters see below) and their opinion is included 
in company’s annual report. This opinion results from an independent 
examination of the company’s accounting records conducted in accordance with 
applicable law and regulation and in accordance with auditing standards issued 
by an independent standard setting body. The audit opinion provides an 
important input into helping to manage the uncertainty associated with 
information asymmetry. By providing an independent examination of the 
financial statements and the expression of an opinion on their truth and 
fairness, the audit plays an important part in protecting the interests of 
shareholders (NB this area has developed recently following the issuance of a 
new auditing standard ISA 700 in June 2013 (FRC, 2013) expanding the 
information disclosed in the auditors’ report).  And although there has been 
some wider misunderstanding about what an auditor was actually required to 
do (the so called “expectations gap” where users of accounts think the auditor 
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has greater responsibility to do more work than actually required by statute and 
regulation (see for example ICAEW (2006)) the auditor had, and continues to 
have, unique rights and responsibilities which are codified in company law to 
enable them to discharge their important role.  
Auditor rights and responsibilities are longstanding and were reconfirmed 
most recently in the Companies Act 2006,  which reaffirms: “a right of access at 
all times to the company’s books, accounts and vouchers (in whatever form they 
are held)” (Section 499 (1) a) and wide ranging rights to require those related to 
the company and its financial statements to “provide him with such information 
or explanations as he thinks necessary for the performance of his duties as 
auditor” (Section 499 (1) b). These rights provide the auditor with unparalleled 
access to company information including share price sensitive information and 
rights and responsibilities to report issues and errors to management and, 
where important, to the audit committee in a way that is transparent and fair 
(NB in certain limited cases auditors also have responsibilities to report to 
regulators and the police). These rights and responsibilities establish 
accompanying levels of trust to behave reasonably, to maintain confidentiality 
and highlight issues appropriately. Audits can be led only by professionally 
qualified and registered auditors who are required to comply with the rules of 
the accounting profession, especially with regard to integrity and objectivity, 
and to be independent of the company both individually and as a firm. The 
ethical responsibilities and requirements which apply to both individuals and 
practising audit firms are set out in the Code of Ethics issued by the ICAEW (see 
http://www.icaew.com).  
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Given information asymmetry, independence is important to companies 
and their auditors are very alert to the threats involved. These include “Self 
Interest Threats” (where “the audit firm or a member of the audit team could 
benefit from a financial interest in, or other self-interest conflict with, an audit 
client”) “Self Review Threat” (where “the audit firm, or an individual audit team 
member, is put in a position of reviewing subject matter for which that 
individual or their firm was previously responsible”), “Familiarity 
Threat”(where, “by virtue of a close relationship with an audit client, its 
directors, officers or employees, an audit firm or a member of the audit team 
becomes too sympathetic to the client’s interests”), “Advocacy Threat” (where 
an auditor finds him/herself in a position of advocate either for or against a 
client in an adversarial situation or takes a strong and proactive position in 
support of a client)  and “Intimidation Threat (where an auditor is at risk of 
being intimidated by, for example, a dominant company director) (See ICAEW, 
2003, pages 5-6). 
In addition to these special rights and responsibilities the audit has 
traditionally also been bound by a particular contractual liability position. 
Unlike most other contracts, the auditor is unable to limit his/her liability.  This 
is important because if financial loss can be proven to have arisen as a result of 
negligence by the auditor, the damages that can be claimed from the auditor can 
be substantial, including putting the personal assets of the individual audit 
partner signing the published financial statements at risk. The major audit firms 
have substantial financial resources and the market is very aware of this 
position (See Section 1.3).  The auditor selection decision is therefore also highly 
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important for the audit firms, as in accepting appointment they are taking on 
considerable risks which could have consequences both for the continuing 
existence of their firms and the financial position of individual partners. 
Lastly under rights and responsibilities, as McMeeking (2009, page 7) 
notes, “The market for audit services is unique because it is a statutory 
requirement for companies to have an audit but it is provided by the private 
sector”. The obligation to have an audit each year is therefore imposed upon 
companies (which means that unlike most other consulting assignments the 
option not to proceed is not available) and, because the auditor is required to be 
independent, companies cannot conduct their audit themselves (although they 
can put in place systems and controls which auditors may test and rely on in 
coming to their opinion). 
The critical and unique role of the auditor therefore further underlines the 
importance of auditor selection. 
1.2.3. Regulatory reviews and their impact on auditor selection  
The role and function of audit was comprehensively reviewed as part of a 
general review of corporate governance in 1991. The setting up of the UK 
Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance led by Sir Adrian 
Cadbury was a direct response to a perceived need to improve the quality of 
corporate governance generally and the Committee included representatives of 
industry, regulators, the stock exchange, shareholders and the legal and 
accounting professions. Its review included widespread consultation with 
interested parties. The Committee’s findings and recommendations were issued 
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in 1992 within what has become widely known as the Cadbury Report (Cadbury 
Report, 1992).  
The Cadbury Report was aimed at all listed companies in the UK and 
included a wide ranging number of observations and recommendations 
covering the effectiveness and constitution of boards of directors, the role of 
non-executive directors and audit committees, the operation of internal control 
and internal audit, financial reporting and the consistent application of 
accounting standards and the relationship of companies with their 
shareholders. Importantly the report made a number of observations and 
produced recommendations aimed at increasing the effectiveness and value of 
the audit. Whilst recognising the importance of the audit as “one of the 
cornerstones of corporate governance” (Cadbury Report, 1992, paragraph 5.1), 
the report also recommended the extension of auditors’ responsibilities 
including reporting on directors’ assessments of the effectiveness of companies’ 
systems of internal control and their assessment of going concern. Significantly, 
although stopping short of recommending the rotation of audit firms, the report 
recommended the periodic change of audit partners “to bring a fresh approach 
to the audit” (Cadbury Report, 1992, paragraph 5.12). This was important as it 
set the precedent that changing audit partners represented good corporate 
governance. Hitherto, audit partners had often had individual professional 
relationships with their audit clients which often persisted for many years.  As 
with many professions value was placed on trust, knowledge and professional 
integrity which facilitated understanding and therefore appropriate judgements 
on issues as they arose (NB accountants had previously been referred to as “the 
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priesthood of industry” (Sampson, 1962)). Once implemented, the Cadbury 
Report recommendation meant that there would inevitably be a need to break 
relationships and rebuild new ones with individuals albeit mainly within the 
same overall inter-organisational audit arrangements. Individual long term 
relationships in audit would be precluded, changing the nature of the audit 
relationship and consequently auditor selection. 
The Cadbury Report formed the basis of a new UK Corporate Governance 
Code in 1992 and a requirement was added to the Listing Rules of the London 
Stock Exchange that companies should report whether they had followed the 
recommendations or, if not, explain why they had not done so (this is known as 
‘comply or explain’).   The Cadbury Report was widely regarded as the first and 
most comprehensive guidance on corporate governance anywhere. It also set 
the precedent for a regulatory framework with a number of corporate 
governance guidance updates following; each refining the regulatory framework 
and the nature of the audit relationship.  These included the Committee on 
Corporate Governance or Hampel Report (ICAEW Committee on Corporate 
Governance, 1998) and the Turnbull Report (Internal Control: Guidance for 
Directors on the Combined Code – ICAEW, 1999). 
In 2002, following scandals at a number of US companies including Tyco 
International, Worldcom and notably Enron (which resulted in the collapse of 
Arthur Andersen, subsequently uncovering a large number of shortcomings in 
the conduct of the Houston office of that firm), recognition of audit and the 
critical role it played in governance again came to the fore and the Sarbanes 
Oxley Act was passed in the US (See http://www.sarbanesoxley). This Act, 
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which also applied to UK companies listed in the US, introduced far reaching 
new provisions on corporate governance and auditor independence, including 
strict rules as to which non-audit services could be provided by auditors to their 
clients. The Act also introduced the Public Company Accounting Oversight 
Board responsible for regulating, inspecting and disciplining accounting firms 
in their roles as auditors of public companies. 
Although the UK had experienced no similar recent collapse at that time 
and, in particular, no similar misconduct by any UK audit firm, the loss of 
confidence caused by events emanating in the US led the UK Government to 
instigate a review under the Coordinating Group on Audit and Accounting 
Issues.  This review again focussed on listed companies and considered a 
number of aspects pertinent to their audit including auditor independence, the 
role of the audit committee, transparency and monitoring of audit firms and 
financial reporting. The Group’s final report was issued in January 2003.  It too 
found against mandatory auditor rotation and mandatory tendering. Although 
the Group “could see some attractions for competition in such a requirement 
[for mandatory tendering]” it concluded that such a step would “cut across the 
enhanced role we see for the Audit Committee” (Co-ordinating Group on Audit 
and Accounting Issues, Final Report, 2003, page 27). The Group did however 
support new rules on audit partner tenure introduced by the Institute of 
Chartered Accountants in England and Wales and the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants in Scotland which, following the Cadbury Report, required rotation 
of lead audit partners from the audit of a company of which they were the lead 
audit partner every five years, and certain other partners and staff every seven 
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years. The report also supported increased responsibilities for audit committees 
in overseeing auditor appointment, tighter scrutiny of non-audit services 
provided by auditors and the introduction of an independent monitoring body 
for audits. 
The Group also commissioned a separate report under the chairmanship of 
Sir Robert Smith to provide guidance to companies on the effective operation of 
audit committees. The Smith Report (Audit Committees Combined Code 
Guidance, 2003) was issued and supported a strong role for audit committees in 
overseeing governance in public companies. The report also specifically 
supported an important role for audit committees in relation to audit; in 
particular: “to make recommendations to the board in relation to the 
appointment of the external auditor and to approve the remuneration and terms 
of engagement of the external auditor following appointment by the 
shareholders in general meeting; to monitor and review the external auditor’s 
independence, objectivity and effectiveness; to develop and implement policy on 
the engagement of the external auditor to supply non-audit services” (Page 6). 
The recommendations of the Smith Report along with those of a report on the 
effectiveness of non-executive directors following a review by Sir Derek Higgs 
(Review of the role and effectiveness of non-executive directors, 2003) were 
included in the UK Combined Code on Corporate Governance of 2003.  The 
emphasis being placed on the role of the audit committee in auditor 
appointment can be compared with the historically greater importance in 
practice of the finance director in that decision (NB In addition to practical 
evidence previous research had also highlighted finance directors as most 
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influential in auditor selection in the past although their influence reduced 
where audit committees were present (Beattie and Fearnley, 1998a). The new 
code also focussed yet more attention on audit evaluation and effectiveness. 
The events surrounding the US scandals of the early 2000’s also had a 
profound effect on the businesses of the major audit firms and their 
relationships with their major clients. Hitherto it had been common practice for 
major organisations (recognising the knowledge of them that their auditors 
possessed) to employ their external auditor to perform other services such as 
providing tax advice and consulting services.  The dominant emerging view 
however became that these other services represented a perceived threat to 
auditor independence and had to be much more strictly controlled. By the end 
of 2002 three of the Big 4 had sold their consulting practices. Prior to the Arthur 
Andersen collapse at the end of 2001, the then FTSE 100 companies were 
paying almost three times as much in non-audit fees to their auditors as they 
were in audit fees and the next 250 companies twice as much. In 2004 (the first 
full year following the post Enron regulatory changes) these ratios had fallen to 
just over one to one for both the FTSE 100 and FTSE 250. Although the Big 4 
would in subsequent years rebuild their consulting, or advisory businesses as 
they became known, they were now increasingly selling these services to other 
audit firms’ audit clients. The nature of auditor selection had therefore 
fundamentally changed.  Whilst those choosing auditors might previously have 
been looking for a supplier of a range of professional service solutions, the 
auditor selection decision was now more narrowly defined with a greater focus 
on independence. There was now much greater concern about perceived threats 
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to independence that might occur through auditors providing non-audit 
services, at least beyond those services which were related to the audit.  
Whereas before the collapse of Arthur Andersen the audit had been the 
hub of a multidisciplinary relationship which facilitated the on-sell of other 
services, it now became much more distinct and, through the restrictions based 
on non-audit services, actually now heavily restricted on-sell. This was both 
formal, through the introduction of company policies governing service 
provision by statutory auditors, and in practice,  because the requirements for 
approval of services by audit committees introduced an additional 
administrative step in the procurement process which management could 
choose to avoid by selecting professional services providers who were not their 
auditors. These changes led to different choices for companies and their 
auditors. Whilst companies broadened their professional service provider 
options away from their auditors and consequentially narrowed their 
relationships with their auditors, audit firms were faced with having to respond 
to those decisions; tailoring their approaches and the focus of their relationship 
management activities. 
In 2004 the post Enron regulatory environment advanced further when 
the Professional Oversight Board (“POB”) was set up in the United Kingdom as 
part of the reformed Financial Reporting Council. This introduced statutory 
independent oversight over the regulation of auditors and reviewed directly, on 
a sample basis through the Audit Inspection Unit (AIU) now Audit Quality 
Review Team (AQRT), the quality of the audits of listed and other major public 
interest entities.  The AQRT reports publicly every year on the findings of its 
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inspections. For the first time the audit quality of firms was being directly 
examined by an independent regulator outside the accounting profession and in 
overall terms being put in the public domain thereby providing signals to the 
market on the comparative quality of the firms (albeit based on small samples). 
A stream of law and guidance has followed based on these foundations, 
including a revised UK Corporate Governance Code in September 2012 and 
subsequently changes to European Community Law published in July 2014 
(European Parliament, 2014). A summary of these developments which post-
dated the research period for this study and their potential practical 
implications for auditor selection is set out in Chapter 7. 
The growth in regulation and the power and influence of regulators within 
the auditing profession has therefore been unprecedented within the past 20 
years. Until the financial scandals of the late 1980’s and early 1990’s auditing 
had been largely self-regulated by the profession’s own institutes with a focus on 
competent and ethical behaviour by their members. Within 20 years, although 
these professional and ethical standards still apply, a comprehensive regulatory 
regime has emerged, not only reliant on monitoring people and the processes 
and procedures of their firms, but independently examining, on a sample basis, 
the detailed conduct of audits.  As noted above, the period has also seen the 
establishment and increasing influence of audit committees on auditor 
appointment. The auditor selection decision has also therefore changed, and 
most fundamentally more recently. Before 2002, as noted above, auditor 
selection decisions were about wide ranging relationships and normally led by 
financial management especially the finance director. Since then they have been 
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about much more narrowly defined relationships and with much greater 
influence expected from audit committees. 
In summary, auditor selection has come under ever closer scrutiny and 
those selecting auditors do so knowing both that it is an important decision and 
that that decision is both subject to regulatory review and public; with the 
potential to be of especially high public profile both for companies and 
individual directors should anything go wrong. With the direction of regulation 
all listed (and some other) companies will now have to consider an audit tender 
and greater understanding of the audit tender decision will help inform that 
process. 
1.3. Auditor selection and auditor choice. Concentration and 
competition in the FTSE 350 audit market 
The previous section considered the evolution and related impact of the 
regulatory environment surrounding auditor selection following a number of 
high profile financial scandals. In addition to the regulatory scrutiny 
surrounding auditor selection and appointment, to understand the context for 
that decision, it is important to consider the nature of the market and in 
particular, the extent of its concentration into four major firms. This issue is 
therefore discussed next. 
Ironically, until 1984, there had been strict regulations enforced by the 
profession in the UK against solicitation of other auditors’ clients including for 
example, a bar on advertising for audit services. Competing for new business 
had been considered unprofessional by many and even a threat to the 
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independence of the auditor. This supported and underpinned the long standing 
audit relationships referred to above.  
The auditing profession had however been consolidating for many years as 
individual firms grew and merged, principally to meet the needs of their clients; 
both in terms of depth of resources and global reach. Following the removal of 
professional restrictions to competition amongst auditors and a period of supply 
side pressure dating back to the 1989 recession (see for example Beattie and 
Fearnley, 1998b) this consolidation culminated in three major mergers. The Big 
8 became the Big 6 in when Ernst & Whinney merged with Arthur Young to 
form Ernst & Young in June 1989, and Deloitte, Haskins & Sells merged with 
Coopers and Lybrand in in the UK in January 1990 (Deloitte merged with 
Touche Ross in most territories around the world). The last major merger; that 
of Price Waterhouse and Coopers & Lybrand to create PricewaterhouseCoopers 
in 1998, was approved following a lengthy competition authority review at the 
European Commission. 
When Arthur Andersen’s UK business was absorbed by Deloitte and 
Touche (now Deloitte) in August 2002 (having been taken over elsewhere in the 
world mainly by Ernst & Young), the current Big 4 was created. These four firms 
have since dominated auditing in the UK (and globally). Their fee income 
dwarfed other firms as highlighted in Table 1 below which shows the total 
income and audit fee income of the Big 4 firms in the UK compared with those 
of the then next four (BDO Stoy Hayward, Baker Tilly, Grant Thornton and 
PKF) shortly after the collapse of Arthur Andersen in 2002.  
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Firm Year end Total 
fee income 
£m 
Audit 
fee income 
£m 
PricewaterhouseCoopers 30 June 2003 1,505 453 
KPMG 31 September 2003 1,008 291 
Deloitte 31 May 2003 1,188 260 
Ernst & Young 30 June 2003 812 226 
Big 4  4513 1230 
BDO Stoy Hayward 30 June 2003 169 82 
Baker Tilly 31 March 2003 150 59 
Grant Thornton 30 June 2003 216 58 
PKF 31 March 2003 107 46 
Next 4  642 245 
Table 1: The audit market shares of major UK audit firms following the collapse of  
Arthur Andersen in 2002 
Source: Financial Reporting Council; Professional Oversight Board for Accountancy;                 
Key facts and Trends in the Accountancy Profession, February 2005 
 
 
As the table shows, the total combined fee income of the Big 4 was 
approximately seven times that of the next four largest accountancy firms in the 
UK and over five times their audit fee income. Importantly, each of the Big 4 
firms, although separate legal entities in the UK, were also part of very extensive 
established global networks with substantial resources. These networks are 
important because in recent years companies have generally chosen to have the 
same auditor across all of their operations. The existence of global networks 
means that these firms could not only provide audit services in a number of 
countries but also provide a more consistent service across those countries 
(Oxera, 2006). 
The newly created Big 4 were also auditors of 97% of all the companies in 
the FTSE 350 in the third quarter of 2002 including all of the UK’s top 100 
companies (based on appointments as disclosed in annual reports and 
announcements of the FTSE 350 companies at that date) and although there 
would be changes within the Big 4, their domination of this market has 
continued ever since. At the end of the third quarter of 2013 the Big 4 were still 
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auditors of 96% of the FTSE 350, earning over 98% of the some £575 million of 
audit fees paid by those companies (Source: summary of audit fees as disclosed 
in the annual reports of FTSE 350 companies). 
1.3.1. Competition and Choice in the UK audit market. 
The Oxera Study (April 2006) 
The market domination by the Big 4 has attracted further government and 
regulatory interest. In 2005 the Department of Trade and Industry and FRC 
commissioned a study of competition in the audit market conducted by Oxera 
(Oxera, 2006). The study sought views on competition and choice from 
interested parties using in-depth interviews and a survey of Audit Committee 
Chairs of listed companies. 
As part of their work Oxera considered auditor selection including 
conducting a survey of Audit Committee Chairs. This was not restricted to the 
FTSE 350 and included audit committee chairs of companies in the FTSE Small 
Cap index. Their work nonetheless indicated that reputation was important; in 
particular the importance to FTSE 350 companies that their auditor was one of 
the Big 4. This was important, they observed, for example because of the 
difficulties in accurately assessing the quality of staff and international coverage 
and was also seen to be important for investors. The other factors considered 
most important were sector specific expertise, international coverage (where 
one concern was consistent service, especially across countries with relatively 
low standards of corporate governance) and technical accounting skill.  
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The context and purpose of the Oxera study is important. The size and 
scale of the Big 4 discussed above means that other firms struggle to compete on 
these factors. In most cases however, and for the same reason, the Big 4 all 
possess these characteristics and therefore, whilst explaining short listing and 
market concentration, these factors are unlikely to provide an explanation of 
auditor selection between the Big 4 which, as Section 1.4.2 below will show has 
characterised the vast majority of all audit FTSE 350 tenders. 
Whilst it wasn’t covered in their survey of audit committee chairs, one 
other factor which was mentioned as important was a good relationship 
between the audit partner and the audit committee and other members of the 
Board. This of course could be a differentiator between the Big 4 and this 
subject is returned to in Chapter 2 where the literature concerning auditor 
selection is reviewed.  It is less clear from the Oxera study how important this 
might be and whether there may be other potentially differentiating factors 
between the Big 4. 
 The Oxera report (Oxera, 2006) argued that there were three elements to 
audit service: a core compliance element, a value added element and an 
insurance element (audit being a line of defence against accounting failure and 
as noted above subject to unlimited liability – see also Bar Yoesef and Livnat, 
1984)) and concluded that competition was not working effectively. The report 
commented on high barriers to entry, both actual and reputational and also 
noted the very low switching rates of auditors of companies in the listed market. 
For FTSE 350 companies this was 3% per year between 1995 and 2004.  The 
message was that low switching rates may be indicative of a lack of choice given 
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the limited number of firms available to meet companies’ needs and the cost of 
transition.   
The barriers to entry for firms seeking to operate in the FTSE 350 audit 
market identified by Oxera (2006) included the need to acquire a credible 
reputation within FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 companies and their investors, the 
need for an extensive integrated international network and for substantial 
resources and experience so as to be able to audit large complex international 
companies.  
The findings of the Oxera study implied that selectors of auditors were 
effectively choosing from a shortlist of four. In fact there may be less than four 
where commercial, independence or other issues precluded consideration of one 
of the Big 4. Given the changing nature of the audit relationship noted above, in 
many instances the Big 4 are likely to have consulting relationships which would 
breach independence requirements and therefore preclude them from acting as 
a company’s auditor unless they are discontinued.  
1.3.2. The Market Participants Report (2007) and  
the McMeeking Report (2009) 
In part at least in response to the findings of the Oxera Report in 2006 the 
FRC established the Market Participants Group to advise it on “possible actions 
that market participants could take to mitigate risks arising from the 
characteristics of the market for audit services to public interest entities in the 
UK” (FRC, 2007, page 3). This Group, including public company directors, 
representatives of major shareholders and of the auditing profession, issued a 
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report which highlighted a number of reasons why it felt public companies 
tended to use the largest audit firms “with the strongest brands and 
reputations” (FRC, 2007, page 5). The reasons they identified included 
capability, reputational, experiential and relationship factors as their report 
explains:  
“In selecting auditors, audit committees look at the ‘added value’ that 
firms bring to the company – including accountancy advice and the limitation of 
the personal and reputational damage of significant accounting misstatements. 
 It is more difficult to assess objectively the quality of an audit firm 
without experience of working with that firm. 
 Non-executive directors and others selecting or influencing the selection 
of auditors are more likely to have experience of working with the Big 4 
rather non-Big 4 firms. 
 The process of switching auditors can be costly for both companies and 
auditors” (FRC, 2007, page 5). 
The final report of the Markets Participants Group included a number of 
recommendations to try to broaden market choice beyond the Big 4 and reduce 
the risk of another major firm leaving the market. It made two 
recommendations surrounding auditor selection and re-selection. The first of 
these was to recommend finding ways to improve access by an incoming auditor 
to information relevant to the audit held by the outgoing auditor. This would 
reduce the cost and risk of switching.  Secondly it encouraged investor groups, 
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auditors and the FRC to promote good practice for shareholder engagement on 
auditor appointments and re-appointments.  
The Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland commissioned follow 
up research on the Market Participants Group report and their report which was 
published in 2009 (McMeeking, 2009) highlighted continued concerns over 
concentration in the large company market and a desire to improve choice. 
Further recommendations were made but the pre-eminence of the Big 4 
continued. Again the debate was focussed on choice and how it could be 
widened beyond the Big 4 rather than how companies selected their auditor 
within it. 
1.3.3. The House of Lords Select Committee (2011) and the 
Office of Fair Trading Consultation (2011)  
In March 2011, in the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008, the House 
of Lords Select Committee on Economic Affairs issued its second report 
“Auditors: market concentration and their role” following an inquiry into the 
market for audit of large companies (HMSO, 2011).  Their inquiry which 
involved interested parties from industry, academia and the auditing profession, 
considered the dominance of the Big 4 and its effects on competition and choice 
and also whether traditional statutory audit still met the needs of the day. The 
inquiry also considered whether auditors could have mitigated the effect of the 
financial crisis by alerting investors to the riskiness of the assets held by banks. 
Although the inquiry concerned itself with market concentration and concluded 
that an oligopoly existed in the large firm audit market which was “underpinned 
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by the fact that large firms are legally obliged to have their financial statements 
audited” (House of Lords, 2011 page 9), it also questioned audit quality, 
especially given the fact that the auditors failed to give warning of trouble in the 
run up to the financial crisis of 2008. Amongst the recommendations which the 
Committee made was one for a detailed investigation of the audit market by the 
Office of Fair Trading with a view to an inquiry by the Competition Commission. 
During 2011 the Office of Fair Trading (“OFT”) conducted a consultation 
process of its own and expressed concerns about the highly concentrated market 
for the audit of large companies with low levels of switching (see also Section 
1.4.2 below) and substantial barriers to entry and expansion.  It concluded this 
meant that this market may not be working well for customers. In October 2011 
the OFT referred the market for supply of statutory audit services to the 
Competition Commission (now the Competition and Markets Authority). The 
Competition Commission reported in 2013 (and subsequently issued new 
proposals in July 2014 following new European Commission regulations – see 
below) after the research period of this study and its findings and implications 
are considered in Chapter 7) but the backdrop of increasing regulatory focus on 
auditor selection had been developing during the period of the study. 
1.3.4. The European Commission 
In addition to a developing regulatory environment in the United Kingdom 
pressure for regulatory change affecting audit tendering and auditor selection 
was also growing in Europe. In November 2011 these pressures were highlighted 
by the issuance by the European Commission of “The Legislative Proposal on 
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Audit Policy (European Commission, 2011) (often referred to as “The Barnier 
Report after its author) which proposed mandatory tendering of audits of public 
interest (listed and some other) companies and mandatory rotation of auditors 
every six years.  As with the Competition Commission the final proposals of the 
European Commission were issued after the study completion date and will also 
be returned to in Chapter 7 but again during the study period they were part of 
an emerging regulatory environment within which those who were selecting 
auditors were operating. 
1.3.5. Conclusion on regulatory influences on auditor selection 
Those making auditor selection decisions face constraints on the choice of 
firm and for many a Big 4 firm, with its associated network may be the only 
realistic option.  Those making auditor selection decisions over the study period 
would also have been increasingly aware of competition authority interest in 
auditor selection and may have been aware of some pressure to consider other 
firms,  even though, for most, their options were in practice restricted to the Big 
4. These influences provide further important contextual background to auditor 
selection. 
1.4. Other influences on auditor selection in the FTSE 350 
In the previous two sections, the high profile nature of auditor selection, 
the evolving regulatory environment and the competitive landscape facing those 
making auditor selection decisions were discussed.  This subsection now 
considers certain other attributes of the audit market within the FTSE 350 
which are other potential influences on auditor selection namely: the linkages 
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between buyers of audit services, the frequency and outcomes of processes and 
lastly the nature of auditor selection processes. As will be explained below, each 
may be an influence on the auditor selection decision. 
1.4.1. Auditor selection - cross directorships, a network of 
buyers and buying influences  
In the previous section the supply side of the FTSE 350 audit market was 
considered and in particular the impact of concentration within the Big 4. In 
this section a particular feature of the demand side is examined further and that 
is the connections between directors of FTSE 350 companies who are making 
and/or influencing auditor selection decisions.   
Chapter 2, which explores the literature concerning decision theory and 
influences on decision makers, will discuss certain literature as it relates to the 
importance of relationships, prior experience, and network influences for 
example through word of mouth.  The presence of cross directorships and 
networks in the FTSE would suggest that auditor selection decisions are likely to 
be influenced, at least to some extent, in this way. 
As explained in Section 1.2.2 above, the auditor appointment decision is 
formally one for shareholders to approve based on a recommendation from the 
Board of the company involved. In turn the responsibility for overseeing 
relationships on behalf of companies rests with the audit committees of those 
companies. Board members and especially audit committees therefore have 
specific responsibilities in relation to auditor selection. 
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There are some 4000 directors of FTSE 350 companies of which some 
1100 are members of audit committees (Source; Management Information of 
one of the Big 4 firms: May 2013). There are also a number of sources of 
connection between the directors in this group which are now discussed.  
One source of connection is caused by appointments that individual 
directors have on more than one company board. For example over 25% of all 
audit committee members have directorships at more than one company. In ten 
cases they have four or more FTSE 350 company directorships (Source: 
Management Information of one of the Big 4 firms: May 2013). This means that 
directors are coming into contact with others and are therefore potentially 
discussing their experiences. These directors may in turn be having those 
discussions with others who may also have other directorates within the broader 
FTSE 350 network and so on. 
In addition to current experience, directors may also have other experience 
gained from previous appointments. Directors often move around from 
company to company and it must be at least possible that some of their 
relationships sustain. Audit committee members in particular are normally only 
appointed for a maximum of six to nine years so have to move from time to time 
between companies as their terms expire; bringing them into contact with more 
FTSE 350 directors.  
Directors also have connections through professional bodies (for example 
some 500 of the FTSE 350 directors are members of the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants in England and Wales (Source: Management Information of one of 
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the Big 4 firms: May 2013).); or other associations, for example the Hundred 
Group of Finance Directors which brings together those finance directors from 
mainly FTSE 100 companies. 
Directors also have other connections with the Big 4. Some 55% of all 
Audit Committee Chairs of FTSE 350 are alumni of the Big 4 along with over a 
quarter of all audit committee members. In addition 57% of all Finance 
Directors of FTSE 350 are Big 4 alumni (Source: Management Information of 
one of the Big 4 firms: May 2013). Connections exist with other alumni (either 
stronger or weaker) and these are actively promoted by the Big 4 firms who each 
operate alumni programmes including events and publications (Source: 
Management Information of one of the Big 4 firms: May 2013).  
Directors are also brought together by the general marketing and training 
events offered by the Big 4 firms (and others). For example a number of 
programmes are run to inform non-executive directors and financial 
management on latest developments, or simply to promote networking between 
peers in particular market segments or industry sectors (Source: Management 
Information of one of the Big 4 firms: May 2013). 
In addition the introduction of the requirement for audit partners to rotate 
off an audit after five years, as referenced above, means connections are 
broadened. Whereas in the past an audit partner may have had only a small 
number of longstanding clients during their career, they are now moving 
between FTSE 350 companies. An increase in audit tendering will potentially 
amplify this effect by creating a greater number of contacts between auditors 
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and companies across the FTSE 350 both as a result of the tender processes 
undertaken and due to the auditor changes that are likely to occur. 
In summary therefore those involved in FTSE 350 auditor selection form a 
highly networked group. The resultant web of contacts and connections as 
outlined in the previous paragraphs is an important source of potential 
influence on auditor selection. An auditor selection decision being taken at one 
company may be being influenced by directors’ experiences at other companies 
(where they will see the work of their own and/or other audit firms; usually the 
Big 4) and by their other connections with the Big 4. 
Those making auditor selection decisions may therefore be comparing 
what they see with their experience not only in the company concerned but also 
in the context of the relationships they hold elsewhere. This would suggest that 
the potential for direct relationship influences.   
In addition to their own experiences, the network is also likely to create a 
number of connections and contacts which are highly likely to promote word of 
mouth influences (see also Section 2.3.5). 
1.4.2. Auditor selection since the demise of Arthur Andersen -
infrequent tenders but high switching once instigated 
Against the backdrop of regulatory scrutiny the level of audit tenders each 
year between the demise of Andersen in 2002 and the issuance of the Corporate 
Governance Code of September 2012 remained at a relatively low level.  
According to information provided by one of the Big 4 there were 111 audit 
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tenders completed by companies which were in the FTSE 350 at the time of the 
tender, during this approximately ten-year period.  Figure 2 below shows the 
level of tenders each year and the number of companies within this tender 
population that changed auditors. 
This information was compiled from data including that firm’s own 
proposals records and disclosures made in the annual reports of FTSE 350 
companies. It is possible that not all tenders have been identified and there may 
be omissions. This could occur where both disclosures were not made of a 
tender in the company’s annual report and the Big 4 firm had no record. The 
numbers of these exceptions is considered likely to be small primarily due to the 
public disclosures that companies are required to make in their annual reports. 
Companies’ annual reports disclose the name of the company’s auditor on 
the audit opinion contained in the report. Any auditor switches can therefore be 
easily identified. In addition, even where there has been no change, companies’ 
annual reports also include details of corporate governance and other audit 
committee activity. It would be highly unlikely for a company to undertake a 
tender and not explain that they had done so. Such a tender would normally be 
considered to be part of the corporate governance activity undertaken by the 
company and overseen by the audit committee and therefore also be disclosed 
in the annual report. 
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 Figure 2: Audit tenders conducted by FTSE 350 companies in the 
period from the demise of Arthur Andersen in August 2002 to the issue 
of the UK Corporate Governance Code in September 2012 
 
The statistics suggest that the numbers of tenders as a proportion of the 
FTSE 350 companies remained low during the period ranging between less than 
1% and just over 5%per annum over the period. Put another way, in spite of the 
auditor appointment being annual, even in the most active year, 95% of 
companies reappointed their auditor without a tender.  
Once a tender was undertaken however the picture changed. The level of 
switching once a tender had been instigated averaged more than 75% over the 
ten year period; implying that once a tender was undertaken companies were 
likely (but not bound) to change. This high level of switching could suggest that 
tenders may have been being driven by dissatisfaction and/or inherent 
problems facing incumbent auditors once a tender had been instigated (this is 
consistent with some previous research which will be returned to Chapter 2, for 
example Beattie and Fearnley, 1995).  In support of the presence of 
dissatisfaction Oxera (2006) found “Several companies interviewed by Oxera 
commented that switching may occur (or has occurred) when companies lose 
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confidence in their auditor, for example because of a fault with the quality of the 
audit opinion, a breakdown in the working relationship between auditor and 
management, or an instance of fraud. Dissatisfaction with the current auditor is 
likely to be one driver of change but there may also be others (for example 
changes in the company’s situation including acquisitions and business 
expansion).  This subject is returned to in Chapter 2 below where the literature 
concerning auditor switching is explored.  
Over the ten-year period, of the 111 completed tenders, 90 audit 
appointments were lost and only 33 retained. In 12 cases out of the 90 change 
situations, the new arrangement involved one of the previous auditors, for 
example, where companies consolidated audit arrangements to one firm from 
more than one firm. 
Table 2 below sets out the number of audit appointments won and lost by 
firms competing in audit tenders conducted by FTSE 350 companies from 
August 2002 to September 2012. 
The table shows that tenders, consistent with the market positions 
outlined above, were dominated by the Big 4 firms. Only 8% of companies (See 
Table 2, first column, 9/111) had an auditor which was not a Big 4 firm before 
the tender as their sole auditor or as part of a joint audit arrangement. In every 
case the incumbent non-Big 4 firm lost the appointment following the tender. 
Where a new auditor was appointed in 96% of cases it was a Big 4 firm.  
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 Reproposals Retentions Losses New 
wins 
Joint to 
sole 
Net 
Deloitte 23 8 15 29 -2 16 
Ernst & Young 27 5 22 8        -1        -13 
KPMG 25 5 20 18 -3 1 
PwC 39 15 24 20 -4 - 
Others  9 0  9  3 -2 --4 
Firms involved 123 33 90 78 -12 -12 
Less: Joint audits 12 0 12 0  12  12 
Tenders   111 33 78 78 0 0 
Table 2: The outcomes of audit tenders conducted by FTSE 350 companies in the period 
from the demise of Arthur Andersen in August 2002 to the issue of the UK Corporate 
Governance Code of September 2012.   
Source: Big 4 firm management information 
Over the period Deloitte had more wins in total and more new wins than 
the others; winning more than a third of the appointments where companies 
changed auditors (29 out of 78 above). KPMG and PwC were broadly neutral 
whilst Ernst & Young was a net loser. It had the second highest number of losses 
(including the lowest retention rate of its own clients in re-proposals) and the 
lowest number of new wins. This may even suggest further concentration within 
the Big 4 with the smallest firm, Ernst &Young losing ground against the other 
three in this period. PwC had the highest re-proposal rate in the period although 
also by the highest re-proposal success rate and the highest number of new wins 
after Deloitte. KPMG had a similar number of re-proposals as Ernst & Young 
and a similarly low re-proposal success rate but won substantially more new 
audits.  
Comparing the performance of the Big 4 with the other firms demonstrates 
the continuing dominance of this group in the FTSE 350 audit market.   
There is strong evidence therefore that, although audit tenders in the FTSE 
350 during the period of this study were infrequent, they were likely to lead to 
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an auditor change when they occurred.  Because of their dominance, where 
there was a change, in the majority of cases this resulted in a switch from a Big 4 
firm to another Big 4 firm. Furthermore it seems that only Big 4 firms were able 
to retain audit appointments following proposals. The data therefore support a 
strong preference for Big 4 firms. This preference for Big 4 firms and auditor 
switching are returned to in Chapter 2 in the literature review.  The statistics 
above however don’t provide insight as to why this is the case and in particular 
how companies might be making a final selection, almost always between the 
Big 4, further supporting the need for a better understanding of this auditor 
selection process. 
1.4.3. The nature of audit tenders conducted by FTSE 350 
companies 
Before concluding on the practical and regulatory influences likely to be 
influencing auditor selection in the FTSE 350, it is worth considering the nature 
of the audit tender processes being undertaken.  There are two aspects to the 
process considered here. Firstly the construct of the selection panel where, as 
will be explored in Section 2.3.5, the behaviour and interaction associated with 
groups is likely to be relevant to the auditor selection decision. Secondly the 
structure of the proposal process and the level of interaction that typically takes 
place. As will also be considered in Chapter 2, the interaction and behavioural 
influences on decision making are therefore also likely to be pertinent.  
In discussing the structure of the selection panel for auditor selection, 
Oxera (2006) identified four stakeholder influences on the auditor selection 
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decision; the audit committee, company management (including the company’s 
Finance Director, Chief Executive Officer and/or Chairman), shareholders and 
external advisers such as lawyers, brokers and investment bankers. According to 
Oxera (2005) auditor selection decisions were, consistent with regulation (see 
Section 1.1 above) taken by audit committees but management and especially 
the Finance Director were also influential. The role of external advisers 
appeared to exert a preference for a Big 4 auditor, but not between them. When 
selecting an auditor, those making that decision would be likely to avoid 
criticism should anything go wrong. The auditor selection decision therefore 
appears to be one involving a group of people within an organisation and with 
evidence of influence from outside the organisation. The dynamics of groups 
and other influences on decision making are returned to in Chapter 2 where 
relevant literature in this area is explored. 
Turning to the process itself; inherently if there are more developed, 
longer or more intense processes, this is likely to involve more interpersonal 
interactions during the tender process which in turn may cause behavioural 
influences to be more pronounced.  
According to management information provided by one of the Big 4 firms, 
audit tenders have typically tended to last for a period of between about a 
month and, for larger and more complex organisations, several months. During 
this period a typical process involves meetings between the competing firms and 
members of management and the audit committee of the companies concerned. 
These meetings are normally set up to enable audit firms to develop their 
understanding of the companies involved and to scope their work. In addition to 
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formal meetings there can also typically be a level of interaction around those 
meetings including ad hoc meetings, telephone calls and other communications. 
The process tends to culminate in the submission of a proposal document and 
normally a presentation to a selection committee.  
This information appears to suggest quite a high level of interaction 
between companies and auditors during proposal processes which would allow 
behavioural influences to come into play and for decisions to evolve as they 
progress. NB the Competition Commission Investigation report (2013) referred 
to above also provides a detailed explanation of the audit tender process and 
evidence to support a relatively high level of interaction. 
The literature concerning the nature of professional services supplier 
selection processes is considered in Chapter 2 (Section 2.4) along with that 
which considers behavioural influences on decision making more generally 
(Section 2.3.3). 
1.5. Conclusion on the regulatory and practice background  
This section has reviewed the regulatory and practical environment 
affecting the auditor selection decision. It has identified a number of potential 
influences on the auditor selection decision: 
 The decision takes place in an increasingly regulated environment 
which can have a high profile, especially when things go wrong. This 
regulatory environment has been evolving (indeed has continued to 
evolve and change since the completion of the study – see Chapter 7). 
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 The market is dominated by the Big 4, who audit almost all of the FTSE 
350 and have been selected in almost all of the audit tenders in recent 
years in this market. This market concentration has created competition 
authority interest which is continuing. There is evidence of competition 
in tenders amongst the Big 4 but the data do not explain their relative 
degrees of success. 
 The buying group is led by FTSE 350 company directors who are highly 
networked implying both past relationship/experiential influences and 
the likelihood for word of mouth influences.  
 Audit tenders have been relatively infrequent but, more often than not, 
have led to auditor change; perhaps suggesting that whilst strong 
relationship influences and switching costs may sustain long term 
relationships generally in this market, prior service dissatisfaction  may 
negate such influences leading up to an audit proposal. 
 Audit tenders also appear to be comprehensive processes where 
behavioural influences are also likely to be present. 
Each of these influences is considered further in the literature review that 
follows. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.0. Introduction  
The regulatory and 
practical backdrop to the 
auditor selection decision was 
explored in Chapter 1. This 
chapter sets out the research 
context for that decision by 
reviewing relevant literature.  
The approach to the 
literature review is 
summarised in Figure 3 and 
explained in the sections that 
follow.  
An initial review of the 
literature identified a paucity 
in relation to auditor selection 
in the important FTSE 350 
market. The approach to the 
literature review therefore took a 
broader, exploratory approach. 
The review starts by considering traditional supplier selection literature 
Figure 3: Summary of the approach taken to 
 the literature review 
Challenges to Traditional Supplier Selection and 
Normative Economic Decision Models
Behavioural Decision Theory
(Section 2.3.3)
An Alternative Value Construct - Service Dominant Logic
(Section 2.3.2)
Groups, Organisations, Networks and Word of Mouth
(Section 2.3.5)
Relationship Influences - Affect, Trust and Loyalty
(Section 2.3.4)
Statutory 
Audit Services
(Section 2.5)
Professional 
Services 
(Section 2.4)
Services Differences and Services Procurement
(Section 2.3.1) 
Traditional 
Supplier Selection 
Models
(Section 2.1)
and 
Normative 
Economic 
Decision Theory
(Section 2.2)
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and then the economic theory on which it has been based. As will be shown, 
there has been very considerable research concerning the purchase of goods, 
taking different approaches and including a number of purchasing optimization 
models based on the principles of rational economics. Such models are 
commonly based on cost minimisation and on quality and delivery measures. 
These techniques have become more sophisticated over time. The goods 
procurement process has also become more complex with closer supply chain 
relationships with fewer suppliers and strategic partnership approaches being 
developed. 
There is however doubt as to how applicable traditional supplier selection 
models, focussed on goods purchasing and based on earlier approaches to 
economic theory, can be in practice. Five areas of challenge to the application of 
these models are considered in this literature review.  
Firstly differences between goods and services have been argued which 
make it potentially unsafe to apply goods purchasing models to services. 
Because services differ from goods they cannot, following this argument, be 
procured in the same way.  There are fewer studies of services supplier selection 
but the extant literature identifies that there are differences in the supplier 
selection in this sector. The differences between goods and services and services 
supplier selection are considered in Section 2.3.1. 
A second challenge questions whether the traditional normative supplier 
selection models are applicable at all. It has been argued that it is impossible to 
optimise value generally and rather that it has to be determined through the 
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eyes of the buyer and in use. This approach necessitates following collaborative 
approaches and co-developing service propositions which is inconsistent with 
normative models. This is considered in Section 2.3.2. 
Whilst these first two challenges identified question the applicability of 
goods based normative models they are not necessarily inconsistent with 
rational choice theory because the underlying process remains one of rational 
actors seeking value. The next three challenges however challenge the 
applicability of economic models generally.  
The third challenge comes from behavioural decision theory. This theory 
argues that in reality decisions are not based on optimality or an objective view 
of economic rationality, but on human judgements which are neither 
economically rational nor necessarily consistent. Behavioural decision theory is 
considered in Section 2.3.3. 
A fourth challenge to traditional normative supplier selection models 
based on rational economic models comes from literature which has identified 
affective and relationship influences on purchasers. Whilst Section 2.1 will 
consider the economic benefits of established relationships, other more 
intangible and not necessarily economically rational influences have also been 
identified. Affect, trust and loyalty are considered in Section 2.3.4 in this 
context. 
The final challenge considered falls within the area of influences that have 
been seen to affect decision making in groups, organisations and networks. 
Traditional models, starting from the position of the rational decision maker 
Chapter Two 
Literature Review 
 
 
42 
 
often ignore such influences and their impact on decision making. Such 
influences have been shown to be often inconsistent with rational economic 
theory. These influences are therefore considered in Section 2.3.5. 
Having explored the general supplier selection phenomenon, this 
literature review then focusses on professional services supplier selection. A 
number of specific differences have been identified between professional 
services and other service purchases. These differences and their impact on 
supplier selection are then therefore considered in Section 2.4.  
Finally, the specific auditor selection literature is considered (Section 2.5) 
including those factors identified which appear to support the selection of a Big 
4 firm over other auditing firms and those which might contribute to 
understanding selection between Big 4 firms. As noted above there is paucity of 
literature in this area.  
In summary, this chapter identifies a number of themes with apparent 
applicability to auditor selection but it is surprising that, given the importance 
of auditor selection discussed in Chapter 1 and with more and more pressure 
(and more recently compulsion) for FTSE 350 companies to tender their 
external audits regularly, there is very little relevant academic literature 
investigating how these important companies select their auditors in 
competitive proposal processes and what factors are affecting their decisions.  
In 1998 Beattie and Fearnley (1998a) explained that, to their knowledge, 
the audit tender process had not been previously studied and that further 
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research was warranted (Beattie and Fearnley, 1998a page 96). There has 
however been little academic research in this area since. 
2.1. Traditional supplier selection models 
In general, supplier selection literature is very extensive, consistent with 
the fact that selecting suppliers successfully can be critically important to many 
organisations. For many, raw materials, purchased parts or outsourced services 
can be a significant proportion of the total costs of their products (e.g. 
Ghodsypour and O’Brien, 1998; Van Weele and van der Vosssen, 1998) and this 
proportion has tended to grow as companies have focussed on their core 
competences after the publication of work by Prahalad and Hamel (1990). 
Furthermore suppliers can have an important impact on businesses. This 
has been seen to include influences on output cost, quality, delivery and service 
(Amid et al., 2009; Kagnicoglu, 2006) and has wider implications, for example 
for future revenues through collaborative product development (van Echtelt et 
al., 2008). And (as expanded on below), as companies have rationalised their 
supplier bases (Tully, 1995) benefits to business of commitments to fewer 
suppliers have been identified (Swink and Zsidisin, 2006); further underlying 
the importance of supplier selection. 
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2.1.1. Supplier selection models – optimising value from 
transactions 
Much of the traditional supplier selection literature has focussed on 
optimising a transaction or exchange or a set of transactions or exchanges 
recognising that the selection decision is likely to be multi-faceted.  
In one of the earliest studies, Dickson observed, “From the purchasing 
literature, it is fairly easy to abstract a list of at least 50 distinct factors 
(characteristics of vendor performance) that are presented by various authors as 
being meaningful to consider in a vendor selection decision” (Dickson, 1966, 
page 5). Dickson’s own research identified and evaluated 23 vendor selection 
criteria which are set out in Table 3 below. 
As the table shows, the factors that Dickson evaluated included a range of 
criteria which covered elements relating to the goods and their supply (which 
were most important), attributes of the vendor operation including production 
facilities and capacity, financial position and management and organisation 
(which were of considerable importance) and behavioural factors including 
desire for business and attitude (which were of average importance).  
Although Dickson’s study was manufacturing based and an early example 
of research into supplier selection, the sorts of criteria that were identified 
(notably quality, delivery and price) as will be returned to below, were also 
identified by and/or a focus of numerous later studies. A focus on 
manufacturing in supplier selection continued over a number of years. 
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Table 3: Dickson’s vendor selection criteria (from Webber, 1991) 
In 1991 Webber et al. were able to identify 74 different studies (also 
restricted to industrial purchasing) relating to supplier selection that had been 
produced since Dickson’s study. They mapped these studies to Dickson’s 
original criteria and considered how they had responded to developments in 
manufacturing including Just In Time techniques. These studies included 
conceptual and empirical studies as well as those involving evaluation 
techniques to analyse different purchase offerings and optimise utility against 
the business priorities of different organisations (Webber et al., 1991). The most 
Rank Factor Mean rating Evaluation 
1 Quality 3.508 Extreme 
Importance 
2 Delivery 3.417  
3 Performance history 2.998  
4 Warranties and claim policies 2.849  
5 Production facilities and capacity 2.775 
 
Considerable 
Importance 
6 Price 2.758  
7 Technical capability 2.545  
8 Financial position 2.514  
9 Procedural compliance 2.488  
10 Communication system 2.426  
11 Reputation and position 
in industry 
2.412  
12 Desire for business 2.256  
13 Management and organization 2.216  
14 Operating controls 2.211  
15 Repair service 2.187 Average 
Importance 
16 Attitude 2.120  
17 Impression 2.054  
18 Packaging ability 2.009  
19 Labor relations record 2.003  
20 Geographical location 1.872  
21 Amount of past business 1.597  
22 Training aids 1.537  
23 Reciprocal arrangements 0.610 Slight 
Importance 
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discussed factors from Dickson’s list were net price, delivery, quality and 
production facilities and capacity. Consistent with the greater demands to meet 
more stringent delivery schedules associated with Just in Time, Webber found 
that these purchasing techniques had led to a sustained interest in quality and 
delivery and also greater interest in geographical location and production 
facilities and capability as well as net price (Webber et al., 1991).  
Over the years considerable focus has been given to developing models 
which try to introduce greater sophistication into optimizing the supplier 
selection decision (Huang and Keskar, 2007). Approaches have included models 
to minimise purchasing costs (Roodhooft and Konings, 1996), total inventory 
costs (Youssef  et al., 1996) and total cost of ownership (Degraeve  et al., 2000).  
 A number of different techniques have been used to identify optimal 
purchasing outcomes as shown in Table 4 below (see also Ho et al., 2010). 
Supplier selection model/approach Author 
Weighted linear models Lamberson et al. (1976), Timmerman (1986) 
Linear programming Pan (1989), Turner (1988) 
Mixed integer programming Weber and Current (1993) 
Grouping methods Hinkle et al. (1969) 
Analytic hierarchy process Barbarosoglu and Yazgac (1997), Hill and 
Nydick (1992), Narasimhan (1983) 
Matrix method Gregory (1986) 
Multi-objective programming Weber and Ellram (1993) 
Total cost of ownership Ellram (1995) 
Human judgment models Patton (1996) 
Principal component analysis Petroni and Braglia (2000) 
DEA Narasimhan et al. (2001), Weber and Desai 
(1996), Weber et al. (1998) 
Interpretive structural modelling Mandal and Deshmukh (1994) 
Statistical analysis Mummalaneni et al. (1996) 
Discrete choice analysis experiments Verma and Pullman (1998) 
Neural networks Siying et al. (1997) 
Table 4; Traditional supplier selection models 
(from S. Talluri, R. Narasimhan (2004) page 239) 
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Ellram (1990) found that studies such as these tended to focus on the 
ability of a given supplier to meet the immediate need, sometimes considering a 
number of different scenarios, but with a focus on factors such as price, quality 
and availability. Their short term orientation tended in turn to a focus on cost. 
The supply relationships between organisations have however been 
evolving and becoming more sophisticated. Purchasing functions have been 
changing significantly from transaction-orientated order processors to supply 
managers with an emphasis on adding value and meeting a company’s longer 
term goals (Stanley and Wisner, 2001). Many organisations, as noted above, 
have reduced their supplier base to facilitate better supplier management (Tully, 
1995) and developed cooperative approaches (Mason, 1996). By working with 
suppliers, more synergistic and longer term benefits have been achieved as 
illustrated by Table 5. 
Benefits of co-operative supply 
approaches 
Author 
Building supplier confidence levels and trust Johnston et al., 2004 
Reducing inventory levels Lee et al., 1997 
Minimising transaction costs Walker and Poppo, 1991 
Achieving more cost effective designs and the 
selection of the best technologies 
Monczka et al., 1994 
Better use of customer knowledge Paulin et al., 2000 
Operational factors (for example non-
retrievable investments, shared technology 
and relationship influences such as trust and 
commitment 
Wilson, 1995 
Table 5: Benefits of co-operative approaches to supply 
The evolution of supply chain management and a resulting focus on longer 
term and inter-organisational relationships has resulted in organisations 
managing their supply bases by identifying, selecting and managing suppliers 
for strategic, long term partnerships as a key ingredient to the success of a 
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supply chain (Talluri and Narasimhan, 2004). Where such a partnership 
approach is adopted organisational financial stability, organisational and 
strategy considerations, technology issues and other organisational aspects also 
become important (Ellram, 1990). Ultimately, where organisations are working 
in partnerships and strategic alliances, needs may not simply be dictated by the 
purchaser but jointly with the vendor (Ellram, 1990). Logically, in a strategic 
relationship it is not possible to define and predict exactly which products and 
services may be delivered or developed. These evolve as market conditions; 
requirements and the nature of the relationship evolve and deepen (Ellram, 
1990). And where this degree of cooperation exists, competition can become 
that of supply chain versus supply chain rather than obtaining at the level of 
single organisations (Lindgreen, 2009). 
Changes in supply chain relationships have therefore added both 
complexity and additional considerations to supplier selection decision. Whilst 
it may still be desirable to optimise a set of transactions, much broader 
considerations are likely to be relevant. As supplier selection decisions have 
become more complex, it has been suggested that evaluation needs to be 
undertaken on an inter-organisational rather than on a product basis (Ellram, 
1990). Further whilst Ellram considered that existing traditional models could 
have been used to incorporate more complex managerial or development issues, 
in practice she found they did not (Ellram, 1990). 
The traditional supplier selection literature then includes large number of 
studies which seek to optimise normative multi-faceted factor models including 
quality, delivery and cost as well a trend to a greater focus on synergies and 
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benefits of collaboration through long term partnership approaches between 
purchasers and suppliers.  
2.2. Normative economic models of decision making and their 
limitations 
In seeking to optimise multi-faceted models much of the traditional 
supplier selection literature has been predicated on an underlying assumption 
that companies are, or ought to be, aiming to maximise economic utility or 
minimise economic disutility. This is grounded in rational choice theory (e.g. 
O’Shaugnessy and O’ Shaugnessy, 2005) which suggests that the decision maker 
ought rationally to choose the option which promises the most valuable 
expected outcome for them. Whilst the outcome of any one choice can’t be 
guaranteed over a period of choices greater success ought to be achieved by 
adopting this approach using the laws of probability. Statistical theory has 
developed to predict the best likely outcome over a series of choices based on 
probability theory and the binomial distribution.  If rational choice theory holds, 
it follows that: “A simple and comprehensive rule for making decisions is the 
following: list all feasible courses of action. For each action, enumerate all 
possible consequences. For each consequence, assess the attractiveness or 
aversiveness of its occurrence, as well as the probability that it will be incurred 
should the action be taken. Compute the expected worth of each consequence by 
multiplying its worth by its probability of occurrence.” (Fischhoff et al., 1981, 
page 391). 
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Prescriptive models based on rational choice can be attractive because 
“they reduce the universe of decisions into a common set of primitives options, 
probabilities and utilities about which one could hope to derive universal truths” 
(Fishhoff et al., 1981, page 391). It is acknowledged that what constitutes the 
most valuable outcome (or maximised utility) is likely to be different depending 
on an individual’s own circumstances and how important the benefits are likely 
to be to them considering for example their marginal utility (Von Neuman and 
Morgernstern, 1947). In arriving at the most valuable outcome, some 
predictions may also have to be made conditional on “guessing” the actions of 
others (Von Neuman and Morgernstern, 1947) but again based on expected 
probability. 
A number of shortcomings in normative economic models have however 
been identified. Firstly they are most effective when applied to a number of 
decisions. There is less likelihood of establishing an effective normality when 
decisions are one off and different in nature (such as a single company’s auditor 
selection decision which, as was explained in Chapter 1, is made typically only 
once in several years). Secondly models based on probability distribution are 
not good at predicting or explaining highly improbable events (Taleb , 2010). 
For example if the various financial scandals highlighted in Chapter 1 had been 
predicted they would not have created such an impact and response. And 
thirdly, much normative theory does not tend to be a good predictor of decision 
outcomes given the critical role of judgement. It has been observed that even 
over a number of instances, decisions don’t tend to follow the pattern predicted 
Chapter Two 
Literature Review 
 
 
51 
 
by normative economic models. This aspect is expanded on in Section 2.3.3 
which considers behavioural decision theory. 
2.3. Alternative views – challenges to traditional supplier 
selection and economic models of decision making 
The previous two sections have considered the traditional supplier 
selection literature and the normative economic models that have been their 
foundation. The next five subsections now consider challenges to this literature 
starting with arguments for differences between services and good and resultant 
differences for services procurement. 
2.3.1. Services differences and services procurement 
Arguments for services differing from goods 
Numerous studies have argued that services are different from goods (see 
for example Fisk, Brown and Bitner, 1993). Indeed it has been argued that 
services marketing defined itself by the difference between services and goods 
(Lovelock and Gummesson, 2004). These differences have commonly been 
classified under four headings and sometimes referred to as “IHIP”:  
intangibility, heterogeneity, inseparability and perishability and are explained in 
the following paragraphs. 
Firstly, given the intangible nature of services it is argued services 
performance cannot easily be seen, felt, tasted, or touched in the same manner 
as goods (Zeithaml et al., 1985) . 
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Secondly, services tend to be heterogeneous. The service experience can’t 
therefore be duplicated exactly for each customer (Fitszimmons et al., 1998; 
Ziethaml et al., 1985). One of the inherent difficulties associated with services 
procurement is the high value contribution from people. Because human 
performance is always unique, irrespective of training and experience, 
heterogeneity and therefore differences in performance will always be present 
(Ellram et al., 2004). 
Thirdly, whereas the production and consumption of goods can be 
separated, the production and consumption of a service usually occurs 
simultaneously and the two are inseparable (Regan, 1963). Customers are often 
present during at least part of the service production and will interact with 
employees and other customers (Anhauser, 2011).   
Finally, perishability means that services can’t be stored (Ziethaml et al., 
1985) which means that a service not provided (for example an empty theatre 
seat or an hour of a employee’s time not utilised) represents an opportunity lost 
(West, 1997). 
As a result of these differences, it has been argued that goods and services 
are evaluated in different ways.  Search qualities apply to products which the 
customer can therefore analyse and evaluate before buying. This may be 
contrasted to experience qualities, which apply only after purchase during 
consumption and credence qualities which cannot be easily evaluated by the 
client, even after consumption, because the client lacks the necessary knowledge 
or capacity (Darby and Karni, 1973) (the topic of credence qualities and their 
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impact on supplier selection is returned to in Section 2.4 when professional 
services are discussed specifically). And as supplies become more intangible, 
purchasing, it has been argued, becomes even more difficult because quality is 
less and less easily assessed based on physical outputs and the service decision 
becomes more complex and difficult because the inputs to the purchaser 
become vague or ambiguous (Stock and Zinszer, 1987).  
Whilst the purchase of highly tangible goods such as simple production 
components can involve a highly tangible evaluation, this would be impossible 
for highly intangible services such as consulting (Schonberger, 1978). And 
although it may be possible to model some repeat standard services such as 
business travel (see Degraeve et al., 2004) it is likely to be more difficult to 
assess other services this way.   
If goods and services have substantial differences then the application of 
traditional supplier selection models to their procurement would therefore be 
unsafe. Literature specific to services supplier selection is considered next. 
Services supplier selection 
Given the differences between goods and services outlined above, it is 
perhaps surprising that the mainstream of supplier selection literature 
remained grounded on goods based supply relationships until relatively 
recently.  
Since 1991 there have been numerous other studies which focus on 
supplier selection involving the procurement of goods. In comparison the study 
Chapter Two 
Literature Review 
 
 
54 
 
of services procurement has developed much more recently. Compared to 
goods, academic knowledge about services has been more limited.  For example 
in 2003, an analysis of the articles in the Journal of Supply Chain Management 
in the 35 years since its inception showed that of the 774 articles that had been 
published, less than 10 related to services purchasing (Carter and Ellram, 
2003). And even by 2007, Ellram at al. considered that business to business 
services purchasing had continued to be given relatively little focus (Ellram et 
al., 2007). Selviaridis and Spring (2010) commented; “Little is known, however, 
about how complex services actually develop and evolve throughout the 
purchasing process, from setting the initial requirements to adapting the 
offering after contract award” (Selviaridis and Spring, 2010, page 171). There 
was also little research into the differences between purchasing materials and 
services (Smeltzer and Ogden, 2002). 
The historic focus on goods as compared to services in supplier selection is 
further surprising given the significant and growing contribution of services in 
major economies; indeed services have been recorded as accounting for 
approximately two-thirds of GDP in advanced economies (Sako, 2006). 
Furthermore the services supplier selection literature has identified a 
number of differences from goods purchases.  
Many of the studies of goods purchases were about how companies ought 
to construct a list of requirements, weight them and seek to maximise expected 
utility (or minimise cost) across those requirements. However the business 
services literature in particular has also highlighted that because of the 
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intangibility and related uncertainty associated with services, many of these 
requirements are defined during the sourcing process. Indeed interaction and 
refinement of service definition is likely to occur both before and after signing 
the contract with continuous refinement of resource allocation (see for example 
van der Valk and Wynstra, 2014). 
During the services procurement process the precise up-front definitions 
developed could still be critical to facilitate performance evaluation and 
minimise supplier opportunism risk (Ellram et al.,2007),  but buying firms may 
be unable to set out detailed specifications from the outset (Ellram et al., 2008) 
and whilst manufactured goods could be precisely specified and quality 
measured, services could be subject to changing scope and the assessment of 
quality could be subjective and user dependent (Ellram et al., 2004). Services 
therefore can pose challenges for buyers in specifying the service, deﬁning the 
speciﬁc content of any service level agreement and evaluating performance. 
Reflecting the dynamic nature of services, requirements may also be 
defined in different ways and therefore supplier selection based on assessing 
different things. For example specifications may be based on inputs (focusing on 
the supplier’s resource/capability base ), processes (emphasising how the 
service is produced), function-oriented definitions stressing service 
functionality and output and outcome-oriented approaches focusing on the 
service’s economic value (with detailed specifications being drawn interactively 
or left to suppliers) (Axelsson and Wynstra, 2002). These different definitions 
can have implications for the relationship between the buyer and the seller in 
business services sourcing (see Selviaridis and Spring, 201o).  For example, 
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where a functional definition is applied there may be substantial scope for the 
supplier to define the processes and resources used to meet those functional 
demands (van Weele, 2005) and where supplier and buyer are working together 
to agree specifications there is a need to carefully manage boundary discussions 
and higher transaction costs may arise as a result of those discussions (Araujo et 
al., 1999). 
Because of the perception that many services are more difficult to manage, 
it has also been felt that services procurements are best managed by the user  
with less or little involvement of supply management or procurement 
departments who would typically be responsible for or influential in supplier 
selection. Furthermore where services are regarded as important and strategic 
they are also most often bought by non-purchasing specialists (Ellram, 2007). 
In addition it has been argued that there exist strong relationships between non-
purchasing specialists and their suppliers which they do not want purchasing 
specialists to interfere with (Van Weele, 2005).  The composition of the audit 
buying unit is set out in Section 1.4.3. It has been a feature of audit services and, 
(as will be returned to in Section 2.4), professional services that those 
responsible for supplier selection have tended to be the users of the service. 
So there is literature which asserts the differences between goods and 
services selection and which highlights particular challenges related to services 
procurement. But services cover a very wide range of activity and there are 
many differences in the characteristics of activities within services. A number of 
different ways of classifying different services have been identified (for a 
comprehensive explanation of service typologies see Cook, 1999).  
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One way of looking at this is to consider services as a purchasing 
continuum according to the degree of tangibility of the good or service being 
purchased (Schonberger, 1978). However there is a challenge whether 
restricting such a continuum to services is really meaningful.  For example, as 
supply relationships have evolved, any boundary between goods and services 
has been blurred. Suppliers of goods have been adding “bundles” of services 
such as support, self-service and knowledge to support core product offerings; 
through servitization (Vandermerwe and Rada, 1988). So whereas the  historical 
focus may have sometimes been on product selling with certain services as add 
on to products, servitization involves the provision of services as a main 
differentiator as part of an integrated product and services offering (Lightfoot et 
al., 2013). 
The services supplier selection literature therefore argues for differences in 
the procurement process as compared to goods, dealing with intangibility and 
greater buyer seller interaction through the procurement process.  Cost, quality 
and delivery requirements may be assessed in different ways and in a more 
interactive way before, during and after contract signature than envisaged in 
traditional supplier selection models. 
As identified in Chapter 1, the core audit service is defined by law and 
regulation although Oxera (2006) also argued for insurance and value attributes 
being sought by audit buyers. The dynamics of service definition for a highly 
regulated, high profile purchase provide an important area of interest for this 
study.  
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2.3.2. Value in use and Service Dominant Logic 
A second challenge to the applicability of traditional supplier selection 
models is posed by those who argue for a different value construct. For those 
supporting value in use, it is not the fact that goods and different from services 
that is of primary importance. Rather they argue value is derived in the buyers’ 
terms and cannot be arrived at in a standard way, making unconditional 
optimisation impossible. This is now considered further. 
In 2004, Vargo and Lusch challenged the historically dominant logic 
(focussed on tangible resources, embedded value and transactions) 
underpinning the traditional supplier selection literature arguing that it may no 
longer be sufficient and ought to be superseded by a new Service Dominant 
Logic (Vargo and Lusch, 2004).  
Service Dominant Logic argues that instead of taking a goods centred 
approach, where the purpose of economic activity is to make and distribute 
things that can be sold because they are embedded with utility with the aim of 
maximising profit from the sale of output, an alternative service centred view 
should be taken. Adopting this service centred logic, organisations ought not to 
focus on value creation through the production and exchange of goods (or 
“operand resources” (Vargo and Lusch,2004), but rather should identify their 
core competences, identify other entities (potential customers) that could 
benefit from these competences, cultivate relationships that involve the 
customers in developing customized value propositions and use analysis of 
financial performance to learn how to improve firm performance (Vargo and 
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Lusch, 2004). Following this logic, operant resources which are often invisible 
and intangible are primary because they produce effects and enable humans to 
multiply the value of natural resources and create additional operant resources 
(Vargo and Lusch, 2004). It then follows that services are not different from 
goods but rather the undeniable core of every marketing interaction (Ballantyne 
and Varey, 2006). No matter whether good or service, each purchase is driven 
by a desire to achieve value for the customer with their unique circumstances.  
Vargo and Lusch were not the first to question the common differentiation 
between goods and services. Gummerson (1995) had argued that “Customers 
…buy offerings which render services which create value… the traditional 
division between goods and services is long outdated” (pages 250-251).  The 
concept of a relationship perspective, where value is created partly in 
interactions between the customer and the supplier or service provider as 
compared to a  traditional value in exchange perspective, had also been 
introduced by Sheth and Parvatiyar (1995) and is at the heart of relationship 
marketing (see for example Berry, 1983). Similarly Normann and Ramirez 
(1993) had argued that with global competition, changing markets and new 
technologies, the whole value creating systems ought to be considered. They 
argued for the importance of co-producing value “the goal is not to create value 
for customers but to mobilize customers to create their own value from the 
company’s various offerings” (page 69). 
Although not the first to introduce these ideas, Service Dominant Logic has 
created wide academic interest (Vargo and Lusch, 2006; Brown and Patterson, 
2009), both from those who support it (for example Rust (2004) and Hunt 
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(2004)) and from those who challenge it (for example Schembri (2006) and 
Achrol and Kotler (2006)). Lindberg and Nordin (2008) have argued that as 
well as Service Dominant Logic suggesting that the emphasis of theory and 
practice should be moved to the exchange of intangible resources (Vargo and 
Lusch, 2004), there has also been a move in the opposite direction. Previously 
identified concepts such as mass customisation (Davis, 1987; Duray et al., 2000) 
and lean services (Bowen and Yougdahl, 1998; Levitt, 1972, 1976), supported an 
approach of standardising and objectifying services. Others have recognised the 
dilemma faced between customisation and standardisation of services and the 
compromise offered, for example by what Sundbo (2002) termed 
“modulisation” . In addition to adding services to goods to create an intangible 
experience, it has therefore argued that companies are also seeking to 
standardise services in a “Goods Dominant Logic”. It has been argued that both 
Goods Dominant Logic and Service Dominant Logic may be operating 
contemporaneously for services (Linberg and Nordin, 2008). 
If services dominant logic is applicable to auditor selection it would be 
expected that rather than creating lists of requirements for potential auditors 
and then assessing responses, companies would be looking for auditors to co-
develop value propositions with them.  In Chapter 1 audit tender processes were 
discussed and in particular their typically comprehensive nature and level of 
interaction between companies and their perspective auditors. Such a process is 
consistent with value proposition development during (and conceivably before) 
a tender process.  
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As noted above in Section 1.2.2, the core audit service is defined by law and 
regulation so there are limits as to the level of co-development and 
customisation that can take place (and indeed opportunities for 
standardisation). These limits however do not extend to how the service is 
designed to be delivered or additional value that might be achieved as part of 
the augmented audit service (Gronroos, 2007, pages 187-191). Again, as noted 
above, collaboration and co-creation of value in a highly regulated and high 
profile environment is likely to be a highly pertinent part of the study. 
2.3.3. Behavioural decision theory 
The previous two sections have set out two challenges to the application of 
traditional supplier selection models. The first of these arising from identified 
differences between goods and services and the second in relation to an 
alternative view of how value is derived. As previously noted, neither of these is 
necessarily inconsistent with rational choice theory because underlying both is a 
desire to optimise utility.  
Behavioural decision theory however provides a third and more 
fundamental challenge because, as previously noted, it argues that decisions are 
taken in reality not based on optimality or an objective view of economic 
rationality, but on human judgements..  
Normative economic theories tend to assume that probabilities used in 
calculating expected utility are objective; they exist in nature. As early as 1926 
Ramsey offered an alternative; that probabilities were driven by the actors’ 
beliefs concerning likely outcomes and this involved judgement (Ramsey, 1926). 
Chapter Two 
Literature Review 
 
 
62 
 
This could be deduced from their behaviour i.e. if an actor bet on a horse that 
was evidence that he believed it would win. Subjectivity could extend both to the 
decision maker’s valuation of the consequences based on his utility and the 
probability measure of the outcome based on his beliefs (Savage, 1954). Whilst 
it may be possible that decisions involved high degrees of objectivity and 
predictability, this would depend on the nature of both the utility and 
probability models applying (Edwards, 1955) (NB one challenge levelled at some 
of the suppler selection models and set out in Section 2.1 is about how decision 
weightings are identified and how realistic and reliable forecasts are).  
Optimality itself is also likely to be conditional both in terms of situation 
and time. What is apparently optimal in one situation may not be in another 
(Einhorn and Hogarth, 1981). Also since people learn, it may be difficult to 
know which was right when optimality as expected appeared to conflict with 
human judgement. Was human judgement more accurate or an error? (Einhorn 
and Hogarth, 1981). 
Another assumption underlying traditional economic models is perfect 
information. In reality this is highly unlikely to hold in anything other than the 
simplest decision. Individual decision making, it has been posited, instead 
operates within bounds (Simon, 1997).  This “bounded rationality” occurs for at 
least three different reasons: 
1. Rationality requires a complete knowledge and anticipation of the 
consequences that will follow each choice – in practice this is not 
available, 
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2. Since consequences lie in the future, imagination has to be applied in 
attaching value to them, and 
3. Rationality requires choice among all possible alternatives when in fact 
only a very few ever come to mind (Simon, 1997).   
“It is impossible for the behaviour of a single isolated individual to reach 
any high degree of rationality. The number of alternatives he must explore is so 
great, the information he would need to evaluate them so vast, that even an 
approximation to objective rationality is hard to conceive” (Simon 1997, page 
93). 
Faced with so many options and possibilities rather than optimise, a 
typical decision maker (“Administrative Man”) is likely to “satisfice”; looking for 
a course of action which is “good enough” (Simon, 1997). Rather than dealing 
with the real world, the administrator deals with a perceived world of bounded 
rationality which is drastically simplified; a world it is argued of trial and error 
and habit; building on what has worked before rather than fully evaluating every 
possible alternative (Simon, 1997). 
Rather than following normative economic theory, it has further been 
argued that an individual’s behavioural intentions are immediate antecedents to 
behaviour and are a function of salient information and beliefs about the 
likelihood of performing a particular behaviour will lead to a specific outcome 
(Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975). It follows from these studies that understanding 
behaviour is not about rational economic models, but more about 
understanding individuals’ attitudes towards performing a specific behaviour 
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and their subjective norms. Information or salient beliefs affect intentions either 
through their influence on attitudes or individual subjective norms (Fishbein 
and Ajzen, 1975). The theory of reasoned action (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980; 
Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975) identified three boundary conditions: 
1. The degree to which the measure of intentions and behavioural criterion 
correspond with respect to their specificity; 
2. The stability of intentions between the time of measurement and 
performance of behaviour; and 
3. The degree to which the intention is under the control of the individual 
(Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975). 
Subsequently the theory of planned behaviour (Ajzen, 1985) built on the 
earlier theory by extending the boundary condition in relation to an individual’s 
volitional control.  This latter theory included the influence of beliefs regarding 
the possession of requisite resources and opportunities. Hence an individual’s 
motivation for performing a behaviour is also influenced by their beliefs 
concerning whether it can be achieved (Ajzen, 1985). 
There is therefore substantial evidence that human decision making does 
not follow that predicted by normative economic theory, even over a series of 
observations. Indeed conversely there is considerable evidence of the 
application of a number of heuristics which introduce apparent systemic 
irrationality into decision making (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Kahneman et 
al., 2007; Kahneman, 2011). These include, for example, irrational judgements 
about an observation’s representativeness of a population (for example 
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overstating preconceived stereo types) and the accessibility of information 
(overstating the importance of observations most easily brought to mind).  
Assessments have also been observed to be impacted by insufficient adjustment 
from where they start or “anchoring” (Kahneman et al., 2007; Kahneman, 2011). 
There is also a tendency according to Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 
1979) for decision makers, as compared to what might be predicted under 
expected utility theory, to exhibit risk averse behaviour in relation to gains 
(respondents tended to choose smaller certain gains over larger probable gains) 
and risk seeking in relation to losses (respondents tended to choose larger 
probable losses over smaller certain losses), (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). 
Where decisions are complex, people appear not to be able cope with all 
the influences on the decision and therefore it has been argued they fall back on 
what the situation feels like using what has been called “System 1” (Kahneman, 
2011) which processes more routine or familiar decisions intuitively rather than 
System 2, their significantly more limited capacity for consciously thinking and 
processing decisions (Kahneman, 2011; see also similarly Thaler and Sunstein, 
2008).  
It has been elsewhere argued that people store experiences and emotions, 
of good and bad situations which generate feelings about and expectations of 
situations being faced; using both rational thought and subconscious emotion 
developed from past experience to make decisions in complex situations 
(Lehrer, 2009). Following this argument where decisions are complex, the 
rational brain can’t cope with all the influences on the decision and therefore the 
decision rests on what the situation feels like (Lehrer, 2009). Attitudes and 
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behaviour may also be impacted by decision makers’ general experience which 
will have created tastes, preferences and identity (Aspara et al., 2008).  
In dealing with complexity and ambiguity, it has also been argued that 
individuals have to fall back on what has gone before; trying to match the 
decision with a similar situation in the past.  Recognition Primed Decision 
Theory (Klein, 1993) suggests that the first step in decision making is to assess 
whether the situation currently faced is familiar (the same or similar to one that 
has been met in the past). If familiar, attention turns to what to do and the 
decision maker runs a mental simulation of a potential course of action; 
considering what happened last time the situation was faced. This may identify 
an acceptable solution. If not, the decision maker will try mental modifications 
then run the simulation again and again until a solution is identified.   
A variation on this approach is offered by Image Theory (Beach, 1990; 
Beach and Connolly, 2005).  This theory suggests a decision process consisting 
of assessing options against previously developed personal standards. 
Individuals it has been argued use their store of knowledge (images) to set 
standards, driving goals about what to do and plans as to how to do it. Options 
that don’t meet these standards are filtered out and the best remaining option 
chosen (Beach, 1990; Beach and Connolly, 2005). 
Based on the preceding paragraphs those arriving at a decision in 
uncertain and intangible circumstances, such as that of auditor selection, are 
likely to be influenced both by natural bias and their past experience. For 
institutions past experience may even be codified and translated into standard 
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operating procedures (Simon, 1979) or less precisely set out in policy (although 
as will be discussed in Section 2.4) professional services have been amongst the 
least formalised areas of purchasing).  Where standard operating procedures 
and policy has been developed the decision is less about which gamble gives the 
best return; more about how well decision compares with those standard 
operating procedures and/or policies (Simon, 1979). 
Behavioural influences on decision making have also been supported in 
other contexts, for example in relation to voting behaviour. In addition to 
rational choice, (which, they argued, itself may be adapted or constrained to the 
extent that decision makers would only collect information up to the point 
where the benefits of collecting further information ceased to outweigh the costs 
of collecting that information) Lau and Redlawsk (2006) identified three other 
models of decision making all involving behavioural influences as set out in 
Table 6.  
Models of individual decision making in 
voting situations 
Salient features 
Early Socialization and Cognitive Consistency Where decision makers are less personally 
concerned, the they tend to fall back on past 
experience and or affiliations, seeking to align 
what they see and hear in the selection process 
with their own beliefs, seeking to avoid 
cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957), in 
other words something which makes them feel 
uncomfortable 
Fast and Frugal Decision makers only focussing on the very 
few attributes of judgement that they really 
care about 
Bounded Rationality” (Simon, 1997) and 
intuitive decision making 
Decision makers consider information only up 
to the point where a satisfactory result is 
identified. This has also been referred to as 
“low information rationality” (Popkin, 1991). 
Table 6: Models of voting behaviour (from Lau and Redlawsk (2006) 
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The implications for Lau and Redlawsk’s models to auditor selection are 
that conceivably, rather than behaving economically rationally, buyers may seek 
to identify facts to support their pre-existing preferences as to which audit firm 
to appoint or focus on a particular problem to be solved without looking across a 
broader set of criteria, or satisfice (as defined by Simon, 1979 and discussed 
previously). 
The importance of behaviour in the selling process is of course also well 
documented in the sales literature with a number of studies considering its 
impact from a number of perspectives. These have included for example in 
evaluating salesman performance, (see for example Pasold, 1975), in assessing 
the impact of adapting in sales generally (Predmore and Bonnice, 1994) and 
specifically the relationship of adapting behaviour to sales success (Marks et al., 
1996). Holbrook and Hirschman (1982) conclude that while much buyer 
behaviour can be explained by the information processing approach, 
supplementing it with an experiential perspective can be greatly enriching. 
Payne et al. (2008) have also considered the role of interaction or 
“encounters”. They identified different types of encounter (emotionsupporting, 
cognitionsupporting, valueexplaining and behaviour and action supporting 
encounters) which would impact customers in different ways; customer decision 
making being affected not only by their objectives but by their experiences. 
The application of behavioural decision theory to auditor selection has 
important potential implications. It is likely, given the importance and profile of 
the decision and the seniority of those involved that individuals will at least 
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strive and/or be seen to strive to make a decision in the interests of 
shareholders and this might drive them to seek an economically rational 
decision. In reality because of the extent of the information which may be 
relevant to the decision (much of it unknown) and the apparent inherent 
distortions in individual decision making, an objective rational choice is likely to 
be impossible and decisions are likely to be highly subjective. The challenge to 
discovering the factors affecting the auditor selection decision is therefore to see 
it through the lens of the decision makers. It is their interpretation and beliefs 
about the decision which is likely to explain outcomes rather than economic 
rationality and this has been reflected in the research approach as will be 
explained in Chapter 3. 
This section has considered a number of factors which have been observed 
to distort decision making from that which might be expected following a 
normative economic model. It suggests that in a complicated auditor selection 
decision, normative predictive models are unlikely to be very reliable. It has also 
identified subconscious influences on decision making.  
2.3.4. Relationship influences on decision making  -             
Affect, trust and loyalty 
The fourth challenge to the application of traditional supplier selection 
models to professional services, and as a subset, auditor selection comes from 
the influence of relationships. 
Many studies have stressed the importance of long-lasting relationships 
between companies and their customers (for example Sheth and Parvitiyar, 
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1995 as referred to in Section 2.1.2).  The important role of relationships in 
value creation was discussed in Section 2.3.2. The different nature of exchange 
in the context of an ongoing relationship has also been argued (see for example 
MacNeil 1978; 1980), along with the positive impact of relationship marketing 
on sales, market share and profit (Crosby et al. 1990; Morgan and Hunt, 1994) 
and the link between relationship quality and purchase intention (Rajaobelina 
and Bergeron, 2009; Wong et al.,2007).  
 The studies so far considered have had a focus on value, the economic 
benefits of relationships. Other, more intangible influences on decision making 
have however also been identified. Within this literature considerations of 
affect, trust and loyalty have been especially prominent. This section therefore 
now considers literature in relation to each of these topics in turn. 
Affect 
The role of affect as an area of focus has been driven by recognition that 
the study of traditional cognitive processes has been inadequate to 
understanding a number of aspects of purchasing and sales situations (Erevelles 
and Fukawa, 2013). 
Affect has been used to describe “an internal feeling state” (Cohen and 
Areni, 1991). Emotion and mood are instances of this where emotion is 
generally considered to be shorter lasting and higher intensity than mood 
(Bagozzi et al., 1999) and is generally associated with a particular object 
whereas mood is generally independent of any object (Clore et al., 2001). The 
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importance of emotion has been identified, both its influence on relationships 
and behaviour. 
In connection with relationships, emotion has been seen to play a critical 
role in their development from initiation, through development and then to 
sustenance (Andersen and Kumar, 2006; Witkowski and Thibideau, 1999). 
Emotion has also been observed creating a positive relationship atmosphere 
(Hallen and Sandstrom, 1991; Sandstrom, 1992).  
The importance of affect in the context of decision making is that emotions 
have been argued as having an immediate and direct impact on an actor’s 
behaviours (Andersen and Kumar, 2006). Empirically evidence exists that 
positive affect enhances people’s willingness to initiate conversations (Batson et 
al., 1979), to take moderate risks (Isen and Patrick, 1983) and to prefer 
collaboration over avoidance as a means of resolving conflict (Baron, 1984).  
Positive affect has also been identified as increasing the likelihood of 
actors to find ways in which the interests of the individuals involved in 
interaction are satisfied in a creative way (Walton and McKersie, 1965). 
Similarly where negotiators like each other they are more likely to come up with 
flexible solutions (Walton and McKersie, 1965).  
Strong positive emotions have been seen to enforce over-ruling analytical 
heuristics and jumping to conclusions thereby impeding rational decision 
making (Gallois, 1994). 
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Conversely it has been suggested that agitation related emotions such as 
tension, anxiety and fear, lead people to withdraw from interaction whilst 
dejection related emotions lead actors to be more aggressive in their behaviour 
(Higgins, 1987).  
It is not generally agreed whether emotions drive behaviour directly or 
indirectly by stimulating cognitive processes which then drive behaviour 
(Baumeister et al., 2007), however whether directly or indirectly, emotions in 
interaction can be seen to exert a number of influences over the way that 
decisions are framed, the processes and behaviour undertaken to take decisions 
and resolve conflicts and ultimately in the outcome of decisions through 
affecting the actors attitude towards potential outcomes. 
The affective influence on decision making is also unlikely to relate solely 
to relationship experience with particular suppliers. The buyers’ attitudes and 
behaviour may also be impacted by their general experience which will have 
created tastes, preferences and identity. Aspara et al. (2008), for example, 
described “Affective Self Affinity” (page 2) which is “the extent to which an 
individual perceives a positively affective congruence between the thing and 
his/her identity”. The definition presupposes that individuals have a sense of 
self and are self-aware so can assess themselves or their identities in relation or 
in contrast to surrounding objects (Rosenberg, 1979). Also, if an individual has a 
positive affective self-affinity with one “object”, he or she is likely to have 
positive affinity with others connected with it (Aspara et al., 2008). Sirgy (1982) 
further suggested that congruency assessments extend to intangibles such as 
services, people and ideas.  
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The implications of this work are that if a key buyer has a positive affective 
self-affinity with a seller and/or attributes of that seller, they are more likely to 
purchase goods and services from that company.  The theory shares some 
commonality with identification and social interaction theories which argue for 
an attraction to people or objects that one can identify with (although 
identification in this context is usually seen as following a cognitive assessment 
(Bhattacharya and Sen, 2003). 
Within psychology it has been widely explored that attachment can 
develop to people (Bowlby 1979; Thompson et al., 2005) or to objects or brands 
(Kleine and Baker, 2004). Attachments can be formed in personal development 
or even in biology and/or due to the mental nature of people. Attachments can 
also sometimes be very strong, even passionate (Kleine and Baker, 2004) such 
that their influence on any decision or selection process would be potentially 
both strong and difficult to change.  
As will be discussed further in Section 2.4 studies of professional services 
selection (for example Sands and McPhail, 2003) have not explicitly explored 
the influence of emotion in interactions although they have often inferred them 
in other criteria for example “client orientation” and “reliability and courteous 
accessibility”.  Similarly, as will again be returned to in Section 2.5, studies have 
also identified an important influence of personal chemistry in auditor selection 
and acknowledged the need for further research in this area (Beattie and 
Fearnley, 1995). 
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So affect and specifically emotion has been widely researched as an 
influence on behaviour and relationships. Within business relationships two 
critical affective influences which have also been widely discussed within a 
buyer-seller context are trust and loyalty. These are discussed next, starting with 
trust. 
Trust 
Trust, it has been argued can be important to a supplier selection decision 
because a buyer will seek a supplier who “is able to perform effectively and 
reliably (credible) and is interested in the customer’s best interests 
(benevolent)” (Doney and Cannon, 1997, page 36). 
Trust has been considered in general terms but “blanket trust” is not often 
applied (one might trust someone to do one thing but not another; either 
because of good experience in one area but not another or perhaps no 
experience of another (Blois, 1999)). Baier (1986) stresses that “there needs to 
be an answer not just to the question: “Whom do you trust? But to the question: 
“What do you trust to them?” (page 236).  
A wide variety of definitions of trust has been developed and as Blois states 
(1999, page 197): “a great diversity of views exists as to what trust is”. Table 7 is 
taken from his summary. 
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Definition AAuthor 
“an attitude displayed in situations where.. a person is relying on 
another person, a person is risking something of value and/or a 
person is attempting to achieve a desired goal” 
Bialaszewski and 
Giallourakis,  
(1985, page 207) 
“the degree to which the channel member perceives that its 
relationship with the supplier is based upon mutual trust and thus is 
willing to accept short term dislocation because it is confident that 
such dislocation will balance out in the long run” 
Anderson et al. 
(1987, page 87) 
“one party’s belief that its needs will be fulfilled in the future by 
actions undertaken by the other party” 
Anderson and Weitz  
(1989, page 312) 
“one party’s belief that another company will perform actions that will 
result in positive outcomes for the firm, as well as not take unexpected 
actions that would result in negative outcomes for the firm” 
Anderson and Narus  
(1990, page 45) 
“a willingness to rely on an exchange partner in whom one has 
confidence” 
Moorman et al. 
 (1992, page 315);  
Schurr and Ozanne, 
 (1985, page 940);  
also Ganesan (1994) 
“existing when one party has confidence in an exchange partner’s 
reliability and integrity” 
Morgan and Hunt, 
(1994a, page 23) 
“perceived credibility and the benevolence of a target of trust” Doney and Cannon  
(1997, page 36) 
Table 7: Definitions of trust (adapted from Blois (1999), pages 197 to 198) 
The table highlights a number of themes surrounding trust including the 
attitude of those placing trust to those trusted, their willingness to rely on them 
and a preparedness to accept short term dis-benefit  in the belief and confidence 
that there will be positive benefits in the future 
It has been argued that trust may occur not only among individuals but 
also among organisations as similar sentiments can occur between collective 
entities. Inter-organisational trust has therefore been distinguished from 
interpersonal trust. Furthermore organisational joint history serves to create 
confidence and the creation of effective sanctions and rewards which sustain 
and enhance the development of trust between organisations (Gulati et al., 
2008).  
It has been suggested that trust can be further divided to include 
salesperson trust, product trust and company trust, in each case representing a 
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belief that the person, product or organisation will fulfil all its obligations as 
understood by the buyer (Plank et al., 1999). 
The deemed importance of trust is perhaps demonstrated by the spread of 
research concerning its development and antecedents examples of which are set 
out in Table 8.  
Antecedents of trust Author 
Formal and informal sharing of information Anderson and Narus, 1990 
Shared values Morgan and Hunt, 1994 
Disclosing, signalling and initiating behaviours Leuthesser and Kohli, 1995 
Calculation of mutual benefit, reliable mutual prediction, 
proven capability and demonstrated intentionality 
Doney and Cannon, 1997 
Societal or cultural norms Sako, 1994; Vaux Halliday, 
2004 
Personal characteristics Wood, 2008 
Non -verbal cues, social cues and shared group 
membership 
Huang et al., 2008 
Table 8: The antecedents of trust 
The positive role of trust in relationships has also been widely documented 
as shown in Table 9. 
Benefits identified Author(s) 
Increased commitment Geyskens et al., (1999) 
Long term orientation Ganesan (1994) 
Increasing cooperation, reducing uncertainty and 
promoting what they called “functional conflict” (the 
positive friction that sustains and helps develop 
relationships through shared differences and problems 
over time). 
Morgan and Hunt (1994, page 22) 
Significant impact of trust on intention of future 
enhancement in a relationship. 
Selnes (1998) 
Positive influence on current purchase intentions and in 
reducing uncertainty for consumers; trust operating as an 
information surrogate in circumstances of information 
shortage about the quality of a product or service 
Sichtmann (2007) 
important role in influencing a customer to maintain and 
build a relationship 
Liang and Wang (2006); Shekhar 
and Gupta (2008) 
A key determinant of relationship quality Swan et al., (1999); Ganesan, 
(1994) 
   Table 9: The positive role of trust in relationships 
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As the table illustrates, a number of benefits of trust have been identified. 
It is however not clear if suppliers are selected because they are, comparatively, 
most trusted.  Although their study was undertaken in the industrial 
manufacturing industry (where there is likely to be less uncertainty than in 
professional services and potentially therefore less reliance on trust) Doney and 
Cannon (1997) found that trust was important as a short listing factor but 
neither trust in an organisation nor in a salesperson influenced purchase choice 
and that factors such as price and reliable delivery were found to be more 
important.  
In the specific auditor appointment situation with high levels of 
intangibility and the auditor’s substantial responsibilities and autonomy (as 
discussed in Chapter 1), it would seem likely that establishing trust is likely to be 
an important influence. 
Loyalty  
Given the long period of tenure of auditors one might also expect high 
degrees of loyalty in relation to auditor appointment however the high switching 
rates would perhaps suggest that there are low levels of loyalty in the specific 
situation of the audit proposal.  
Although the direct link from satisfaction to purchase behaviour has been 
questioned (Hepworth and Mateus, 1994), there is significant evidence of a 
positive impact of satisfaction as an antecedent to loyalty through repurchase 
behaviour (Sambandam and Lord, 1995) and repurchase intent (Andersen and 
Sullivan 1993; Cronin et al. 2000). 
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Loyalty however has not necessarily been found to guarantee or dictate a 
purchase decision. Oliver (1999) identified four consecutive phases of loyalty. 
Firstly, cognitive loyalty which results from an assessment of available 
information resulting in a conclusion that one offer or brand is better than 
another. Secondly, affective loyalty which results from a liking or attitude 
toward the brand based on several satisfying experiences. Thirdly, conative 
loyalty, which implies a commitment and therefore ties the customer more 
tightly to the supplier. However in order for a purchase decision to be 
implemented a fourth phase, active loyalty has to be achieved. Under this last 
phase the positive motivation to purchase overcomes any obstacles that might 
prevent the act. 
Kuenzel and Krolikowska (2008) have extended the exploration of the 
impact of loyalty and commitment by looking at bonds in professional services 
and in particular audit relationships. The existence of relationship bonds (as 
defined in the social psychology literature) could act as a strong incentive to 
choose to work with existing, known people and organisations as opposed to 
others. Two types of bonds have been identified; the social bond (Seabright et 
al., 1992) and the knowledge bond (Halinen, 1997).  Kuenzel and Krolikowska 
(2008) found that social bonds as well as knowledge bonds were important to 
commitment.  
The long periods of appointment associated with audit appointments as set 
out in Chapter 1 may suggest evidence of loyalty although other factors such as 
switching costs are also likely to be important. Also, as noted in Chapter 1 and 
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will be returned to in Section 2.6, audit tenders have often been associated with 
problems with the incumbent auditor. 
 Loyalties my however exist outside of the relationship of a company with 
its auditor and these are considered later in section 2,3.5. 
2.3.5. Groups, organisations, networks and word of mouth 
As set out in Chapter 1, the auditor selection decision by FTSE 350 
companies is made by a selection group typically involving non executives and 
management. This group is operating within a corporate organisational context 
and in a highly networked environment with other and with resultant likelihood 
of word of mouth influences. The influence of groups, networks and word of 
mouth is therefore considered next. 
Group behaviour 
A number of factors in and around a group have been seen to affect 
decision making. For example the overall objectives set for the group are likely 
to steer thinking (e.g. many decisions are driven by a desire to achieve quality 
but other factors such as the acceptance of the decision by others or the need for 
originality can be more important (Stumpf et al., 1979)).  There may also be 
established group rules and protocols. A  group cognitive style may develop 
dependent on the styles and social interactions of those involved (Leonard et al., 
2005); Under certain conditions groups can make poor decisions through a lack 
of application of individual judgement and challenge (Janis, 1983; Neck and 
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Moorhead, 1995) given that individuals in groups are likely to be influenced by 
the majority view (Asch, 1951). 
Individuals who favour a particular outcome or selection may also act as 
an advocate for it (Krapfel, 1985), or speak louder or more often and through 
that behaviour change the decision (Hunsekar, 1983). The power of individuals 
in the group may come from a number of sources including their expertise, 
authority and the respect that they have within the group (French and Raven, 
1959, Thomas, 1984), or their tactics, such as recommendations, threats and 
promises (Frazier and Summers, 1984). 
A buyer’s decision may also be influenced by the role they are assigned or 
adopt within a group (Carlson et al., 2000). The buyer could be representing a 
constituency of stakeholders, or a position, or an area of expertise. In these 
cases both the interaction with the group and the buyer’s final decision may be 
different from that expected solely considering their own individual best 
outcome. A decision could also be influenced by the resources available to the 
group for example information and the way that it is shared (Larson et al., 
2004).  
Lastly, a buyer may be influenced by their sense of obligation to the group 
or broader society. In this regard Etzioni (1988; 1993) argued that there were 
three sources of influence on the decision maker; utilitarian, social and 
deontological. Utilitarian corresponding to the individual utility of prescriptive 
theory,  social which comprised the codes in operation in that individual’s wider 
community, and deontological reflecting the moral and ethical considerations 
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that guide the individual.  These latter deontological influences were driven by 
the individual’s own sense of obligation, duty and conscience (Etzioni, 1988; 
1993). Social influences came from those around the individual (fear of 
ostracism if accepted codes of conduct were crossed).  
In considering the auditor selection decision these group influences seem 
to represent other potential influencing factors and yet, as will be considered in 
Section 2.6, the auditor selection literature has focussed on the individual 
decision maker. As well as general group influences, those making decisions also 
do so in the context of their own corporate environment and the networks 
within which they operate. Before concluding on influences on individual 
decision makers the next two sections therefore consider these organisational 
and network influences. 
Organisational buying behaviour 
The difference between individual and organisational decision making was 
highlighted many years ago by Webster and Wind (1972) who suggested a 
general model of organisational decision making. This general model recognised 
that organisational decision making usually involved many people in the 
decision making process with complex interactions among those people 
including who were influenced by both individual and organisational goals 
(Webster and Wind, 1972). 
Webster and Wind further suggested that organisational decision making 
was influenced by four variables which were individual, social, organisational 
and environmental. Within each of these variables they recognised rational 
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economic influences on decision making within a ‘task’ category and other 
influences such as emotion, personal goals and internal politics which they 
termed non –task (Webster and Wind,1972). The classifications and examples 
of variables influencing organisational buying decisions identified by Webster 
and Wind (1972) are set out in Table 10 below. 
 Task Non task 
Individual Desire to obtain lowest price Personal values and needs 
Social Meetings to set specifications Informal off-the job-interactions 
Organisational Policy regarding local supplier 
preference 
Methods of personnel evaluation 
Environmental Anticipated changes in prices Political climate in an election year 
Table 10: Webster and Wind (1972) classification and examples of variables influencing 
the organisational buying process 
Webster and Wind (1972) therefore identified organisational buying 
behaviour as a complex process involving many people, multiple goals and 
potentially conflicting decision criteria. In turn these decision criteria would go 
beyond purely rational economics. Although ultimately decisions were made by 
individuals who were motivated by a complex combination of personal and 
organisational objectives, they were constrained by policies and information 
filtered through the organisation and influenced by others involved in the 
buying process (Webster and Wind, 1972). 
Others have developed similar models (for example: Robinson, Faris and 
Wind, 1967; Sheth, 1973) which recognise organisational buying behaviour 
having complex contextual or situational influences (such as environmental , 
organisational and group), going beyond individual decision making (see also 
example Johnston and Lewin, 1996) 
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As will be discussed in Section 2.5, the professional services buying 
situation within an organisation typically differs from other types of buying 
within organisations because the buyer is normally the user, with traditionally 
less or no involvement of professional procurers. 
Networks and word of mouth 
The previous sections considered some influences likely to affect the 
decision maker in a decision making group and within an organisation. There 
are however also likely to be influences outside this unit. Indeed it can be 
difficult to identify the buying unit when there are other influences inside or 
outside the organisation which can have a significant impact on an individual 
buyer and a decision (Silk and Kalwani, 1982). 
In reality a transaction is likely to occur in the context of a web of activity 
some of which is anonymous but much influenced by established interpersonal 
relationships (Jackson 2006). Network theorists have argued that socially 
“negotiated” structures exist which keep order and heavily influence the 
decision making of individuals (see for example Strauss et al., 1963).  
The influence of the network may vary depending on the position of the 
individual relative to others in the network (for example proximity (Rice and 
Aydin, 1991) but its impact on decision making processes can be significant.  It 
has been argued that informal decision networks both within teams and 
throughout organisations can systematically bias the way decisions are made 
(Cross, Thomas and Light, 2009). Allen (1977) for example, found that 
engineers and scientists looking for information were five times more likely to 
Chapter Two 
Literature Review 
 
 
84 
 
turn to friends or colleagues than to electronic and paper based repositories (the 
age of this study is acknowledged). 
Word of mouth has been seen generally to play a significant role in 
consumer behaviour and sales (Goldenberg et al., 2001). People can be 
influenced by others even if they have only tenuous or random relationships 
with them (weak ties) as well as more stable, frequent and intimate 
relationships from their personal networks (strong ties) (Granovetter, 1973). 
Although strong ties appear more likely to be influential in consumers’ 
decisions, weak ties appear more likely than strong ties to facilitate word of 
mouth referrals (Brown and Reingen, 1987). 
Within business to business, word of mouth effects have been seen to be 
strong for example in service promotion (Berry and Parasuramen, 1991) and 
outweighing the direct influence of advertising and sales promotions (Park et 
al., 1988). This importance has been connected with both pre and post purchase 
word of mouth (for example Andrus et al. 1990, Bolfing 1989, Richins, 1983). 
Positive word of mouth all other things being equal has also been shown to 
have a major effect on purchase decisions (Arndt 1967; Herr et al., 1991). Others 
have also shown that negative word of mouth is at least as powerful as positive 
(Blodgett et al., 1993; Mangold, et al., 1999; Richins, 1983).  
Most of the literature on word of mouth has so far concentrated on its 
overall impact on sales and marketing performance. There is less specific 
research on the receiver (Sweeney et al., 2007, Bansal and Voyer 2000, 
Gremler, 1994) and therefore on how word of mouth may be affecting the 
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decision maker. One exception is Sweeney et al. (2007) who concluded that 
word of mouth was most likely to be acted on when the receiver needs further 
information about the product or service, they have limited time for comparison 
and when they want to reduce the risk of purchase. Corporate buyers have also 
been observed to solicit positive word of mouth from other customers and weigh 
that input heavily in their service provider selection (Gould, 1988; Kotler and 
Bloom, 1984). 
Reingen and Kernan (1986) found word of mouth to be critical in a 
professional services context (although their study was constructed in a 
business to consumer context). Kotler and Bloom (1984) argue for the need to 
manage of  word of mouth referrals in professional services. 
The presence of network influences on auditor appointment was identified 
by an early Australian study (Davison et al., 1984) which found a connection 
between audit appointments and cross directorships. Although this study 
predated the changes in the auditing market explained in Chapter 1 and was in a 
different geographical context, the potential for network influences seems likely 
to still persist. The positive influence of alumni relationships which, as noted in 
Chapter 1, are prevalent in the FTSE 350 provides another example of 
influences on auditor selection emanating from connections outside the 
company. Iyer et al (2000) and Lennox and Park (2007) found positive 
correlations between auditor appointments and other economic benefits to 
firms where their alumni were present in target companies. 
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 The high intangible or credence properties which make it difficult for a 
purchaser to evaluate (Parasuraman et al., 1985) provide potential for selectors 
to seek reassurance from others.  
The highly networked nature of the FTSE 350 with cross directorships, 
alumni relationships (as referred to above) and other networks in the FTSE 350 
as explained in Chapter 1 add to the potential for such influences to be high. 
This influence has however not been a recent focus in the auditor selection 
literature.  
2.4. Professional services procurement 
The previous sections have discussed the traditional supplier selection 
studies based on normative economic theory and a number of challenges to 
their application. This section now focusses in on relevant professional services 
selection literature more specifically before the auditor selection literature is 
considered in Section 2.5.  
The nature of professional services 
Professional services have been classified to include; accounting, auditing 
and bookkeeping services, advertising agencies, business and management 
consultancy services, engineering and architectural services and legal services 
(Stock and Zinzser, 1987). 
A number of studies have identified particular attributes of professional 
services which suggest they differ from many other services. These were 
summarised by Ojasolo (2007) and are set out in Table 11. 
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Characteristic of professional 
service 
Author 
Provided by qualified persons with a 
substantial fund of specialist 
knowledge 
Wilson, 1972; Sarkar and Saleh, 1974; Gummerson, 
1978; Gardner, 1986; Payne ,1986; Hayward-Farmer, 
1988) 
Problem solving approach Wittreich, 1966; Gummerson, 1977; Hill, Garner and 
Hanna, 1989; Mayere, 1991;Day and Barksdale, 1992 
Operation based on assignments Gummerson, 1978; Gardner, 1986 
Code of ethics Greenwood, 1957; Wilson, 1972; Gummerson, 1981a; 
Bloom,1984; Mansen and Stephen, 1984 
Societal acceptance Kleingartner, 1967; Mansen and Stephen, 1984; 
Swartz and Brown, 1991 
Professional association Wilson, 1972; Bloom,1984; Mansen and Stephen, 
1984 
Confidentiality Gummerson, 1981a; Wheiler, 1987; 
Marketing based on understanding 
customers’ fundamental problem, 
social contacts and referrals important 
Wittreich,1966; Gummerson, 1981a,b,c; Harris, 
1981; Wheiler, 1987; Zinser, 1987; Edvardsson,1988; 
Hill, Garner and Hanna, 1989; Hill and Neeley, 
1989; Hart Shlesinger and Mayer, 1992 
High degree of customer uncertainty Wittreich,1966; Gummerson, 1978; Bloom,1984; 
Wheiler, 1987; Swartz and Brown, 1991; Nooteboom, 
Zwart and Bijmolt, 1992 
Affected by characteristics of 
information 
Cleveland, 1982; Mason, 1992 
Table 11: Characteristics of professional services (adapted from Ojasalo, 2007) 
As the table shows, professional services are characterised by high degrees 
of uncertainty for buyers where suppliers have high degrees of expertise and are 
commonly working on one off project type assignments.   
Professional services can also be strategically important to companies as a 
source of knowledge and to enable innovation (Bessant and Rush, 1995; Muller 
and Zenker, 2001; Pemer et al., 2014).  This might be compared for example 
with simple, lower paid manual work which is less expensive and less risky to 
purchase (West, 1997). 
If a service involves a large amount of expertise, is seen to be of critical 
importance, is recommended to others, involves quality criteria which are 
difficult to evaluate and where the nature of the service to be provided is 
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unclear, it is likely to be considered to be a professional service (Thakor and 
Kumar, 2000).   
Furthermore, the application of knowledge and expertise has been 
considered critical in professional services and the ability of professional service 
firms to attract, mobilize, develop and transform the highly educated employees 
they need to create value for their clients (Lowendahl et al., 2001; Sonmez and 
Moorehouse, 2010).  The high level of professionals possessing expertise gained 
through formal higher education and the exercise of judgement in delivering the 
service have also been seen as an important feature of professional services 
firms (Hill and Neeley, 1988; Lowendahl et al., 2001, Sonmez and Moorehouse, 
2010). 
The highly intangible nature of professional services and the level of 
buyer- seller interaction typically associated with them have given rise to 
challenges in specifying and comparing services both before and after purchase 
(Clark, 1995; Day and Barksdale, 2003; Pemer et al., 2014).  
Professional services therefore have high credence qualities (Darby and 
Karni, 1973; Dulleck and Kerschbauer, 2006; Bonroy 2013)) where the service 
cannot easily be assessed even after its completion.  There is uncertainty for 
buyers as services might be provided in excess of actual need or poor quality 
services may be chosen over better quality services because value cannot be 
adequately assessed (Chaserant and Harnay, 2013). Sonmez and Moorehouse 
(2010), for example, concluded that “there is no doubt that the decision to 
purchase skills training is hard and challenging for managers like any other 
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professional services due to intangibility of services and subjective nature of 
such decisions” (Sonmez and Moorehouse, 2010, page 204) and for at least 
some organisations selecting professional service providers was “mainly based 
on “gut feelings” and subjective assessments” (Sonmez and Moorehouse, 2010, 
page 204). The difficulty of assessing certain services has also been called 
performance ambiguity, defined as occurring where any dimension of an 
exchange makes it difficult for either party to evaluate it (Bowen and Jones, 
1996). 
In addition to this uncertainty surrounding performance other 
uncertainties have also been identified in relation to consultancy procurement. 
These have included relational uncertainty (whilst sharing knowledge within 
and across industries is a core part of consulting, companies have concerns 
about whether their sensitive information may be shared with their 
competitors) and psychosocial uncertainty (essentially companies’ anxiety about 
involving unknown outsiders) (Bergholz, 1999; Pemer and Werr, 2013). 
Procuring professional services 
The review of supplier selection decisions for professional services 
identified four themes which relate to how buyers of professional services have 
been seen to respond to the challenges of supplier selection in this sector. These 
have been identified as summarised in Figure 4 and are considered thereafter. 
 
 
Chapter Two 
Literature Review 
 
 
90 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Themes from professional services selection literature 
Relationships 
Recent research, especially into supplier selection in management 
consultancy (Werr and Pemer, 2005, 2007; Sieweke, 2012; Pemer and Werr 
2013; Pemer et al, 2014) has focussed on the procurement process and the role 
of procurement professionals. Buyers have  been seen to manage the challenges 
of professional services procurement by relying on buyer – seller relationships 
typically, as noted above, with limited or no involvement of professional 
purchasing departments (Armbruster, 2006; Bals et al., 2009; Werr and Pemer, 
2007; Sieweke at al, 2012).  
Services expenditure and marketing services expenditure in particular has 
also been seen to be managed very informally with low levels of professional 
procurement involvement (Bals et al., 2009; Ellram et al., 2007, Tate et al, 
2010).  This reliance on relationships can risk “overembeddedness” (Uzzi, 1997) 
where consulting arrangements persist with an existing supplier when there 
may be more beneficial opportunities with other suppliers that have not yet 
been used. Informal management of services procurement also provides little 
incentive for suppliers to improve their cost management (Tate et al, 2010). 
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More recently organisations have started to formalise their professional 
services procurement activities (Ogden et al., 2007; Werr and Pemer, 2007) by 
introducing policies and special arrangements including preferred provider 
agreements (Pemer and Werr, 2013) although the extent of formalisation has 
also varied across organisations (Pemer et al., 2014; Sieweke et al., 2012). In 
relation to consulting services, different approaches have been identified. Some 
companies have adopted a decentralised approach where functional managers 
decide on whether to use consultants (Honer and Mohe, 2009; Werr and Pemer, 
2005), others have followed a more centralised approach involving procurement 
specialists selecting consultancies or supporting managers in contract 
negotiations (Werr and Pemer, 2007). A hybrid approach may also occur 
involving elements of both (Werr and Pemer, 2005).There is a challenge to 
formalising procurement when the  purchase of knowledge intensive business 
services such as professional services is normally characterised by high levels of 
interaction and collaboration and problem solving in order to co-create value 
(Aarikka-Stenroos and Jaakkola, 2012). 
The auditor selection decision also poses particular challenges to 
procurement professionals given its governing law and regulation. As set out in 
Chapter 1, the scope of work performed is governed by law and the auditors’ 
professional judgement and is required to be taken by the Board based on a 
recommendation from the audit committee. 
In addition to studies concerning the professional services procurement 
process other studies of supplier selection in this sector have also identified 
relationship influences of track record (Stock and Zinszer,1987), experienced 
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based trust (Glucker and Armbruster ,2003; West, 1997)and  accumulated 
knowledge (Dawes, 1992). 
Appendix I summarises literature which has considered criteria affecting 
supplier selection decisions in professional services. In addition to relationship 
influences, three other influence groups are identified namely people put 
forward and their firms (competences and capabilities), behaviour and service 
design. These are now considered. 
People put forward and their firms  
The second theme identified from the review of the professional services 
selection literature was assessment of the people put forward and their firms. 
This has included consideration of the reputations of the individuals in the 
teams competing for selection and their firms both generally and in the relevant 
specific functional area (Cagley, 1986; Dawes, 1992; Stock and Zinszer, 1987). 
Prior experience of the competing teams at an individual consultant level and at 
a firm level and including their relevant industry experience have been 
considered important (Dawes, 1992). In some cases prior experience has been 
directly relevant for example if services being provided were closely related to or 
integrated with those previously provided. For example; “advice concerning 
information technology often results in the purchase of complex computer and 
telecommunications equipment. “If a consultant is used to help an organisation 
purchase such equipment, then it is quite natural for that consultant to oversee 
its installation” (Dawes, 1992, page 189).  
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Studies also identified the influence of the quality of people being 
proposed more generally (Cagley 1986, West, 1997) and the conduct of personal 
assessments on key individuals (Somnnez and Moorehouse, 2010).  
Size, age and location of the firm, and other consultants’ recommendations 
have been  found to be less important (Dawes, 1992) although having sufficient 
professionals to allow flexibility in delivery has been found to be influential 
(Somnez and Moorehouse, 2010). 
Behavioural cues 
The third theme identified related to behavioural cues which were seen to 
be cues for quality, for example people seen to be behaving professionally were 
considered more likely to deliver a quality service (Stock and Zinszer, 1987), or 
where the gravitas and personal presentation of a trainer and ability to share 
real world experience and anecdotes were seen as supporting a better training 
solution (Sonmez and Moorehouse, 2010).  
More generally firms demonstrating understanding of the clients’ needs  
and  having  good interaction, and communication skills (Day and Barksdale, 
1992) were also found to be important. 
Service design 
The fourth theme incorporated considerations which are associated with 
how well the proposed service connected with the purchasing company such 
that its design most precisely met their needs. This includes understanding the 
client’s needs (West, 1997), the ability of the provider to customise the solution 
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to the client’s needs, to thinking and to bring added value (Somnez and 
Moorehouse, 2010) and agreement on goals and objectives (Cagley, 1986). Day 
and Barksdale (1992) also separately identify contractual and administrative 
conformance. 
These studies also indicate an influence of competitive fees as a decision 
influence and added value (Dawes, 1992;.Day and Barksdale, 1992; Glucker and 
Armbruster, 2003). 
In summary therefore professional services are often strategically 
important, contain high degrees of knowledge, tend to be highly intangible and 
as a result, are difficult to assess before, and even after, completion. In response 
to the particular challenges of procuring such services pertinent literature shows 
companies using a range of factors for assessment which may be grouped into 
four themes. These include capability and competence assessment of the teams 
and their firms, relationships, behavioural cues as well as service design. 
Sonmez and Moorhouse, (2010) found that factors related to reputation, 
organisational capability and costs were short-listing factors, or pre-qualifiers, 
whereas those related to competence, knowledge and understanding and the 
product (training solution) were final stage differentiators. 
This section has considered professional services literature outside of 
statutory auditor services. The next section now focusses on that specifically. 
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2.6. Statutory audit services 
The nature and recent history of statutory audit services and the FTSE 350 
audit market was discussed in some detail in Chapter 1. In this section therefore 
the focus is on what has been identified in academic literature relating to 
auditor selection within the overall category of professional services, restricting 
that review to decisions made by companies. As will be shown, there is a paucity 
of literature. For example this researcher is aware of no previous academic 
study devoted solely to FTSE 350 companies and no recent academic study of 
auditor selection in the United Kingdom. Given the different regulatory and 
cultural environments affecting auditor selection, overseas studies are likely to 
be informative, but not strictly applicable to the United Kingdom context. 
Because of the low tendering and switching rates identified in Chapter 1, 
there has been some academic interest in auditor switching. Although the 
reasons for moving away from an auditor might not necessarily be the same as 
those for choosing a new one (Beattie and Fearnley , 1995), for the reasons set 
out below these studies have also been included as it is likely that they can 
provide further relevant insight. 
In common with other professional services audit relationships have been 
found to be complicated and changing and the decision as to which auditor to 
appoint is likely therefore to be complex.  “Because one of the main aspects of 
service marketing is the concept of intangibility, clients of accountancy firms 
may be expected to have difficulty in assessing complex services and the 
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associated proprietary methodologies or standardized methods of approach 
which are offered by such firms” (Scott and van der Walt, 1995, page 28). 
The auditor selection literature suggests that this decision is likely to be 
influenced by characteristics of the company (these factors will determine the 
general size, class and/or industry specialisation of the audit firm selected 
(Beattie and Fearnley, 1998b) and by supply-side factors, (auditor 
characteristics which will also influence the specific audit firm chosen) and the 
auditing environment (Beattie and Fearnley, 1998b). The evolution of the 
auditing environment is discussed in Chapter 1. This section therefore now 
considers the influence of buying company and auditor characteristics. 
Company characteristics and preferences for big firm auditors 
Unsurprisingly given the market and regulatory environment surrounding 
audit as explained in Chapter 1, much of the literature exploring the impact of 
company attributes on auditor choice has focussed on agency influences and 
especially their impact on assessment of audit quality.  As noted in Chapter 1, 
agency is important in the choice of auditor given information asymmetries 
between management who run the business on a day to day basis and 
shareholders who own the company and profit or lose from its operation. 
In theory, the quality of auditing ought to be homogenous across all audit 
firms because each has to comply with the same regulatory oversight and follow 
the same accounting standards. In practice however there is evidence from a 
number of studies and jurisdictions which shows that differing company specific 
attributes have influenced the auditor selection decision towards more specialist 
Chapter Two 
Literature Review 
 
 
97 
 
or larger firms who are considered to provide greater audit quality. These are 
now considered in turn. 
The constitution of company boards 
A greater proportion of independent (non-executive) directors working in 
active audit committees has been associated with the selection of industry 
specialist auditors (Abbott and Parker, 2000). Independent directors, it has 
been argued, are more likely to be focussed on audit quality because they are 
concerned with their own personal reputational risk. As people likely to have 
established reputations they are likely to be more concerned to avoid financial 
errors and misstatements. Industry specialist auditors are argued to provide 
best audit quality because, following this argument, they are more likely to 
detect and report financial statement errors and fraud and so the presence of 
directors with high personal reputational risk therefore influences the selection 
of auditors towards them (Abbott and Parker, 2000; 2001). 
Companies with higher proportions of outside (or non-executive) directors 
have also been associated with the appointment of specialist industry auditors 
in specialised industries; again industry specialisation argued as a proxy for 
audit quality (Beasley and Petroni, 2001).  
One limitation on the extent of the selection of industry specialist auditors 
and the likely resultant concentration of audits with a few industry specialist 
firms is a reluctance that has been identified on the part of companies to 
appoint the same auditor as their competitors in industries of high 
concentration (Kwon, 1996). 
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The composition of the shareholder group 
The presence of institutional shareholders has also been associated with 
companies with specialist industry auditors (Velury et al., 2003). Because 
institutional shareholders are argued to be actively interested in the quality of 
reporting in the financial statements of companies and empirical evidence 
supports an association of audit quality with quality of reporting (Velury at al., 
2003), it is argued that better quality reporting enables institutional investors to 
monitor their investments more effectively. Industry specialism is again taken 
as a proxy for audit quality because industry specific experience enables 
auditors to identify and address industry specific issues more thoroughly than 
other auditors (Velury et al., 2003). The influence of institutional investors is 
underpinned by the greater numbers of shares that they hold and is manifest in 
a number of ways including negotiations with management and press relations 
(Velury et al., 2003).  
The influence of block institutional shareholders was identified following 
the demise of Arthur Andersen. Companies with block shareholders were 
observed to be more likely to move to completely new auditors when Arthur 
Andersen collapsed rather than follow their previous audit teams into the firms 
taking over their audits (Blouin et al., 2007).   
Information asymmetry 
The existence of information asymmetry in the shareholder/management 
relationship as outlined in Chapter 1, means that shareholders cannot accurately 
assess audit quality because of the limitations on the information made 
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available to them. Because of this, it has been argued that the appointment of a 
larger audit firm provides a signal to shareholders that management are 
expecting growth in future cash flows and therefore the value of the relevant 
company (Bar-Yoesef and Livnat, 1984); or that there is an underlying 
favourable story to tell which a higher quality auditor might expose more 
accurately (Titman and Trueman, 1986).  
Agency costs arising from information asymmetry have also been seen to 
create a preference for bigger, “brand name” auditors in relation to new issues 
(Firth and Smith, 1992). The lower levels of shareholding by management 
following a listing and typically high debt levels have been seen to be associated 
with the appointment of a “brand name” auditor (then “Big 8”). A preference for 
big firms by listed companies in emerging markets (having greater perceived 
risk) has also been identified (Citron and Manalis, 2001; Timea et al., 2011). 
Because users of financial information cannot directly observe audit 
quality it has been shown that they have relied on the reputations of the larger 
firms (Firth and Smith, 1992). The influence of auditor brand reputation on 
auditor selection was also supported by Francis and Wilson (1988) who 
identified that in seeking quality differentiated audits, brand rather than 
company size or agency costs explained the preference for big firms.  Auditor 
reputation has also been identified as important for large companies generally 
(Hermanson et al., 1994).  
As well as the presence of outside block shareholders referred to above, the 
propensity for companies with greater agency concerns to move was also 
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attributed to reputational issues and in particular a concern for the companies 
to be seen to have completely independent new auditors (Blouin et al., 2007). 
Following the demise of Arthur Andersen, companies with higher agency costs 
across a number of measures including size, complexity and levels of 
management share ownership tended to sever ties and move to completely new 
auditors whereas those with lower agency costs followed their previous Arthur 
Andersen partner thereby minimising the costs that would need to be incurred 
from switching auditor completely (Blouin et al., 2007).  
The financial resources of the larger firms 
Lastly, it is argued that because larger firms have greater financial 
resources, the appointment of a larger firm provides a degree of insurance to 
shareholders because these larger firms can be held more financially 
accountable in the event of misstatements contributed to by their negligence 
(Bar-Yoesef and Livnat, 1984), especially given the unlimited liability of the 
auditor referred to in Chapter 1. This was also suggested by Oxera (2006) as a 
factor favouring the selection of Big 4 firms in the FTSE 350. 
Conclusion on company characteristics and the resulting 
preference for big firms 
This section has shown that a number of attributes of companies have 
been identified which influence auditor selection; whether industry specialist, 
big firm or well-known brand.  This helps to explain the concentration of FTSE 
350 audits within the Big 4 audit firms noted in Chapter 1, and the price 
premiums achieved by big firms that have been observed in the United Kingdom 
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(for example; Ireland et al., 2002; Clatworthy et al., 2009). However because 
each of the Big 4 firms has substantial size and an established global network 
and reputation, these company attribute related influences appear to provide 
less evidence as to how companies choose between the Big 4 in the FTSE 350. 
Given, as shown in Section 1, that most tenders are won and lost by the Big 4, it 
is therefore likely that other factors will be more pertinent to decision making in 
this market, at least after composition of a shortlist. A closer look at other 
auditor choice literature therefore follows to seek to identify decision factors 
that have been seen to cause companies to choose between audit firms. 
Further auditor choice literature - the influence of audit firm 
attributes and approaches on auditor selection 
Evidence of the influence of the competing firm’s attributes and their 
approaches on the auditor selection decision can be found in studies both of 
auditor switching and auditor choice.  
The findings from research into auditor selection that has been conducted 
suggest a multidimensional assessment of auditors which is broadly consistent 
with the four themes identified for other professional services previously set out  
in Section 2.5. Figure 4 was set out in that section and has been modified below 
to include (in italics) further related items from the audit selection literature.  
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Figure 5: Themes identified from the statutory auditor selection literature 
Appendix II summarises the specific auditor selection research concerning 
factors affecting selection decisions and this is now discussed below. 
Relationships and past track record 
Although as Beattie and Fearnley (1995) observed, the reasons driving 
change (e.g. problems with the previous auditor) were not necessarily involved 
in the choice of a particular new auditor (see also Francis and Wilson, 1988), it 
would not seem unreasonable to assume that factors giving rise to a potential 
change (e.g. dissatisfaction) in an otherwise very stable market are likely to be 
relevant to a selection decision in at least some cases (e.g. removing the causes 
of that dissatisfaction). In choosing a new auditor, companies might reasonably 
be expected to seek to resolve the issues they had with their existing auditor or 
look to strengths or proposals from their new auditor to address weaknesses in 
their existing auditor and, if failings in relationships are seen to trigger 
consideration of change, then the existence of successful relationships elsewhere 
would be likely to be a decision influence.  
The direct reference to relationships in the statutory auditor selection 
literature is limited, perhaps reflecting the questionnaire approach to the 
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research that most of the studies that have undertaken. This is returned to 
below. 
Competence and capability 
In assessing audit firms, the importance of the competence and technical 
quality of the audit engagement staff has been highlighted along with industry 
specialisation, knowledge and expertise (Addams and Davis, 1994; Almer, 2014; 
Beattie and Fearnley, 1995; Sands and McPhail, 2003). In making comparisons 
of competence studies, have identified assessments being made at the client 
team and firm level (Beattie and Fearnley, 1995) and also that of the lead audit 
partner (Almer, 2014). Harmanson (1994) identifies more generally, personnel. 
In addition to competence-based assessments capability measures have 
also been considered including international spread and capabilities of the audit 
firm, product range and broad range of services (Addams and Davis, 1994; 
Beattie and Fearnley, 1998; Scott and van der Walt, 1995). Similarly the quality 
of non- audit services has also been posited as a factor (Beattie and Fearnley, 
1998). In contrast to competency assessments these capability considerations 
seem to be being made at the firm level. However this is an example of an area 
where the dynamics of the auditor selection decision are likely to have changed. 
As noted in Chapter 1, following Sarbanes-Oxley and the UK Combined Code 
there has been much more focus on the level of non-audit services delivered by 
auditors as a result of the potential risk this is argued to provide to auditor 
independence. Quality of non-audit services delivered by a firm might therefore 
more recently be a reason not to appoint that firm as auditor or at least the 
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range of services which companies may deem as being permissible for their 
auditors to supply is likely to be very restricted; potentially only to those 
services which may be considered related to the audit such as, for example 
certain audit work related to regulatory requirements.  
The existence of an office located close to principal accounting functions 
and location of firms’ offices and geographic proximity more generally have also 
been identified as influences (Addams and Davis, 1994; Beattie and Fearnley, 
1995; Sands and McPhail, 2003). Although studies comment on the existence of 
an office close to companies’ operations, it also seems relevant that the 
comparative strength of local offices ought also to be a factor. 
Lastly, in relation to firms’ resources, image and acceptability to a 
company’s regulators have been identified (Beattie and Fearnley, 1995; Scott 
and van der walt, 1995); although as noted earlier in this section, in practice 
these may in many situations be short-listing factors rather than decision 
factors given the comparability of the major firms.  
Behavioural influences 
In relation to behavioural influences, Addams and Davis (1994) found that 
the impact of personal relationships developed through the proposal process 
was the most important decision factor. Beattie and Fearnley (1998) identified 
the importance of personal chemistry and personality. They also acknowledged 
however that the determinants of personal chemistry were not readily identified 
and recommended more work in this area.  
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 The influence of the interaction between audit firms and companies 
during tender processes has been largely ignored by other studies and, given the 
nature of FTSE 350 tender processes explained in Section 1, this could be an 
important extension of research 
Service design 
Companies have been identified to be seeking audit quality in their auditor 
selection decisions (Baldacchino and Cardona, 2011; Beattie and Fearnley, 
1995). Other aspects of the audit service identified as influences include  
guidance on accounting principles and quality of advice to management (Beattie 
and Fearnley, 1995; 1998a) along with the quality of working relationships 
(Beattie and Fearnley. 1995; 1998a; Eiechenseher and Shields, 1983).  
People related service factors identified have also included client 
orientation (Sands and McPhail, 2003), accessibility of key staff (Scott and van 
der Walt, 1986),responsiveness (Eiechenseher and Shields, 1983) and 
availability of the auditor (Baldacchino and Cardona, 2011). 
Value for money and fee have also been identified as factors affecting 
auditor choice (Eichensher and Shields, 1983; Beattie and Fearnley, 1995: 
Baldacchino and Cardona, 2011) although Beattie and Fearnley (1998a) found 
that fees were not significant influences on a decision except where they fell 
outside an acceptable range and that other factors were more important. This 
finding was recently supported by Almer (2014). 
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The auditor selection literature has been considered in this section and 
does provide additional insights to inform this research. However there are also 
important limitations affecting this body of research and before concluding the 
literature review these are therefore considered next. 
Limitations of the auditor selection literature 
As noted above, whilst the extant literature does provide some insight into 
auditor selection, there are also important limitations within it which affect its 
relevance to this study.  
Firstly most of the studies have involved questionnaire based surveys. 
Whilst this has enabled responses to specific questions to be identified, it 
provides little evidence as to what influences are in play as decisions are arrived 
at and how they might evolve during a process.  
Also, many of these studies have included companies who have never 
conducted an audit tender and so they are hypothesising about what would 
happen should they do so. Respondents have also been asked to select priorities 
from a list, but in some cases the rationale for that list is unclear introducing the 
risk that the factors sampled might miss other important influences.  
Thirdly, and as illustrated in Appendix II, these studies have been 
undertaken in a number of different populations and jurisdictions. Whilst it can 
be worthwhile to consider a number of different perspectives, auditor choice 
may well be different given the different pertaining cultural and regulatory 
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environments and especially between different market segments (private, 
smaller public and larger public companies).  
Fourthly, the empirical research in the United Kingdom predates much of 
the regulatory and market activity summarised in Section 1 and in particular, 
the Enron scandal, the collapse of Arthur Andersen, developments in the 
regulatory environment and the significant focus on the roles and 
responsibilities of audit committees that followed. 
2.6. Conclusion: supplier selection literature and the FTSE 
350 context 
Following the identification of a paucity of literature specifically focussing 
on auditor selection this literature review has taken an exploratory approach as 
summarised in Figure 4, reviewing literature in relation to supplier selection 
more generally and that concerning decision theory and other related literature. 
The review of supplier selection literature identified numerous studies 
concerning the supply of goods. The evolution of supplier selection as more 
collaborative approaches and strategic partnerships was discussed. Most of the 
traditional supplier selection studies tended to be based implicitly or explicitly 
on normative economic models. 
The review has however identified a number of challenges to traditional 
goods based supplier selection models and their underpinning normative 
rational economics: 
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 The chapter has 
identified literature 
which suggests that 
services are inherently 
different from goods 
because they are 
intangible, 
heterogeneous, are 
characterised by the 
production and the 
service being 
inseparable and 
perishable (in the sense 
that they can’t be stored 
such that a service not 
supplied can be a service 
lost). As a result the 
procurement process 
does not operate in the same 
way. 
 Criticism of normative models based on factor optimisation has also been 
identified from those who argue that value has to be customer specific 
and co-developed. In an environment where competent suppliers and 
involved buyers co-create value standardisation would be impossible. 
Figure 6: Summary of the approach taken 
to the literature review 
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 Studies have also criticised the rational economic theory underpinning 
traditional normative models. In particular behavioural decision theory 
strongly suggests that human decision making does not follow rational 
economic norms. In any decision involving complexity there are likely to 
be too many variables and insufficient information to meet the 
requirements for perfect information.  People therefore “satisfice” and 
demonstrate systemic bias; often falling back on past experience. This 
behavioural decision literature also suggests that many decisions, 
especially those taken under uncertainty, are unlikely to be wholly or 
mainly based on pure rational economic models. Given the uncertain and 
intangible nature of auditor selection explained in Chapter 1, these 
behavioural influences are likely to be relevant to the auditor selection 
decision.  
 In situations of uncertainty people also fall back on relationships and 
their decision making is also therefore likely to be affected by the 
relationships they have, the trust they place in people and the loyalty they 
feel.  There is considerable literature supporting the influences of 
relationships in buying and selling. The importance of trust in the audit 
relationship, given the special rights of the auditor which was explained 
in Chapter 1, appears to be of particular interest. As has been shown, 
however, there is some doubt as to whether trust is a short-listing factor; 
necessary to have a chance of selection or a final decision criterion. The 
literature also suggests that loyalty can also be a powerful influence on 
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buying although a number of limitations and conditions have also been 
identified. 
 In addition decision makers’ behaviour is likely to be influenced by the 
groups, organisations and networks that they operate within. There is 
strong evidence of the influence of groups on behaviour generally, also of 
a number of ways in which groups interact in making decisions. The 
structure of a typical audit selection panel was discussed in Chapter 1 
where it was explained that decisions tend to be made by selection groups 
of senior management and non-executives of companies representing 
different roles and working relationships with the auditors. The dynamics 
of groups are therefore also likely to be relevant to the auditor selection 
decision. But it is not only likely that decisions will be influenced by the 
interaction that takes place within a selection panel. In Chapter 1, Section 
1.4 the high degree of connectivity between directors across the FTSE 350 
was discussed and how word of mouth has been seen to influence 
decision making was considered next. 
This completes the review of the relevant literature. It has identified a 
number of potential themes in relation to factors which may be affecting auditor 
selection but no comprehensive overall model and no recent research within the 
UK.  
The auditor selection decision sits within this overall complexity and it is 
against this backdrop that the auditor selection decision is being taken. This 
research seeks to extend our understanding of that selection process by 
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conducting a holistic study of the influences at play in the auditor selection 
decisions of FTSE 350 companies. 
The research question to be answered by this study is therefore: 
What are the factors affecting the auditor selection decisions of FTSE 350 
companies in competitive tenders? 
The next chapter sets out the research methodology adopted in order to 
answer that question. 
  
Chapter Two 
Literature Review 
 
 
112 
 
This page has been left intentionally blank
 113 
 
CHAPTER THREE 
METHODOLOGY 
 
3. Introduction 
This section considers the research philosophy, strategy and design and 
sets out the reasons for adopting a qualitative, constructivist methodological 
approach. It also explains the data collection method and the analysis 
techniques used. 
A summary of the overall research approach is set out in Figure 7 and is 
explained in the sections that follow. 
 
 
Figure 7: Summary of the research approach 
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The paucity of research into professional services supplier selection and in 
particular auditor selection within that sector was discussed in Section 2.5. Due 
to this paucity of research there is a need for exploratory research to understand 
the factors influencing the auditor selection decision and how interaction 
between these factors contributes to auditor selection outcomes. Chapter 2 
identified economic and behavioural influences that influence or ought 
(according to normative economic models of supplier selection) to influence 
buying decisions. Although there is extensive literature in relation to supplier 
selection (especially as it relates to goods) and also in relation to behavioural 
and relationship influences on purchasing and relationship management, there 
is very little empirical research as to how these varied influences may be 
interacting and influencing professional services supplier selection. This 
provides further support for an investigative approach. 
By exploring the auditor selection decision from the viewpoint of those 
who have been closely involved in auditor selection processes, both as buyers 
and sellers of statutory external audit services in the UK’s largest companies 
(the FTSE 350); this research aims to answer the question of how the various 
factors considered by them are influencing the auditor selection decision. The 
research is based on data obtained from semi structured interviews and 
interview records covering a ten year period from the acquisition of the UK 
practice of Arthur Andersen by Deloitte in August 2002 to issuance by the 
Financial Reporting Council of the revision of the UK Corporate Governance 
Code with effect from 1 October 2012. 
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Consistent with its exploratory and investigative nature, the research is 
inductive in design and aimed at gaining greater understanding of the selection 
decision from the perspective of the purchasers and sellers of statutory audits. 
The research is based on qualitative interviews which attempt “to understand 
the world from the subjects’ point of view, to unfold the meaning of their 
experiences, to uncover their lived world prior to scientific explanations (Kvale 
and Brinkman, 2009, page 1)”. It uses a grounded approach (Glaser and Strauss, 
1967) to explore emergent theory whereby the ideas and concepts flow from the 
data rather than being used to challenge or support existing theoretical models 
and hypotheses. This inductive design and constructionist approach enables the 
examination of relationships and emerging themes building from initial coding. 
This chapter has four sub-sections. The first sub-section considers the 
research philosophy comprising the ontological and epistemological 
assumptions underpinning the qualitative and interpretive approach adopted. 
The second sub-section sets out the research strategy and explains why it is 
consistent with the underlying philosophical assumptions adopted. The third 
sub-section then considers the data collection methods adopted and the 
analyses approach and tools used. Lastly this chapter considers ethical matters 
relevant to the study. 
3.1. Research philosophy and design 
The philosophy of the research is important because it informs the 
research design, how the data will be collected, the method of analysis and how 
the knowledge will be gained.  The acceptance of a particular epistemology 
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usually leads to a researcher adopting methods consistent with that position 
(Easterby-Smith et al. 2002). This section therefore explains the philosophical 
position of the research; in particular the ontological and epistemological 
positions which underpin it. 
3.1.1. Ontology and epistemology 
Ontology is concerned with the nature of what exists. In social sciences 
this has been interpreted as concern with the nature of social reality (Blaikie, 
2007).  An epistemology is a theory of knowledge. It is a theory of how we know 
what we know. It provides the philosophical grounding for establishing what 
can be known. In social sciences it has been interpreted as a concern with how 
social reality can be known (Blaikie, 2007).  
The philosophical debate in social science about how research should be 
conducted has often been framed on a range between two extreme traditions. 
These two extremes are positivism and social constructionism (Easterby-Smith 
et al., 2002). 
The ontological assumption underpinning positivism is that reality is 
external and objective. Its underlying epistemological assumption is that 
knowledge can only be of significance if it is based on observations of this 
external reality (Easterby-Smith et al., 2002). Positivists argue that the social 
world exists externally and that its properties should be measured through 
objective measures rather than being inferred subjectively through sensation, 
reflection and intuition (Easterby-Smith et al., 2002). At the extreme of 
objective approaches the social world is seen as a hard concrete real thing “out 
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there” which affects everyone. Reality is an objective phenomenon that lends 
itself to accurate observation and measurement. The researcher’s role is to 
discover the meaning that already exists in “things” (Blaikie, 2007). Any aspect 
of the world that cannot be observed in an activity or behaviour is regarded as 
being questionable (Morgan and Smircich, 1980). Within this paradigm human 
beings are viewed as the product of external forces and as conditioned by the 
stimuli in their environment (Morgan and Smircich, 1980). Positivism has been 
generally associated with quantitative research methods where theory is tested 
by developing hypotheses prior to data collection. 
Next sits realism which asserts the existence of some kind of reality and for 
social sciences is concerned with the nature of reality and where it can be found 
(Blaikie, 2007). Within realism a number of different ontologies have developed 
including shallow or naive realism (Bhaskar, 1979) (which argues that all that 
exists is what we can see) conceptual realism (Blaikie, 2007), (which argues that 
whilst there is an existence independent of human minds it can only be known 
through the use of the innate human capacity for thought and reason) and depth 
realism (Bhaskar, 1978). Depth realists argue that reality exists in three 
domains: the empirical domain which represents our experience through our 
senses, the actual domain which includes events that occur whether anyone is 
there to see them or not and the real domain where the processes that generate 
events are located (Bhaskar, 1978). 
At the opposite end of the range to positivism sits social constructionism 
(Berger and Luckman, 1966) which focuses on the way that people make sense 
of their world; especially through sharing their experiences with others through 
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language (Easterby-Smith et al., 2002). Social constructionists argue that 
“reality” is not objective or exterior but rather is socially constructed and given 
meaning by people. The researcher plays an active role in the creation of 
meaning from “things” (Blaikie, 2007). “The social world is a continuous 
process, created afresh in each encounter of everyday life as individuals impose 
themselves on their world to establish a realm of meaningful definition” 
(Morgan and Smircich, 1980, page 494). “Knowledge arises through acting and 
interacting of self –reflective beings” (Corbin and Strauss, 2008). Social 
constructionism is generally connected with qualitative approaches where 
theory is built through interpretation of data collected. 
Across the range of ontological and epistemological positions there are 
many other alternative philosophical positions. Understanding the 
philosophical alternatives is important to enable the researcher to make 
ontological and epistemological choices which are clear and consistent with the 
research methods adopted. 
3.1.2. The chosen research philosophy 
The research philosophy selected followed consideration of the various 
ontological paradigms, the researchers own philosophical position, and had 
regard to the gaps left by the approaches taken by most of the auditor selection 
studies (and numerous supplier selection studies more generally) which have 
generally adopted a positivist largely quantitative approach.  To fit with these 
considerations and to address these gaps, the current research therefore adopts 
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the ontological paradigm of social constructionism which is one of a number of 
interpretive approaches (Habermas, 1970). 
Studies based on an ontology of social constructionism aim to increase 
understanding of a situation by gathering rich data from which ideas are 
induced. Having regard to human interest and stakeholder perspectives they are 
generalised by theoretical abstraction. This approach is consistent with the 
exploratory and investigatory nature of the proposed research which is aimed at 
understanding the influences on the auditor selection decision from the 
viewpoint of those involved in that decision. The research adopts an 
interpretivist epistemology to investigate how people make sense of the 
decision. 
As noted above, much of the previous research into auditor selection and 
supplier selection more generally has traditionally taken a deductive approach 
based on a positivist ontology which assumes a reality independent of those 
involved. An alternative grounded approach has been adopted to explore what 
the actors felt was important and how they experienced the auditor selection 
process. 
The implication of this approach is that the researcher argues that there is 
no independent reality “out there” and the “reality” of an auditor selection 
decision is constructed by those involved based on the influences and 
interactions which shape their views. 
The qualitative, grounded approach (see further below) adopted is 
consistent with the underlying ontological and epistemological assumptions, the 
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research question, the exploratory nature of the research being undertaken and 
the complexity of the influences on the auditor selection decision. 
3.1.3. The justification for a grounded approach 
The study adopts a grounded approach which is adapted from grounded 
theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1965; 1967). Grounded theory challenged the 
deductive approaches which were predominant in the United States in the mid 
twentieth century (Charmaz, 2012).  The deductive scientific approach argued 
that research could only be valid if based on replicable experiments, operational 
definitions of concepts, logically deduced hypotheses and confirmed evidence 
(Charmaz, 2012); supporting this approach is a prerequisite that the researcher 
is independent of the research. 
Glaser and Strauss shifted the emphasis from testing theories to their 
generation.  They argued that good theory was systematically discovered from 
and verified with the data of social research (Blaikie, 2010).  Furthermore they 
advocated an inductive process whereby theory generation is intimately 
involved in the process of research rather than distinct and separate from it 
(Blaikie, 2010). The components of grounded theory include simultaneous 
involvement in data collection and analysis, constructing analytic codes and 
categories from data rather than preconceived logically deduced hypothesises, 
constant comparisons during each stage of the analysis, advancing theory 
development during each stage of data collection and analysis, memo writing to 
elaborate categories, define relationships between categories and identify gaps, 
sampling aimed at theory construction rather than population 
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representativeness and conducting the literature review after developing 
independent analysis (Charmaz, 2012).   
Given the exploratory nature of the current research, the complexity and 
intangibility surrounding auditor selection described in Chapter 1 and the lack 
of existing theory in professional services supplier selection explained in 
Chapter 2, grounded theory provides a systematic and proven approach to 
support the generation of theory in this study.  Moreover grounded theory, 
accepting the complex nature of organisational life (Glaser, 1992; Heath and 
Cowley, 2004), is consistent with the social constructionist ontological and 
interpretivist epistemological position adopted for the study as explained earlier 
in this chapter. 
The approach advocated by grounded theory has however been adapted for 
this study principally in two ways. Firstly grounded theory as originally 
espoused, proposes limited prior knowledge of the research area. This is 
important so as to avoid contamination of the data which may occur as a result 
of any preconceptions the researcher may bring to the study (Pettigrew and 
Fenton, 2000). In this study however the researcher’s business development 
position and experience working in the auditing profession would inevitably 
preclude an approach based on grounded theory as it was originally proposed 
and defended by Glaser (1992).  Secondly, and similarly the literature review 
was not conducted after the completion of the research but rather before and 
during it providing further risks of contamination if measured against grounded 
theory as proposed by Glaser (1992). Strauss however has suggested that some 
researcher knowledge and experience or depth of reading before collecting data 
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is both beneficial to theory development and unavoidable (Strauss and Corbin, 
1998; Heath and Cowley, 2004; Speakman, 2008). 
In this study the Researcher’s own knowledge and current experience of 
working as a qualified chartered accountant for a Big 4 firm was important to 
the study. It enabled access to a rich pool of data (as will be further explained 
below) and, as also further explained below, facilitated access to those involved 
in a large proportion of auditor selection decisions during a key part of the 
research. Importantly and consistent with Beattie and Fearnley (1995),  it 
enabled a relationship of trust to be established with those involved in the study 
because of the confidentiality assurance and the common professional ground 
which existed because both researcher and most of those researched were 
qualified accountants. 
In relation to this study therefore, although the assumptions of grounded 
theory design are not inherent in the research, the organisation of the data 
collection and analysis are heavily influenced by it. In addition the principles of 
grounded theory have also been used as a basis of the methods used to uncover 
emergent theory.   
A grounded approach consists of systematic data collection and analysis in 
order to construct theory which is grounded in the data itself (Charmaz, 2006). 
In this study the grounded approach is taken whereby emergent theory in 
relation to the auditor selection decisions taken by FTSE 350 companies is 
grounded in the accounts of those involved in the decision.  It is important that 
no prior hypothesis was developed. This approach follows and is consistent with 
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grounded theory where the aim is to conduct research with few or no 
preconceptions or hypotheses and allow emergent themes in the research to 
shape development of theory through a series of coding and reflection stages 
(Spiggle, 1994; Speakman, 2008).  This grounded approach fits most closely 
with the later work of Straus and Corbin (1990;1998) where data analysis is 
bound by the preconceived themes identified through prior knowledge and 
literature review (Charmaz 2006; Easterby -Smith et al., 2002).  
3.2. Research methods 
To address the research question of how FTSE350 companies make their 
auditor selection decisions in competitive proposals, the study captured the 
views of those involved in auditor selection. Since, as shown in Section 1.4.2, 
auditor changes have been until recently comparatively rare, the study 
examined post-decision interviews and records of such interviews, with 
FTSE350 companies for a ten-year period from August 2002 (the acquisition of 
Andersen by Deloitte, the last major consolidation in the UK FTSE 350 audit 
market) until the end of September 2012. 
3.2.1. Identifying the research population 
The researcher worked with one of the ‘Big 4’ audit firms and the 
population was initially identified in three stages. Firstly the firm’s internal 
proposals records were reviewed and checked against the lists of FTSE 350 
constituents published quarterly by the Financial Times to identify proposals 
performed by companies whilst in the FTSE 350. Secondly those lists of FTSE 
350 constituent companies were further reviewed for evidence of an auditor 
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change (or “switch”) and where a switch was present the companies’ accounts 
were reviewed to identify whether or not that switch involved a proposal which 
may not have included the firm. Lastly, the accounts and other stock exchange 
announcements, where relevant, of those companies in the index at any quarter 
during the last two years of the period were reviewed for evidence of any 
proposal. As noted in Chapter 1, there may be omissions where both no 
disclosures were made of a tender in the company’s annual report and the Big 4 
firm had no record, but the numbers of these exceptions is likely to be small. 
Companies’ annual reports disclose the name of the company’s auditor so any 
auditor switches can be easily identified. In addition, even where there had been 
no change, companies’ annual reports also include details of corporate 
governance and other audit committee activity. It would be unusual for a 
company to undertake a tender and not explain that they had done so. The 
tender would normally be considered to be part of the corporate governance 
activity undertaken by the company and overseen by the audit committee and 
therefore also be disclosed in the annual report. 
Also as noted in Chapter 1, during the research period the firm 
subsequently submitted details of audit tenders to the Competition 
Commission. This process involved significant further investigation and 
consultation internally and cross referencing to external databases. The 
population initially identified was reconciled to that submission with only two 
additional tenders in the research period being identified. 
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3.2.2. Achieving the research sample 
 The research attempted to consider as many of the auditor selection 
decisions from competitive tenders identified in the population as possible and 
covered situations where the incumbent auditor was retained as well as those 
where an auditor switch occurred.  As set out in Table 12 below, it proved 
possible to consider 60 auditor selection decisions in competitive proposals.  
Table 12: Summary of the research sample 
Having obtained consent from the Big 4 firm, for the first 8 years of the 
study period (“Phase 1”), the firm’s post proposal interview records were 
examined. It proved possible to obtain post tender decision interview records 
for 43 of 83 decisions (52%) taken in that period   
For the most recent two years of the study period (“Phase 2”) 17 of the 28 
decisions (61%) taken in that period were examined in greater detail including 
in depth interviews regarding a specific auditor appointment covering the 
companies selecting auditors (the FTSE350 decision makers) and, where the Big 
  Research Phase 
(as set out above) 
Decision 
Period 
Population Decisions sample Coverage     
Total Auditor 
switches 
Auditor 
retentions 
Total 
 
  % 
 Phase 1 data 
analysis  
August 
2002  
to May 
2010 
83 34 9 43     52 
 Phase 2 
In depth interviews 
of which: 
Company only (2a) 
Company and  
Big 4 firm 
partner(2b) 
Mid 2010 
to 
September 
2012 
 
 
28 12 
 
 
4 
 
 
8 
5 
 
 
1 
 
 
4 
   17 
 
 
     5 
 
 
   12 
    61 
 Total  111 46 14 60      54 
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4 firm was involved in those tenders, also the key partners in the audit firm 
involved in the tender.  
In total, therefore, the 60 tenders considered by the research covered some 
54% of the 111 total tender population identified as having been undertaken over 
the approximately ten year period. 
3.2.3. Data gathering 
The next two subsections set out the data gathering process. Phase 1 was 
based on the pre-existing post auditor selection decision records maintained by 
the Big 4 firm. Phase 2 was then based on semi structured interviews conducted 
under research conditions. 
Phase 1: Review of professional firm’s interview records August 
2002 to May 2010 
The firm’s feedback from tenders normally involves an interview with at 
least one member of the selection committee conducted by someone 
independent of the tendering team; typically a senior partner of that firm or a 
senior member of the business development team. Interview results are 
documented in notes prepared at the time; sometimes the notes of more than 
one interview are collated for any one decision. 66 interview notes were 
obtained covering the 43 tender decisions identified above.  Each interview 
typically lasts one hour so some 66 hours of interview material was considered.  
In each case the interview record contained an outline of the reasons companies 
gave for their selection decision, although in some cases the notes were quite 
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short and they provided a less rich picture than others. The interview records 
also of course could only relate to the tenders that the firm was involved in. The 
sample selected however included interviews only with those actively involved 
in a recent FTSE 350 auditor selection decision at the time of the interview and 
therefore included only those with recent experience of being involved in such a 
decision. It was thus a highly purposive sample. The later phases of this 
research also included tenders that the firm was not involved with and were 
recorded and subscribed (or in a small number recorded with cross checked 
notes). These later phases are considered next. 
Phase 2: In depth semi structured interviews June 2010 to  
July 2012 
Where a tender was identified in this period a semi structured interview 
with at least one person involved in the selection process was conducted as soon 
as possible after the tender’s completion.  Those interviewed included company 
executive management and non-executive directors from the companies’ audit 
committees.  As noted above it proved possible to conduct these company 
interviews in relation to 17 decisions or 61% of the 28 proposals identified. In 
total 23 interviews were conducted covering tenders both that the Big 4 firm 
was involved in and those it was not.  
Because the firm was involved in 12 of the 17 decisions examined in these 
cases, an interview was also conducted with one or more partners on the 
tendering team. These interviews covered 43% of the total 28 proposals 
identified. The total number of partner interviews conducted was 24.  
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In total 47 interviews were therefore conducted in the two parts of Phase 2. 
Each of these interviews was again typically an hour in length, so some 47 hours 
of interview material was collected. This meant that well over 100 hours of 
interview material was included in the study as a whole when Phases 1 and 2 are 
taken together. 
The selection of the semi structured interview for Phase 2 
The semi structured interview technique was selected for Phase 2 as it was 
considered to meet most closely the objectives of the research and was 
consistent with both previously successful research into auditor selection.  
Beattie and Fearnley, 1998a, page 77) commented that a semi structured 
interview “enables interviewees to provide responses in their own terms and in 
the way that they think and use language.  The semi structured interview 
approach also serves to focus on understanding the dynamics present within 
single settings” and with industry practice for audit post tender reviews.  
Kvale (1983) defines the qualitative research interview as “an interview, 
whose purpose is to gather descriptions of the life-world of the interviewee with 
respect to interpretation of the meaning of the described phenomena” (page 
174). The aim is to focus on “specific situations and action sequences in the 
world of the interviewee” (Kvale, 1983, page 176).  A qualitative interview 
approach is consistent with the research objective of understanding the auditor 
selection decision from the worldview of those who had been involved in it. The 
use of semi-structured structured interview techniques also facilitates the 
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gathering of richer and more insightful data and facilitates comparison between 
interviews conducted with different interviewees (Bryman 2001; Rowley, 2011) 
Furthermore the semi structured interview has been considered the most 
appropriate for social construction of situated accounts (Qu and Dumay, 2011) 
where “social phenomena do not exist independently of people’s understandings 
of them and that those understandings play a crucial generative role” 
(Hammersley, 2007, page 297).  The method is therefore consistent with the 
underlying philosophical position taken by the study. Semi-structured 
interviews also help develop understanding of the ways in which managers 
make sense of their jobs and their environment and create meaning from them. 
The issue becomes how to get inside the life world of managers so that the 
researcher is able to interpret this life world from within (Schwartzmann, 1993). 
The semi-structured interview protocol and approach 
A semi-structured interview protocol was developed which was designed to 
enable the interviewees to explain the auditor selection decision from their 
viewpoint. The protocol also included prompts to explore the five themes 
identified from the literature review. These themes were capabilities and 
competences, relationships, the degree to which proposals were tailored to their 
needs, the behaviour of the firms during the process, and decision making. This 
helped to provide a frame for the discussion although in practice interviews 
flowed naturally as a conversation about the tender process and the decision as 
it progressed from initiation to final decision. The protocol also contained a 
prompt at the end to ask the interviewees to reflect upon what had been 
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discussed and to think about whether there were other matters that they 
considered may have been relevant to the decision. 
The protocol was tested in the first three interviews before being reviewed. 
This review confirmed the interview protocol was working satisfactorily. A copy 
of the final interview protocol is set out in Appendix III. 
Each interview was conducted with a consistent approach which included 
an initial briefing about the purpose of the interview and an expression of 
interest to hear about events as the interviewees saw them.  Interviews were 
then conducted initially using open questions to encourage interviewees to talk 
through the audit selection decision process from the start and including how 
the final decision was made and including events or interactions that took place 
during the tender that the interviewee felt was important. After these 
introductory questions a range of questioning techniques was adopted 
consistent with Kavle and Brinkman (2009) including: 
 Follow up questions to encourage interviewees to extend their answers 
and including verbal cues such as “mm” and non verbal cues such as 
nods of recognition. 
 Probing questions to explore matters raised in more depth. 
 Specifying questions aimed at gaining a more precise understanding of 
what was being said. 
 Direct questions to clarify comments made. 
 Indirect questions to explore the interviewees views on how others were 
feeling or viewing things. 
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 Structuring questions to move the conversation along. 
 Silence to enable interviewees to reflect and develop their thinking. 
 Interpreting questions to confirm understanding of meaning in what 
was being said. 
Of the 23 company interviews conducted 16 were digitally recorded and 
transcribed. In each case where the interview was not recorded (typically due to 
concerns about  commercial confidentiality) a senior executive from the firm 
who was not on the client bidding team was also present at the interview with 
this researcher and, following the interview, notes were prepared independently 
and then discussed to agree what was actually said.  A similar approach was 
taken for the partner interviews where 21 out of 24 were digitally recorded and 
transcribed. 
To illustrate the approach and by way of example, a transcript of one of the 
Phase 2a interviews (with names anonymised) is set out in Appendix IV. 
Both company and partner interviews (with one exception) were 
conducted at the interviewee’s offices either in their own office or in a meeting 
room or boardroom to help ensure that the content of the conversation was 
confidential to those involved and interviewees felt at ease. 
3.2.4. Data analysis 
Interview notes for both phases were coded using Nvivo 9 and adopting an 
initial coding and a splitting approach (Saldana, 2009).  Coding adopted a 
grounded research approach with no pre-coding any data. Codes were also 
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employed with simultaneous coding where data was considered relevant to 
more than one node (Saldana, 2009).  
Before concluding initial coding, the original code assignments and 
descriptions were reviewed to ensure that the code description fairly reflected 
the coded data and that the coded data were sufficiently consistent within the 
node. This resulted in some changes to a number of node names and recoding to 
ensure that the nodes really did fairly reflect the underlying data. There was also 
further splitting of a small number of codes. In particular nodes for meetings 
during the process, proposal documents and presentations were split to identify 
the individual elements within which were mentioned in the data. 
Appendix V shows a screenshot (redacted to preserve confidentiality) of 
the initial coding that was applied to one part of the interview transcript 
example set out in Appendix IV, namely as it related to certain comments made 
about the company’s relationship with its incumbent auditor. The initial coding 
and consolidating axial codes applied are shown in the coding stripes. These 
axial codes were created using the process set out next. 
The second cycle coding process was undertaken to develop a sense of 
categorical, thematic and conceptual organisation from the first cycle codes 
(Saldana, 2009). Initial coding had identified a large number of factors and 
some potential groupings. During second cycle the number and description of 
nodes was then subject to a process of reflection, exploring tentative groupings 
and relationships through the use of manual spider diagrams. Building on the 
initial coding, axial coding was employed to reassemble data that were “split” 
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during the initial coding process (Strauss and Corbin, 1998, p124). The axial 
codes were reviewed extensively and some reassignment of individual nodes 
between these codes. Some nodes were also merged with others where it was 
apparent that the data they included related to the same issue as other nodes.  
An example of part of the coding framework is set out Appendix VI. This 
contains that coding previously illustrated in Appendix V. The audit trail here is 
therefore from the transcript (where on pages 472-473 of this thesis the original 
comment about dissatisfaction was recorded), to the initial and axial coding 
illustrated in Appendix V through to the coding framework shown in Appendix 
VI. The codes identified in Appendix VI and the underlying text coded then 
support the narrative set out in findings (the relevant section is 5.2.1). 
Coding was recorded in three independent Nvivo files for Phase 1 and each 
of the company and partners analysis for Phase 2. As Phase 1 was completed 
first this enabled the development of a conceptual model which was revised and 
developed during Phase 2.  This approach also facilitated the independent 
analysis of each phase (and group within Phase 2) to ensure that the analysis 
was true to the data in that group and any differences between the phases (and 
groups) could be easily identified. Having said that, ex post comparisons were 
made across the phases to ensure that coding was using a consistent approach 
for the same underlying references. 
Once complete the initial coding gave rise to some 1800 nodes in total 
across the two phases.  Whilst the Phase 1 interviews were less detailed and not 
always completed using the probing techniques later developed, they did 
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nonetheless provide a large data set that which formed the basis for the initial 
conceptual model. This in turn then informed the construction of the more 
detailed interview protocol explained above which was designed to probe more 
deeply. 
In some cases references were assigned to more than one node because the 
comments identified were relevant to more than one issue.   In a number of 
cases the interpretation was challenging due to some ambiguity in the notes. For 
example, perhaps the most challenging area in the interpretation of data was in 
separating competence (the skills and competences that audit firms and teams 
had) from approach. For example in one interview a comment was made that 
one firm fell well short of the top two and on one technical area was a long way 
adrift. It would have been possible to attribute this comment either to a lack of 
resources in a particular area or a shortcoming in the proposed approach. When 
these cases occurred careful consideration was given to the content in the 
surrounding interview notes and the overall situation pertaining to that 
proposal as set out in the interview notes before deciding upon the most 
appropriate existing node or setting up a new one. 
The second cycle coding then involved reflection and exploring groupings 
and relationships as explained above. This second stage coding also drew on the 
themes that had been emerging from the contextual considerations explored in 
Chapter 1 and the themes which had been discussed in Chapter 2.  
Chapter Three 
Methodology 
 
 
135 
 
During the coding process a number of factors emerged quite naturally. 
These factors contained other nodes where individual or smaller groups of 
matters identified in the interview records had been captured. The second phase 
of coding was then completed using both reflections from context and literature 
and the formative factors to create factor groups influencing auditor selection as 
shown in Figure 7. 
Figure 8: Developing the factor groups influencing auditor selection 
As noted above, the initial coding phase included examples of assigning 
interview record content to more than one node. Having completed second 
stage, axial coding it was apparent that there were examples which included  
connections across the five factor groups influencing auditor selection(for 
example where a past incumbent relationship had been impacted by the way 
that an audit firm had dealt with a technical accounting issue) , within factor 
group  (for example where an audit firm’s thorough preparation for meetings 
was connected with their understanding of the business), or simply because one 
paragraph of interview documentation contained unconnected content  that was 
mentioned in the same paragraph of the interview notes and the whole 
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paragraph had been coded to all the relevant nodes so as to facilitate subsequent 
axial coding based on an understanding of the context of the comment. The 
issue of connections between factor groups is returned to under results. 
Phase 1 axial coding culminated in a number of factors which represented 
related decision influences. This is explained further in Chapter 4. The factors 
identified were further placed within five factor groups influencing auditor 
selection and these are also explained below under findings.  The process of 
axial coding took place of a number of months as coding was reviewed to ensure 
that the individual nodes were accurately coded to subcategories that fairly 
reflected the substance of the comments contained in the interview records. 
Although there was a rich range of individual stories, the overall factor groups 
identified proved to be consistent between all three independent analyses: 
Phase 1, Phase 2 company interviews and Phase 2 partner interviews and 
aligned to the literature as the research progressed. 
For each of Phases 2a and 2b, one interview was check coded by a 
researcher independent of the study. The results of the check coding were 
compared with the original coding.  The check coder was provided only with the 
overall background to the study and the two interview transcripts.  The coding 
framework and coding was not shared in advance, making this a challenging test 
of the coding. On the first pass, there were some differences in terminology 
between the original coding and the check coding. For example one of the factor 
groups influencing auditor selection identified was behavioural influences 
during the tender process. The check coding had identified this as “Process 
Influences”. A detailed discussion followed the check coding during which the 
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coding framework originally used was discussed with the check coder. The 
purpose of this discussion and related reflection was to confirm whether 
differences identified were solely terminological or indicative of underlying 
problems in the original coding. During the course of this process the check 
coder confirmed that had they had access to the coding framework prior to 
check coding they would have used those codes. In other words the differences 
were overwhelmingly minor differences of terminology. Aside from these 
differences of terminology the check coding was consistent with the original 
coding with only a few minor differences representing less than 10 per cent of 
the check codes. 
3.2.5. Ethical considerations 
Ethical considerations are important to interview based research because 
of the nature of the interaction between the interviewer and interviewee 
“researching private lives and placing accounts in the public arena” (Birch et al., 
2002, page 1). As a result researchers conducting qualitative research should 
observe high ethical standards. This research was conducted having been 
approved by Cranfield’s ethical standards. 
Four fields of ethical uncertainty have been identified in connection with 
interview research which are normally addressed by ethical guidelines (Kvale 
and Brinkman, 2009). These are informed consent, confidentiality, 
consequences and the role of the researcher. How each of these related to the 
research and the actions taken to maintain the highest ethical standards is now 
explored in turn. 
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Informed consent 
Informed consent involves informing the research participants about the 
overall purpose of the study and the main features of the design. It also entails 
communicating any risks and potential benefits involved in participating in the 
study (Kvale and Brinkman, 2009). 
For this study the interviews were arranged in slightly different ways 
depending upon the research participant. For Phase 1 consent to use the data 
was obtained from management of the Big 4 firm and,  as for other interviews, 
references to interview records remained unattributable. 
For Phase 2 three different processes were used to obtain informed 
consent from research participants: 
Where the Big 4 firm had participated in the tender, interview 
arrangements were facilitated with company officials by partners and staff at the 
Big 4 firm who had been involved in the tender. In these cases the interview also 
formed part of the firm’s proposal post decision review process as described. In 
every case however the researcher informed interviewees of the intention to 
include the interviews within the research either in a written communication 
prior to the meeting or at the interview.  Research participants were given the 
opportunity to decline an interview or accept the interview but restrict its 
purpose solely for the Big 4 firms’ post decision review process. In all but one 
case research participants consented to inclusion of the interview material in 
the research. In one case the interviewee confirmed that they were happy to 
conduct an interview but solely for the purposes of the Big 4 firm’s post decision 
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review process. In this case the interview was conducted for the Big 4 firm but 
the results were excluded entirely from the study. 
For interviews with the Big 4 firm’s partners, interviews were organised 
directly and consent was obtained directly prior to the interview. 
Where the Big 4 firm was not involved in the tender, interviews were 
facilitated through partners with other business relationships with the research 
participants. In these cases consent was obtained at the interview. In these cases 
interview participants were given the opportunity to restrict the use of interview 
material to solely for the purposes of the research and not to provide any 
information back to the Big 4 firm. In these cases their preferences were 
respected in every case. 
In summary therefore informed consent was obtained for the use of the 
Big 4 firm’s data from that firm’s management prior to Phase 1 and from each 
research participant prior to each interview in Phase 2. 
Confidentiality 
Confidentiality implies that the private data identifying the participants 
will not be disclosed. Where information may be recognisable to others, the 
participants should agree to the release of this identifiable information (Kvale 
and Brinkman, 2009). 
For the purposes of maintaining confidentiality the position of three types 
of interview participants was considered. 
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For the Big 4 firm permission was obtained to conduct the research in 
general and to disclose findings as long as nothing could be attributed to 
individual clients and partners. This included contributing to discussion with 
Financial Reporting Council concerning findings. 
For interviewees who had been part of the Big 4 firm’s post decision review 
programme no individual comments have been identified; rather, as noted 
above the types of comments were identified. 
For interviewees forming part of Phase 2 commitments were made to 
ensure that comments included within the study were non attributable. 
Assurances that comments made would be non-attributable were provided to 
the research participants.  During the research a request was obtained from the 
Competition Commission to provide post decision review data for a five year 
period to February 2012. This included a number of interviews which formed 
part of this study. The request so far as it related to the interviews covered by 
the research was initially declined given the commitments which had been given 
to research participants that their information would be non attributable. In 
theory it may have been possible to mask or redact content of interview notes to 
maintain anonymity however there remained a substantial risk that 
interviewees could be identified by the circumstances of the proposal. Legal 
advice was obtained from the firm’s competition lawyers who advised the 
substantial rights and responsibilities of the Competition Commission which 
meant that they were bound to maintain confidentiality and not to make public 
any information relating to individuals without their prior consent. Should 
information requested be withheld substantial financial penalties could have 
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been imposed. After consultation with Cranfield University involving the 
supervisor of this study, the university’s ethics committee and the Vice 
Chancellor and following an express instruction from the Big 4 firm, the 
interview notes were released. Subsequent Competition Commission reports 
make no specific reference to the data requested. 
Consequences 
The consequences of a qualitative study need to be considered to ensure 
that any potential harm to the participant should be the least possible and that 
the overall benefits accruing from the research outweigh any potential harm 
(Kvale and Brinkman, 2009). This means that the balance between benefits and 
risks should be considered. 
The practical benefits of the study to understanding of the auditor 
selection decision in an environment where there were likely to be more audit 
tenders for companies, auditors and regulators was discussed above. The 
potential contribution to theory in the area of professional services supplier 
selection in an area where there is a paucity of research have also been 
discussed previously. 
The risks to participants including interviewees and the Big 4 firm were 
assessed. The risks to interviewees given commitments made to non-
attributable comments were assessed as minimal. There was potential for the 
Big 4 firm to be commercially disadvantaged by disclosing information which 
could be generally helpful to firms supplying audit services as it would help to 
explain buyer influences on this important decision. This was specifically 
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discussed with the leadership of the Big 4 firm who considered to the benefits to 
industry and the regulators of providing greater transparency around auditor 
selection outweighed any potential commercial disadvantages. 
The role of the researcher 
The role of the researcher and in particular their integrity is critical to the 
quality of the knowledge obtained. In interviewing, the integrity of the 
researcher is especially important as the researcher him/herself is the 
instrument for obtaining scientific knowledge (Kvale and Brinkman, 2009). 
In this study the potential influences on the independence of the 
researcher were identified at the outset. The research study is sponsored by a 
Big 4 firm and the researcher is employed by that firm. In relation to the 
influence of the Big 4 firm, no constraints or restrictions were provided; indeed 
that firm has encouraged transparency internally and externally to demystify 
the auditor selection decision. The researcher’s own integrity was maintained by 
complete transparency of purpose and by honouring commitments made to 
interviewees. Even in response to intervention from the Competition 
Commission with substantial statutory powers information was not released 
until the public position of research participants was assured and detailed 
advice had been obtained from Cranfield University and the Big 4 firm’s senior 
partners and the firm’s legal advisers. 
.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
RESEARCH FINDINGS: PHASE 1 
REVIEW OF INTERVIEW RECORDS AUGUST 2002 TO MAY 2010  
4.0. Introduction 
The research findings chapters are organised so as to report the findings 
from the analysis of data relevant to answering the research question: 
“What are the factors affecting the auditor selection decisions of         
FTSE 350 companies in competitive tenders?” 
In line with the phased approach explained in the methodology chapter 
under Section 3.2 and following 
the contextual explanation 
(Chapter 1) and literature 
review(Chapter 2), these 
findings are organised into 
three further chapters; each 
covering one phase of the 
research as set out in Figure 8. 
Chapter 4 explores the 
findings from the analysis of interview records provided by a Big 4 firm for the 
period August 2002 to May 2010. Following this introduction this chapter is 
split into six sections.  
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The first section explains the five factor groups influencing auditor 
selection that were identified from the analysis. These were consistent with and 
developed upon the themes which were highlighted from the literature review. 
As well as considering these five factor groups independently, the analysis also 
extends the themes identified from the literature review by identifying the 
factors underlying these themes in the auditor selection context  and also starts 
to consider the linkages between them that the analysis identified (this latter 
point is then developed following the analysis of the two parts of Phase 2). 
Five further sections then discuss in turn these factor groups influencing 
auditor selection namely; Relationships and track record (at the start of the 
proposal process), Service design, Capabilities and competences (of the 
proposing firms and teams), Behavioural influences (during the process) and 
Final decision making. Chapter 4 then concludes with the outline of an initial 
conceptual model. 
Following this chapter there are two further chapters that examine the 
results from Phases 2a and 2b respectively. Chapter 5 discusses the findings 
from Phase 2a, consisting of 23 in depth semi- structured interviews conducted 
with company executives and non-executive directors with recent experience of 
involvement in 17 different auditor selection decisions which took place in the 
period between May 2010 and September 2012.  This chapter is structured in a 
manner consistent with Chapter 4 and, as will be explained, the analysis of these 
data supported the influence of the same five factor groups; although as will be 
shown the analysis  did reveal some differences  both in the nature and in the 
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weight of certain underlying influences. Chapter 5 includes the discussion of 
revised conceptual model. 
Chapter 6 then sets out the findings from Phase 2b which involved a 
further 24 in depth semi-structured interviews conducted with partners of a Big 
4 firm and covering 12 of the 17 decisions analysed in Phase 2a; those being the 
decisions where that firm tendered. The analysis of this final set of data 
produced consistent results with the other two phases in that the same five 
factor groups influencing auditor selection were present, but there were again 
differences between the nature and frequencies of mention of each individual 
higher order category as compared to the first two phases. 
Discussion of the findings and the contribution of the thesis to theory and 
practice are then included within Chapter 7. 
Throughout the three phases the term “reference” will be used to mean the 
presence of a topic in the data and its extraction into an Nvivo code. This is 
consistent with the terminology used in the Nvivo software.  The term 
“interview records” will be used to describe the post tender interview data 
provided by the Big 4 firm and used in Phase 1.  
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4.1. Review of Big 4 firm’s post tender interview records:          
August 2002 to May 2010 
 The first set of results relate to  Phase 1 of the research namely  the 
analysis of the post decision interview records provided by a Big 4 firm for the 
period August 2002 to May 2010 and the creation of an initial conceptual 
model. The analysis was conducted in accordance with the approach set out in 
Section 3.2.4 above.  
In total 66 
contemporaneous post decision 
review interview records (or 
“sources”) were analysed. Across 
the interview records the 
analysis identified 515 nodes and 
2251 references (as defined 
above) in relation to the tender 
decisions analysed, were 
assigned to these nodes (on 
average some 34 references per interview record).  The axial coding process 
described in Chapter 3 assigned these nodes into factors which in turn fell 
within five factor groups influencing the auditor selection decision.  The 
presence of these five factor groups was very clear with each being present in 
over 90% of the interview records. As noted in Section 4.0 the five factor groups 
influencing the auditor selection decision identified were: Relationships and 
track record (at the start of the proposal process), Service design, Capabilities 
Figure 9: Phase 1 within the overall research 
approach 
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and competences (of the competing firms and teams), Behavioural influences 
(during the proposal process) and Final decision making.  
 
Figure 10: Five factor groups of influences on auditor selection 
In the next five sections the factor groups are each considered in turn. As 
noted above, all five factor groups were very prevalent and no particular 
inference should be drawn at this stage from the order in which they are 
presented. Within each factor group, individual factors are presented in 
descending order determined by the number of interview records (or sources) 
which were found to refer to them. 
Throughout reference will be made to the number of interviews where 
particular issues were highlighted in the interview notes and, in places, also the 
number of references made to them in those notes. This has been done to 
provide some indication of the regularity of occurrence although it is 
acknowledged that because this stage of the research is based on interview 
records rather than transcripts, these results can only be indicative. Each of 
these notes provided insights concerning the auditor selection decision for the 
company concerned, however the interview records contained varying degrees 
of detail so they provide only an approximation of the number of times each 
matter was mentioned. A more accurate assessment of occurrence is provided 
by Phase 2. 
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In addition selected extracts from the interview notes will be used to help 
to illustrate how factor groups and individual factors were manifest in the 
interview records. 
4.2. Relationships and past track record at the start of the 
tender process 
 
The analysis of the findings of Phase 1 of the research identified the 
relationship context and events leading up to the audit proposal as important 
influences on the auditor selection decision. This was present in each of the 
interview records and 509 references were recorded. 
This first phase of the research identified four main factors of data in the 
interview records concerning the relationships which companies had with their 
incumbent auditors and other firms leading up to a tender process.  These are 
set out in Table 13 along with the numbers of sources and references identified 
for each.  
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Factors Sources References 
Audit firm incumbency 62 361 
 Track record  53 155 
 Inherent position for incumbent auditors 42 147 
 Auditor transition 34 59 
Non-audit services track record and targeting 31 73 
Past and current relationships at other companies 20 35 
Alumni 13 20 
Other relationship matters 14 19 
Table 13: Phase 1 relationships and track record sources and references by factor (NB the sum of 
the sources within the audit incumbency subheading exceeds the disclosed total number of 
sources due to consolidation in the Nvivo analysis i.e. where a source interview record included 
references to more than one subcategory. This consolidation does not affect the number of 
references). 
The four main individual factors influencing auditor selection namely 
audit firm incumbency, non-audit services track record and targeting, past and 
current relationships at other companies and alumni are now considered in 
more detail. Further comments are also made about the other relationship 
matters identified. 
The consideration of findings starts with the company’s relationship with 
its incumbent auditor which was by far the most prevalent topic identified.  
4.2.1. Audit firm incumbency 
The relationship between the tendering company and its incumbent 
auditor was discussed in 62 (94%) of the interview records analysed and 361 
references were recorded from those records; making it perhaps unsurprisingly 
a very substantial part of the discussion about past relationships. 
Furthermore the analysis identified the relationship of the company with 
its incumbent auditor (and therefore the potential for that auditor to be re-
appointed) being influenced both by the specific service track record of delivery 
provided by the incumbent auditor but also by inherent situational 
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circumstances. These latter influences included those forces which were 
inherently encouraging change, those inherently favouring the incumbent and 
considerations pertaining to the pros and cons of auditor transition. Each of 
these influences on auditor selection pertaining to the incumbent is now 
considered in turn. 
Past service track record 
Consistent with the high switching rates identified in Section 1.4.2 and the 
discussion of switching covered in Chapter 2, the interview records identified a 
much higher proportion of companies with service problems in the period 
leading up to the tenders. In total past service problems were explicitly 
identified in 46 (70%) of the source interview records. Most commonly 
problems had contributed to putting the audit out to tender and although there 
was not in most cases a definitive position to change they did leave the 
incumbent auditor in a weaker position. The following interview record 
reference typifies the tone: 
Chair of audit committee: [Audit firm] had had a lot of ground to make 
up and some might have been inclined to forgive them the past but this was 
probably not realistic. 
In contrast only 20 (30%) of the interviews identified a positive incumbent 
track record (NB in a small number of cases the records identified both 
problems and positives). This normally occurred where audit proposals were 
driven by auditor consolidation or by a perceived corporate governance need for 
a tender. 
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In many of the interview records comments made about incumbent 
auditors related to general levels of dissatisfaction. The interview records did 
however also highlight a number of specific problems that had been experienced 
with incumbent auditors and these are considered in the following sections.  
Dealing with technical accounting issues 
Amongst the specific problems identified, the failure of an audit firm to 
deal with accounting issues was the most prevalent (identified in 19 interview 
records) and especially when new standards were applied notably at the time of 
the implementation of new International Financial Reporting Standards 
(although not restricted to that).  
These instances included situations when companies became concerned 
that their lead audit partners were not empowered to approve accounting 
treatments adopted by the companies. (NB each of the major audit firms has a 
central department which assists audit partners on complex accounting matters. 
This group typically includes partners who work with standard setters to 
understand and interpret new accounting developments. They also typically 
coordinate meetings where a panel of audit partners may meet together to 
discuss a specific client accounting issue which is particularly complex or 
sensitive). A number of companies felt that their audit partners were being 
disempowered and the real decisions were being made behind the scenes. 
This is exemplified by an extract from an interview note containing a 
comment from one company finance director: 
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.. it seemed that the audit team had moved away from being able to 
answer [him] on technical issues . It seemed like a new laborious process had 
been introduced whereby cases were put on the table and then referred 
somewhere in the labyrinth of [audit firm] and then some days later while 
smoke or black smoke would appear..... the relationship had changed such that 
nothing could be done without referring back to head office... in spite of 
assurances given by [senior partner] [company finance director] doesn’t feel 
like the local team is empowered. 
Companies also expressed frustration when accounting issues were 
resolved too slowly or had concerns about the way these issues were being 
resolved. For example, where an incumbent audit firm was considered 
intransigent or was unwilling to enter into a debate.  
There was also concern where an audit firm had appeared to change its 
position on an accounting issue (from initially accepting the position put 
forward by a company to disagreeing with it) or where the same audit firm had 
signed an audit opinion at another company where the same issue had been 
dealt with in a different way.  
Other service problems identified 
Although failure to resolve accounting issues satisfactorily was the most 
frequently identified service problem in this first phase of research, other 
service problems were also identified albeit less often in the interview records. 
These included coordination and control of overseas offices (where concerns 
were identified about the lead office being able to control or coordinate its own 
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overseas network effectively (six instances), problems with non-audit services 
being delivered (six instances) which tainted the audit relationship (for example 
where there was a perceived failing in a non-audit assignment) and fee disputes 
(five instances). 
In addition to potential damage to the incumbent auditor’s chance of being 
reappointed following a tender process these service problems also appear to 
have had an influence on future service design and audit proposal evaluation 
criteria. Having gone through a poor experience in a particular area (for 
example accounting issue resolution) companies were sensitive to the issue and 
its importance increased when selecting a new auditor). This is returned to in 
Section 4.3 when service design is discussed. 
But as noted above the likelihood of an incumbent auditor to be 
reappointed seems not only to be affected by their service track record with the 
company. In addition to past service problems, the interview records also 
identified influences on the auditor selection decision driven by more general 
attributes associated with incumbency and these are considered next. 
Inherent position for incumbent auditors 
Inherent disadvantages for the incumbent were identified in 34 (52%) of 
the interview records. The themes which emerged are set out next. 
Forces for change 
The influences identified relating to the inherent position of an incumbent 
auditor were more often than not unfavourable. Forces for change were 
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identified in 18 interview records.  These included new management looking for 
new things (five instances). Incumbent firms were therefore at risk where there 
were new executives who wanted to change things as the following reference 
from an interview record exemplifies: 
[Group Financial Controller] explained that [CEO] and [CFO] had been 
generally looking across all their suppliers including professional services – 
“every adviser” and it was therefore natural that [incumbent auditor]  were 
going to be reviewed. Having said that however [CFO] had come in new and 
considered how things were done and it was not what he expected. 
The more general degree of change within the company was also seen on 
occasion to have created an environment where those involved were positive or 
at least more accepting of change (four instances). 
There were also examples of “guilt by association” (four instances) where 
companies had had their own accounting or internal control problems which 
were not considered to be the fault of the auditor but which still caused them to 
question the quality of that auditor’s work. Although the company was 
responsible for its own management and accounting  it still questioned “where 
were the auditors?” when things went wrong. 
Why now? 
In addition to these forces for change, incumbent auditors could also place 
themselves at risk by changing their service propositions in response to the 
proposal. Auditors were seen to be at a disadvantage through the very act of 
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trying to improve their service offering (nine instances). In these instances 
where incumbents had brought new ideas and innovation companies questioned 
why they had not done so before. Companies felt let down that an audit tender 
had been necessary to stimulate the offer of improved service from their 
incumbent auditor.  
Weighing against the inherent disadvantages was the value that companies 
saw in the knowledge that incumbent auditors had of companies and this is 
considered next. 
Incumbent knowledge 
Companies acknowledged the value of an established understanding of 
their business that incumbent auditors possessed (17 instances). Interestingly 
however the records often mentioned this when conducting a comparison of 
inherent advantages and disadvantages that an incumbent might have. There 
was a sense that this knowledge was recognised but in the context of other 
(stronger?) influences which were disadvantageous to the incumbent. 
 In addition, in eight cases incumbent knowledge was identified only as a 
shortlisting factor where companies were consolidating auditors following  a 
company merger (i.e. only incumbents were on the tender list but since they all 
had knowledge of some part of the group this did not necessarily provide an 
advantage to any one firm in the final decision making).   
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Audit transition 
The long tenure periods of FTSE 350 auditors and low overall switching 
rates were discussed in Chapter 1. One of the reasons highlighted for low 
switching rates was the cost of changing to a new auditor. New auditors would 
initially lack the cumulative knowledge and experience of an established 
incumbent. Although it is normal market practice for an incoming auditor to 
invest time in building their knowledge without charging the company for the 
costs incurred there is nonetheless and inevitably a degree of disruption for 
companies as they bring the new auditor up to speed. This process is normally 
referred to as audit transition. 
Audit transition was identified as a factor that could advantage the 
incumbent although the analysis identified quite a mixed picture as to its 
influence on the selection decision. There were in total 34 (52%) of the interview 
records which included references to audit transition. There were however only 
a slightly higher number (16 instances) where the  focus was on the potential 
risk and disruption of transition as compared to those which identified change 
as a positive (13 instances). 
Where transition was mentioned, concerns were identified about both the 
perceived risks of transition and the level of disruption. For example: 
[CFO] The discussion following the presentation had a large element 
around the risks of change. There were three people in the discussion who were 
ex-profession and so understood. There was a debate around the process of 
change and which parts might be easy and which might be more difficult.  
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From the records it wasn’t possible to identify the specific risks that 
companies were concerned about. The notes talk mainly about transition risk 
generally. Concerns over disruption however were normally associated with 
worries about the time investment that companies would have to make to effect 
the transition (NB: Oxera (2006) also identified inter alia transition concerns to 
include the time investment of management and the audit committee). 
Those influences encouraging an auditor change might be encapsulated by 
the term “time for a change” (13 instances). Within this group there was 
reference to the benefits of a “fresh look” (four instances) and the general view 
that change was a positive (three instances). One finance director commented: 
..there was something about a fresh pair of eyes and new ideas which 
made change attractive” 
It was also however noticeable that interview records identifying a positive 
attitude to change were often those which contained references to past service 
problems. So in many of these cases a readiness to change included a 
combination of past experience and attitude to change.  
The potential risks and disruption could also be mitigated by transition 
planning (10 instances).  The non-incumbent “challenger” firms sought to 
demonstrate that the risk and disruption of transition could be managed and 
mitigated. To support this detailed plans were submitted by the non-incumbent 
audit firms to demonstrate how they would work with the company to achieve 
this (five instances). This could also extend to the preparation and submission 
of plans for the audit itself (four instances). References were also made in the 
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interview records to the thoroughness of transition planning including the 
completion of audit plans as the next reference illustrates: 
[Chair of Audit Committee]: [Audit firm] gave the impression that they 
had done a lot of work already in terms of preparation for the audit. It 
seemed that they had done much of their audit planning.... This reinforced the 
impression that [audit firm] had done a lot of work to get the job. Their 
document was very detailed and gave the impression that they would be very 
hands on. 
Overall concerns over the potential risk and disruption caused by change 
seemed to have a varying although mostly relatively low influence on the auditor 
selection decision. There were some instances of transition concerns supporting 
the reappointment of the incumbent but for others these concerns were 
outweighed by other factors. The interview records also highlighted companies 
for whom transition risk was not considered to be significant at all. 
The analysis seems to indicate that once a tender is instigated, companies 
either want to change, or are open to change auditor and in this situation 
transition concerns are either discounted or planned for in their selection 
deliberations; the latter situation supported by transition plans submitted by 
the “challenger” firms. 
The incumbent auditor therefore appeared under threat in most audit 
proposals for service or other reasons associated more generally with 
incumbency; their service track record affecting both their reappointment 
chances and shaping service design. This contrasts with some previous 
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literature indicating that incumbent suppliers tend to have an advantage over 
new suppliers. 
4.2.2. Other (non-incumbent) audit firms’ relationships with 
the tendering company and targeting 
In the previous section the position of the incumbent auditor prior to an 
audit tender was discussed. The increasing restrictions on auditors performing 
other services for their audit clients were however discussed in Chapter 1. This 
has meant organisations having broader professional service relationships with 
the Big 4 and the likelihood of relationships and track records being developed 
which could influence the auditor selection. 
The analysis identified 31 (47%) of the interview records which referred to 
the influence of past non-audit service and targeting track records with the 
company and on the selection decision.  This included instances where firms 
had non-audit service relationships and where they were targeting the company 
(as defined below). 
Past non-audit service relationships 
The discussion of past non-audit service relationships (22 instances) 
included tax services (10 instances), transaction support (two instances), 
accounting advice and regulatory services. 
In the previous section the influence of a track record for an incumbent 
was identified. The interview records suggest that a similar influence can be 
established by other non-incumbent firms through their track record of 
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delivering other services; the way that a firm approached non-audit services 
being taken as indicative of the way that they might approach the audit.  
For the most frequently talked about service included here, taxation, of the 
10 instances identified seven were positive for the firm involved and only two 
negative. In the remaining case the company had tax relationships with all the 
firms. 
Indeed the track record on other services could be decisive as the following 
reference suggests: 
[CFO] So to the key question why did they go with [Firm x] rather than 
[Firm y]?  It became clear that they felt they had a proven working 
relationship with [Firm x].  This relationship had arisen from transaction 
history and from [Firm x] 
Conversely where there were problems with the non-audit services 
relationship there could be a similar negative influence on auditor selection (two 
instances).  
Targeting 
In addition to providing non-audit services the interviews also identified 
the influence of the closely related activity of company “targeting”.  Targeting in 
this context means a range of activities undertaken by a firm aimed at 
developing relationships and selling services to identified target companies. 
Over a quarter (18 instances) of the interview records included reference to 
activities and investments in marketing and relationship building undertaken by 
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the firms in an attempt to win work.  These included a range of activities from 
general contact to more formal programmes for non-executives. A number of 
interview records suggested this to be a positive influence both because of the 
value it had delivered and the message it communicated about the firms’ 
interest in working with the companies involved. For example: 
 [Firm x] had been targeting [Company] and had sent literature and had 
one or two meetings with the CFO...... They had also stayed in touch on tax. 
[ACC] had also been to at least one of their non-executive briefings in London. 
They were “dead keen” 
In 11 cases companies talked generally about the targeting efforts the firms 
had made and in nine of these cases they were identified either as a positive for 
a firm where this had taken place or a negative where it had not. 
4.2.3. Current and past relationships at other companies 
In the past two sections the influence of audit firms’ past service track 
records with tendering companies on auditor selection was considered. Section 
1.4.1 however also highlighted the presence of cross directorships and 
movements of directors between FTSE 350 companies. This means that many 
directors also have current or past personal experience of being served by audit 
firms and their partners and staff in other companies. This section therefore 
considers the Phase 1 interview record references as they related to past working 
relationships of those selecting auditors and the experience of working with 
auditors at current cross directorships. 
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Past service relationships at other companies. 
The interview records showed auditor selection committee members 
having had past audit and other service relationships at other companies (11 
instances) and normally (although not exclusively) these experiences had been 
positive.  
The interview records were not always detailed or explicit about the 
operation of these relationships but where the detail was explained it showed 
that past service relationships at other companies could be very influential.  For 
example positive aspects of delivery such as proven robustness and the ability to 
work together effectively were specifically highlighted in three cases and in two 
of those cases the proposing partner from the relevant firm had been the 
director’s audit partner previously.  The following reference illustrates the point: 
[CEO] The [successful non-incumbent] team was known to the key 
players on the Board and known to be robust and strong through the 
association [as auditors] at [his previous employment] 
Consistent with the previous subsection, pre-tender behaviour being taken 
as likely behaviour should the relevant firm be appointed. 
Current cross directorships 
Given the extent of cross directorships identified in Section 1.4.1 the 
number of interview records which referred to directors’ current cross 
directorships was perhaps relatively small (mentioned in only 8 interview 
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records). Where mentioned cross directorships were seen to complicate matters 
and these connections were not always positive for the audit firm involved.  
For example in one case a firm was excluded from the audit tender 
shortlist because a director had had a poor experience with that firm at another 
company where he was a director. In another case there were concurrent audit 
tenders being conducted by companies which had a common director. In this 
case it was suggested that it might be unlikely for the same firm to be appointed 
auditor to both companies as the director concerned would not want to 
concentrate their relationships with one firm. 
Another complication arose where in a tender for one company, a firm was 
offering something which a director hadn’t seen at another company where he 
was a director and that firm was the auditor. He was unimpressed that the 
tender had identified that the firm was offering a valuable service which he had 
not seen before. 
The interview records therefore identified the influence of service track 
records both positive and negative from outside the tendering company albeit 
that there were fewer mentions of this than the other relationship influences 
outlined above.  
Another source of potential influence on auditor selection came not from a 
service track record, but from past employment with one of the Big 4 firms.  The 
influence of alumni relationships is therefore considered next. 
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4.2.4. Alumni 
The high level of presence of Big 4 alumni as directors of FTSE 350 
companies was noted in Section 1.4.1.  An influence of alumni on auditor 
selection was confirmed by the current research, indeed alumni were referenced 
13 (20%) times in the source interview records. Interestingly however the 
influence of such alumni was not always positive for their “old firm”.  
There were examples in approximately equal numbers of alumni being 
involved in appointing their “old firm” and in appointing another firm. Although 
a degree of loyalty might have been expected the notes also showed antipathy. 
Other references acknowledged the sensitive position alumni and their 
former firms are in; the alumni not wishing to appear biased and their firms not 
seeking to put them in a difficult position. As the following reference illustrates: 
[Audit Committee Member] feels that alumni are “a double edged sword”. 
He thought dangers [sic]. Firstly alumni can be sensitive to their position and 
not wish to be seen to be too supportive of their old firm; they “aim off”. 
Secondly firms might “get more relaxed”. He questioned on [Company] 
whether the presence of two senior alumni of [Firm x] may have caused [Firm 
x] to put less effort into the proposal perhaps assuming some sense of an 
established relationship.  
The presence of alumni from the competing firms therefore appeared to 
influence auditor selection but the nature and extent of that influence could be 
different depending on the individual circumstances.  
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4.2.5. Other relationship matters 
Other matters 
Aside from the matters discussed in the subsections above, the interview 
data were perhaps also interesting because of the topics that they didn’t 
highlight or highlighted very thinly. For example, there was no data reference to 
friends influencing decisions. In the high profile environment explained in 
Chapter 1, the evidence from the interview records suggests and that 
relationship influences on the selection decision were being derived from past 
professional working relationships and not from other more social or personal 
relationships. Indeed as the example of alumni suggests, companies appeared 
sensitive not to let this introduce bias. 
Given the literature discussed in Chapter 2 and in the context of the rights 
of the auditor and generally long periods of auditor tenure discussed in Chapter 
1, it might have been expected that the research would highlight high levels of 
discussion about the influence of loyalty and/or trust. There were references to 
trust which included people looking for people they could trust and commenting 
adversely where they felt they could not trust people.  However the amount of 
discussion was low and trust was mentioned in only eight (12%) of the 
interviews. 
Furthermore there was very little reference to affective influences; other 
than a small number of instances which highlighted how companies became 
frustrated with what they saw as arrogance in failing to deal with accounting 
issues (this lack of apparent emotion in looking back may be contrasted with the 
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affective influences identified from behaviour during the process and 
considered below in Section 4.5). 
Again perhaps surprisingly, given the importance of word of mouth that 
had been highlighted by the literature in Chapter 2, the level of explicit 
comment on companies taking references on individuals or firms was low. In 
only six instances did the interview records identify companies taking 
references or talking to others outside the organisation more generally to obtain 
views on the competing firms or teams. In only one was an extensive exercise 
identified in relation to references. Consistent with the generally extensive 
processes highlighted in Chapter 1, companies appeared to be relying more on 
their own assessments and experiences. 
There was even less explicit reference to loyalty in this phase of the 
research (five instances).  Indeed in two of these cases comments related to how 
unimportant it was to the selection process. 
This section concludes the findings from the Big 4 interview records as 
they related to relationships and past track record at the start of proposal 
processes. They suggest a relationship influence on service design and expected 
behaviour. The next section now examines the next factor group namely audit 
service design. 
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4.3. Service design 
 
The second factor group influencing auditor selection is audit service 
design. The Phase 1 analysis of the interview records highlighted important 
elements of the audit service design, including planned execution and proposed 
outputs as influences on auditor selection. In total 61 (92%) of the interview 
records referred to it and there were 303 references. 
In Chapter 1 reference was made to Oxera (2006) identifying that an audit 
had three elements: insurance, core and value add. Oxera’s previous work was 
not fully supported by the current research. Phase 1 identified no explicit 
references to the audit as insurance. That said, as set out below, companies were 
looking for audit rigour (and the dominance of the Big 4 may have meant that 
any insurance element of the selection may have been considered present in 
each Big 4 firm and therefore assumed in the context of a selection decision 
between them).  
The analysis of Phase 1 also shows a difficulty in separating what is core 
from what is value added. For example an auditor is required under auditing 
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standards to review accounting controls, but the way the audit is organised to 
test those controls and feedback is identified as a source of value as will be 
further explored below. Similarly coordination and communication are essential 
for audit delivery but their manner and focus, and the quality of communication 
has also been identified as valuable feedback. 
After considering the material in the interview records which talks about 
whether audit can generally be differentiated by buyers of audit services, the 
analysis of specific differentiators is set out using a classification developed by 
Gronroos (2007). The Gronroos core and augmented services framework 
appeared to provide a better fit with the findings than that suggested by Oxera 
and is explained on page 169. 
4.3.1. Audit approach - general differentiation and tailoring 
Discussion of attributes of the audit service was included in 65 (98%) of 
the 66 source interview records analysed as part of Phase 1. Within this group, 
companies talked about the positive influence of the audit approaches being 
proposed by the firms when they were specific, flexible and meeting their 
specific needs and plans, and negatively when this was not the case (16 
instances) .  References were also made to general differences in audit 
approaches (eight instances); either where companies were comparing the 
proposed audit approaches with what they had received before, or making 
comparisons between the audit approaches being proposed by the tendering 
firms. 
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So, although not explicit in every interview record there was evidence of 
audits being tailored and companies identifying different approaches; thus 
differentiation being an influence on auditor selection. 
In addition to references to general differences being identified there were 
also more specific references to areas of focus in auditor selection including 
audit delivery, ideas and innovation, fees and transition. These are considered 
in the next sections. As noted above, a core and augmented service classification 
based on a model originated by Gronroos (2007) was considered a good fit with 
the findings of this phase of the research.  
According to Gronroos (2007) the core service is defined by the type of 
business in which the firm is competing. The augmented service includes the 
core service and in addition the supplementary services that surround it.  These 
supplementary services may then in turn be divided between facilitation 
services, which are indispensable to the delivery of the core service, and 
supporting services, which add value to the core product. 
Although this classification is not without challenges in the context of 
auditor selection (not least because the definition of the core audit is not wholly 
understood by its users despite being prescribed by statute and regulation) the 
expectations gap (referred to in Section 1.2) it does provide a framework for 
ordering the discussion of the identified factors influencing auditor selection 
identified in the interview records. 
The following sections are therefore ordered firstly to consider audit rigour 
and assurance, which may be considered as broadly analogous to core audit, 
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secondly, the four most commonly identified facilitating services of the on-going 
audit are considered; namely coordination and communication, accounting 
technical matters, IT and systems audit, and working with internal audit. 
Thirdly, the main supporting service; that of ideas and insight from the audit is 
considered before reviewing references made to commercial arrangements. 
4.3.2. Core audit – audit rigour and assurance 
For the purposes of this analysis the core audit has been taken to include 
comments made about the underlying audit and the assurance that companies 
seek from it. Assurance in turn relates to giving comfort to the company that a 
thorough and rigorous audit has been completed such that the risk of errors in 
the accounts has been minimised. This is consistent with the definition of audit 
quality from Deangelo (1981) as it relates to consideration of whether auditors 
were likely to identify and then report errors. The requirement here is 
commonly referred to within the profession as “no surprises”. 
The analysis of interview records identified that companies were indeed 
looking for audit rigour and assurance, this having been discussed in 21 (48%) 
of the interviews.  There was evidence of both executives and non-executives 
looking for rigour and assurance from the audit. One way that this was 
expressed was in the value companies ascribed to being challenged by their 
auditors (seven instances). For others robustness was important (three 
instances) and in another case the underlying rigour and assurance being 
sought would be manifest in a degree of intrusiveness.  
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For these 21 people (at least) their auditor selection assessments were then 
influenced by audit rigour.  The nature of this influence is exemplified by 
comments noted to have been made an Audit Committee Chair namely: 
[Audit Committee Chair]: Technical [audit] approach was forest for trees 
but it doesn’t mean it’s not important – I wanted to be able to sleep at night. 
In Section 4.2.1 it was identified that performance in non-audit services 
prior to an audit tender could be taken as indicative of what might follow. This 
extended to positive influence of rigour as the following illustrates:  
[CFO] knew that [successful firm] would push [the company] hard, 
[successful firm] had always delivered [in non-audit services] and [the 
company] wanted robustness from their auditors. 
There was therefore interview record evidence of companies looking for 
rigour and assurance from their audit. There were also references to the 
facilitating services surrounding the audit and these are considered next. 
4.3.3. Facilitating services 
For the purposes of this analysis, facilitating services fundamental to the 
delivery of the core audit have been defined to include the four most often 
discussed elements of: coordination and communication relating to the audit, 
accounting technical support, approach to  IT  systems and controls and 
working with internal audit. Other factors were discussed less often as Table 14 
shows. 
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The four main facilitating services influences on auditor selection are set 
out in Table 14 below along with the number of sources and references 
identified from the interview records for each subcategory. These are then 
considered in the sections that follow.  
Factors Sources References 
Coordination and communication 21 42 
Accounting technical support 16 27 
Working with internal audit  13 19 
IT systems and controls 13 13 
Other 7 8 
Table 14: Phase 1 sources and references for Facilitating services 
Coordination and communication 
Many FTSE 350 audits have substantial international operations with 
audit work often undertaken in many different territories. Coordination and the 
management of communication of that work can be quite a large exercise: 21 
(32%) of the interviews referred to it. 
The importance of coordination specifically was discussed in 13 of the 
interview records. Concerns were identified about coordination of international 
audit work generally and in relation to coordination in key operational 
territories for the company. The area of international coordination was 
previously identified as a problem for auditors in Section 4.2.1. 
There is also evidence of companies comparing the audit firms in tender 
processes as to their likely ability to coordinate internationally and the 
important influence that this could have on a selection decision. For example: 
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[Finance Director] We talked about the reasons behind [audit firm] 
winning on the day. Both felt that [audit firm] had got it right in focussing on 
the global coordination point – this was a big issue for the Audit Committee 
and the NEDs. 
Communication in an audit context was discussed in ten interview records 
and can be multidimensional. Typically there will be communication between 
auditor and company at a local level and between the local operations and head 
office of the company and between local auditors and the group auditor. In 
addition there is communication at the company between management and the 
audit committee and also auditor communication with both. Both formal and 
informal reporting were important as part of auditors feeding back on the 
results of their work. This feedback is sometimes referred to as the auditor 
acting as the “eyes and ears” for management and the audit committee and 
feedback could include qualitative observations on issues. 
The importance of reporting to the audit committee is illustrated by one 
non-executive director: 
....communication and reporting are critical. Audit committees need to 
know not just is it alright but how alright is it? Not just OK or not [but] year on 
year have we got closer to the edge... how are [our accounting] treatments 
were evolving over time. 
The style of communication was also important with companies looking 
for a balance between auditors standing firm on key issues but not being 
unnecessarily inflexible where it didn’t matter. For example: 
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 [Senior Executive]: [Lead Partner] was “always sensible” “allows stuff 
that doesn’t matter to go through” but “stands her ground” 
Consideration of the influence of communication style is returned to in 
Section 4.4.3 where the influence on auditor selection of the capabilities and 
competitiveness of the lead partner are considered. 
The importance of communication and reporting being accurate but 
balanced was also identified. Achieving accurate feedback from divisional audits 
was also seen as important.  
The interview records therefore identified aspects of both communication 
and coordination of the audit which companies had considered during their 
auditor selection decisions. In total 21 interview records identified these 
matters. 
Dealing with accounting technical matters 
In Section 4.2.1 above the problems for incumbent auditors with poor 
track records were discussed. One of the problem areas was accounting issue 
resolution. The interview data suggests that these past relationship issues were 
not only counting against the incumbent as noted above but were, perhaps 
unsurprisingly, also shaping the future service offering required.  There were 16 
interviews which discussed accounting technical matters.   
Within the area of accounting technical matters, the resolution of 
accounting issues was most frequently identified (12 instances). Examples were 
identified of tendering audit firms providing commitments on responsibility and 
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accountability in relation to resolving accounting issues; (notably around 
empowerment of the lead partner as having final responsibility for important 
accounting decisions) and also about the time it would take to resolve 
accounting issues (in the form of turnaround times for accounting technical 
queries).  
Evidence was also present of companies explicitly assessing audit firms in 
relation to how they proposed to deal with accounting issues. For example: 
 [Audit Committee Chair] went on to talk about what he saw as [Firm x] 
biggest negative. In his words “the feeling was that when it came down to an 
accounting treatment issue or a controversy, [Firm x] would be more inclined 
put their own interests 1st and those of the client 2nd “. [Company] had 
deliberately posed a series of questions aimed at testing the degree to which 
the auditor would support a client’s position and had concluded that [Firm y] 
would be more client centric when making their decisions and judgements 
In addition to providing evidence of the influence of resolving accounting 
issues, the interview records also included comment on the value of informed 
accounting judgement and the need for auditors to advise companies on the 
overall prudence of their approaches.   
Within accounting technical matters there were fewer records relating to 
the need for more general accounting updates and support (eight instances) but 
there was at least one reference to each of: helping the company to produce the 
highest quality annual report as possible, keeping company directors on top of 
emerging or complex accounting issues, providing a range of options for 
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accounting treatments, speed of response for routine enquires and dealing with 
accounting standard setters to achieve pragmatic solutions. 
Working with internal audit  
Most FTSE 350 companies have an internal audit function and indeed it is 
a requirement of the UK Corporate Governance Code that audit committees are 
required to consider whether there is a need for such a function each year where 
there is no such internal audit function in place. Such functions are normally 
internally staffed and/or outsourced to an audit firm other than the external 
auditor. 
Depending upon the type of work that internal audit performs, there is 
potential for overlap between internal audit and external audit. The principal 
issue identified in the ten interview records that included references to aspects 
of working with internal audit was the working relationship between internal 
audit and external audit and in particular the approach to collaborating and 
coordinating their audit plans and the extent to which external audit was relying 
on the work of internal audit. 
Companies were looking for active engagement between internal audit and 
external audit including joint planning and permissible secondments (13 
instances).  
In one case however a high degree of integration had attracted regulatory 
interest because of the risk to independence of the external audit should the 
external auditors be conducting internal audit work. There is evidence that 
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selection decisions seem to be balancing the desire for collaborative approaches 
with internal audit, with the independence requirements needed for the 
statutory external audit. 
IT systems and controls 
Auditing standards require auditors to assess the adequacy of companies’ 
accounting systems and controls and, where they are tested and found to be 
operating properly, auditors are entitled under those standards to rely on them 
and to reduce the amount of substantive tests of individual transactions that 
they need to conduct during their audit. 
The interview data suggests that different companies expected different 
levels of reliance to be placed on their systems and controls and that the firms’ 
responses to these different expectations influenced their auditor selection 
decisions (13 instances).  Those wanting greater reliance commented positively 
about reliance on systems and controls and criticised more substantive 
approaches based on checking individual balances and transactions.  
For example:  [CFO ] [Audit firm] had become very substantive. The work 
seemed to be ingrained into large amounts of checking of low risk areas away 
from the key risk and control issues. 
Such companies saw the audit as supporting their systems and controls 
developments, for example assessing how well the audit approach was aligned 
to their plans for shared services and how well it kept in step with their plans for 
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the development of their internal control processes and procedures more 
broadly. 
4.3.4. Supporting services - ideas and insights from the audit 
The special rights and responsibilities of statutory auditors were explained 
in Chapter 1. As noted there, these rights and responsibilities give auditors 
unique access to companies as they conduct their audits. The interviews provide 
evidence (13 instances) that companies are expecting their auditors to use the 
experience that this access gives them to share ideas and provide insights as 
part of the audit; to help them with their businesses.   
The insights that the companies were looking for included ideas and 
insights from their competitors, their industry and more generally. Although, as 
identified in Chapter 1, the auditor is subject to strict confidentiality rules, 
companies still expect them to share information not covered by those rules (on 
a non-attributable basis) and their ability to do so can therefore be an influence 
on the selection decision.  
The information which companies expect auditors to share includes 
industry best practice, the best practices and procedures that their firms are 
delivering at other clients and from their other experiences. These ideas and 
innovations are expected to be delivered as part of the overall audit service. 
Closely related to this were a number of comments indicating the apparent 
influence on selection decisions of audits firms’ behaviour in putting forward 
ideas and insights during a proposal process.  So, for example whilst ideas and 
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insights may be valued, the very fact that they are being put forward may be 
influential as well as their quality. This is discussed further in Section 4.5 below. 
4.3.5. Commercial arrangements 
The previous sections have focussed on what the interview records 
identified companies were looking to get out of their audit service. This section 
now turns to findings related to the influence of audit fees on auditor selection 
decisions and the related area of the influence of the budgeted hours. Given the 
way that audits are normally costed, based on hourly rates and hours worked, 
the greater the number of hours, all other things being equal, the greater the fee. 
These commercial aspects were referred to in 46 (70%) of the interview records. 
Typically in FTSE 350 tenders audit firms provide a fee quotation for one 
year, or more than one year, which is then fixed subject to any changes in the 
companies’ organisation (for example acquisitions) or problems that could not 
have been foreseen at the time of the tender. These fixed fees may be quoted 
subject to an annual inflation adjustment. 
Because audit fees are disclosed in the annual reports of UK listed 
companies, audit firms know the current level of fee paid before they enter into 
tenders, although as discussed in Chapter 1 above, reductions in fees following 
tenders have been typical in the past. 
The most common theme identified in the interview data was of the 
relative lack of influence of fees on auditor selection decisions. This is an 
important finding that is consistent with certain auditor selection literature 
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(Beattie and Fearnley, 1995; Hermanson, 1994). Although this didn’t apply in 
every case, there appear a number of different reasons why fees were not 
generally very influential to the final decision. 
In some cases the interview records indicated that fees appeared to be of 
little influence because all of the firms proposed (or moved in negotiation to) 
fees that were very close in quantum with each other (in practice in most cases 
the quoted fees for the tenders covered in this phase would all be less than the 
fees paid before the tender). The following reference illustrates the point: 
 [Audit Committee Chair] ...in this case fees from all three firms were very 
close, within a few thousand pounds. ....there was nothing in [it] and nothing 
worth haggling about with the eventual preferred supplier. 
There was also evidence that those selecting auditors considered fees not 
to be important per se stressing the relatively greater importance of getting the 
best job for a fair price. A few highlighted a concern that low fees might even 
undermine the relationship. 
In this context it should be noted that there was an expectation that fees 
could be negotiated after a decision was made in principle based on other 
factors; and also that such negotiations did indeed take place. There was 
evidence therefore of fees, rather than being an influence on the selection 
decision, being a matter to be settled afterwards once the decision had been 
made. The following reference illustrates this point: 
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[Group Finance Director] In relation to [audit firm] he thought that there 
were savings related [changes in the audit] that could be made and were not 
reflected in the quote.  He asked [audit firm] to match the middle quote which 
[it] did. In [Group Finance Director]’s view the process was always going to be 
about selecting the firm that [company] wanted to work with and fees would 
always be negotiable with the selected firm. 
In one case a substantial downward revision in the proposed fee during the 
process had been influential as the Group Finance Director saw it as a strong 
signal of the audit firm’s desire to work with his organisation. However others 
were concerned about audit fees being too low; either where an incumbent firm 
proposed a fee substantially lower than their previous year’s fee or where the 
low fee caused the company to question the adequacy of the scope of work that 
was being proposed or the actions that the company would have to undertake to 
achieve the proposed fee.  
Where high fees were identified as a problem, the interview data suggested 
that this could happen where these fees were presented in a way which 
suggested an inefficient approach, or where the company considered that more 
work than was necessary was being proposed (based on the past and bearing in 
mind that many of the interview records related to conversations with those 
who had been auditors in the past). The number of hours being proposed and 
the mix of hours were also therefore important; there were by and large buyers 
who were knowledgeable in this area as the negotiation of fees was a normal 
annual occurrence even without a tender. Knowledgeable buyers are not always 
the case in the purchase of professional services as highlighted in the literature 
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review in Chapter 2. 
This section has considered interview record evidence as it related to 
commercial aspects of proposals. This suggests that the influence of audit fees 
on the auditor selection decision is generally low. This evidence also further 
suggests that where high fees have been seen to be problematic this seems 
generally to be associated with concerns over the scope of work performed. Low 
fees also seem to be problematic where incumbent firm’s lower fees in proposals 
from their pre-tender levels (which seem to cause companies to question their 
approach to previous years) or where they give rise to concerns over the 
adequacy of the scope of work being proposed. That said, these results show that 
companies often expect price negotiations to be carried out post appointment. 
This completes the Phase 1 consideration of audit service design influences 
on auditor selection. The analysis shows companies looking for rigour and 
assurance from the auditors. It also shows them looking for important 
facilitating aspects of service including coordination, appropriate 
communication and the right level of focus on companies’ own accounting 
systems and controls, accounting issue resolution and working with internal 
audit. Furthermore ideas and insights that the proposing audit firms could 
provide were also recognised. The influence of fees appeared less important; 
either because quoted fees were similar or negotiations took place after the 
decision. 
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The next section considers the interview evidence as it relates to the 
influence of capabilities and competences of the firms and their teams on 
auditor selection. 
4.4. Capabilities and competences 
 
In the previous section influences on the auditor selection decision 
identified from the interviews as they related to service design and assessment 
were discussed. The literature however suggests that service assessment for 
professional services with high credence qualities can be challenging because of 
the inherent difficulty of assessing them before (and during) the service.  A 
theme from the review of the professional services and auditor selection 
literature was companies turning to assessments of firms’ capabilities in their 
selection decisions (as well as behavioural cues which are discussed in Section 
4.5). This third factor group therefore contains matters identified in the 
interview records which related to those capabilities and competences of the 
competing bidders.  
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The interview records provide substantial evidence that companies are 
considering capabilities and competences in their auditor selection decisions. 
References totalling 411 were identified and the topic was covered in all of the 
66 records analysed. Furthermore the records show assessments being 
undertaken on a number of levels which may be categorised as: firms overall, 
the proposed team including assessment of key individuals within the team, and 
within the team especially the lead partner (which has therefore been split out 
from the rest of the team in the narrative that follows).  
Table 15 shows the number of sources and references within the data 
identified for each of these levels. These are discussed in turn in the following 
subsections. 
Factors Sources References 
The proposed team 55 174 
The audit firms 55 155 
The lead partner 38 80 
Table 15: Phase 1 Capabilities and competences sources and references by factor 
4.4.1. The team 
In this section the interview data as it relates to comments about teams is 
discussed. This includes references to individuals within the team, the structure 
of the team and the attributes of teams as a whole. As noted above and given the 
frequency of discussion of the lead partner this has been split out and is 
considered in Section 4.4.3. 
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Comparing individuals within the team 
 The interview records provided a lot of evidence of companies assessing 
key individuals in the team. A total of 36 (55%) of the interviews referenced this 
(even after excluding the lead partner discussed below). 
There were three groups of individuals who were subject to most 
discussion. Firstly the group or head office team under the lead partner, 
secondly the specialists involved as part of the audit and thirdly those overseas 
partners in key operational locations for the companies. 
In relation to the group or head office team, 21 interviews discussed the 
group director or senior manager. Most of the comments made were general 
references to the strength or weakness of individuals in this role (17 instances). 
There was also acknowledgement of the importance of the individuals playing 
this role in the audit (six instances). For example: 
[CFO]: So it became about was the senior manager going to be any good? 
The more we thought about it the more important the senior manager was.  
[Audit senior manager] had not let them down. 
In a number of larger proposals (as considered further below) audit firms 
organise their teams with more than one partner overseeing the audit. Generally 
there is a more senior lead partner and a second partner. In 11 interviews the 
second partner was discussed, including their general strength (six instances) 
and their personal style (four instances). 
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Taken together, the team below the lead partner was seen as evidence of 
strength in depth as the following highlights: 
[Audit Committee Chair] went on to say that they had been very 
impressed with [Second partner and manager]. They were part of a great 
operational audit team. [Audit firm] strength in depth was a real 
differentiator. 
The second group of individuals referred to were specialists (16 instances). 
These included professionals who were risk management experts and systems 
and controls specialist auditors, industry experts and actuarial and accounting 
technical experts. The interview data suggests that these specialists can 
influence the auditor selection decision as long as their availability is assured 
and their role as part of the wider team is clear. An example extract from the 
interview records illustrates the point: 
It was also important that [Audit firm] had brought others into the 
picture. [Risk management expert] great – talked about risk”. “We want to 
know about the risk management structure. [CEO] knows [Risk management 
expert] – he has a “commercial pragmatic viewpoint in addition to knowing 
what the [Industry regulator] wants CFO thought – here’s the robustness we 
need. 
The third group of individuals referenced were partners in critical 
territories (11 instances).  Discussion often turned to an overseas partner where 
the company conducting the tender had very large operations in particular 
countries, or where there had been problems; either with the audit or the 
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company’s own accounting control environment in that location.  
Most of the discussion in relation to overseas partners was restricted to 
consideration of whether they were considered to be strong or weak. It was not 
evident in many of the interviews why that might have been assessed to have 
been the case. Where there was additional information it related to 
understanding of the business associated with industry experience and expertise 
and personal style for example: 
 [x partner] is the acceptable face of America. 
So, companies were assessing the individuals they met as part of the 
process. They were also keen to have clarity about how those individuals would 
work together and with them and this is considered next. 
Audit team structure 
Most FTSE 350 companies are large organisations and as noted above 
many have considerable international operations. The audit is normally led by a 
group audit team and the different ways of structuring that team and the 
supporting teams was commented on in 24 (36%) of the interviews. 
The most common theme within these interviews was about how the team 
was structured at the top. As noted above, given the size of FTSE 350 audits, 
there is often a need to have more than one partner working at the centre and 
leading and/or coordinating the global audit. Typically where this occurs there 
are two central partners; one more senior than the other. The interview records 
suggest that a number of different approaches have been adopted by the audit 
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firms which companies commented on in different ways in interviews about 
their auditor selection decisions.  
There was evidence that some companies were looking for a two partner 
model with clarity of role between the two partners. For example 
[Executive management] were very keen to have a two partner 
relationship... [Successful audit firm] played two quite senior partners with the 
more senior as the signing partner. 
On the other hand where there was a lack of clarity companies commented 
negatively on it. As the following references illustrates: 
[Audit Committee Chair].[Auditor selection panel] were unsure how 
[senior partner] role was going to work as [company industry] expert. In 
some respects this was because [incumbent auditor] had proposed a London 
specialist as part of their team in their last proposal and the company hadn’t 
seen him.  
A second theme identified in the interview records was the influence on 
decisions when audit firms involved more than one office in their proposed 
team. There is evidence that companies were concerned about how these offices 
will work together. 
A third issue in relation to structure arose where a company had 
substantial UK operations or divisions in addition to its head office. In these 
cases different views were recorded in the interview data as to how best to 
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organise the audit team in response. The principle issue was whether the audit 
team leading the group should also audit the divisions. 
Lastly, some of these large FTSE 350 companies are organised by global 
region (e.g. Americas, Europe, Middle East and Africa and Asia Pacific). In these 
cases there was interview evidence of the influence of audit firms responding 
appropriately to that structure by introducing a partner dedicated to 
coordination of their services to these global regions; allocating a dedicated 
partner to link with the company’s regional management team. 
In arriving at their auditor selection decision there is therefore evidence 
that companies are concerned about the structure and clarity of the team at the 
centre and cohesion between offices. There was also some interview evidence 
that companies were concerned that audit firms structured their teams to meet 
their own structure and there is also some variation in what they were looking 
for.  
Attributes of the teams as a whole 
Lastly, under consideration of the influence of the teams, there was also 
evidence of companies including assessments of attributes of the team as a 
whole in their decisions. Consistent with the findings in relation to the firms 
discussed in the previous sections, industry experience and geographical factors 
were again present. 
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Industry experience (as with firms discussed above) was considered 
important and was identified in 16 (24%) of the interview records. This was in 
some cases connected with the team’s history of working together. For example: 
[Chair of Audit Committee]: appreciated the industry experience in every 
member and they liked the fact that team members worked together well. 
There were ten interviews which discussed the influence of geography on 
companies’ decision making. There were two principal issues. The first related 
to the location of the head office team where there was a company with a UK 
regional head office (five instances). There were differing views here between 
those who felt that a London led team would provide a greater level of rigour 
and challenge because they would have greater FTSE 350 experience as most of 
these companies have their head office in or around London. This compared 
with an alternative view that a local team would have greater understanding of 
the company’s culture. In contrast with some of the literature, proximity was 
not discussed widely as a decision influence. Indeed it came up in only one 
interview. 
The second issue identified (four instances) was having strong teams in 
key international locations. This is consistent with the comments made above 
about companies including international strength and depth in assessing firms 
and with those made above about companies assessing key overseas partners. 
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4.4.2. The audit firms 
In Chapter 1 the dominance of the Big 4 firms was discussed.  In relation to 
the analysis of the interview records two issues arose. Firstly, whether it was 
possible to differentiate generally between the Big 4 and secondly, the extent to 
which the Big 4 were generally differentiated from the smaller mid-tier firms. 
The two issues combined appeared in 30 (45%) of the interviews. 
In relation to the Big 4 there were some (13 instances) who felt they were 
different. In these cases they tended to relate to what these people experienced 
through a proposal process or from a previous proposal which they then 
attributed to the firm as a whole. Their opinions concerned, for example, one 
firm being more prestigious or more formal, more flexible or centrally 
controlled than others. There was no consistent pattern as to which firms were 
considered to be associated with which attribute. 
In contrast there were ten references to companies explicitly not seeing 
differentiation between the Big 4 firms. For example: 
[Chair of Audit Committee] felt each firm put its ideas across in its own 
way but that whilst there may superficially be differences in style and detail 
the substance for the Big 4 .......was pretty much the same in quality and 
product. All of the Big 4 are good at what you do. 
So, the evidence suggests that whereas some individuals saw the firms 
differently, there was no consistency in how they might be different; and others 
saw them categorically as not differentiated generally. 
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The position was much clearer in relation to differentiation of the Big 4 
from the smaller, mid-tier firms. There were 13 interviews which contained 
references to the next or mid-tier firms. In most of these cases, these firms were 
excluded because the view was held that they would not have the capability to 
do the work; in some instances specifically associated with views about the 
weakness of their international networks or lack of experience auditing FTSE 
350 companies. In some cases this appeared to be based on pre-held views, in 
others following pre-qualification assessments. Where these mid-tier firms were 
involved in the formal process, in most cases they performed less well and/or 
withdrew.   This area is perhaps best exemplified by the following reference: 
[CFO]: The process was limited to the Big 4. There doesn’t seem to be a 
middle tier. They felt they ought to look at the middle tier but there wasn’t one. 
It was pretty clear to [Company] that they would be the biggest client by a 
factor. 
So, companies often appeared not to be differentiating or at least not 
differentiating on any consistent basis between the Big 4 firms specifically. 
What they were doing was differentiating between the Big 4 as a group and the 
mid-size or smaller firms.  
There were however three areas where companies did seem to be 
differentiating between the Big 4 in the context of their own needs in specific 
individual tenders. These were industry experience and expertise, geographical 
strength in depth, and conflicts and independence. Each of these is now 
discussed further. 
Chapter Four 
Research Findings Phase 1 
Review of Interview Records August 2002 to May 2010 
 
 
193 
 
Industry experience and expertise 
By far the highest number of references in the interview data concerning 
firms related to industry experience and expertise. Thirty (45%) of the interview 
records mentioned this.  
At the firm level a relative lack of industry experience was identified as 
excluding firms from tender processes or damaging their chances of success. 
Industry experience was identified both as important and, when present, was 
identified as a positive influence on the decision. 
[Chairman]: [Audit firm] had slightly more [industry] and European 
network credentials and these were finely balanced against the risk of change 
but [the company’s executive team] felt that on balance they would gain more 
from having a more experienced [industry] audit team, it would give them 
more options. 
It was however also identified in a small number of cases that companies 
were concerned that an individual audit firm had too much experience. There 
were concerns where a firm already had a number of clients in the same sector 
or was just considered to be too big generally. The principal concern here was 
whether the company would really receive good service because it may not be a 
priority for that firm. The following interview record illustrates this point: 
[Group Financial Controller]:[Company] would be an important client 
for [Audit firm] – biggest client [in Company’s industry] in the UK – get the 
best team. With [Incumbent audit firm] they were one of many. As they were 
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not number 1 this had to affect service levels. The issue was not about 
[industry] expertise – they hadn’t seen much of that from [their incumbent 
audit firm] – it was about commitment to service 
In some cases industry expertise might also be regarded as a negative 
when it concerned an audit firm’s relationship with a specific competitor of the 
tendering company. In four interviews companies had indicated concerns that 
particular firms audited their major competitors. In one case this had led to a 
firm being excluded from the invitation list and in another a firm being excluded 
quite early in the process. In one case the concern related to non-audit services 
where a company did not want its auditor to be acting for a competitor in a 
potential company acquisition that it too was considering (as noted in Chapter 
2, the factors weighing against industry concentration within audit markets 
were discussed by Kwon, 1996). 
So industry experience was the most commonly discussed attribute of the 
firms. Geographical strength in depth was the next most commonly discussed 
and is considered next.  
Geographical strength in depth 
Although mentioned less than industry experience and expertise 
geographical strength in depth was highlighted in 15 interviews (23%). 
In a substantial majority of these cases (11 instances) the concern was the 
international dimension. This included consideration of the firm’s global 
coverage, and its structure/organisation.  A number of interviews within this 
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group were concerned about even the Big 4 firms’ presence in emerging 
territories such as Asia and Eastern Europe. In other cases references were less 
specific and about considering the global coverage of the firms more generally. 
In many cases, strength in depth was also related to the firms having 
relevant industry experience in the right locations, but in other cases the 
comments were made more generally.  
In three cases, the strength in depth was present as a factor in relation to 
UK regions. In these cases the presence of the right listed company experience 
and/or industry experience were the issues highlighted. 
Conflicts with other services and independence 
In the previous sections the influences of firms’ competences and 
capabilities relating to industry expertise and geographical strength in depth 
were identified. This section also highlights that companies were not only 
assessing the capabilities and competences that the firms had; they were also 
keen to ensure that they would get the benefit of these capabilities and 
competences through receiving the right priority service. This section considers 
data from the interview records which deals with the special circumstances 
associated with auditor independence which can create problems for companies 
actually wishing to access capabilities and competences from the Big4 audit 
firms. 
As referred to in Chapter 1 and again in Section 4.2.2, in the aftermath of 
the collapse of Arthur Andersen the nature of the relationship between FTSE 
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350 companies and their auditor became much narrower with significantly 
heightened concerns over perceived independence threats. This made FTSE 350 
companies very sensitive to the level of non-audit work they gave to their 
auditors. 
Conflicts of interest were referred to in 14 interview records and three 
principal issues were identified. 
Firstly, there were conflicts with non-audit services that the firms were 
providing and companies valued and wanted if possible to continue to have 
access to them in the future.  In one record the issue identified was a service that 
couldn’t, by regulation, be provided by the auditor; namely internal audit. In 
another it was tax service which could be provided but which the company 
preferred to keep separate. 
Secondly, there was an influence in relation to non-audit services that had 
been provided by a potential auditor in the past. In one case a firm declined to 
tender because it could not meet auditor independence rules as they related to 
self-review risk as discussed in Chapter 1. 
Thirdly, in one case a firm declined to tender because a partner in that 
firm had been employed as an adviser to the company. 
The influence of conflicts on auditor selection means that where it occurs 
firms affected can be excluded from the process (or their chances of 
appointment reduced) and there is then a corresponding reduction in choice 
available to the company conducting the tender. 
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In one case the interview records show comments from a Group Finance 
Director following a change of auditor and relating to the former incumbent 
auditor of the company: 
...the proposal loss might actually be “liberating” for the relationship in 
that [the company is] determined to continue their split between audit versus 
advisory services.  He thought that in a strange way this might end up being a 
better decision for [the outgoing audit firm] 
What he meant by this was that the opportunities for non-audit work were 
far greater than the value of the audit fee to the firm. Freed from the auditor 
independence regulations, the outgoing auditor may well be able to develop a 
more extensive non-audit services relationship than the audit in this case. 
This concludes the Phase 1 consideration of the influence on auditor 
selection of the attributes of the firms. The next section considers the influence 
on the auditor selection decision of the assessment of the proposed lead partner. 
4.4.3. The lead partner 
Lead partner has been separated for consideration from the rest of the 
team given the prevalence of mentions identified in relation to them. The 
interview records highlighted a focus on the lead audit partner which was 
referenced in 38 (58%) of the records.   
There were ten interviews which included only general comments about 
whether a particular lead partner was strong or weak. However there were also 
more specific comments which may be divided into three groups; each of which 
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occurred with similar frequency. These were the fit of their personal style with 
the organisation conducting the tender (15 instances), the experience of the 
audit partner (14 instances) and how effectively they would be able to deliver the 
audit service (13 instances).  
In consideration of personal style, companies were interested in how well 
individual partners would work in a way that was consistent with their preferred 
way of working and their expectations of how a lead partner ought to behave. 
This included their style in communicating clearly and confidently, delivering 
tough messages, “telling it like it is” and standing firm. In addition confidence, 
personality fit and pragmatism were also identified.  The following extracts from 
the interview data capture the spirit of much of the data: 
[Audit Committee Chair]: [Lead Partner] is [Lead partner] – I like his 
style – I’m looking for the meat of it – audit committees on the whole want to 
know about issues 
[Audit Committee Chair]: The partner sets the tone.. the partner is 
important… there are tricky situations where you want your auditor to stand 
firm 
[Group Financial Controller]: [Partner] is seriously impressive…back 
bone...tell it like it was 
Lead partner experience attributes discussed included that of the relevant 
industry, accounting and audit technical knowledge and experience of working 
with FTSE companies. However most referenced was industry knowledge and 
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expertise (10 instances). The interview records showed references to positive 
reactions when lead partners had industry knowledge for example: 
[CFO]: [Audit lead partner] had just rotated from [Industry leading 
organisation] and his significant industry knowledge was a big mitigating 
factor against any fears they may have had of risk of change.  The industry 
knowledge was palpably there. 
And concern was identified when it was not there: 
[CFO]: [Audit lead partner] didn’t bring the [specific] industry expertise 
– he wasn’t in the [industry organisation] – no doubt he was in whatever the 
[other industry] equivalent of that was.  
The ability of the lead partner to deliver the audit service and to access the 
skills and experience of others was the third influence discussed. This was 
present in general comments about the partner’s ability to deliver (5 instances), 
for example: 
[CFO] said that he and [Group Financial Controller] had joked that 
[Audit firm] were the Rolls Royce bidder and they had a vision of [Lead 
Partner and Lead tax partner] sitting in the passenger seats knowing they 
could mobilise everything they needed, and they did. 
And in more specific references including: the lead partners’ leadership 
ability, their relationships in the company and connections outside, and their 
ability to deliver their firm. An individual reference was also made which 
connected personal style with ability to deliver. Here it was argued that if the 
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audit team liked working with a particular lead partner they would therefore be 
more likely to deliver a better service working for him. 
Further evidence of the importance attached to the lead partner was also 
identified in relation to partner rotation (11 instances). Chapter 1 discussed the 
regulatory requirement which require the lead audit partner to rotate off FTSE 
350 audits every five years. In some cases the partner rotation triggered the 
audit tender. In others the inability of an audit firm to put forward a strong 
enough alternative appears to have severely damaged their chances of winning 
the tender and so retaining the client. For example: 
[Chair of Audit Committee] felt the critical element [in a tender involving 
consolidation from joint auditors to a sole auditor] was that the [Lead audit 
partner on one side] was “time expired” [had served a full five years]. [CAC] 
knew the [Lead audit partner on one side] well – he works on another 
company where [Chair of Audit Committee] is on the audit committee but he 
couldn’t carry on. [Lead partner on the other side] was not time expired [had 
to rotate off in line with regulation as set out in Chapter 1). 
In this case the unavailability of a specific lead partner was the critical 
factor as to why that partner’s firm was unsuccessful in the tender. 
Finally in one case the relationship between the lead audit partner and the 
company was so strong that it was suggested that the decision to change auditor 
was at least in part made so that the company could continue to work with that 
person in a non-audit service relationship when he had to rotate off the audit. 
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This concludes the discussion of the third higher order category identified 
from the Big 4 firm’s interview records. There is evidence of decisions being 
influenced on three levels;, the team, the firm and the lead partner. Across the 
three levels there was most discussion on industry experience although 
geographical considerations around location of lead office and strength and 
depth were also identified. 
The fourth factor group related to behavioural influences during the 
proposal process and this is discussed next. 
4.5. Behavioural influences during the tender process 
In Section 1.4.3 the nature of audit tenders for FTSE 350 companies was 
discussed and in particular the typical extensive nature of the process and the 
high level of interaction normally associated with such tenders.  In Chapter 2 
the influence of behaviours as cues on buyers of professional services with high 
credence qualities was highlighted. Important behavioural influences on 
decision making were discussed. This section discusses the references to 
behavioural factors identified in the interview records 
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The interview records included a high number of references (610) across 
almost every source (94%). And although the limitations on using interview 
records in this way were identified in Chapter 3 there was in particular a rich 
variety of behavioural factors. These are grouped in Table 16 which also shows 
the number of sources and references which were assigned to each subcategory. 
Factors Sources References 
The quality of response 48 183 
Other behaviour during the tender process 60 415 
 Hunger, commitment and enthusiasm  50 149 
 Listening and understanding 35 74 
 Personal chemistry and empathy 33 62 
 Proving competence 32 56 
 Teamwork 31 49 
 Ideas and insights 15 23 
Table 16: Phase 1 sources and references for Behavioural influences 
These categories are now discussed further in turn. The way that these 
factors were manifest in the interview records is again illustrated on an example 
basis using references. 
The first section discusses the influence on auditor selection of the quality 
of the responses to the invitation to tender and includes respecting and 
complying with the request for proposal. 
The next six sections then consider the influence of more general 
behaviour on the auditor selection decision in descending order of the number 
of interviews that discussed them. The six behaviour groups included here and 
as set out in Table 16 are hunger, commitment and enthusiasm, listening and 
understanding, personal chemistry and empathy, proving competence, 
teamwork, and sharing and testing ideas and insights. As Table 16 shows and 
the next sections highlight, behavioural influences during a tender process 
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extend considerably beyond simply delivering a compliant tender response; 
indeed other more general behavioural influences were discussed in the 
interviews far more extensively. 
4.5.1. The general quality of response 
The general quality of response is considered here in each of the three 
principal elements of a typical proposal process and in descending order of the 
number of interview records which mentioned them, namely; the proposal 
document, the presentation and the meetings during the process. 
Proposal documents 
The quality of the proposal documents submitted by the firms was 
discussed in 39  (60%).  Comments from the interviews about the importance of 
the document to the final decision are included in Section 4.6. Interestingly 
there were slightly more interviews that discussed the design and production 
quality of the documents (22 instances) than the content quality and clarity (19 
instances). 
The comments made about design and production included expressed 
views about whether one document or more than one as a package was most 
helpful, the overall print and production quality and the colours that were used. 
In a small number of cases some approaches to production and design were 
considered “quirky” although in the majority of cases documents were 
considered to have been professionally and well put together. 
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References to the quality of content included both its relevance and the 
clarity with which it was presented. In this latter case most reference was made 
to the succinctness of messages and the clarity of the language used. 
The interview records contained nine references to companies 
commenting on the degree to which the proposal documents complied precisely 
with the request for proposal (e.g. responding to the requests contained in the 
invitation to tender in the order in which they were set) and therefore how easy 
it was to check this against their requests for proposal. 
Companies also commented positively on the effort that had been put in to 
produce a high quality document and the clarity of message.  For example: 
[Audit Committee Chair]: [Firm x]’s was good document. There was 
evidence of depth of experience to cover the bases but it was less detailed and 
more generic than [Firm y]. This reinforced the impression that [Firm y] had 
done a lot of work to get the job. Their document was very detailed and gave 
the impression that they would be very hands on. 
The interview records therefore provided evidence of companies valuing 
good documents and complying with the request for proposal.  
Presentations 
The final presentations were discussed in 35 (52%) of the interviews. There 
were three themes within this group.  
 The most common discussion was about the style of the presentations (23 
cases). Within this group the areas discussed included the degree of formality 
Chapter Four 
Research Findings Phase 1 
Review of Interview Records August 2002 to May 2010 
 
 
205 
 
adopted by the competing firms, the degree to which they were structured or 
unstructured and the use of technology or other props. In one case a firm had 
attempted to use an interactive game which had caused amusement (but not 
offence) when it didn’t work properly. There were six interviews which 
highlighted a positive response to a discursive style.  
The overall quality of the presentations was also discussed in fairly general 
terms (16 instances). In most cases there was positive comment but in a few 
cases companies expressed frustration that the presentations had not 
adequately supported the propositions that the firms had put forward in their 
documents and meetings. 
In 12 cases companies talked about the degree of preparedness of 
presentations. In most cases companies felt the firms were well prepared and 
the word “polished” was used in a number of different interviews. In some cases 
the degree of preparedness caused amusement as companies observed 
behaviour that they thought had obviously been coached. 
Meetings  
The meetings which took place during the process were discussed in 17 
interviews. Companies commented positively on proper organisation and 
preparedness for those meetings.  The following illustrates for example the 
importance that one company attached to agendas: 
ACC: The company was very impressed with the sheer thoroughness that 
[Firm x] demonstrated in this process. It was acknowledged that the process 
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presented a significant logistical challenge and [Firm x] covered it very 
effectively. [Firm x] went to meetings very well prepared [with] good agendas 
[and] worked through details 
Respecting the process 
The high profile nature of the auditor selection decision was discussed in 
Chapter 1 and evidence of companies investing to make sure that processes are 
conducted in a professional and fair way is presented in Section 4.6 below. In 
this environment the number of interviews which discussed whether the 
competing firms respected the tender process and followed the spirit of the 
process was perhaps quite low at 11 (17%) instances. However where this was 
discussed, companies in most cases expected the firms to operate within the 
rules of the tender and reacted positively when this happened. Where attempts 
were made to go outside the process, by organising contact with people not on 
the tender list, or by trying to arrange additional meetings, these were normally 
prevented or viewed negatively. 
There were some exceptions that showed that not every company was so 
strict. Some tolerated firms challenging the process or even not complying in 
certain ways within reasonable tolerances because they thought it indicated 
particular enthusiasm, for example: 
After the initial meeting ...there was a shut out period while [Company] 
completed its year end. During this period the only permissible contact was a 
fortnightly call with [Group Financial Controller]. [One] team had complied 
with the rules but had actually come closest to not complying. “They gave the 
Chapter Four 
Research Findings Phase 1 
Review of Interview Records August 2002 to May 2010 
 
 
207 
 
feeling of enthusiasm” – just crept over the line “on a couple of occasions” 
“minor point” “much further and would have got “hang on”. 
In four cases companies reacted negatively where they considered the 
firms’ behaviour to be inauthentic or not in keeping with the spirit of the 
process. One firm had attempted to support its key propositions by using large 
polystyrene blocks which was  seen as a negative as the company felt this was an 
indication that that firm was making light of what they considered to be a 
serious process. 
In this section and the previous one, discussion has been about influences 
on auditor selection related to the quality of their performance in relation to the 
documents submitted, the presentations and the meetings and how well firms 
respected the tender process. The interview records provide evidence of 
companies valuing proper preparation in relation to both meetings during the 
tender process and in the final presentation. Furthermore the interview records 
also show companies valuing compliance with tender rules with limited 
tolerance of firms breaking the rules in how they complete the process; further 
there is evidence of companies valuing documentation which complied with the 
request for proposal 
The next six sections now discuss more generally the behavioural 
influences on auditor selection identified from the interview records. As will be 
shown the level of discussion in these areas was substantially more than that 
about the quality of response. 
 
Chapter Four 
Research Findings Phase 1 
Review of Interview Records August 2002 to May 2010 
 
 
208 
 
4.5.2. Other behavioural influences 
The interview records included substantial comment in relation to 
behaviour which went beyond simply meeting the requirements of the tender 
with a high quality response. As the following sections show, although there  
was evidence of companies testing firms on their propositions and competence 
much of this appeared to involve highly affective matters. The first of these was 
companies looking for firms to demonstrate hunger, commitment, enthusiasm 
and desire to win the work. 
Showing hunger, commitment, enthusiasm and desire 
Hunger, commitment, enthusiasm and desire was the most frequently 
referenced category within behavioural influences and was present in 50 (75%) 
of the source interview notes.  Companies recognised in particular, and 
commented favourably on, the high levels of effort and enthusiasm that firms 
were investing in proposals (21 instances).  
The favourable impression created by hunger, commitment, enthusiasm 
and desire was manifest in a number of different ways.  
The overall level of effort put in by lead partners and their teams was 
noticed both in the proposal process and in the effort put in to create high 
quality proposal documents (this latter point is returned to in Section 4.5.1).  
The following examples illustrate this point: 
[Director of Finance] felt [Firm x] had called the stage 1 process exactly 
right.  [Firm y] had not.  The enthusiasm came through from [Firm x lead 
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partner] right from the start.  [Company] had set out a minimum proposal 
requirement but significantly greater effort than expected had been put in by 
[Firm x]  
A favourable impression was also created not just by the overall level of 
effort but also in such areas as speed of response to tender requests, pro-activity 
and even in one case, passion. 
Companies also noticed how quick the firms were to respond to the initial 
request for proposal in particular and expressed concern where that speed of 
response was comparatively slower; on occasion interpreting this as lesser 
desire to win the audit.  
Companies also referenced favourably the level of pro-activity 
demonstrated by the firms during the proposal process. This was present in 
general comments, in summaries of proposal processes prepared by those 
managing the process for audit committees and in one case as an explicit 
assessment criterion. 
There were a number of instances of firms going beyond the process and 
providing things that companies had not asked for. This included highly 
designed and high quality printed documents, creating bespoke dedicated 
websites and delivering video footage of the team. 
The role of very senior partners (often members of the firms’ management 
teams) was also a prevalent area of discussion (32 instances). Companies’ 
reactions to this however varied. For some the involvement of a very senior 
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partner was welcome as was the degree of interest. Furthermore where there 
had been problems in the relationship between the company and the proposing 
firm, the involvement of a very senior partner was positive as it helped to repair 
the position. In other cases however the involvement of senior partners was not 
well understood. For example: 
[X Firm Chairman] had also contacted the SE Asia CFO to offer resources 
to help with [the company’s] growing pains. A call was made directly by [the 
Firm Chairman] to the CFO. This didn’t really work as the CFO didn’t know 
who he was talking to until the end of the call and then stood up and saluted! 
In other cases companies specifically asked for senior partners not to be 
involved unless they were on the service team. This was not always respected 
and as a result when these senior partners appeared it caused annoyance. 
Listening and understanding 
Listening and understanding were recurrent themes in the interview data. 
In total 35 (53%) of the 66 interview records referred to them. 
The positive influence of demonstrating understanding was highlighted in 
21 interview records. The most often referenced area of understanding relates to 
understanding of the company’s business (13 instances) (this is consistent with 
the emphasis on industry experience and expertise noted in the discussion of 
competing firms’ capabilities and competences discussed in Section 4.2 above). 
Business understanding was referenced for example: 
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[Audit Committee Chair]: [Firm x] demonstrated a much better 
understanding of the detail. Their media credentials were helped by the fact 
that their local manager had previously worked in radio. 
[Audit Committee Chair]: [Firm x] had got more into the soul of the 
business and this is what swung it for them. 
Within the topic of business understanding, the importance of 
understanding risk was also specifically referenced with comparative statements 
as to how well firms had shown their understanding in this area.  
References were also made to understanding client culture, understanding 
client needs and understanding grey areas. 
Listening was referenced in 19 of the interview records. The interview 
notes identified the positive influence of listening. References to listening were 
made generally such as: 
[CFO]: [Firm A] came in and listened and demonstrated depth – made 
suggestions up front – had confidence 
In addition and although there were a number of references to how well 
firms had listened these were also in most cases associated with a responding 
action. For example in eight instances listening was associated with a 
subsequent change or enhancement of the proposed team. In three further 
instances the positive influence of firms being seen to be trying to respond to 
what they had heard in specific areas was also identified. So it was not just 
about listening it was also about an effective response. 
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In seven instances companies highlighted how firms had specifically 
sought feedback on how they were performing. This feedback included the 
teams seeking comments as they progressed through the proposal and also 
contact from senior partners within the firms not directly involved in the 
proposals. 
The third area was focus on the right things; those of relevance to the 
companies (11 instances). This included focussing on the company (rather than 
their own firm),  and identifying and discussing all the important issues, 
focussing on the key issues as the companies saw them and not talking to 
services which were outside the scope of the tender. 
The demonstration of understanding and listening and responding were 
then identified as behavioural influences on auditor selection. The next set of 
influences concerned the personal interaction and chemistry. 
Personal interaction and chemistry 
Personal interaction and chemistry was referenced in 33 (50%) of the 
interview notes.  There were a number of different ways in which this was 
expressed. The highest number (eight) were looking for people they could work 
with, for seven others, people talked explicitly about including personal 
chemistry in their consideration of perspective auditors. Five others commented 
on the personalities of the teams whilst three others talked about rapport. Other 
comments included whether people were comfortable with each other, how well 
the teams fitted in and how easy they were to relate to. 
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The following extract illustrates the overall point : 
[CFO]: the relationship has got better as we’ve worked together. There’s 
never been a problem that we haven’t been able to resolve. 
It became for [CFO] [about] can I work with these people? Am I going to 
look forward to ringing these people? Who am I going to be dealing with? 
Other positive influences on auditor selection included demonstrated 
authenticity and integrity (four instances). 
Conversely there were also references to behaviour which was not 
conducive to good personal chemistry. This included trying to use the proposal 
to sell other services (three instances) appearing arrogant, overpromising, 
taking credit for the work the company itself was doing and lacking empathy. 
Interestingly many of the comments recalled individual instances of good 
or bad behaviour. For example in one case a senior manager was considered to 
have “scored a number of spectacular own goals” by talking about expensive 
restaurants that he had frequented. The finance director in this case reflected on 
his last Chinese meal indicating his feeling that the individual had completely 
misread the company’s culture. 
Assessing and proving competence 
Section 4.4 discussed the interview record evidence concerning what 
competences and capabilities were being sought by those selecting an auditor. 
The interview records contain considerable evidence of this being assessed 
during tender processes with 32 (48%) of the source records containing 
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reference to it. The most common facets were comments on the general quality 
of the performance of individuals (12 instances) and on the demonstrated 
strength and depth of the team (nine instances) .  
 The vast majority of references in relation to individuals related to their 
performance in the final presentation with references evenly split between those 
referring to the team as a whole and those relating only to the lead partner or 
the lead partner and working partner. 
Similarly of the nine references to depth these were predominantly about 
how well this was demonstrated in the final presentation, by for example the 
strong presentations of the whole team or specifically by bringing overseas 
partners to it. 
A further four interview records contained references to how well teams 
performed in the question and answer sessions as part of final presentations. 
The predominance of the presentations in commenting on behavioural 
performance was also a feature of measuring teamwork as is referred to next. 
Teamwork 
The interview records also provided evidence that companies were not 
only noticing how the firms were interacting with them, but also how they were 
working with each other. In total 31 (47%) of the interview records contained 
references to who came to various meetings (and in particular the final 
presentation) and how they interacted. 
Chapter Four 
Research Findings Phase 1 
Review of Interview Records August 2002 to May 2010 
 
 
215 
 
In common with assessment of competence, the vast majority of the 
references related to how teams structured and worked together in final 
presentations (18 instances), the balance of performance within the final 
presentations (eight instances) and more explicitly on the teamwork that was 
demonstrated (five instances).  
Presenting and testing ideas and insights 
Presenting and testing ideas and insights were referenced in 15 (25%) of 
the interview records. This section is of course closely associated with 
consideration of these matters as part of the future service design outlined in 
Section 4.3.4. However the Phase 1 analysis not only identified these ideas and 
insights being valued as part of the future service design but also the act of 
raising them during the proposal process being influential. 
Companies commented favourably where firms demonstrated insight into 
their industry and geographical markets, about the current and emerging issues 
facing them and about the companies themselves.  
There were a small number of comments about new ideas including how 
the firms’ audits might improve the company’s reputation and even its share 
price. Other ideas included suggesting the use of software in an innovative way 
in the audit. 
Companies however did want to hear about ideas at the right time. A 
suggestion for an improved relationship with internal audit was badly received 
by the head of internal audit and the audit committee because they had not 
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heard of the idea until the final presentation and it had not previously been 
discussed with them. 
4.6. Final decision making 
 
In the previous sections the focus has been on evidence from the interview 
records of influences on the auditor selection decision arising from the 
relationships which existed before the tender processes and from facets of the 
service propositions that put forward (service design) of the firms and the teams 
put forward (their capabilities and competences) and elements of the way they 
behaved during the tender process. 
The final factor group is final decision making. There was evidence that 
companies were committed to conducting fair and proper proposal processes 
(13 instances).  References were made to investing time in the process and 
making time for firms to meet key people (five instances), a structured process 
(three instances), an extensive process (two instances) and  a real process (two 
instances). Companies also identified that they had not tendered the audit for a 
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long time (nine instances) and that they thought it was the right thing to do 
either generally or following corporate governance (eight instances). 
In every case, the formal and final decision on auditor selection was made 
at the end of the process and normally following final presentations received 
from shortlisted firms, although some companies chose to shortlist down from 
their original invitation list based on firms’ performance during the proposal 
(normally after submission of a proposal document). 
In arriving at a final decision a discussion took place which considered the 
process overall. This final factor group therefore relates to the nature of the final 
discussion that took place, what aspects of the process were given weight, and 
who was involved. Matters relating to decision making were identified in 62 
(94%) of the interview records. 
The numbers of sources and references for each of these subcategories is 
set out in Table 17 and then each is considered in turn.  
Factors Sources References 
Decision elements and their 
weight 
51 159 
Decision consultation 50 118 
Decision makers 47 109 
Table 17: Phase 1: sources and references for Final decision making 
4.6.1. The decision elements 
The interview records contained a lot of evidence about how the various 
stages of the proposal process (for example meetings and feedback, proposal 
documents and presentations) were considered in final decision making. This 
was identified in 51 (77%) of the interview records.  
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Within this group, 31 interview records included references to a decision 
developing during the process. As noted above there were ten instances where a 
formal shortlisting from the original list, normally from three or four firms, to 
two took place. In most cases however companies seemed not to have fixed 
views on the likely outcome until the final discussion (which is not to say that 
they did not have preferences – for example the challenges facing incumbent 
auditors were discussed in Section 4.2.1). The potential for expectations to 
change was highlighted by examples of incumbent auditors overturning difficult 
positions at the start of the tender process, challenging firms overtaking 
incumbents during audit tenders, different firms being ahead at different stages 
of the process and firms being ahead but tripping up. A reference attributed the 
Finance Director of one company illustrates the point: 
The decision didn’t emerge however until after the presentations when 
the committee discussed all four tenders. In a fluid process all had probably 
changed their minds at least once. 
A measure of the dynamics of the final auditor selection decision is 
provided by the relative influence of different parts of the tender process. This 
may be divided into three parts: meetings, documents and presentations. 
There were 18 interview records which referred to gathering feedback from 
meetings during the tender process and responses were coordinated centrally 
and in some cases summarised. A further 11 records referenced specifically the 
use of score sheets and weightings. Generally the records referred to feedback 
forms with specific questions which were then supported by more informal 
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discussion.  The forms were seen a guide rather than being designed to create a 
numerical result. There is evidence of the feedback from meetings being very 
influential in the final decision, but also of firms coming second or third still 
being appointed. 
The interview records evidence concerning the influence of proposal 
documents on selection decisions was mixed. Although five  interview records 
referenced the importance of proposal documents as a means of obtaining 
information, particularly for non-executives, both for informing and reassuring 
that an appropriate proposal process was being undertaken, in 12 interview 
records there was evidence of their lack of importance. This lack of importance 
was expressed either relative to the other parts of the process or in absolute 
terms as is illustrated by a reference relating to a Group Financial Controller: 
[Group Financial Controller] reflected on how much time he had 
probably wasted whilst he was at [a Big 4 firm] in preparing proposals. He 
looked at the proposals and ten pages were enough. He doubted that others 
had really looked at them. 
In contrast there was no evidence of anyone thinking the final presentation 
was unimportant. In the 13 interview records that referred to presentations they 
were considered important; either as one selection criteria in their own right 
amongst others or in most cases as the culmination of a decision process that 
was still taking shape and was still in the balance. 
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4.6.2. Decision consultation 
In Chapter 2 the role of affect and its particular influence where decisions 
are made in the moment was highlighted. Also in that chapter the power of 
group dynamics in decision making was considered. The nature and timing of 
the final decision and the way that the decision was reached in most cases in 
open discussion are consistent with both influences being present in auditor 
selection. 
The dynamics of the final discussion were discussed in 50 (76%) of the 
interview records. The interview records provided evidence of a number of 
themes. 
Firstly, decisions tended to be close, at least between the preferred bidder 
and the next best (27 instances).  One CFO was recorded as having commented: 
…a length and a half separating the four runners 
An Audit Committee Chair was recorded as saying: 
… it was 50:50 but of course you can’t have 50:50 so 51:49 
Secondly, decisions tended to be consensual between the selection panels. 
One CFO was recorded as commenting that it was a bit like a jury.  In most cases 
in spite of the comment about the closeness of the assessment of the firms, a 
decision was reached in a relatively short time and straight after the 
presentations. Where there was disagreement there was evidence of airing of 
views and debate which was twice referred to as “long and hard”. There were 
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five instances where a decision was taken in principle but subject to follow up on 
areas of concern. 
Thirdly, although the discussion tended to be chaired by the Audit 
Committee Chair in some cases (five instances) the decision either followed a 
management recommendation, or audit committees referred the decision to 
management having satisfied themselves that the alternative firms being 
considered were all acceptable. Where a decision couldn’t be made, typically 
other members of the Board were invited to input (four instances) to help break 
the deadlock. 
Fourthly, although companies had checklists and a number talked about 
going through the strengths and weaknesses of the firms and feedback from 
those met by the firms during the process, this did not appear to be decisive. For 
example one CFO was recorded as having said he: 
Looked at what the scores told me but I had no intention of following 
[them] 
The interview records therefore suggest that in spite of an evolving 
process, the final decisions were not being taken until in most cases 
immediately after the final presentation. The literature would suggest that with 
a decision so close to the final presentation the influence of affect on that 
decision may well be heightened. 
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4.6.3. The decision makers 
It is the formal responsibility of the audit committee as explained in 
Chapter 1 to make a recommendation to the Board for subsequent shareholder 
ratification concerning auditor appointment. The interview records however 
showed that the ways that companies were interpreting that responsibility 
played out in different ways in practice. The construction of the decision making 
unit may be influential to the auditor selection decision given the different 
responsibilities of those involved especially between audit committee and 
management. 
Most tenders had a selection panel which included members of the audit 
committee and group financial management. In some cases extended to include 
representatives of key operating divisions or other head office management such 
as internal audit or the company secretary. In some cases the selection 
committee was split with a management only committee reporting to the audit 
committee. In only two cases was there reference to the involvement of the chief 
executive (although in one case decisively as will be referred to again below). In 
only one case was there reference to a chairman being involved in the process. 
There was in practice a range of involvement of the audit committee. In 
some cases having satisfied themselves that due process had been followed they 
had left the decision to management. In other cases they had received a 
recommendation from management which after final presentations they had 
accepted. The interview records identified two tenders where the audit 
committee concluded that there were two high quality proposals and referred 
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the final decision back to management. In one case the audit committee could 
not decide and the decision became one for the company’s board as a whole and, 
in one case, the audit committee and management disagreed and the chief 
executive officer became arbiter. In a further case the feedback from the 
meetings process was so influential that the audit committee and management 
were content to go with it. 
In some cases the decision making unit was much more narrowly defined 
including only the chair of the audit committee and the finance director and in 
one case the chair of audit committee and the chairman. 
Before concluding the discussion of the influence of decision making 
processes on auditor selection it is worth considering the interview record 
evidence as it related to contextual influences on auditor selection. 
4.7. Summary and conclusion on Phase 1 
The literature review which was completed in Chapter 2 identified five 
themes arising from supplier selection literature and behavioural decision 
theory and certain other literature relevant to influences on decision makers. 
These were relationships and track record (at the start of the proposal process), 
service design, capabilities and competences (of the competing firms and 
teams), behavioural influences (during the proposal process) and final decision 
making.  
This chapter has set out the findings of Phase 1 of the current research, 
namely the analysis of the post decision interview records provided by a Big 4 
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firm for the period August 2002 to May 2010. This analysis was conducted in 
accordance with the approach set out in Section 3.2.4 above and has identified 
the same five themes as factor groups. 
The findings from Phase 1 also provide additional evidence as to how the 
auditor selection decision is likely to be working. In particular, they provide 
additional detail concerning the factors influencing auditor selection which lie 
below the five factor groups influencing auditor selection. They also provide 
challenge in some areas, where factors which the literature might suggest were 
influential, were not referenced. 
Relationships and track record 
Within the relationships and prior track record factor group, the important 
influence of the relationship the company has with its incumbent auditor was 
identified. In this phase most companies conducting audit tenders had service 
problems especially around accounting issue resolution and (to a lesser extent) 
international coordination and communication.  As well as putting the 
incumbent auditor at a disadvantage these sources of problems became service 
design objectives. 
The research however also identified other factors inherent to the 
incumbent auditor situation which also put them at risk. These included 
changes in management and changes in companies more generally which 
caused companies to consider auditor change. Where incumbent auditors 
responded with proposals for service improvements they faced the challenge of 
“Why not before?” 
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Against these disadvantages were weighed incumbent knowledge and the 
potential risk and disruption associated with auditor transition; although the 
latter was also counteracted by the attractiveness of a fresh approach and 
detailed transition plans submitted by challenger firms. These were seen to 
mitigate concerns over transition. 
Service design 
Phase 1 provided evidence that service design could be differentiated and 
companies were considering design including  a core and an augmented service.  
At the core, companies were valuing rigour and assurance in considering 
auditor selection whilst the augmented service consideration included 
facilitating services associated with the audit. These were coordination and 
communication associated with the audit, accounting technical matters 
(especially dealing with accounting issues), the approach to the audit of IT 
systems and controls and how auditors proposed to work with internal audit 
departments. Companies were also looking for ideas and insights from their 
auditors based on their broader knowledge and experience. 
Fees were found generally not to be a major influence on auditor 
appointment. This arose either because the fee quotes were close, or because 
companies felt the fees unimportant as they represent a small proportion of 
total spend, or because negotiations took place after the decision or as part of 
the decision with the preferred bidder. 
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Capabilities and competences 
Capabilities and competences were found to be influences on auditor 
selection and operating at three levels: the firm, the team and the lead partner. 
For the firm the principal influences identified were industry experience and 
expertise, geographic coverage and dealing with conflicts.  
The assessment of teams was being undertaken at the individual and team 
levels with industry experience and expertise again being highlighted. 
Companies were also keen to understand how the team was structured. 
A focus on the experience of the lead partner, along with an assessment of 
their ability to deliver the audit, as well as their personal styles was also 
identified.  
Behavioural influences 
A variety of behavioural influences was also identified.  Whilst companies 
were assessing the quality of the responses made to their requests for proposal, 
including the quality of the meetings conducted, the proposal documents and 
the presentations, there was a much broader discussion of the influence of 
behaviour during the tender process and there was considerable evidence of 
affective influences. 
The most referenced influence was hunger, commitment and enthusiasm 
and indeed this was referenced in slightly more interview records than the 
assessment of the quality of response. References to the importance of listening 
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(and responding to what was heard) and understanding and personal chemistry 
were referenced slightly more often than those relating to proving competence. 
These findings may well support the fact that companies found it difficult 
to undertake assessments of the service provisions or felt that each of the firms 
could provide the same service and were therefore falling back on other 
interpersonal influences. 
Final decision making 
Phase 1 identified that the final decision was typically not made until after 
the final presentation. In most cases this decision discussion immediately 
followed the final presentations although consideration was given to meetings 
including feedback from those not present at the final discussion, the 
documents and the final presentations. 
In the majority of cases decisions were close but the final discussion 
consensual between the selection panels which included both non-executives 
and executives. There were instances of non-executives passing the decision to 
management once acceptable alternatives had been identified. Where there was 
disagreement, there was evidence of debate and discussion and where there was 
a deadlock, evidence of bringing in other Board members. 
Relationships between the factor groups 
As set out in Section 4.0, Phase 1 formed part of a three phase approach to 
answer the research question: 
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“What are the factors affecting the auditor selection decisions of              
FTSE 350 companies in competitive tenders?” 
The research design was therefore focussed on identifying influencing 
factors. During Phase 1 however a number of indications started to emerge 
about how these factor groups influencing auditor selection might interrelate. 
For example the track record of experience and in particular service problems 
were seen to focus service design around providing solutions to those problems 
especially, but not restricted to, accounting issue resolution. Similarly the 
experience that companies had prior to tender with competing firms, through 
non-audit service relationship and/or targeting, was taken as evidence of how 
firms were likely to behave in the future. 
Capabilities and competences were identified as being assessed especially 
in the final presentation. Changes to the teams were also being made as a result 
of listening. And the lead partner assessment was being influenced by 
consideration of that person’s style with clear references to the way that they 
behaved in the proposal process.  
Service design was also being evolved during the process with tailored 
service and audit plans.  
Although not directly part of the initial research design which was focussed 
at identifying influence factors (not their inter-relationships) they do provide an 
interesting additional aspect and are returned to in Chapter 5. 
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Introducing the initial conceptual model 
The initial conceptual model was developed reflecting the five order 
categories identified in Phase 1 and also took into account the contextual 
influences discussed in Chapter 1. Reflecting the literature which cast doubt 
over the applicability of normative models, the initial conceptual model 
therefore also recognised that each selection decision is likely to be influenced 
by the general experience and situation of the proposal.  
The model also started to consider the indications of relationships which 
the factor groups influencing auditor selection might have with each other.  The 
initial conceptual model is set out in Figure 11. 
 
 
The model was constructed based on the pretext that the auditor selection 
decision started with the context; being the individual circumstances facing 
those making the selection decision and the market and regulatory context. 
Figure 11: The initial conceptual model 
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 Each decision would then start with some extant conditions. These related 
to the relationships that existed at the start of the selection process and the 
capabilities and competences that the competing firms and their teams had. 
 The activities that took place during a proposal process were then service 
design and other interpersonal contact. These were moderators of relationships 
and capability and competence because decision makers’ assessments of these 
first two factors would evolve as the proposal process went on. They were also 
however decision influences in their own right because comparisons were being 
made between the service propositions and people were falling back on 
behavioural cues where they found the service propositions similar. 
 In the final selection all of these factors were influential and they would be 
processed in a final decision; the dynamics of which formed the final influence 
factor. The discussion and debate in the final discussion including the dynamic 
between those involved would shape the final outcome; especially as most 
decisions appeared to be close. This discussion typically took into account the 
whole process including meetings, documents and presentations, but whilst the 
documents were of variable importance, the presentations were seen more 
generally to be important. 
As will be seen in the following chapters, the later phases of the current 
research suggested a different model with consistency about the underlying 
factor groups influencing auditor selection but some differences in their 
position and inter-relationships. 
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The initial conceptual model was however an important part of the 
research as it stimulated reflection in a more holistic way about the auditor 
selection decision. This is developed in the chapters that follow. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
RESEARCH FINDINGS PHASE 2a: 
IN DEPTH SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS WITH COMPANIES 
JUNE 2010 TO SEPTEMBER 2012  
 
5.0. Introduction 
In line with the phased approach explained in Section 3.2 this is the 
second chapter of three which set out the findings of the data relevant to 
answering the research question: 
“What are the factors affecting the auditor selection decisions of         
FTSE 350 companies in competitive tenders?” 
In the previous chapter the 
findings of the analysis of post 
tender interview notes 
maintained by a Big 4 firm were 
discussed.  
This chapter now sets out 
the research findings following 
the analysis of the in-depth 
interviews conducted with those 
within FTSE 350 companies who, 
at the time of the interview, had recently been involved in an auditor selection 
decision involving a competitive tender.  
Figure 12: Phase 2a within the overall research 
approach 
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5.1. Analysis of in depth interviews with those involved in an 
auditor selection decision by a FTSE 350 company 
Consistent with Phase 1 of the study, the analysis was conducted in 
accordance with the research approach set out in Section 3.2.4 above. Across the 
23 in depth interview records, 696 nodes were identified and 1709 references 
were assigned to these nodes (on average some 74 references per interview). 
The numbers of both nodes and references per source interview were much 
higher than Phase 1; consistent with the fact that Phase 2a was based on in-
depth interviews and transcripts (or detailed cross checked notes) rather than 
the Big 4 firm’s pre-existing post decision review notes used for Phase 1 (see 
pages 118-119 for more details). Reflecting the greater richness in the underlying 
data, additional issues were identified and some influence factors emerged with 
different slants and nuances.  
In summary however, although the research findings analyses of Phase 1 
and Phase 2a were conducted independently, in each case using the grounded 
approach set out in Chapter 3, there was a high degree of consistency in the 
findings at both the factor group and individual factor level, albeit as will be 
discussed below and again in Discussion in Chapter 7, there were some 
differences especially in balance between the phases. 
As a result of the Phase 2a analysis a revised conceptual model was 
constructed which considered the factors affecting auditor selection. 
The revised model followed detailed reflection based on the themes and 
knowledge emerging from the research as it progressed. As Figure 13 shows, this 
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post Phase 2a model contains the same five factor groups influencing auditor 
selection but, having been developed separately based on Phase 2a findings, 
takes a different approach to the relationships between these factor groups. 
Lastly the revised model deals with contextual influences in a slightly different 
way. 
The conceptual model is set out below and explained in the subsections 
that follow.  
 
Figure 13: The revised conceptual model 
Consistent with Phase 1, the five factor group influences on auditor 
selection identified were: Relationships and past track record (at the start of the 
proposal process), Service design, Capabilities and competences (of the 
competing firms and teams), Behavioural influences during the proposal 
process and Final decision making. 
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The principal relationships identified in Phase 2a were placed within three 
groups: firstly, the influence of Past relationships and track record on Service 
design (1a), Behavioural influences (1b) and Capability and competence 
assessment (1c); secondly, the influence of behaviour during the process on 
Service design (2a) and Capability and competence assessment (2b); thirdly, the 
influence of Service design (3a), Behavioural influences during the proposal (3b) 
and Capabilities and competences assessment (3c) on Final decision making. 
The five factor groups influencing auditor selection are considered first, 
then the relationships between them. 
5.2. Relationships and past track record 
The generally long 
periods of auditor tenure, 
but also high switching 
rates within tenders, had 
previously been identified 
in the contextual review 
(Section 1.4.2) and 
confirmed by the current 
research (Section 4.3). 
There was evidence that audit 
relationships often sustained 
but that once at tender, companies tended to switch. 
Figure 14: Relationships and past track record 
influences on auditor selection 
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The findings from Phase 2a showed considerable consistency with Phase 1, 
highlighting the relationship that a company had with its incumbent auditor, its 
relationship with other firms and the individual relationships that directors and 
senior management had with firms from past experience, cross directorships 
and past employment (alumni relationships) as the main influence factors.  The 
number of sources and references for each of these is for Phase 2a set out in 
Table 18 below.  
Factors Sources References 
Audit firm incumbency 23 180 
 Incumbent track record 20 75 
 Incumbent inherent position 20 72 
 Audit transition 14 33 
Targeting and non-audit service relationships 14 48 
Relationships at other companies 12 35 
Alumni 8 17 
Trust 5 14 
Table 18: Phase 2a Relationships and track record sources and references by factor 
The findings in relation to each of these subcategories are considered in 
the following sections. 
5.2.1. Audit firm incumbency 
Audit firm incumbency was discussed in 
each of the 23 in-depth interviews conducted 
as part of Phase 2a of the research and 180 
references were identified. The discussions 
related to both the track record of the 
incumbent and its inherent position as a 
result of other matters at the relevant 
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company and at the relevant time. Considerations pertaining to audit transition 
are also dealt with here. 
The track record of the incumbent is considered first. 
Incumbent track record 
Phase 1 had identified past service problems, particularly those relating to 
dealing with accounting issues and international coordination. Within Phase 2a 
in comparison, the references to the track record of the incumbent auditors 
were much more balanced between positive and negative comments. Of the 20 
(87%) source interviews which referred to the track record of the incumbent, 12 
(52%) referred to past service problems but the same number talked about 
auditors doing a good job (NB in four interviews both problems and positive 
experiences were discussed).  Accounting issue resolution which had been 
highlighted as a common problem in Phase 1 was only discussed in one 
interview. 
The change in balance between positive and negative comments was 
directionally consistent with a change in the reasons people gave for the tender. 
In Phase 2a ten interviews (44%) indicated that corporate governance or a 
feeling that best practice required a tender had been a driver of the proposal 
(this compared with only 25% in Phase 1 where dissatisfaction had been 
identified as the most common driver). 
The reduction in the level of problems associated with accounting issue 
resolution and the increased influence of corporate governance may well be due 
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to the later time period covered by Phase 2 as compared to Phase 1. This is 
returned to in Discussion in Chapter 7. 
In Phase 2a there was however a variety of other issues which gave rise to a 
poor incumbent service record although none of these occurred more than a 
small number of times. In addition to general comments about dissatisfaction 
with service and relationship problems these specific issues included:  
 issues not being communicated effectively from an important overseas 
subsidiary ( two instances) or in another case where a company felt it 
was receiving poor quality reports; 
 problems with the rotation of a lead partner (in accordance with the 
mandatory maximum tenure periods for lead partners explained in 
Chapter 1);  
 a disagreement about a specific issue or event which became 
problematic (for example disagreement about a major governance 
issue); 
  a relationship that had become stale such that company no longer felt it 
was getting good service or a service that was no longer right for them 
such that they questioned the value that was being delivered by their 
auditors; 
 concern over the approach that the auditors were taking, when for 
example, the company felt that this approach was not recognising their 
own investment in systems and controls or that recommendations for 
improvement were not constructive  “beating us over the head”  (one 
instance each); 
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 where companies felt their audit fees were too high; and lastly, 
 in an otherwise good relationship, a tender and change were triggered 
when a company’s incumbent audit firm decided to propose for the 
audit of one of its competitors (supporting the preference for companies 
not to be audited by close competitors identified by Kwon (1996) and 
discussed in Chapter 2). 
So there were a variety of situations that could give rise to perceived 
service problems for incumbent auditors. In some cases, the comments related 
to issues which, of themselves, did not seem sufficiently serious to merit a 
change in auditor. Companies seemed to be prepared to tender with fewer, less 
serious or indeed any problem with their incumbent. One financial controller 
commented: 
“We haven’t done it [tendered] for 23 years so we don’t do it often, we 
don’t do it lightly. Was it a criticism of [incumbent firm]team, no, but did they 
light us up and make us feel special and deliver stuff, no not really and to be 
honest it was probably a bit of a journey…” 
As noted above, Phase 2a identified 12 instances where companies 
conducted an audit tender in spite of positive comments about the past service 
track record of their incumbent. In eight cases interviewees referred to their 
auditors doing a good job generally. In addition interviewees talked about 
commitment and investment in the relationship, good balance in the partner 
team, evolving the relationship and moving partners around their group 
globally.  So consistent with more corporate governance driven processes,  more 
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audit tenders were being started even with apparently good service 
relationships.  
The inherent position of the incumbent 
Comments in relation to the inherent position of the incumbent were also 
quite balanced with those highlighting advantages (14 instances) comparing 
broadly with those discussing disadvantages (11 instances). 
In 14 interviews references were made to the inherent advantages that an 
incumbent auditor possessed. In most cases these related to that auditor’s 
knowledge and understanding of the company, its business and its people (11 
instances).  These references were not always however entirely straight forward. 
For example, although acknowledged as an asset, one Group Finance Director 
talked about how his company had not selected their incumbent firm which is 
what they had expected to do, given their knowledge of the business.  In another 
case the potential value of knowledge was noted but it was felt to be outweighed 
by other factors. 
Incumbent knowledge appeared most persuasive when it was used 
effectively; translating into behaviour during the process. In one case a Group 
Finance Director talked about how the incumbent had demonstrated greater 
understanding of the company in their presentation. In another they had 
tailored their style: 
[CFO] “I think [incumbent firm] knowing us extremely well, this was 
their presentation, really light….[they] are saying look we know these guys , 
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they don’t like [messing] around, they like getting on with things and this is all 
they need to come to views and a decision. So I think this lighter version for us 
was absolutely right”  
Companies also valued the knowledge they had of the audit team and firm 
and its strengths and weaknesses (accepting that this would not always be 
positive).  A benefit for the incumbent was therefore that they constituted a 
“known entity” (four instances). 
Amongst the inherent disadvantages for the incumbent there were cases of 
new management driving tender processes (four instances), and recognition of 
general change in the business de-stabilising an audit relationship (three 
instances).  A number of more specific risks to an incumbent were also 
identified. 
Firstly, companies felt that it was easy for an incumbent to be complacent. 
Where the same people were discussing the same issues the repetition could 
become both boring and frustrating (even when the auditor was right). 
 Secondly, there was a challenge as to what was going to be different. An 
incumbent introducing new ideas and innovations runs the risk of the 
challenge: why not before? (as noted in Phase 1 – four instances)  
A related challenge identified in one interview was whether an incumbent 
auditor ought to change the team that was apparently doing a good job. A 
change would involve a loss of incumbent knowledge which might reduce their 
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inherent advantage but, at the same time, the new team might bring new ideas 
and innovation and therefore mitigate an inherent disadvantage. 
The challenge for an incumbent auditor is perhaps best illustrated by a 
Group Financial Controller who said: 
“I work very, very closely with the audit team and there are people who 
assumed that [incumbent firm] would have an advantage in this process being 
incumbent auditor. You should do, business knowledge and that kind of thing 
you can play on, but actually I saw it as a disadvantage. ...because how do you 
make yourself new and refreshing…you’re almost on a hiding to nothing” 
The Phase 2a analysis suggests companies were more open to ideas, 
innovations and new approaches; without such a tight focus on past problems.  
Audit transition 
As in Phase 1, concerns were identified in Phase 2a about the challenge of 
transition. Seven interviewees acknowledged the difficulties and challenges of 
transitioning an audit. They talked about the “hassle” of change and that 
changing auditors was not something that ought to be done lightly. A comment 
made by one financial controller exemplifies the issue: 
“You know changing auditors is no small thing in terms of the sort of 
knowledge that they will have built up over the years and obviously the 
smoothness of an audit. So …on the basis of smoothness of the audit – would 
we ever change? Probably not”. 
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Other changes taking place in the business were considered to increase the 
difficulty of changing auditors or indeed preclude it; there being an argument 
for too much change going on at any one time (four instances). 
In one case the audit committee satisfied itself that there were two credible 
tenders; one was the incumbent, and the final decision was left to management 
as to whether they felt that they could manage the change effectively given the 
other challenges in the business. 
As with Phase1 however, an inherent attraction was identified of new and 
refreshing ideas. The comparison became between new ideas and sticking with 
the current service. One interview suggested “the grass is always greener” and 
another suggested that change is good for its own sake and was in their case 
overdue. 
The perceived challenges of an auditor change could also again be 
mitigated by transition planning by non-incumbent firms. There was evidence 
that companies recognised the investment that the non-incumbent firms had 
made to prepare properly for the transition (five instances). Examples included 
detailed transition plans and audit plans and more general investments of time 
that had been made to ensure that the audit firm was ready to take over the 
audit straightaway. 
The proposing teams’ experience was also relevant. In one case, a major 
company drew comfort from the fact that the proposed team they selected was 
transitioning off another major company with similar issues such that they 
would not need to educate them. In another, the investment that the firm had 
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made in targeting and the past track record provided evidence that they had 
sufficient knowledge to take over the audit to meet a tight reporting deadline. 
In total, 14 interviews discussed transition and the findings were similar to 
Phase 1; namely that transition could be a concern, but that some found change 
inherently attractive and, where there were concerns, these could be mitigated 
by activity before the tender and by sensible plans being submitted by the 
“challenger firms” as part of preparing for the future. 
Incumbent’s overall position at the start of the proposal process 
In seven interviews respondents commented on whether they thought the 
incumbent stood any chance of retaining the work.  One indicated that the 
tender was for corporate governance, one a merger and the others service 
related. Three interviewees (corporate governance, merger and one service) 
responded that the incumbent did stand a chance; the others thought it unlikely 
that they would be appointed. In the end all changed perhaps providing at least 
some indication that whilst a poor record most often led to a change, a positive 
track record does not necessarily lead to reappointment.  In this environment, 
with such low retention rates, it was perhaps surprising that there was only one 
identified instance of an incumbent auditor declining to tender. 
5.2.2. Targeting and non-audit service relationships with the 
company 
As noted in Chapter 1, the fact that many companies have non-audit 
relationships with other Big 4 firms arose at least in part from regulatory change 
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and the ensuing concerns over auditor 
independence. In Phase 2a there were 14 
interviews which discussed the influence on 
the selection decision of targeting activity (as 
defined below) and of a past non-audit service 
track record with the company. 
In total seven interviews referred to targeting activity  (NB: In this  context 
and consistent with Phase 1 of the current research, “targeting “ is used as 
commonly referred to in practice within the accounting profession as a “bundle” 
of activities aimed at building relationships and winning work at new clients 
through directed marketing activity and more specific business development 
meetings. It may entail elements of key account management or be less 
structured in nature but, in each case, entails a focussed investment in time with 
the company). 
Particular targeting activities identified included technical accounting 
updates provided by a firm to company personnel, secondments of firm staff to 
the company before the tender process, introducing company management to 
relevant contacts both from within the firms (for example contacts in critical 
territories) and with other business contacts. In one case a number of briefing 
sessions had been organised by one of the firms for a new finance director 
concerning regulation and relevant industry matters. In two cases interviewees 
talked about the value of a development programme for future finance directors 
which one of the firms ran. In addition to being quite diverse these targeting 
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activities could also be long standing and, where sustained, could be highly 
influential. 
One CFO commented: 
“ I think the relationship and the effort put in definitely put [Firm x] in the 
lead what that’s worth who knows but certainly everything else being equal 
that would have been sufficient … you’ve got to reward that sort of effort and 
attention” 
Five further interviews referred to past (fee paying) service relationships 
involving corporate and ex-patriate tax services, accounting advice and 
transaction support.  
In terms of the influence on the selection decision the principal benefit of 
targeting and other non-audit service relationships for the companies seemed to 
relate to mutual knowledge. In two cases people talked about the importance of 
this and in two other cases of the negative impact when it was not there.  One 
financial controller talked about building trust and one identified the 
importance of targeting as the level of commitment that had been demonstrated 
ahead of the proposal. 
Although across the interviews the influence of non-audit service 
relationships was on balance positive there were also cases of a negative 
influence for the firms concerned. In two cases there had been fee disputes, in 
one case a local partner was known but disliked and in a third the issue was 
conflict where an existing non-audit service provided by one firm was valued 
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highly and this counted at least to some extent (although according to the 
company not decisively) against that firm being appointed as auditor given the 
independence concerns that it raised. 
5.2.3. Relationships at other companies 
The first two parts of this section were 
concerned with direct relationships between 
companies and audit firms before the audit 
tender; either as the incumbent auditor or by 
virtue of the fact that there were established 
non-audit services relationships or targeting 
activity. 
Similar to Section 4.2.3 this section now looks at relationships and track 
record influences between those selecting auditors and the firms through past or 
current relationships outside the tendering company.  
In Phase 2a evidence of the influence of past working relationships at other 
companies was substantial and this is considered first. There was very limited 
evidence of any influence of current cross-directorships. This is briefly touched 
on next. 
Past service relationships at another company 
Past experience of working with one of the competing firms could arise as 
a result of a change in employment of one or more of the key directors. The 
appearance of new management was identified as one of the potential forces for 
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change for an incumbent above, but clearly also affects the selection chances of 
any firm where it occurs. Such people bring either good or bad experiences of 
the firms from their previous employment.  
The Phase 2a research identified 12 (52%) of the interviews where those on 
the selection panel had past experience of working with at least one of the 
competing firms at another company. There was then quite a high level of 
discussion although the nature and level of influence this appeared to have on 
the auditor selection decision was quite varied and, in some cases, complicated 
as the following paragraphs highlight. 
Past relationships could have a decisive impact on the decision.  Two cases 
were identified; one where the decision was influenced positively for the 
relevant firm, one negatively. In the first case the recent past experience of one 
of the firms was decisive because two of the directors had had a favourable 
impression of one firm and spoke up in favour of that firm in the final decision 
discussion. Their speaking for the firm involved was identified as decisive for 
their success in being appointed. In this case one of the directors had recent 
working experience with the individual who was the proposed lead partner.  
The negative influence arose when one of the divisional directors had had 
a poor experience of working with a proposed partner on one of the teams and 
spoke up vehemently against the appointment of that firm. The firm was 
ultimately not appointed with this opinion having said to have carried weight. 
In a further case there was a negative, but potentially not decisive, 
influence against one of the firms because the company CEO knew one of their 
Chapter Five 
Research Findings Phase 2a 
In-depth Semi-structured Interviews with Companies 
June 2010 to September 2012 
 
250 
 
key people from a previous employment and wanted to be able to use that 
person for other non-audit services. Had they been appointed auditor this 
would not have been possible due to independence restrictions. So in this case, 
contrary to what might be expected following much of the relationship 
marketing literature, the firm was negatively influenced by a positive track 
record of non-audit service delivery.  
How recent the experience was could also be important. Although 
company directors may have had established working relationships in the past, 
these could be overtaken by more recent targeting or work experience (three 
cases). In one of these cases, the Group Finance Director thought his previous 
relationship with one of the competing firms was very strong and he considered 
the partner leading their proposal to be a friend. However that firm was 
ultimately not selected. He felt his relationship had made the decision more 
difficult, but that was not enough to overcome the more recent targeting activity 
of the successful firm. 
In other cases the influence of past relationships on the auditor selection 
decision was complicated by the fact that a number of those on the selection 
committee had relationships with a number of different firms. The Group 
Financial Controller of one company commented: 
 “I knew one of the partners on [one team], the Audit Committee Chair 
knew most of one of the other teams because they audit the company where he 
is the Finance Director….[he also] knew [a third team] well [from past work]I 
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don’t think those relationships skewed the decision but I think if there had been 
a past issue with any of the firms it might have skewed it”  
Current cross directorships 
The high number of directors with more than one Board appointment in 
the FTSE 100 was identified in Chapter 1. There were multiple appointments in 
places, particularly involving non-executive directors.  Because such directors 
populate the audit committees, who are formally responsible for audit 
appointment, an influence of such cross-directorships might have been 
expected. In Phase 2a however cross directorships were only mentioned in 
relation to two auditor selection decisions. In one case the reference was simply 
acknowledging that such relationships existed and, in the other, a comment was 
made about a recent tender at another company. There was therefore limited or 
no evidence of these cross directorships as an auditor selection influence in 
Phase 2a. 
5.2.4. Alumni 
In Phase 2a there was noticeably more 
discussion about alumni relationships than in 
Phase1 and indeed eight of the interviews 
touched on it (over a third). In almost all 
cases, those interviewed were positive about 
their old firms at least to some extent 
although these relationships did not seem 
greatly to directly influence the results. 
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In one case an alumnus acknowledged that he had trained with the team 
from one of the firms tendering for the audit and indeed still socialised with 
them and considered the lead partner to be very good. However, although he 
had warned them that the tender was coming, he felt that during the process 
another firm had clearly put forward a better tender effort. It would not have 
been right or possible to overturn that. He commented: 
“So obviously in my position I’ve got to be impartial I think you 
embarrass yourself if you’re not these days and its obvious when if it’s a 
decision with a big group, it’s pretty obvious if you’re evidently favouring one 
for another” 
In two cases senior directors were alumni of competing firms in situations 
where those firms were incumbent. The recent negative service history at the 
company in these cases overturned any allegiance they may have felt to their old 
firm. 
Similarly in another case many of the group finance team were recent 
alumni of one of the competing firms, but that firm was the subject of criticism 
based on past service problems elsewhere and was ultimately not appointed. 
In one case the presence of a recent alumna was problematic for her old 
firm when that firm made assertions about what they were going to deliver in 
the audit. She knew they could not deliver what they were promising when she 
was employed by that firm and challenged them hard as to how they thought 
they could deliver it at the time of the tender. 
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In summary the findings in Phase 2a in relation to alumni were consistent 
with Phase 1 in that there are sensitivities and the interview evidence suggests 
that alumni relationships can be helpful (but not decisive) or unhelpful given 
the specific circumstances of the tender. 
5.2.5. Other relationship matters 
Phase 1 indicated that there was no evidence of personal or social 
relationships influencing auditor selection; instead relationship influences 
related to professional working relationships.  Phase 2a findings were consistent 
with this. In only one case was a mention made that one finance director asked a  
Big 4 firm partner at his golf club to suggest who he should send the request for 
proposal to because he had no relationship with that firm. There is no 
suggestion that that partner was then involved in the proposal process. 
Again references to loyalty were missing from the Phase 2a findings; and 
Phase 2a confirmed earlier the rather surprising indication (in the context of the 
professional services literature) of a low level of reference taking with only two 
of the 23 interviews touching on it. 
There was however one notable difference from Phase 1 to Phase 2a and 
that related to trust. In Phase 1 it was noted that references to trust were absent 
from the interview records. In Phase 2a however there were references to it in 
five of the interviews, almost of a quarter of the total. It is not obvious why this 
may have occurred.  
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For two interviewees (one as identified in Section 5.2.2) it was important 
for trust to be established as part of the selection process. In one case trust was 
damaged when one of the lead partners tendering over-stated their experience 
claiming to lead an audit of a major company when they only in fact led the 
audit of one of its divisions. The Finance Director disliked what he considered to 
be overselling and subsequently mistrusted that individual. 
In two cases the importance of trust in the audit service was also 
recognised. In both cases the importance of difficult issues being discussed in 
the right way and communicated to the audit committee appropriately was 
identified. 
Lastly, one interview identified a need for inter-organisational trust with a 
need for trusting relationships to exist between the most senior people at the 
company and the audit firm; not just the audit team. In this case some major 
issues had been confronted in the period leading up to the tender between the 
company and its auditor. 
This concludes the discussion of relationships and service track record 
influences on auditor selection.  Important influences in relation to the 
company’s relationship with its incumbent and with other firms have been 
identified. The next section considers the Phase 2a findings on the next higher 
order category, audit service design. 
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5.3. Service design  
 
This section now sets out the Phase 2a findings using the same 
classification adapted from Gronroos (2007) as was used in Phase 1 to order the 
consideration of the auditor selection influences.  These include the core audit, 
facilitating services and ideas and insights as a supporting service. The influence 
of fee on auditor selection is also considered. 
By way of introduction this section starts with consideration of the 
evidence from the interview transcripts as to whether buyers of audit services 
thought that that service was a standard or a commoditised service or whether 
differentiation was possible. The latter would be consistent with service design 
being a decision influence in auditor selection. 
 
Figure 15: Service design influences on auditor selection 
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5.3.1. Audit approach, general differentiation and tailoring 
The results of Phase 2a in relation to general differentiation and tailoring 
were consistent with Phase 1 with the balance of comment heavily towards the 
argument that the audit is not a commoditised service.  
Although four interviewees commented that the core audit was “a given” 
(assumed to be available to an appropriate standard from all of the firms)  and, 
in two cases, observations that the audit approaches that were proposed by the 
firms were not different, there were nine (39%) of the source interviews which 
highlighted tailoring of approaches and specific proposals. This was manifest in 
the final proposal documents submitted by the competing firms and in three 
cases by detailed audit plans submitted as part of the overall tender submission.  
Audit service design was discussed in each of the 23 interviews and in 
addition to the general evidence of tailoring the areas of focus were largely the 
same as Phase 1. These were rigour and assurance from the audit (analogous 
with the core service and concerned with the technical quality of what was being 
selected), the facilitating services of coordination and communication, 
accounting technical matters, IT systems and controls and working with 
internal audit as facilitating services, and ideas and insights from the audit as a 
supporting service. In addition to these influences, Phase 2a also identified an 
additional area of influence relating to the audit service. This related to other 
aspects of the working relationship. This will be considered further in Section 
5.3.3. 
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Each of the identified audit service assessment influences on auditor 
selection is now considered further starting with audit rigour and assurance. 
5.3.2. Core audit –rigour and assurance 
Phase 2a identified 10 (43%) of the interviews which discussed the needs 
for rigour and assurance in the audit 
service. This represented a 
substantially larger proportion of 
the total population than in Phase 
1. A desire for challenge in the 
audit process was identified in three 
interviews, others talked of the need for a robust, rigorous, solid audit or just 
better assurance. 
In addition to comments in relation to the need for overall rigour including 
challenge, there were also some insights into specific activities which companies 
thought would support rigour. These included, in one case each, confirming that 
the finance team had done what it should and the audit assessing the Finance 
Director and their team (a comment made by a Finance Director). In one case 
assurance in emerging territories was identified as particularly important 
reflecting the higher levels of operational risk which that company perceived to 
be present in those countries.  Lastly, in one case, the influence of one of the 
firms employing data analysis tools to support the quality of the audit was seen 
as a positive.  
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The need for rigour and assurance is illustrated by the comments of one 
finance director interviewed: 
“[Firm A] missed the point ….I’d asked them how to do my audit - I think 
we had an eight page document and on the middle page that was the first time 
they actually talked about their audit and how they’d do it…. And in the pitch 
they told me that anyone can do an audit which actually I saw as a real insult 
because actually I don’t care how anyone does it I want you to explain to me, 
in detail how you’ll do my audit because actually my head could roll if I get it 
wrong.” 
So rigour and assurance from the audit was again identified as an 
influence on auditor selection. The next section now looks at influences arising 
from the way the audit is delivered through consideration of facilitating services. 
5.3.3. Facilitating services 
The Phase 2a interview data identified five Facilitating services influences 
on auditor selection. These included the 
working relationship, accounting 
technical matters, coordination 
and communication, IT systems 
and controls and working with 
internal audit.  
The numbers of interviews where each was discussed along with the 
references is set out in Table 19 below.  
Chapter Five 
Research Findings Phase 2a 
In-depth Semi-structured Interviews with Companies 
June 2010 to September 2012 
 
259 
 
Factors Sources References 
Working relationship 14 57 
Accounting technical matters 11 46 
Coordination and communication 10 21 
IT systems and controls 7 15 
Working with internal audit  5 9 
Other 2 2 
Table 19: Phase 2a sources and references for facilitating services 
Four of these influences are consistent with Phase 1. Phase 2a identified 
additional influences related to how the service relationship would work. These 
have been grouped under a heading of working relationship which is considered 
first. 
The working relationship 
There was considerable reference to the importance of the working 
relationship between auditors and companies being audited and 14 (61%) of the 
interviews included reference to this. 
In three cases the interview identified the influence of the working 
relationship generally as important, in two of these especially so in difficult 
times and in one case especially for a smaller company. There were however 
also more specific references to aspects of the working relationship. 
Notwithstanding the profile of the decision and the regulatory 
environment surrounding audit, companies were still valuing interpersonal 
aspects of the audit relationship in their decisions. People talked about the 
importance of identifying people they could work with (as an objective of the 
future audit service) (seven instances). For example a comment from a Group 
Financial Controller highlights the point: 
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…part of it was a subliminal piece which was do you think you can work 
with these people… because that was key. Now for example our tax team were 
pretty clear that they couldn’t, they really didn’t think that they could work 
with [one firm’s proposed] tax people. 
The need for sensitivity to, and fit with, the company’s culture was also 
identified (four instances).  Three interviewees referred to a desire to work in 
partnership, including mutual respect. This is of course closely associated with 
personal chemistry which is considered further under behavioural influences in 
Section 5.5 
The interviews also identified that companies were looking for proactivity 
and valuing a straightforward approach, expecting auditors to be hands on and 
engaged and getting the basics right which were discussed in one interview 
each.  
Lastly, three interviews identified the efficient completion of the audit as 
important including a precise timetable, getting the audit done with an efficient 
process that would make company executives’ lives easier and not waste their 
time. 
Accounting technical matters 
In Section 5.2 it was noted that whilst accounting technical matters had 
noticeably featured less strongly than in Phase 1, Phase 2a interviews still 
showed this to be a commonly identified area of concern for future service 
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design. In total 11 (48%) of the interviews identified aspects of accounting 
technical matters as areas for consideration in auditor selection. 
The interviews did however identify a change in the balance and nature of 
matters being discussed in this area. Rather than problems such as engagement 
partner empowerment and accountability and responsibility within audit firms 
for dealing with accounting issues, in Phase 2a there was much more discussion 
about arriving at appropriate accounting outcomes; for example the company’s 
desire to understand the available range of acceptable outcomes (four 
instances). In particular people were keen to understand how prudent the 
proposed outcomes were within the acceptable range and in one case 
specifically how all the accounting judgements that had been taken positioned 
the financial statements as a whole within this range. As previously mentioned 
this may relate to the later period covered by Phase 2 which is discussed in 
Chapter 7. 
Companies also valued comments that the proposing firms made 
concerning the companies’ annual reports and the various disclosures they 
included (four instances). In one case the fact that the annual report had been 
thoroughly benchmarked by one of the firms against the companies’ peers was 
specifically identified as valuable to the company and therefore a positive 
influence in the discussion of auditor appointment. 
Where companies were concerned about specific accounting issues they 
used the proposal process to further their thinking and/or ensure that the 
proposing firms were comfortable with them (two instances). In one further 
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case a company had recently resolved some complex accounting issues and 
wanted the proposing firms to understand and be comfortable with the 
outcomes that they had agreed with their incumbent auditor.  
In two further cases the interviews identified that companies wanted the 
accounting decisions to be consistent with and support the overall business 
strategy. 
The focus on the process of resolving accounting matters had not 
completely disappeared in Phase 2a, and three interviews still commented on 
the need to manage the input of technical accounting departments, and in one 
case, especially internationally, but the number of references to this issue was 
far lower than in Phase 1. As noted above, this is thought likely to be because of 
the later time period covered by Phase 2a. There were not so many changes in 
accounting rules within this time period as Phase 1 which had seen the 
introduction of new International Financial Reporting Standards. 
Coordination and communication 
The importance of coordination and communication in what can be very  
extensive international audits was highlighted in Section 4.3.3.  Within the 
Phase 2a interviews, the main areas of focus identified were around audit issue 
management, reporting and the style of communication.  
The importance of audit issue management to auditor selection was 
identified in five interviews. Companies wanted to know that issues would be 
appropriately escalated from divisional audits, but also that unnecessary alerts 
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which were not really substantive audit issues were avoided. There was some 
concern that issues may be raised which, when discussed and thought through 
with the auditor, turned out not to be important. This is illustrated by a 
comment made by a finance director: 
“[The] initial view of an issue isn’t always where you land up on the issue 
when you’ve done the real thinking around the piece and therefore you need to 
be very confident that your auditor will address that in a sensible approach 
and get to the right answer without any sense of point scoring or trying to 
show they’re cleverer than you are” 
Related to the concern about dealing with issues sensibly, there was also 
concern to ensure that matters were reported authoritatively to the audit 
committees, but also that reporting was being done fairly and accurately (three 
instances – in every case the comment was made by a finance director). In two 
cases people were concerned about the quality of reports produced by auditors 
more generally. 
The style of communication was also identified as important (three 
instances). In one case a focus was the openness of communication with 
auditors. In another it was important for the auditor to provide a sounding 
board for ideas and a third indicated a desire for communication to be 
straightforward. 
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IT systems and controls 
IT and systems and controls as an influence on auditor selection were 
identified in seven (30%) of the Phase 2a interviews. There was again a variation 
of approaches that companies were considering. For one highly information 
technology reliant company, the audit approach to their core operating system 
was at the centre of their selection decision (although ultimately it did not 
become a differentiating factor because each of the competing firms presented 
an approach which met the company’s needs). For another company however, 
with operations in an emerging territory, there was nervousness about too much 
focus on IT systems and controls and a desire for more traditional checking 
back to records. 
In two cases, companies valued a tailored approach involving experts on 
the effectiveness of the controls on their own specific IT environment (SAP or 
JD Edwards). 
In addition, the use of audit technology by the firms themselves within 
their audits was also identified as an influence with one company identifying it 
as an important factor which differentiated the successful firm from the 
previous incumbent firm. The use of specialist software designed to interrogate 
a company’s specific information technology platform as part of the audit was 
identified. Another company talked about the value of an online portal to share 
information internationally across the company as part of the audit. 
The Phase 2 interviews therefore suggests that both the auditors’ proposed 
approaches to relying on the companies’ own IT and controls environment and 
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the use of its own technology in delivering the audit were capable of influencing 
the auditor selection decision. 
Working with internal audit  
Lastly in relation to facilitating services, the working relationship with 
internal audit was again identified as an influence for companies (five 
instances). Companies talked about their established internal audit functions 
and how they were keen for the external audit to be planned and coordinated 
appropriately to ensure that the two different teams worked most effectively 
together. 
This concludes the consideration of facilitating services identified from the 
interviews with those involved in auditor selection. The next section considers 
the important supporting service identified and that is ideas and insights from 
the audit. 
5.3.4. Supporting services: ideas and insights from the audit 
There was evidence in Phase 1 of audit selection committees looking for 
ideas and insights from their auditors. In 
Phase 2a the focus on ideas and 
insights emerged strongly. In 
total 15 (over two thirds) of the 
interviews provided evidence of 
companies looking for ideas and insights 
from their audit. 
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It is important to note that this did not amount to a request to be able to 
buy additional services from their auditors. In one case the attempt to try to 
bundle additional services with the audit was received negatively as it included 
services that the company felt amounted to consulting and which therefore it 
would not source from its auditors due to its own strict independence policies 
governing non-audit services. 
The nature of what companies were looking to receive may be illustrated 
by one group financial controller: 
“Yes you get an audit opinion which is what you know makes everyone 
happy and is required by statute but you’ve actually got quite a lot of talented 
people [auditors] spread all over the organisation looking at how you do 
things, could have the benefit of looking at your peers, looking at how other 
people do things” 
In six interviews people indicated that they were looking for ideas and 
innovation. In three cases reference was made to benchmarking an organisation 
against its peers. 
In the context of receiving advice from their auditors (rather than buying 
consultancy services), the interviews identified a broad range of areas of interest 
to companies including support into new overseas territories (three interviews), 
tax, training company staff, advice with corporate social security matters  (three 
interviews) and strategy, performance improvement, environmental issues and 
cost optimisation (once each). 
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The evidence suggests that companies have high expectations of the 
experience and talent that their prospective auditors could offer and were 
looking to receive the benefits of this as an integral part of their audit. 
5.3.5. Commercial arrangements 
In Section 4.3.5, the background to fee setting in the FTSE 350 was 
explained and it was also identified from Phase 1 that fees were generally not 
influential to auditor selection decisions as had been identified in certain of the 
auditor selection literature. The reasons for this included the relative closeness 
of fee quotes provided by firms, the focus of selection committees on other 
criteria and the likelihood that fees could be negotiated after selecting a chosen 
firm. 
In Phase 2a there were 14 interviews which identified consideration of fees 
as an influence on auditor selection. Among these 14 interviews, eight referred 
to negotiation, and this was the most discussed area under consideration of fees. 
In four cases, people confirmed that their preferred auditor was the most 
expensive and that a negotiation had taken place whilst in the other four, no 
negotiation had taken place because the preferred auditor had already 
submitted either a lower or comparable fee. A comment made by one Finance 
Director illustrates the point: 
“On the financials [Finance Director’s] attitude was that they needed to 
get the best firm and could negotiate. [Finance Director] said he had 
discussions with all of the firms. Before the discussions [successful firm] were 
out of line but that shouldn’t be the thing that drives it – much more about best 
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firm – needs to be right – best firm. If it couldn’t be resolved only then would it 
become a show stopper”. 
Although two interviews identified companies looking for value for money 
with the context suggesting this meant lower fees, and in one case a fee 
reduction was explicitly identified as an objective of the proposal process, there 
was other evidence which showed concerns with such an approach. Three 
interviewees had concerns about whether a low fee was credible and in two 
others explicitly stated that they would be prepared to pay more for additional 
work. In addition one interviewee stated that the decision was never going to be 
about selecting the lowest fee, and in one further case it was even suggested that 
high fees were a convenient excuse to exclude a firm from consideration when in 
fact other factors were much more important. 
Fees were assessed as comparable, and so therefore not a differentiator, in 
three cases and, in a further case, the relative small size of the fee as compared 
to the companies’ other expenditures was also referred to. 
Other influences identified included the desire for clarity over fees being 
quoted and certainty including fees fixed for more than one year. 
The interviews in Phase 2a therefore provided evidence of a focus on audit 
fees, but for them not to be influential in many cases. This is because fees were 
already comparable, or that other concerns were felt more important or, most 
commonly, because there was, or companies believed there could be, 
negotiation to bring the fee quotes received from tendering firms into line. 
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Consideration of commercial arrangements completes this section on the 
Phase 2a interview findings as they relate to audit service design. The findings 
are consistent with Phase 1 and identify an assessment which includes audit 
rigour and assurance as a core attribute, facilitating services and supporting 
services within the overall selection deliberations. Fees were generally not found 
to be influential because they tended to be comparable, relatively small amounts 
and/or subject to negotiation which tended to be satisfactorily resolved in 
favour of the preferred firm based on other criteria. The next section now 
considers the influence of the capabilities and competences of the firms on 
auditor selection. 
5.4. Capabilities and competences 
 Figure 16: Phase 2a Capabilities and competences influences on auditor selection 
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Phase 1 identified competence and capability considerations operating at 
three levels within the auditor selection decision. These related to the firm, the 
team and the lead partner.  The findings from Phase 2a supported these three 
levels of assessment. 
The number of sources and references for each subcategory within the 
capabilities and competences higher order category are set out in Table 20: 
Factors Sources References 
The proposed team 21 164 
 Assessing individuals in the teams 17 64 
 Strength of the team as a whole 14 69 
 Structure of the team 11 26 
 Other 3 5 
The audit firms 21 112 
 The Big 4 and the Mid-Tier  16 45 
 Industry experience and expertise 13 29 
 Conflicts with other services 10 18 
 Geographic coverage 5 15 
 FTSE company experience 5 5 
The lead partner 19 82 
 Ability to deliver the audit 15 35 
 Style and connection 9 21 
 Experience 7 15 
 Lead partner rotation 7 11 
Table 20: Phase 2a Capabilities and competences sources and references by factor 
As the table demonstrates, the same three levels of assessment were 
identified.  There were however some differences in the balance of discussion in 
the interviews both between and within these levels as the following sections 
now discuss further in descending order of the number of interviews which 
discussed them. 
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5.4.1. The team 
This section discusses Phase 2a interview content as it relates to references 
concerning the proposing teams.  This was the most referenced of the three 
levels and with 21 (91%) of the interviews covering it . 
Discussion in this area included 
consideration of individuals within 
the team other than the lead partner 
(discussed separately below), the 
strengths of the team as a whole and 
the structure of the team.  
 In relation to the team the influences identified included relevant 
experience in the relevant industry, geographical strength and depth and 
experience and expertise in the relevant segment (for example working with 
FTSE 100 companies). The section starts with consideration of individual team 
members. Given the high level of discussion specifically related to the lead 
partner this is dealt with separately in Section 5.4.3. 
Assessing individuals in the teams 
Specialists 
The Phase 2a analysis contained substantial references to specialists in the 
auditor selection process. Specialists were discussed explicitly in 12 of the 
interviews which was noticeably higher than in Phase 1. Whereas reference to 
specialists was present in some one quarter of the Phase 1 interview notes, for 
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Phase 2a this proportion was more than one half.  The Phase 2a analysis 
identified evidence in particular of an important influence of specialists in risk 
management and accounting and internal control in particular, which were 
discussed in a quarter of all of the interviews. 
It was also possible to identify a split between two types of specialists in 
this area; namely those that were an integral part of the audit team (such as 
those in risk management, information technology (including specialists in the 
particular software platforms being used by the companies), accounting and 
internal control and those who may be available as needed for specific pieces of 
advice, but not an integral part of the audit (referred to above in consideration 
of firms’ Capabilities and competences).  These were deep subject matter 
experts that companies might seek access to from time to time. 
Group directors and senior managers 
A second group of individuals identified were the directors and senior 
managers working at the centre of the group audit. 
The influence of audit directors and senior managers on the auditor 
selection decision was discussed in six interviews.  Companies made general 
comments comparing those in one competing firm against another and also 
expressed interest in the likely continuity at this level and the understanding of 
business issues which individuals possessed. In one case a company was 
concerned that an individual had been a director for a number of years without 
progressing to partner, and questioned what that might indicate in terms of his 
ability. In another case the role of the director and senior manager were 
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identified as critical to the decision. For this organisation the competence of the 
partners was accepted as a given and they were keen to ensure the best working 
team. 
Partners in overseas locations 
Partners in key overseas territories were also identified as an influence on 
auditor selection and also discussed in six of the interviews. Companies were 
interested in partners identified in territories where they had future plans as 
well as existing important areas of operations. There was some difference in the 
way that the firms structured their teams which companies commented on and 
reacted differently to.  
Whilst, in a most cases, teams were constructed based on established 
relationships between the individual international partners on the competing 
team, in one case a company was impressed when one firm explicitly shied away 
from doing that and identified the team purely on their experience in the 
relevant industry sector.  
In another case a positive influence on the selection decision of an 
experienced overseas partner in the relevant industry was noted even though 
the company’s preferred relationship was for central control such that the 
finance director never expected to see the relevant individual if the audit was 
operated as he wanted it to be. He was still drawing assurance on the quality of 
the underlying work from his assessment of the individual that he met. 
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Junior members of the team 
In two interviews people talked about the importance of the more junior 
members of the team and, in three cases, stressed the importance of continuity 
of staff to avoid the need to keep educating new members of the team. 
This section has talked about references made to individuals as part of the 
selection decision and identified the importance of specialists, the working 
partners and senior managers at group, partners in key overseas territories and 
continuity of more junior team members. Companies made comments about the  
strengths of the teams put forward as a whole and this is considered in the next 
section. 
The team as a whole 
The interviews identified that companies were looking for a number of 
strengths in the experience and the expertise of the proposed teams as a whole 
(14 instances) and these are now outlined. 
There were four main themes on the experience and expertise of the team 
namely industry experience, the quality of overseas teams, expertise of auditing 
similar FTSE 350 companies and more general comments about the proposing 
teams; each of these is now discussed. 
Industry experience was highlighted in nine Phase 2a interviews having 
also been identified as the most often referenced attribute of the team in Phase 
1.  The importance of industry experience was raised in Phase 2 highlighting in 
particular the need for teams to be able to understand a business, to share good 
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practice from what others were doing, and as a way of creating value adding 
ideas. The importance of sharing industry insights was previously highlighted in 
Section 5.3.4 within Service design. 
The presence of industry expertise in the team was considered essential, in 
many cases being identified as a reason to exclude firms in situations where it 
was lacking from a particular team. The comparative strength of industry 
experience and the quality of ideas that this generated was also a decisive factor 
in other situations. Therefore industry experience could be both a shortlisting 
factor and a final selection factor depending on the particular circumstances of 
the proposal. 
A second area of influence as it relates to teams was the strength and depth 
of overseas teams (eight instances). There were examples of companies looking 
for strength and depth across a range of their operating territories. In some 
cases this took the form of a general assessment across relevant territories. For 
example: 
 [Group Finance Director] also felt that consistency around the world and 
good quality everywhere was a factor – “being able to field good teams around 
the world”… “3rd places become show stoppers”. 
In other cases where there was a territory of special importance, more 
thorough and in depth assessments were seen to take place, including 
assessments of the firms’ local resources and obtaining feedback from other 
organisations locally. In one case a company went as far as interviewing the 
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proposed firms’ more junior staff to assess their individual competence to 
undertake the audit.  
The technical strength and credibility of the team was also identified as an 
influence on auditor selection. In five interviews this was identified explicitly 
and was expressed generally in the context of companies looking for a team with 
technical strength and also in terms of teams being able to deal with issues as 
they arose. In two cases, finance directors were expressly looking for teams who 
would be credible in front of their audit committees. 
In addition to the specific attributes of the teams identified in the previous 
sections, in five of the interviews more general comments were made 
concerning the strength and quality of the of the teams competing in the 
tenders. These comments could be generally categorised under three areas. 
Firstly, there were general comments on the companies’ assessment of the 
quality of the competing teams as a group of individuals. Secondly, comments 
highlighted the general strength in depth of the teams, including in one case the 
negative influence on the auditor selection decision of a team having a strong 
leader but little strength below that leader. Thirdly, comments identified that  
certain auditor selection decisions were indeed taken based on assessment of 
the competing teams as opposed to any individual or the firm.  
This section has talked about references made to the strength of teams as 
part of the selection decision. Companies also tended to talk about structure of 
the team and this is considered in the next section. 
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Team structure 
The principal issue from Phase 2a was that companies were looking for 
clarity in the way that the proposed audit teams were organised especially in 
relation to the most senior members of the team. Eleven interviews referred to 
issues related to the structure of the team. 
Companies were keen to understand where responsibilities for certain 
elements of service delivery were being assigned and where decision making 
during the audit would be centred. There was also evidence of proposing firms 
finding this area difficult and putting forward proposals which companies 
looked upon, at least relatively, negatively. For example in one case a Finance 
Director did not understand how a team having both a relationship partner and 
working audit partner would work in practice. He felt that that got in the way of 
developing relationships through the proposal process. It was not clear who his 
prime contact was.  
In another case, a firm proposed two partners but the company found a 
competitors’ single partner proposal clearer and more attractive. In a third case 
a finance director understood that his prime contact was an audit partner but 
was then frustrated when a more senior relationship partner led all the meetings 
and the presentation. 
Clarity of responsibility within the central team more generally was also a 
problem in one case, where a firm put forward a team containing a number of 
partners, directors and senior managers. The company was concerned about a 
lack of clarity about who was responsible for what.  
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In a further case, the  Audit Committee Chair did not understand the role 
of a director because that position had not existed when he had worked in the 
auditing profession in the past. 
Lastly for one company (and there was a similar case in Phase 1) the global 
structure of the team was important. This related to whether firms took a 
centralised approach or put forward partners to coordinate key territories or 
global regions. 
Overall then the structure of the team was seen as an influence on decision 
making and one which could be important, especially as firms seemed on 
occasion to struggle to get their proposals in this area to clearly meet the 
companies’ needs.  
Consideration of the influence of team structure completes this section on 
the influence of the team which has considered the individuals, the team as a 
whole and the team structure. The next section now considers the second most 
referenced level of assessment within Capabilities and competences and that is 
that of the audit firms. 
5.4.2. The audit firms 
The influence of comparison of 
firms related to capability and 
competences assessment was discussed 
in 21 (91%) of the interviews in Phase 2a. 
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The principal topics of discussion were comments on the Big 4 and 
comparison with the next biggest or Mid-Tier, industry experience and 
expertise, conflicts with other services, geographic coverage and relevant 
experience at similar FTSE 350 companies experience. Each is now considered 
in turn. 
The Big 4 and the Mid-Tier 
The dominance of the Big 4 in audit tenders was discussed in Chapter 1 
and supported in Phase 1. Phase 2a also identified that whilst companies 
appeared to see little difference between the capabilities and competences of the 
Big 4 in general terms they did see such a difference between the Big 4 and the 
next tier of audit firms.  
In the 11 interviews that included comparatives of the Big 4, the overall 
theme was one of companies not feeling that they could be differentiated. In five 
interviews companies stated that any of the Big 4 involved in the tender could 
do the job adequately or well. In addition three others felt that all of the Big 4 
were good or very good and one noted that, whilst all had made claims of 
leadership, they had been disregarded. In total therefore nine (39%) of the 
interviews explicitly identified companies not considering the Big 4 to be 
differentiated. In one case a company official felt that movement of people 
between the Big 4 was one reason why they were not generally differentiated. 
In four interviews the issue of branding was discussed and although one 
company official felt that one firm was the premier and another identified that 
each may have its own house style, it was more common for companies to 
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conclude that there was no difference in brand or that the Big 4 itself was a 
brand. 
By contrast, the eight interviews which included comparisons of the Big 4 
with the Mid-Tier did support that companies felt there was a difference.  In six 
cases the issue was reputational with one Audit Committee Chair explicitly 
stating: 
“..you never get fired for choosing IBM and you’re never [going to] get 
fired for choosing one of the Big 4” 
In four cases companies were concerned about the lack of breadth offered 
by those Mid-Tier firms; in one case about their lack of experience in the FTSE 
350. In a further case concern was expressed about the calibre of the staff 
employed by the Mid-Tier firms as compared to the Big 4. 
It is also worth noting that in a number of tenders covered by Phase 2a 
there was no Mid-Tier involvement and companies may not in these cases have 
covered this topic as an important part of their final decision (as compared to 
their shortlisting process). 
The findings from Phase 2a are therefore consistent both with Phase 1 and 
the findings of the various regulatory and competition reviews discussed in 
Chapter 1. Consistent with Phase 1 there appeared to be no general 
differentiation of the Big 4.  
As in Phase 1 however, there were factors which enabled companies to 
differentiate between the Big 4 in the context of their own circumstances and 
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the main themes were also consistent. The findings of Phase 2a which relate to 
this differentiation, and therefore influence the auditor selection decision, are 
now therefore discussed, starting with industry expertise. 
Industry expertise of the firms 
In Phase 2a evidence of the influence of firms’ industry experience was 
present again (13 instances) as both a shortlisting factor and a positive influence 
on the decision. There were three main topics of discussion.  
Firstly, whether the Big 4 could be differentiated in the context of the 
particular proposal and in the particular industry. Four interviewees thought 
that this was the case. As might be expected, these related to more highly 
specialised industries. 
Secondly, industry expertise arose (four instances) where companies had 
concerns over whether one or more firms actually had the relevant expertise. In 
one case the firm had relevant expertise in the industry concerned, but not audit 
experience in that industry.  The company was therefore concerned that 
although one of the Big 4 had specialists in its industry, they were not auditors 
so had no direct relevance to the auditor selection decision. 
Thirdly, industry expertise was considered important (four instances) 
because, as noted above, companies were looking for ideas and insights from 
their industry. It is perhaps interesting that much of the literature about 
industry specific auditors has focussed on this being a proxy for audit quality. 
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These findings suggest that there is more to it than that and that knowledge 
sharing is also important. 
The challenge of offering industry knowledge, but not working with 
competitors, was also again identified. In four interviews this issue was 
discussed. At its extreme an audit proposal was triggered by a company’s 
existing Big 4 auditor agreeing to tender for the audit of a company’s 
competitor. In this case there was also a change in auditor (even though the firm 
affected was unsuccessful in the tender for the rival). In one other case a 
Financial Controller indicated that the company concerned would not choose to 
select a firm which audited its closest rivals. However in another case a Finance 
Director had said they had consider a potential conflict involving one of the 
firms and their audit of a major competitor, but had concluded that it was 
manageable. Lastly, a potential conflict with an audit by one of the firms of a 
competitor was resolved when that firm put forward a team with no 
involvement with that audit after changing a key individual. 
Companies were seen to be testing industry experience (as will be returned 
to in Section 5.4).  For example in one case a Big 4 firm had established itself as 
the industry leader in the eyes of one company, based apparently on the 
marketing activity of that firm, and this was decisive for them to be shortlisted.  
Ultimately however that firm was not successful as the company’s view on the 
relative strengths of the firms was changed by evidence presented by another 
firm during the process. This second firm was assessed to be as experienced in 
the industry and therefore the final decision was more influenced by other 
factors. Another company concluded that a particular firm which it had 
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considered strong in its industry actually had limited relevant audit experience 
and this became a concern in the selection process. 
Lastly, in one case, an Audit Committee Chair talked about appointing an 
auditor with industry experience as the company would not be criticised should 
something go wrong. In this case the relevant company was in a specialised 
industry with  important industry specific challenges in its accounting and 
reporting. 
Perceived conflicts of interest with non- audit services 
The background to auditor independence and perceived conflicts with 
auditing and other non-audit services was discussed in Chapter 1 and in Chapter 
5, three sources of conflict in this area were identified: 
 Conflicts with other services that were currently being provided by a 
prospective auditor; 
 Non-audit services that had been provided in the recent past (giving 
rise to a self-review risk as explained in Chapter 1); and 
 Conflicts which arose as a result of the relationships that company 
board members had with the competing firms (in Chapter 4 the issue 
that a director of the company was employed as an advisor to one of 
the Big 4 firms). 
In Phase 2a conflicts with other services were identified as a selection 
decision influence in ten ( 43%) of the interviews and although there was no 
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incidence of complications created by individual board member relationships in 
this phase, the other two influences were again present. 
Where there were perceived conflicts with other services, the relevant firm 
had been excluded from the process (four instances). For example, in two cases, 
one of the Big 4 firms was excluded from the audit proposal process because 
they were the company’s preferred tax advisers. In one further case recent tax 
advice although completed was arranged with fees which were contingent on the 
future savings made. Because these contingent arrangements had not been 
concluded prior to the proposal the relevant firm which provided the advice was 
excluded from the process (they would have been auditing the numbers upon 
which their contingent fees were based). In some cases conflicts arose because 
the situation brought into play regulatory restrictions; in others they were 
driven by the companies own policies and/or preferences. 
Where firms were included in the tender process, companies were still 
mindful of conflicts.  One finance director was concerned to ensure that 
including a Big 4 firm that was the company’s internal auditor would not cause 
any independence problems. A Chief Executive was noted as having a 
preference for using another Big 4 firm for non-audit-services. 
More generally in one case, an Audit Committee Chair identified that, 
having no conflicts with other services, was one of the general selection 
objectives. Indeed a financial controller suggested that given all the focus on 
auditor independence and the opportunities for non-audit work it may be better 
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for firms not to be the company’s auditor. Another Audit Committee Chair 
commented: 
“You know the irony of all this is that nowadays you almost have a better 
chance of getting more work if you’re not the auditor so I guess your dilemma 
is you know the flags you want to wave in reception as it were of FTSE 350 
audit clients versus the amount of fees you actually want to take in and they 
won’t necessarily lead you to the same place” 
Local strength in depth in key UK and overseas locations 
There were five interviews which discussed a company’s need for the right 
depth of resources in the right places. Most companies when they commented 
on regional and global strength in depth, felt that all of the Big 4 had adequate 
coverage to complete their audit. This also extended to many new operating 
territories including China. There were however exceptions. 
Consistent with Phase 1, there was one case of a regionally headquartered 
company in the UK expressing concern about the ability of the local offices of 
the Big 4 to service them locally and, specifically, about whether they would 
have the right calibre of staff. This concern was based on some issues that they 
had experienced with their incumbent auditor in the past. 
For another company, the assessed weakness of one of the Big 4 in a 
critical emerging territory in which it operated was identified as important and a 
limitation without which that firm could perhaps have won the tender. It 
appears that at least in some cases companies have needed to assure themselves 
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that even the Big 4 had the necessary resources to provide competent teams 
everywhere and in at least one case this proved impossible: 
Group Financial Controller: These other guys had to prove that they 
could do and one of them quite frankly, lovely, lovely firm, lovely people, we 
just weren’t 100% sure they’ve really got what it took for [major emerging 
territory] and that’s the biggest part of our business.  
A third company discussed how their assessment of the Big 4 in a critical 
emerging territory for them had also taken into account the other clients of the 
Big 4 in that territory. A concern was expressed about whether a firm could have 
adequate resources to audit them in that key territory when they also audited a 
major competitor. 
Experience in the FTSE 350 
Lastly, in relation to firms’ Capabilities and competences, and in addition 
to the comparative comments which firms made about the Big 4 and the Mid-
tier referred to above, in five interviews companies also talked more generally 
about the listed company experience of the firms. 
The influence of specialists within the audit team was discussed in 5.4.1. 
Five companies also talked about access to specialists not directly involved in 
the audit. These were typically professionals with experience of issues facing 
other larger companies including cost reduction, contract assurance, capital 
raising, structuring or transaction support and specialist areas of legislation, for 
example the Bribery Act.  
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Access to specialist capability, as well as assessment of specific 
competence, was therefore seen as a positive. However the broad relationships 
and skills bases that this can entail were also identified as potentially 
problematic in auditor selection as companies identified perceived conflicts of 
interest as referred to above. 
In summary in relation to the firms, in selecting their auditors, Phase 2 
suggests that companies face some important challenges. Industry experience 
and expertise appears important, but in many cases this is gained by working 
with their competitors which causes concerns over resourcing (and more 
generally). Similarly, companies are seeking specialist input in non-audit 
services but concerns over regulation and independence mean that using other 
firms reduces their realistic options as to who could become their auditor. 
5.4.3. The lead partner 
Given that the interviews identified a 
high level of discussion of the 
individual lead partner the 
relevant matters identified have 
been split out from these relating 
to the team and are considered here.  
Overall 19 (83%) of the 23 Phase 2a interviews explicitly discussed the lead 
partner (NB in other cases interviewees tended to speak in more general terms 
making comparative statements about the competing teams or firms). One 
Group Financial Controller in particular commented: 
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“The Audit Committee all know [the firms] can do the job, it’s a question 
of looking across the table and knowing the person in the room can do the job”. 
Phase 2a supported the presence of the three previously identified 
influences of perceived ability to deliver the audit (15 instances), partner’s style 
(9 instances) and experience (7 instances). There was therefore a different 
balance from Phase 1 where the lead partner’s style was discussed slightly more 
often than their experience and perceived ability to deliver the audit. 
Examples of how this ability to deliver an audit was manifest included the 
need for the lead partner to be in control of accounting judgements. One Group 
Financial Controller observed: 
“You know that appealed to us .... the lead partner going [sic] I’m in 
charge, other partners in other countries have got opinions which they send to 
me, I read them but if I don’t agree .... I’ve got the power to override something 
in light of the bigger picture or the Group opinion” 
Another specific example was companies’ assessment of how well the lead 
partner would deliver the resources of the firm when they were required. 
Another Group Financial Controller highlighted for example: 
Group Financial Controller: “What I found impressive about [Lead 
Partner]’s approach to this and about him as a partner is that it was evident to 
me very early on that he could martial the quality of resources that he would 
be happy with giving to the client and that he wouldn’t be under resourced and 
he would only have quality people but he had the contacts within [his firm] to 
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deliver so you, you know you’re not dealing with a fool you’ve got somebody 
who can bring the right people to the table”. 
As with Phase 1, reference was made to the importance of the lead 
partner’s style and personality. Some of this appeared to be further associated 
with their ability to be effective in delivering the audit by having the right 
relationships with senior company officials.  The following example illustrates a 
need for the lead partner to be respected: 
Group Finance Director: “The guy from [x firm] had the gravitas that 
said my Chairman and my Chief Exec will listen” 
There were less references in Phase 2a to the lead partner’s experience and 
in particular experience in the relevant industry although, as noted in Section 
5.4.2., there were more references to the industry strength of the team in this 
phase of the research than in Phase 1. 
The importance of the lead partner was also evidenced by the impact of 
their mandatory rotation discussed previously in chapters 1 and 4. Rotation of 
the lead partner was discussed in seven of the interviews. In most cases this 
arose in the context of why the decision had been made to conduct an audit 
tender; where a lead partner was rotating off the audit it triggered an audit 
tender. In one case the rotation back on of a previous audit partner was seen as 
a positive as he brought knowledge of the company from his previous 
incumbency.  
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Having to change the partner was however not always a negative influence. 
In one case a change in partner and the fresh approach that a new partner 
introduced was highlighted as an important reason for the incumbent auditor to 
retain the audit. In that case the inherent challenge to incumbent auditors of 
companies looking for fresh ideas as considered in Section 5.2.1 was met by the 
change in partner rather than by a change in firm in that case. 
In summary therefore, there was substantial evidence of lead partner 
assessment being an important part of the auditor selection decision with 
consideration of their experience and in particular their perceived ability to 
deliver the audit being foremost as well as their rotation coinciding with audit 
tendering. 
This concludes the discussion of the findings from Phase 2a as they related 
to the influence of capabilities and competences on the auditor selection at the 
individual, team and firm levels. There is also evidence of influences of 
experience, perception and clarity about delivery and of style; the latter 
especially connected to the lead partner. 
The next section now considers the next identified factor group namely 
Behavioural influences during the proposal process. 
5.5. Behavioural influences  during the proposal process 
Phase 2a provided substantial evidence of behavioural influences on 
auditor selection. These behavioural influences were identified in each of the 23 
interviews.   
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Figure 17: Behavioural influences on auditor selection 
As part of Phase 2a axial coding, seven subcategories of behavioural 
influence on auditor selection were identified. These were similar to Phase 1 and 
included the general assessment of the quality of response of firms in complying 
with the tender and six other behavioural influences. For Phase 2a however, 
upon further 
reflection it was 
considered that 
these seven could 
sensibly be reduced 
to four 
subcategories 
reflecting the 
nature of what was 
felt to be going on 
in the behavioural 
interactions taking place.  For example for two subcategories, “Assessing 
competence and capability” and “Testing ideas and proving propositions”, the 
underlying behaviour seems to be that the companies and the firms are testing 
each other and seeking proof to support what was being said. Whilst the 
companies are testing the teams, at the same time the teams are testing their 
ideas and seeking to prove their propositions.  
Similarly a new subcategory, “Caring”, brings together the comments made 
by the companies about proposing firms demonstrating behaviours such as 
hunger, energy and commitment, with those related to listening and 
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understanding. By demonstrating interest and enthusiasm the audit firm was 
really highlighting that it cared about what was going on and what was needed 
and wanted. 
Lastly, the general nature of the interaction between the companies and 
the proposing teams has been grouped with that between the teams themselves. 
This reflects the fact that the overall dynamic of interaction included that within 
teams as well as between teams and the companies. 
 The four new subcategories, consolidating the seven initially identified, 
are set out in Table 21 along with the number of sources and references for each. 
Subcategory Sources References 
Testing and proving 22 120 
 Testing and assessing competence and capability 20 72 
 Testing ideas and proving propositions 18 70 
Caring 21 97 
 Hunger, energy and commitment 19 60 
 Listening and understanding 14 37 
Quality of interaction 20 92 
 Engagement and connection 19 73 
 Teamwork 11 19 
The quality of response 20 84 
Table 21: Phase 2a sources and references for Behavioural influences 
It is very noticeable that discussion of behaviour covered a range of 
interaction and only a small part of it related to the quality of the specific 
response to the requirements set out in the invitation to tender. 
Phase 2a identified that five out of the original seven factors were each 
discussed in over 75% of the interviews. There was also a much greater number 
of references; underlining the presence and importance of the behavioural 
influences on auditor selection.  
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Each of the four factors identified in Table 21 is now considered in turn, 
organised in descending order of the number of interviews and references 
identified. Consideration therefore starts with Testing and proving. 
5.5.1. Testing and proving  
Phase 2a suggested that an important element of the behaviour that was 
going on between companies and the firms 
proposing for their audits was mutual 
testing. For the companies they were testing 
the teams including their competences and 
the quality of their ideas. For the firms, they 
were testing their ideas about the future 
service and relationship. 
 Companies assessing teams and their propositions 
There were 20 interviews (87%) which highlighted comments that 
companies made about the performance of teams and their responses to 
questions and challenges.  
These comments, in the context of extensive proposal processes, were 
perhaps somewhat surprisingly skewed towards the final presentation. In nine 
interviews there were general comments about individual and team 
performance in the final presentations. In three cases there was a focus on new 
people who had not been met during the proposal process. In one further case 
there was a heavy focus only on the lead partner (with others being discounted) 
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however in a further case the emphasis was on the performance of the more 
junior members of the team. In this latter case the competence of the more 
senior people was assumed. 
Seven interviews talked about the weaknesses demonstrated by the firms 
in their final presentations. These related to the general style of the 
presentations, for example “flat” or “superficial”, to elements of the 
presentations for example where people were deemed to be rambling in places 
and to specific errors that put their proposals in jeopardy; “shot themselves in 
the foot”. 
Nine interviews talked about the questions they asked during 
presentations. In some cases these were standard lists posed to all the firms, in 
others, completely tailored depending on specific issues identified in each 
individual proposal document or meetings and in some cases a mix. In one case 
thoughtful answers were specifically seen as positive. One interview highlighted 
a company specifically looking for weaknesses in the firm’s people or 
arguments. 
It was a recurrent feature of the discussions which took place that much of 
the focus seemed to be around general performance of teams and individuals in 
presentations. The way that teams performed in the presentation seeming to be 
at least as much about how they came across as about the substantial content of 
what was said. In an extreme example one audit committee chair commented: 
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“It’s always difficult to distinguish what’s glitz with what’s not but if they 
can put on glitz that’s encouraging…….you’re confident with the major firms 
they’re up to scratch” [from a substantive perspective] 
In comparison to the final presentations, other comments in relation to 
performance of the competing firms were relatively sparse although three 
interviews commented more generally on the way that people had been 
perceived to be of high quality, based on the language that they used and the 
knowledge they imparted. 
Lastly (as noted above) where all of the firms were making claims to 
leadership in relation to a particular aspect of their market position, these 
claims were disregarded for everyone (two instances). In one case where 
individual experience had been exaggerated, this had a negative impact and 
caused other claims made by that person to be treated with some scepticism. 
Firms testing ideas and proving propositions 
Whilst the selectors of auditors were seen to be testing the competing firms 
and their arguments, the firms were testing their ideas with the tendering 
companies and seeking to bring their ideas to life. This was present in 18 (78%) 
of the interviews. 
In six interviews, firms were identified testing new ideas. These related to 
suggestions as to how to change the existing approach so as to add more value to 
the audit, for example by helping to contribute more constructively to resolving 
issues, working more effectively with internal audit or providing bespoke 
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training. In three other cases the incumbent was seen to be testing changes to 
their service proposition in response to feedback that had been received. 
Firms were also testing and changing their teams through the process 
(four instances). In one case a number of partners were put forward for 
consideration before the tender and in another the lead partner was changed 
during the tender as a result of feedback received. The checking of the team 
included independent checking by a senior partner outside the proposed audit 
team. 
In three cases the firms were identified testing their propositions in the 
final presentations. In four cases people talked about the firms using examples 
to help to explain their propositions and another used analogy. 
The notion of putting forward propositions and testing them is of course 
consistent with the ideas of co-creation of value discussed in relation to value in 
use and Service Dominant Logic in Chapter 2. 
5.5.2. Caring 
The second of the behavioural 
influences from Phase 2a combines the 
comments made about proposing firms 
demonstrating such behaviour as hunger, 
energy and commitment (i.e. behaviours 
that signalled the proposing teams and 
their firms really wanted the audit) with 
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those which were made about the influence of the firms and their teams 
showing that they were listening and understanding (i.e. that they were taking 
time and giving attention to identifying what companies were really looking for).  
Hunger, energy, enthusiasm and commitment  
The importance of the proposing firms demonstrating behaviours which 
signalled they really wanted to win the audit was identified in 19 (83%) of the 
interviews. These behaviours were categorised as hunger, energy, enthusiasm 
and commitment.  
This influence is perhaps best encapsulated by a comment made by one 
finance director: 
“You want someone who wants the job – passion for doing it – you want 
people who want to work for you” 
The demonstration of enthusiasm by the firms was considered important. 
Interviewees commented positively on enthusiasm (five instances) and in the 
related areas of firms demonstrating that they wanted the work (three 
instances) and/or were hungry for the work (three instances).  
For three interviewees the relative importance of their company to the 
proposing firms was the factor that mattered. For them their company needed 
to be a priority or crown jewel client for the proposing firms.  
The interviews also provided evidence of the activities that created an 
impression of hunger, energy, enthusiasm and commitment. In essence there 
appeared to be three types of influence.  
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Firstly, an impression of hunger, energy and enthusiasm was created by 
firms going beyond the requirements of the invitation to tender. In eight cases 
this related to firms investing in the style and production quality of their 
documents (as opposed to the written content). In seven cases the firms’ 
investment in producing bespoke video material was also noted. One finance 
director commented: 
“The video piece was important. It signals investment. A neat thing. [It] 
signalled you were serious about this. What it says is here are guys who are 
serious about the gig”. 
Firms also created internet microsites to share information and support 
their ideas. 
Secondly, in three cases comment was made about firms investing time in 
meetings and pushing for more time. Although, in one case, a firm was also 
viewed less positively for appearing to be desperate. In a further case a company 
was negatively influenced because they felt a particular firm had tried to set up 
numerous meetings without really demonstrating that they had thought about 
what was important and so the meetings lacked focus. 
Lastly, two interviews identified that the timing of activity was influential. 
In one case being “quick off the mark” was a positive and in another being “slow 
out of the blocks” was a negative.  
 
 
Chapter Five 
Research Findings Phase 2a 
In-depth Semi-structured Interviews with Companies 
June 2010 to September 2012 
 
299 
 
Listening and understanding 
The importance of listening and demonstrating understanding was 
identified in 14 (61%) of the interviews.  
Comments in relation to listening were present in 11 interviews and they 
could be summarised rather simply as the positive impact of listening and the 
negative impact of not listening. Firms were seen to be listening or to have 
listened through the way that they behaved during the proposal process, the 
responses they gave to questions in meetings and presentations and by the 
propositions they put forward in their documents. This latter point being 
demonstrated either because particular areas of interest were addressed 
properly or because of the detail with which firms responded.    
Importantly, it was not just the act of listening that mattered; it had to be 
associated with a response.  This point may be illustrated for example by a 
comment made by a Finance Director: 
The feedback I got,especially about [partner A] was very positive because 
he’s very good at…he’s a good listener  ... he often follows up points that are 
raised at the meetings which impresses anyone… I think genuinely none of 
them felt they were being sold anything” 
This may be contrasted with the comments made by a financial controller 
in relation to the way some firms approached the final presentation: 
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“You know it’s just like you have not been listening …in sales mode…I just 
think some of them need coaching in that. Would it have changed our decision 
ultimately? No but it might have made it a lot harder” 
Firms being seen not to have listened resulted from their behaviour in the 
final presentation and in the way that they approached the overall proposal 
process.  
The related area of the importance of demonstrating understanding was 
identified in eleven interviews. In five cases people identified the importance of 
firms demonstrating understanding of their business generally and in one 
further case the importance of understanding the market context. This links to 
the desire for industry knowledge identified as a selection influence under 
Capabilities and competences assessment considered in Section 5.4. 
There were also examples of companies looking for understanding more 
broadly of the company and its people and what they wanted. One Finance 
Director described this as firms demonstrating understanding of “what our 
world is like”. Another Finance Director thought it was about whether people 
showed more generally that they had understood the company’s needs. In two 
cases people identified that understanding their culture was important. 
5.5.3. Quality of interaction 
The third subcategory of behaviour identified from Phase 2a related to the 
influence on the selection decision of the general interaction that took place 
during the proposal process.  
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The evidence suggests that interaction between the companies and the 
proposing firms is highly influential. This 
is described below as “Engagement and 
connection”.  Phase 2a also supports that 
companies are observing and taking note 
of the way that teams are interacting with 
each other and the teamwork that is being 
displayed. Each of these two influences is now considered further. 
Engagement and connection 
Engagement and connection related to the positive influence on the 
auditor selection decision of those involved connecting interpersonally by 
establishing personal chemistry and discussing the right topics of most interest 
to companies. 
In total, 16 of the interviews (70%) talked about matters related to 
personal chemistry and whether people liked key members of the tendering 
firms. There were comparisons being made about how much people liked 
members of one team versus another (four cases) and of people talking about 
people they liked (two cases).  For example: 
Group Financial Controller: “all four can do the job, its about 
personality…did we like [the lead partner from Firm x] ? Yeah… do we like 
other people better? Yeah” 
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In three further interviews, people spoke specifically about the need to 
establish personal chemistry.  Further interview discussion highlighted the 
importance of building a relationship during the proposal process (three 
instances); in one case referring to bonding through the proposal process, in 
another referring to establishing a personal connection. Lastly in one case a firm 
was discounted from selection because of what was described as a personality 
clash. 
The Phase 2a interviews also provided evidence of more specific 
behaviours which appear to support or detract from the establishment of 
personal chemistry. 
Supporting the development of personal chemistry were factors such as 
the style of interaction matching the culture of the organisation, meetings 
engagement and showing empathy. Two further interviews discussed the impact 
of social contact during the proposal process. In one case a financial controller 
thought it powerful that the proposal document shared details of the team’s 
personal background and interests. Others talked about the general quality of 
engagement with the non-executives in the final presentation (three instances). 
Those behaviours which were seen to damage interactions included 
arrogance in the final presentation (three instances), presenting in a style that 
did not fit with the audience at the final presentation, and in one case, people 
being offended by a firm trying to tell them where to sit.  
So how people interacted at an interpersonal level was identified as an 
important influence on auditor selection. Engagement and connection was 
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however not only about how interaction occurred, but also the matters that that 
interaction revolved around. 
There were nine interviews which talked about the positive impact of an 
appropriate agenda or, more often, the negative impact of not focussing on the 
right topics. Commonality of issues between the company and the tendering 
firm was important (two instances) and in a further case simply that meetings 
were more interesting where a firm had created the right agenda. Conversely 
firms were criticised where they lacked focus on the right issues or territories, 
spent too much time talking about themselves and their audit approach, or in 
one case, were described as simply “off the wall” because they had completely 
misjudged what that company finance director was looking for. 
In a connection between relationships at the start of the tender and 
behaviour during the proposal there was evidence of acceptance that the nature 
of interaction was impacted by what had gone before. For example four 
interviews identified that interactions were easier where they knew the firms 
involved; whilst there was also an appreciation that meetings were different for 
incumbent auditors, for example they asked fewer questions as their knowledge 
was greater. 
Teamwork 
Although not mentioned as many times as the other main behavioural 
influences considered in the preceding sections, teamwork demonstrated by the 
firms was again identified as an influence on auditor selection (11 cases). This 
was consistent with Phase 1. 
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In Section 5.5.4, the frequency of comments made in relation to the 
influence of the final presentation was noted as they related to assessing teams 
and their propositions. A similar preponderance of comments were also 
identified in relation to the final presentation in considering teamwork. Four of 
the 11 interviews that talked about teamwork did so in relation to the firms’ 
behaviour in the final presentation and how well that worked as a team in that 
session. In addition to these general observations the way that responsibility for 
answering questions was shared around between the team was also specifically 
noticed. It was also noticed where there was a weakness with an overseas 
partner who came across as subservient. 
Teamwork was however not only observed in the final presentation. One 
Financial Controller observed when a team did not get on through a proposal 
process. Another contrasted a team that gelled as a team with another where, 
primarily through the body language she observed, it was obvious to her that the 
lead partner was unduly dominant in the team. Another similarly observed 
where people sat in meetings was indicative of how they worked together as a 
team. One financial controller observed that: 
The first meeting had seemed like the [Partner A] show. There had been 
ten minutes on [Partner A and him talking about his firm]. In the first meeting 
there had been breakout sessions so [Group Financial Controller] didn’t see 
much of some of the team”. 
There was one exception where a finance director was indifferent to 
teamwork. He was impressed that one lead partner freely admitted he had never 
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met any of the global team and was proud of that because he argued it was 
better to identify the best people for the audit and not just people he knew. 
That concludes the Phase 2a consideration of the quality of interaction 
during a proposal process which highlighted influences on auditor selection 
from personal chemistry, connecting on the right agenda and firms 
demonstrating teamwork. The final aspect of behaviour considered here is the 
influence of how well firms responded to the specifics of the invitation to tender. 
5.5.4. The quality of response  
This final area of consideration of 
behavioural influences on those selecting 
auditors covers the general quality of the 
proposal processes conducted by the 
competing firms and how well they met 
companies’ expectations.  This covered the 
proposal processes as a whole including meetings, proposal documents and 
presentations. Because the logical flow of a proposal is from meetings to 
documents to presentation the results have been set out in that order.  
Meetings 
In relation to meetings the quality and thoroughness of preparation that 
had been undertaken by the firm impressed companies (six instances) and 
counted unfavourably when it was not observed (one instance). Companies were 
also impressed by the quality of the materials produced by the firms and used 
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during meetings being assessed (three instances). In one case a financial 
controller indicated that this was formally scored as part of the overall tender 
score sheet.  
In addition to individual meetings, companies also commented on the 
relative performance and consistency of the competing firms across the 
meetings process as whole (three instances); they were in two cases, impressed 
by the way that the firms organised a thorough and well managed meetings 
process. 
Lastly, in relation to meetings, there was discussion about the influence of 
firms seeking to break the rules and engineer meetings outside the formal 
process (six instances). There was no consistency in relation to the influence 
that this had on companies. For one organisation, where a contact had been 
initiated to check the team outside the formal process, this had been perceived 
very negatively.  Others were however less concerned. For one company a 
formal strict process had been designed but firms were not disadvantaged by 
going beyond it. In a further instance a group financial controller was happy to 
have further meetings as long as they were interesting. 
Proposal documents 
In relation to the proposal documents, 14 interviews included reference to 
aspects of the perceived quality of tender documents received. Positive views 
were expressed when documents clearly answered the questions in the 
invitation to tender and were clearly structured or formatted (six instances).  
Other favourable comments were made more generally about the high quality of 
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the documents submitted (three instances) and how documents had been 
professionally put together (three instances). 
 There was however some difference between companies’ expectations as 
to the overall length of the documents submitted. Whilst five interviews 
identified short documents being received positively or longer documents being 
considered too detailed, in two others identified that the documents submitted 
were not detailed enough. Two others appreciated the professionalism of 
detailed tender documents. 
Presentations 
There were 11 interviews which discussed the general quality of 
presentations. Companies noted positively where they perceived that the 
presentations were properly rehearsed (five instances) and were impressed by 
the obvious effort that had been put into rehearsals. By way of exception, there 
was one interview where firms were criticised for over-rehearsing. In a further 
three cases comments were made about how presentations were generally 
impressive and in two other cases how well they were structured. 
So for the meetings, documents and presentations, companies were 
observing how well firms generally had responded to the invitations to tender in 
arriving at their auditor selection decisions. 
That concludes the findings from the Phase 2a interviews as they related to 
behaviour. The next section considers the decision dynamics surrounding 
auditor selection. 
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5.6. Final decision making 
The fifth and final decision influence within the revised conceptual model 
is the Dynamics of final decision making. 
During this phase there was again evidence of companies’ commitment to 
a fair and proper proposal process. In total 12 interviews highlighted extensive 
processes. Within this group seven had dedicated a proposal manager to 
running the process and twice external consultants were involved. Seven 
interviews talked about substantial investments of time being dedicated to the 
tender and commonly more 
than was anticipated at the 
outset.  There was also 
explicit commitment to 
fairness (five instances).  
In comparison only 
four companies talked 
about a short process but 
even then that was relative 
and the underlying tender 
still involved investment of 
time by both companies 
and the prospective auditors.  In eight cases, companies acknowledged that the 
long auditor tenure they had justified taking the tender seriously. 
Figure 18: Phase 2a Final decision making influences on 
auditor selection 
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In every case the final decision was taken after final presentations, but in 
some cases, companies shortlisted down to a final two either after receipt of 
proposal documents or after a first round of shortlisting presentations. There 
were only two cases where Mid-Tier firms were invited. In one of these cases, 
the relevant firm declined to tender. 
The dynamics of decision making were discussed in 22 of the 23 company 
interviews and the three decision influences highlighted were again the 
elements of the decisions process (meetings, documents, presentations) and 
their weight, the decision makers and the final consultation process. 
The sources and references identified for each of these are set out in Table 
22 and considered in turn. 
Factors Sources References 
Decision elements and their 
weight 
23 112 
Decision makers 21 75 
Decision consultation 20 67 
Table 22: Phase 2a sources and references for Final decision making 
5.6.1. The decision elements and their weight  
The influence of the various stages of the 
proposal process was discussed in each of the 
23 company interviews.  
During Phase 2a the part of the process 
most discussed was the meetings that took 
place during the proposal process. Although 
some saw them principally as opportunities for 
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the firms to gather information (four instances) there was much greater 
discussion about their influence on the selection decision (14 instances). 
Companies talked about gathering feedback from each meeting (eight 
instances) and about scoring or ranking the competing firms’ performance in 
meetings (six instances). The feedback from the meetings became critical to the 
decision in four cases involving companies with international operation. In 
these cases important members of the companies’ local management teams 
voiced strong concerns about one or more of the firms. These people might not 
be present at the final presentation and subsequent decision discussion, but 
carried sufficient weight for their views to be taken very seriously. For example: 
Group Financial Controller: “In a way it was decisive what happened at 
that stage. The feedback from the [major territory] management team was 
very one-sided in that one of the firms got fairly consistent negative feedback 
and because we had such a formalised process of getting feedback and we’d 
said upfront that the [major territory] resource piece was the number one 
factor … it was actually very difficult to reach a different conclusion” 
Even where there were no critical views expressed locally, the meetings 
and subsequent feedback were used in the final decision discussion. This helped 
the selection panel to gain an overall picture of how the firms compared and in 
particular where there may be weaknesses that needed to be explored in the 
final presentation. 
The meetings were therefore important and could be critical. 
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The presentations were the next most discussed element of the process (13 
instances). These presentations were considered important or very important 
generally (six instances) and the discussion also provided evidence as to why 
they were important. 
The presentations were considered important as the final “product” (three 
instances) and were critical where firms were seen to be “neck and neck” (two 
instances). The presentations also involved senior people who might not have 
been involved in the process up until then (two instances). Firms could also 
exclude themselves with a poor performance (one instance). 
Not everyone saw the presentations as most important. For some the 
meetings were more important and the final presentation was largely 
confirmatory of what had gone before (four instances). A very good presentation 
was also not seen to override previous poor performance in meetings (one 
instance). 
Where the importance of the proposal documents was discussed there was 
a split of opinion. For those who thought the document was important (five 
instances) it provided evidence of a well thought through approach, 
demonstrated that firms had listened and highlighted differences in 
competences between the competing firms. For those who felt it was 
unimportant relative to other aspects of the process (three instances) it was 
directly compared with the presentation which was for these people, more 
important. 
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5.6.2. Decision makers 
The composition of the selection 
committee and their relative influence was 
discussed in 21 (93%) of the interviews. 
The selection committee always had 
participation from members of the audit 
committee and the companies’ 
management, but the balance between them varied with perhaps, given the 
regulatory backdrop, a much larger influence of financial management than 
might have been expected as compared to the audit committees. 
There was a high level of discussion of audit committee involvement in the 
selection decision (20 instances) and in particular the audit committee chair 
was normally actively involved (13 instances). Management however were very 
active (14 instances) either because they were running the process, summarising 
feedback and reporting to the audit committee (in some cases making a 
recommendation to the audit committee) or because they were influential in the 
final decision discussion itself. 
 There was evidence of especially the Finance Director having an important 
role. The range of influence varied between involvement in the decision through 
to being seen as the prime decision maker. In one case an audit committee chair 
only met the finance director’s choice of audit firm in another the finance 
director orchestrated the process. The following reference illustrates this point: 
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 “And I guess you know it’s about making sure that everyone else is 
comfortable with that decision. So I led the tender, I led the decision process 
and I made sure my Audit Committee Chair was happy, the Chief Exec, 
Chairman was [sic] happy and then we told the rest of the non-executives and 
the rest of the Board” 
There was therefore a balance of influences involving the audit committee 
but in most cases, only or mainly its chair and management. The nature of the 
discussion that took place between these groups is considered next. 
5.6.3. Final consultation and decision making 
There were two principal elements identified 
in relation to consultation. Firstly how close the 
decision was (making it either easier or more 
difficult to come to a decision) and secondly the 
nature of the discussion that took place in reaching 
a decision. There were 20 interviews which 
discussed this influence on the selection decision. 
In 10 cases people considered the decision to have been close. In eight 
cases people talked about a lack of differentiation because the propositions were 
considered highly comparable or the same (four instances); or that all of the 
offers were very good (three instances). In comparison only three instances were 
identified where interviewees believed the decision to be clear cut. 
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Although the decisions were close, there was little evidence of 
disagreement or difficulty in reaching a decision. There was collective 
evaluation, with the use of scorecards as a basis (but not a final driver) (seven 
instances) and evidence of a lot of consensus (five instances), collective 
approaches (five instances) and a “collegiate” approach (two instances). Where 
there was disagreement this was resolved by debate (two instances) and in one 
case where there were initially quite different views, additional documentation 
was produced to attempt (successfully) to facilitate an end to the impasse. 
5.7. Relationships between the factor groups 
As noted in Chapter 4, although the research design was focussed on 
identifying influencing factors a number of interesting indications started to 
emerge about how the factor groups influencing auditor selection identified 
might interrelate. 
The influence of past service problems on future service design was noted 
in Phase 1.  This phase also identified a number of benefits of past relationships 
affecting assessments of service and behaviour. Knowledge and trust developed 
delivering other services to the company, or through providing services at 
another company, appearing to influence companies’ assessment of firms’ 
abilities to serve them as they would want and with the right capabilities and 
competences. Furthermore past behaviour created expectations about current 
and future behaviour. 
Behavioural influences during the proposal process also appeared to affect 
other factors. The two-way testing by firms of their ideas and by companies of 
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people and propositions appeared to influence both service design and 
capability and competence assessment. 
Finally the Service designs which firms developed, the behaviour they  
exhibited during the proposal process and the capabilities and competences 
they put forward fed into the final decision making process. 
5.8. Summary and conclusion on Phase 2a 
 This chapter has set out the findings of Phase 2a of the current research 
which involved 23 in-depth interviews with those within FTSE 350 companies 
who had recently been involved in an auditor selection decision. The analysis 
was conducted in 
accordance with 
the research 
approach set out 
in Section 3.2.4 
above. 
 As a result 
of Phase 2a a 
revised 
conceptual model 
of FTSE 350 
auditor selection 
has been developed 
Figure 19: Revised conceptual model 
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Phase 2a identified the same five factor groups as the previous phase, that 
were influencing the auditor selection decisions of FTSE 350 companies.  These 
were: Relationships and track record (at the start of the proposal process), 
Service design, Capabilities and competences (of the competing firms and 
teams), Behavioural influences (during the proposal process) and Final decision 
making.  
In addition Phase 2a has also provided indications of the relationships 
between the five factor groups as shown in the numbers contained within the 
Conceptual model. These are: firstly, the influence of Past relationships and 
track record on Service design (1a), Behavioural influences (1b) and Capability 
and competence assessment (1c); secondly, the influence of behaviour during 
the process on Service design (2a) and Capability and competence assessment 
(2b); thirdly, the influence of Service design (3a), Behavioural influences during 
the proposal (3b) and Capabilities and competences assessment (3c) on Final 
decision making. 
Relationships and track record 
Within the relationships and prior track record factor group the important 
influence of the relationship the company has with its incumbent auditor was 
identified. This phase did not however support that relationships between 
companies and their auditors were necessarily problematic at the start of the 
tender process. As many interviews discussed positive relationships as poor 
ones. 
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The research however did support the presence of other factors inherent to 
the incumbent auditor situation which also put them at risk. These included the 
attractiveness of new ideas which the incumbent might have difficulty in 
introducing because of the challenge of “why not before?” 
Against these disadvantages were again weighed incumbent knowledge 
and the potential risk and disruption associated with auditor transition; 
although the latter was also counteracted by the attractiveness of a fresh 
approach and detailed transition plans submitted by challenger firms. These 
were seen to mitigate concerns over transition. 
Service design 
At the core, companies were valuing rigour and assurance in considering 
auditor selection whilst the augmented service consideration included 
facilitating services associated with the audit. These were the working 
relationship, coordination and communication associated with the audit, 
accounting technical matters (especially dealing with accounting issues), the 
approach to the audit of IT systems and controls and how auditors proposed to 
work with internal audit departments.  
Companies were also looking for ideas and insights from their auditors 
based on their broader knowledge and experience. 
Fees were found generally not to be a major influence on auditor 
appointment. This arose either because the fee quotes  were close, because 
companies felt the fees unimportant as they represent a small proportion of 
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total spend, or because negotiations took place after the decision or as part of 
the decision with the preferred bidder. 
Capabilities and competences 
Capabilities and competences were found to be influences on auditor 
selection and operating at three levels: the firm, the team and the lead partner. 
In this phase most discussion related to the team. The assessment of teams was 
being undertaken at the individual and team levels with industry experience and 
expertise again being highlighted. Companies were also keen to understand how 
the team was structured. 
The focus on the experience of the lead partner along with an assessment 
of their ability to deliver the audit along with their personal styles was also 
identified.  
The firm was discussed less but the main issues included industry 
expertise, global reach and conflicts with other services. 
Behavioural influences 
Behavioural influences were identified which appeared to go way beyond 
submitting a professional and compliant bid, although that was also an 
influence. 
The main behavioural influences from Phase 2a underlined the importance 
of affect. The quality of interaction between the teams and the companies 
including personal chemistry was the most discussed behavioural influence on 
auditor selection. Companies also value the effort and enthusiasm that firms 
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put in and how they listened and responded to what they heard. Lastly, Phase 
2a supported the presence of a process of testing and proving going on during 
a proposal process. Firms were testing and proving their ideas and 
propositions whilst companies were testing the propositions put forward by 
the firms and their competence; the latter especially in the final presentation. 
Final decision making 
Phase 2a supported that the final decision was typically not made until 
after the final presentation, although it typically evolved during the process. The 
influence of meetings during the tender was identified as important both 
because it drove the feedback that was collected at the centre and because it 
started to form opinions. Presentations were also influential as the final stage of 
the process and often involved senior people; some of whom had not previously 
been involved. 
In most cases this decision discussion immediately followed the final 
presentations although consideration was given to meetings including feedback 
from those not present at the final discussion, the documents and the final 
presentations. 
In the majority of cases decisions were close but the final discussion 
consensual between the selection panels, which included both non-executives 
and executives.  Audit Committee Chairs were involved but there was also an 
influential role for management; especially the Finance Director. 
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Relationships between the factor groups 
Although focussed on identifying the factors affecting the auditor selection 
decisions of FTSE companies, this phase of the research also started to identify 
relationships between those factors primarily: the influence of Relationships 
and past track record on expectations about Service design (1a), behaviour (1b) 
and  Capabilities and competences (1c); the influence of behaviour during the 
proposal on Service design (2a)and perceptions of Capabilities and competence 
(2b) and finally the influence of Service Design (3c) Behavioural influences 
during the process (3c) and Capabilities and competences (3c) on Final decision 
making. 
That concludes consideration of findings in Phase 2a and consideration of 
the two buy side phases of the research. In the next chapter the findings from 
the sales-side interviews is set out. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
RESEARCH FINDINGS: PHASE 2b 
IN DEPTH SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS  
WITH BIG 4 FIRM PARTNERS 
JUNE 2010 TO SEPTEMBER 2012 
 
6.0. Introduction 
In line with the phased approach explained in Section 3.2 this is the third 
and final chapter setting out the findings of the data relevant to answering the 
research question: 
“What are the factors affecting the auditor selection decisions of  
 FTSE 350 companies in competitive tenders?” 
In the previous chapters the 
findings of the analyses of 
interview records obtained from a 
Big 4 firm (Phase 1) and of in depth 
interviews conducted with those 
involved in auditor selection 
decisions by FTSE 350 companies 
(Phase 2a) were considered. This 
chapter now provides a different, 
sales side, perspective on the Figure 20: Phase 2b within the overall research 
approach 
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auditor selection decision by setting out the findings relating to views of the 
partners involved in 12 of the 17 audit tenders included in Phase 2a.  
6.1. Analysis of in depth interviews with those involved in an 
auditor selection decision by a FTSE 350 company 
This final phase of the study (Phase 2b) sets out the findings following the 
analysis of in-depth interviews conducted with Big 4 audit partners who had 
recently, at the time of the interview, been involved in a proposal for the audit of 
a FTSE 350 company. 
Consistent with the first two phases of the study, the analysis was 
conducted in accordance with the approach set out in Section 3.2.4. Across the 
24 in depth interview records, 560 nodes were identified and 1465 references 
were assigned to these nodes. This represented a similar number of nodes to 
Phase 2a although the references were fewer at an average of some 61 per 
interview.  The overall number of references was less than Phase 2a notably in 
connection with discussion of the final decision making. This is understandable 
given that they would not have had sight of the final decision making. 
The findings from Phase 2b, however, demonstrated a high degree of 
consistency with the other phases at both the factor group and individual factor 
level and supported the revised conceptual model set in Figure 13 in Chapter 5 
and reproduced in Figure 19. For convenience the model is set out again below 
as Figure 21. 
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Figure 21: Revised conceptual model 
The analysis of the Phase 2b interviews also provided additional 
perspectives in some areas, especially around the interaction that took place 
during the proposal processes. As will be expanded below, discussion of 
behavioural influences on auditor selection was especially frequent, whilst 
service assessment was comparatively less frequently discussed.  
As in the previous two phases, the five factor groups influencing audit 
selection identified were: Relationships and track record (at the start of the 
proposal process), Service design, Capabilities and competences (assessment), 
Behaviour influences (during the proposal process) and Final decision making.  
The findings from Phase 2b of the study are now discussed in turn for each 
factor group in the five sections which follow. 
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6.2. Relationships and past track record 
The partner interviews 
supported the importance of 
relationships at the start of 
the tender process and 
consistent with the previous 
two phases the types of 
relationship and track record 
influences on auditor 
selection were very similar. 
These are set out in Table 23 
and featured positive and 
negative influences pertaining to 
auditor incumbency, the influence of a track record of other non-audit services 
and targeting activity, the influence of alumni, relationships at other companies. 
Subcategory Sources References 
Audit firm incumbency 21 118 
 Past service problems 16 34 
 Positive track record 10 13 
 Incumbent inherent disadvantage 11 39 
 Incumbent inherent advantage 7 18 
 Auditor transition 10 14 
Non-audit track record and targeting 19 111 
Alumni 13 24 
Past and current relationships at other 
companies 
11 35 
Table 23: Phase 2b Relationships and past track record sources and references by factor 
The Phase 2b research findings in relation to each of these factors are now 
considered in the following sections in descending order of the number of 
Figure 22: Relationships and past track 
record influences on auditor selection 
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interviews which discussed them. The position of the incumbent auditor is 
therefore considered first. The influence of targeting and other service 
relationships at the company is considered next, then the influence of alumni of 
the Big 4 firms and finally relationships at other companies. 
6.2.1. Audit firm incumbency 
The partners talked about the important 
influence on the auditor selection decision of 
the relationship of the company with its 
incumbent auditor (21 instances). Consistent 
with the first two phases of the research there 
influences on auditor selection came from the 
service track record of the incumbent,  influences arising from the inherent 
situation of being an incumbent and lastly matters relating to auditor transition. 
Incumbent service track record 
Both positive and negative influences were identified for the incumbent in 
relation to their service track record.  As Table 23 shows however there were 
many more interviews containing references to past service problems than to 
positive track records and more interviews highlighting incumbent inherent 
disadvantage compared to incumbent advantage. The interviews included 
situations where the partners themselves were the incumbent, where the 
partner was new, but the firm was incumbent, and where another firm was the 
incumbent and the partner was challenging for the audit. 
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There were 16 partner interviews (67%) which highlighted problems with 
incumbent track records; a very high proportion of the whole population. 
Although the position is complicated here to some extent because in five of 
those interviews partners discussed both positive and negative aspects of the 
incumbent auditor’s track record, nevertheless the balance of discussion was 
more negative than positive. 
In 11 of the 16 interviews referred to above, partners talked generally about 
the dissatisfaction they had identified with the incumbent auditor and/or their 
service. In these cases partners talked about the influence it had on the 
interactions that took place during the proposal process. This included 
companies spending time talking about their frustrations with their incumbent 
auditor. One partner thought this just reinforced the company’s feeling of 
dissatisfaction by keeping it front of mind. 
“And I think they were very open as I say, giving with their time, quite 
happy to discuss the issues, most of which were about how [bad] [incumbent 
firm] were so actually in the early days we had very little opportunity frankly 
to demonstrate our own value. It was all about beating up the incumbent and 
we sat there quietly and just kind of sagely nodded and tried not to agree too 
much” 
Hearing about incumbent problems helped partners shape their own 
responses; ensuring that their own service propositions dealt with the 
frustrations identified. 
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As well as the discussion in general terms certain specific areas of 
dissatisfaction were also highlighted. These included incumbent auditors having 
become complacent (three instances), disputes over fees (three instances) and 
missing or not dealing with issues (three instances). 
Two interviews talked about a specific situation where a senior partner of 
an incumbent auditor had actually apologised for past actions. In this case the 
apology had been critical to the retention of the audit by that incumbent. It was 
thought important that the company was confident that a set of particular 
circumstances which had damaged the relationship between the company and 
its auditor would not be repeated. 
In comparison with the high proportion of interviews highlighting 
problems with auditor track record, the instances of a positive track record were 
much fewer.  Although in total there were 10 interviews which identified 
positive influences relating to the incumbent service relationship, as noted 
above, in five cases these arose in interviews which also discussed negative 
influences. Where partners talked about the positive influence of incumbency, 
in most cases (eight instances) they talked about relationships rather than 
service. These included examples of teams having strong relationships with 
their clients generally and strong individual relationships between the auditors 
and directors and senior management. In one case a partner explicitly identified 
the positive relationships which existed before the tender being the critical 
factor for success. In another the relationships that an incumbent had provided 
the platform to evolve the audit service and defend the audit appointment; 
dealing with the service concerns that had been identified. 
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Incumbent inherent position 
As discussed in the earlier phases of the research the position of the 
incumbent at the start of a proposal process was not however affected only by 
their track record. There are also inherent advantages and disadvantages. And 
again here the disadvantages (11 instances) were more often than not seen by 
the partners to outweigh the advantages (seven instances). 
The forces for change identified in the previous phase(s) were also seen to 
be present by the partners. These included changes in key company directors 
(four instances) such as an audit committee chair, finance director or, as in one 
case, several changes of members of the board. In these cases new people were 
either looking for change as part of a more general change programme or had 
different attitudes to tendering. For example where new people who believed 
tendering was a good thing (even where there was no dissatisfaction) replaced 
those who saw less value in it. 
As well as changes in key people, change in the company’s business was 
also considered by the partners to create an atmosphere which favoured a 
change of auditor (four instances). This was the case in two particular 
companies. In the first of these companies, there had been a substantial and 
negative business event which had left the company under severe financial 
pressure. There was in this case an element of the auditor being guilty by 
association. Having been present during the problems the view was “How could 
they not have identified the issues and helped prevent the problem?”  
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In the second case the company had made a transformative acquisition 
which had increased its size very considerably and meant that the audit 
arrangements would need to be different anyway. The company’s view was: why 
not take the opportunity to review the relationship as a whole and identify a new 
auditor for the new situation? 
There was also evidence of incumbent auditors acknowledging the 
inherent difficulties they may face in an audit tender and preparing ahead. This 
had led to changes in the service team to introduce new people offering fresh 
approaches to combat the inherent attraction of change (four instances). In one 
case this extended to presenting a new audit plan with new ideas, similar to a 
proposal document, ahead of the tender process. 
The challenge for an incumbent to come up with new ideas against the 
backdrop of an established service relationship was also identified again. In one 
case, a partner even felt it was necessary for an incumbent to come up with 
surprises. In another case, a challenge was identified for the meetings during 
the proposal process. For many, these meetings would be about the audit firms 
fact finding. Incumbent auditors however would be expected to know everything 
they needed to know to perform the audit. How would they demonstrate interest 
in this situation? 
There were seven interviews which identified incumbency as an inherent 
advantage in audit tenders. Some felt that companies would need a reason to 
change in order to outweigh costs and disruption of transition and that there 
would be a tendency to stay with the incumbent ceteris paribus (three cases). 
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Why would a company change and incur the potential disruption of transition if 
this was not necessary or obviously beneficial? At any given time a company 
would also be coping with other changes affecting its finance function.  One 
partner talked about the importance of potential auditor change needing to be 
effected in the context of a lot of other changes going on at one particular 
organisation. 
Others saw incumbency as an advantage because it gave that firm access to 
the tendering company and its key officials in the run up to the proposal (two 
instances). This regular contact would facilitate maintaining relationships and 
testing new ideas in the course of normal business and in a way that was not 
open to others who would be constrained by the rules of the tender process. 
Only two interviews identified loyalty to the incumbent firm as an 
influence on auditor selection. This low level of discussion is consistent with the 
previous two phases of this study. 
Lastly, in relation to the inherent position of the incumbent, partners 
found it difficult to assess their position when a tender was being driven by 
corporate governance (five instances). In particular partners found it difficult to 
assess whether the corporate governance agenda would be satisfied by the 
tender alone or whether there was an underlying feeling within companies that 
there had to be a change. For example one incumbent partner commented: 
“There are two possible interpretations of this… you know it will be an 
absolutely level playing field and we stand every chance of winning or it’s 
being put out to tender with a presumption for change because that is the 
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interpretation being put on FRC guidance.. we will never know and you might  
not know at the end of the process”  
Audit transition 
The last area of analysis relating to the incumbent auditor is  audit 
transition.  In total 10 interviews identified a variety of specific transition 
influences on the selection decision. (NB this section restricts itself to 
consideration of specific references to issues about the actual act of transition). 
There are also likely of course to be broader relationship influences which 
influence a company’s appetite for transition. These were discussed earlier in 
this section.  
Three interviews discussed transition as a concern for companies. In one 
case an individual finance director had appeared to be against change and 
seemed to prefer to reappoint his existing auditor over concerns about a new 
firm getting up to speed. In another, a partner suspected that there may have 
been a concern about a new firm taking a different view on a company’s 
accounting judgements. In the third case, any transition would be coinciding 
with the transition of an audit committee chair. The company was nervous 
about the transition and especially with its coincidence with this important 
board change.  
Three further interviews discussed companies exploring the transition by 
asking questions in proposal meetings or presentations; confirming how things 
were going to work in areas of interest.  
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Transition did therefore appear as a concern, however one partner felt that 
it would not be successful for an incumbent just to assert that transition would 
be too difficult and disruptive. This had happened on the proposal that he had 
been involved with and it backfired for that incumbent as other firms were 
offering new ideas and approaches. 
In this phase aspects of transition preparation and planning were also 
discussed. This was raised in seven interviews. In three of these interviews 
partners talked about the detailed transition plans that had been prepared so 
that the firm was ready to start should they be appointed. One further interview 
raised the importance of previous transition experience in the team. Finally two 
interviews identified the role of the secondment of a member of a firm’s staff to 
the tendering company. In one case, a secondee prior to the tender was 
proposed to help facilitate the transition. In another, a firm identified a separate 
transition manager who they offered to second to the company to help with the 
administrative aspects of the transition. 
Overall the partner interviews showed a number of consistencies with 
Phase 2a with transition identified as a concern for companies, but one which 
firms sought to mitigate with detailed transition plans and support. 
So, consistent with the previous two phases, the incumbent auditor starts 
in a unique position. In the auditor selection context the partners saw this, more 
often than not, as a negative position which of course contrasts with some of the 
literature in this area.  
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Other firms however also had established relationships and this is 
discussed in the next section. 
6.2.2. Targeting and non- audit service relationships at  the 
company 
The partner interviews identified a range of non-audit relationship matters 
which they considered to have influenced auditor selection.  These related to 
other service relationships and targeting activity (as previously defined in this 
context in Chapter 4). 
Targeting 
In addition to past services, 14 (58%) of the partner interviews also talked 
about investment in relationship building or targeting ( as previously defined) 
ahead of the proposal.  
The positive influence of contact ahead 
of the proposal process was identified (nine 
instances). Interestingly in every case the 
initial contact of the audit teams was 
facilitated by others with existing 
relationships with the companies or 
individuals concerned. Contacts arose from a number of different sources 
including the non-audit service relationships mentioned above, contacts from 
other companies and in three cases as a result of past unsuccessful audit 
proposals where contacts during those processes were sustained. 
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These (targeting) meetings tended to be discussions about the company’s 
business or more generally getting to know people and often in a social setting 
such as over drinks or a meal or connected with a sporting event. In two cases 
however much more structured approaches were discussed, including global 
target team account planning workshops. 
In three interviews partners talked about the challenges they faced in 
winning the proposal, absent such targeting activity, and one reflected on the 
opportunity lost before the proposal where there had been limited investment in 
relationships. 
The importance of knowledge of the company and its business and people 
was also recognised by the partners (five instances). The impact of not having 
this knowledge was explained by one partner: 
“Because we didn’t know the client well enough we made some 
assumptions. We were forced to make too many assumptions and we didn’t get 
it right. We made an assumption about me and didn’t get it right, we made an 
assumption about [which office to use to conduct the audit] and got that 
wrong….I think we were probably forced to make an assumption about the 
presentation....we didn’t know how to be edgy and got that wrong” 
One of the tactics which had been employed to help build knowledge of a 
company and its business and relationships with its people was seconding staff 
to companies ahead of the proposal (two instances). This had proved successful 
in helping to provide valuable knowledge to their firms during the proposal 
process. In one case, a former senior employee of the target company was 
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employed as a coach to the team; helping them to understand how things 
worked within that organisation. 
Other non-audit service relationships 
Where non-audit services were being provided by an audit firm, this 
enabled those providing those services to introduce their audit colleagues and 
help to start building relationships (four instances).  Chapter 1 explained the 
change in nature of the Big 4 firms and how post Enron they typically provided 
non-audit service to companies who were not audit clients. Phase 2b identified a 
number of these service relationships at the start of proposal processes. They 
included tax advice and consulting (two instances) and advice in relation to 
director’s remuneration and corporate structuring. One partner talked about 
such non-audit services creating confidence in the company that the firm could 
do a good job and this would extend to audit. Notwithstanding the strict 
independence rules referred to in Chapter 1, one organisation was still thought 
to view their relationships with their professional service providers as holistic; 
where individual services would not be considered in isolation but rather as part 
of a broader whole. Where individual relationships had been built through the 
provision of non-audit services, it was suggested by one partner, this made it 
easier in proposal meetings for those members of the proposed audit teams who 
did not have any such relationships. They were being introduced to the 
companies by members of their own firm who had existing relationships. 
The past non-audit service relationship was however not always a positive 
influence for the firm involved. In one case, a successful tax relationship seemed 
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to have had little impact on the audit decision (the tax director effectively 
abstained). In another case some problems with a consulting assignment and a 
dispute over fees had caused friction. The audit partner brought in to resolve 
these problems had been earmarked to lead the audit proposal, but as a result of 
the negotiations to resolve the problem his relationship with the company 
suffered. As a result they suggested he should not subsequently lead the audit 
proposal for that firm. 
The track record of working with a company therefore provided both 
personal contacts and knowledge, which proved useful in a subsequent audit 
proposal. The success or otherwise of the service history caused positive or 
negative influences on that auditor selection decision. 
6.2.3. Alumni 
The discussion of alumni relationships 
was more prevalent in Phase 2b than in the 
other two phases and identified in 13 (54%) of 
interviews conducted. The interviews also 
identified a more consistently positive view of 
alumni relationships and their influence on 
auditor selection for their former firms.  
Partners talked especially about alumni providing advice before the 
proposal process and then feedback during it (eight instances). This happened 
in a number of ways. In one case the proposed team was discussed ahead of the 
proposal with a senior alumnus who provided views on whether they thought 
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people were strong enough and whether they would fit based on their 
knowledge of both the firm’s people and the company concerned. In other cases 
the influence concerned providing additional background on the business and 
providing feedback on the firm’s (although generally not the competitors’) 
performance in meetings. In one case positive feedback on an early meeting 
motivated the team as one partner observed: 
“You know we got feedback within 20 minutes of that first meeting. They 
rang me when I was in the cab on the way back to say that went really well. So 
you take great heart from that and the team took great confidence from 
getting [alumnus] feedback after the second meeting. I think it helped all of us, 
absolutely everybody. So having moles is phenomenally helpful” 
In another case a partner observed that an organisation had several alumni 
from the firm and thought that their recruitment was evidence of the company’s 
respect for the talent it had. They suspected that alumni may be recruiting 
people like them and this may well have also influenced their views on auditor 
selection. 
The partners could of course only comment directly on the influence of the 
alumni of their firm because they had no direct access to what other firms’ 
alumni were feeding back to their old firms. They did however suspect that there 
were also positive influences for other firms where alumni were in key positions. 
Two interviews talked about such situations and suspected it to be positive for 
those firms. 
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The positive influence of alumni was not however in relation to alumni 
voting for their old firms. It was more in the nature of using their knowledge to 
help them to get to a better proposition or generally to create a positive 
impression. 
Alumni were however not universally positive. In two cases alumni were 
specifically observed not providing any comment or feedback in processes which 
had strict rules about this. In another case an alumnus provided no input having 
lost contact with the firm for several years. 
The role of alumni as coaches to their former firms was therefore the most 
common theme of discussion. There was no discussion of alumni appointing or 
overtly lobbying for their former firms. 
6.2.4. Relationships at other companies 
Phase 2b identified rfewer discussions 
of any influence from relationships that the 
firms had with decision makers through 
connections or experience at other 
companies (11 (46%) of the interviews 
discussed this). Where it occurred however 
there were instances where it was very 
influential to auditor selection.  
There were eight cases where directors had been audited by another firm 
at another company where they had previously been employed. In two of these 
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cases, partners considered these pre-existing relationships to be decisive in the 
current auditor selection decision. Indeed in one case, a recently appointed 
finance director supported the appointment of the individual audit partner who 
had led the audit at his previous company.  
There seemed to be less influence where the previous relationships at 
other companies related to non-audit services. Where non-audit services had 
been provided by the competing firms at other companies, none of these 
relationships was identified as being influential to the selection decision (four 
instances). 
Current cross directorship influences 
There were five cases where directors were also currently directors of other 
companies where one of the competing firms was the auditor. It was not evident 
from the interviews whether such a presence was influential, but in no case was 
the connection associated with success for the firm concerned. 
Consistent with the other two phases then, there was less discussion of the 
influences on auditor selection as a result of cross directorship relationships at 
other companies than there was in relation to past relationships affecting the 
tendering company itself. 
6.2.5. Trust 
Phase 2b identified trust as a positive influence on auditor selection (seven 
instances). Partners thought trust influential in two ways. Firstly through the 
individuals that were being proposed to conduct the audit. It was felt important 
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that behaviour in the run up to proposal (and during it) supported what was 
being said. One partner thought trust was built “in the execution”. (NB the 
examples highlighted in the previous section about working relationships at a 
previous employment may also support this). 
Secondly in two cases trust that had been built by non-audit partners was 
considered to support the credibility of the audit proposal by creating inter 
organisational trust. For example one partner commented: 
I don’t think you can overestimate how important the 10 year 
relationship with the firm before we go into tender. So [what] [Tax partner] 
and then what the team had done….that track record and trust…you can never 
overestimate its intangible but a key factor. Because they trusted us, we’ve 
helped them out, we’ve been in the trenches with them over ten years. They 
trusted us. They trusted [Tax Partner]. 
The importance that partners assigned to trust and the relatively little 
discussion of it in the client interviews of previous phases is interesting.  
Partners may be overstating the importance of trust or alternatively companies 
may not be recognising something implicit.  
6.2.6. Other relationship matters 
In seven interviews partners talked generally about the strength of 
relationships which they or their competitors had with the tendering companies, 
providing further evidence that they considered it an influencing factor on the 
selection decision. 
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However as identified in one case significant supply relationships between 
the company and the firm (whereby the services bought by the firm from the 
company significantly exceeded the quantum of the audit fee) appeared to play 
no part in the decision. Although an audit firm was a significant customer of the 
company, this was discounted (or ignored) in the auditor selection decision. 
The level of comment on references was also again relatively low with only 
three interviews referring to it; providing further evidence of the apparent 
relatively low influence of word of mouth in FTSE 350 auditor selection 
decisions. 
That concludes the consideration of Phase 2b findings on the influence of 
pre-existing relationship on auditor selection. This phase provides further 
evidence of companies being influenced in their auditor selection decisions by 
the status of pre-existing relationships. These relationships were found to relate 
to those with their incumbent auditor, other non-audit service providers, (to a 
lesser extent) connections at other companies and through alumni relationships 
(especially with alumni as coaches to their former employers). 
The next section now considers the influence of Service design.  
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6.3. Service design 
 
The analysis of the findings of partner interviews as they related to service 
design and assessment has been organised using the same service definition 
framework adapted from Gronroos (2007).  As in the previous phases influences 
associated with the rigour and quality of the audit are classified within the core 
audit service.  Influences associated with the way that the audit is delivered are 
classified as facilitating services. Those influences related to adding value above 
the delivery of the audit, but still part of the overall audit service, are classified 
as supporting services. 
In the previous two phases there had been some discussion about whether 
it was possible to differentiate an audit overall within the Big 4. This section 
therefore considers the partners views on this first. 
Figure 23: Service design influences on auditor selection 
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6.3.1. Audit approach, general differentiation and tailoring 
The partners generally did not mention this during the interviews. It came 
up in only three interviews and in two cases partners recalled their prospective 
clients telling them that they were not differentiating on core audit. A quote 
from one partner illustrates the point: 
“Approach?.....Guess what it’s an audit, they more or less said anyone can 
audit, you can all audit, all four of you, don’t care which firm. It’s a given so I 
don’t even want to talk about that” 
So, in contrast to the previous two phases the partner interviews provided 
little evidence of discussion of differentiation of the core audit and indeed some 
evidence that they thought companies felt the audit overall could not be 
differentiated between the Big 4 firms.  
The interviews did however make frequent references to aspects of the 
audit. These have been organised in an order consistent with Phase 2a and are 
considered in the sections that follow using the same Gronroos (2007) 
framework; therefore starting with the core audit.  
6.3.2. Core audit rigour and assurance 
For this section the same 
definition of the core audit has 
been used as was explained in 
Section 5.3.1. and Section 5.3.2. 
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Reflecting the definition of audit quality outline by DeAngelo (1981), the 
core audit is defined here to include aspects relevant to auditors identifying and 
reporting (material) errors and therefore includes descriptions of attributes that 
would make this more likely (for example including such attributes as rigour 
and assurance (that there were no surprises)).  
Eight interviews (one third of the total) referred to audit rigour and related 
matters.  Within this group three partners talked about the importance 
companies placed on a robust or high quality audit and one that would not miss 
issues. For two others the focus was on the actual delivery of the audit at the 
centre of the proposal. 
In addition, four other partners talked about discussions they had had with 
companies concerning the audit approach and how specific areas would be 
addressed (to confirm that adequate effort was being directed to ensure that 
errors would be identified). Where companies probed specific aspects of the 
audit partners felt it important that they were able to deal with the issues raised. 
In two cases, partners noted how a clear response had received a positive 
reaction. In another interview however, the audit team had been less clear about 
how they would approach a particular important area of the audit. The lead 
partner felt that had been an important and negative influence on the selection 
decision. 
Finally, and consistent with the comments made above about inherent 
difficulties for the incumbent, one partner commented that it was very difficult 
to explain the audit in an interesting way where the proposal coincided with the 
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year end audit. In effect, the partner concerned felt he was trying to explain 
what the company already knew because they had just experienced it. This he 
felt put him at a disadvantage in the proposal process as he was being compared 
with other firms with new and different ideas (which might inherently be more 
interesting even if they were not better than the current service plans). 
6.3.3. Facilitating services 
The analysis of the Phase 2b interview data was consistent with Phase 2a 
and also identified five facilitating services influences on auditor selection. 
These are set out in Table 24 below along with the number of sources and 
references identified from the interview records for each subcategory. 
Factors Sources References 
The future working relationship 14 30 
IT systems and controls 8 14 
Coordination and communication 6 10 
Accounting technical matters 4 8 
Working with internal audit  5 5 
Table 24: Phase 2b sources and references for facilitating services 
Although these subcategories are the same as those identified in Phase 2a 
which in turn had a high degree of consistency with Phase 1 the frequency of 
discussion was somewhat different with 
similar numbers of interviews 
discussing the working 
relationship, IT systems and 
controls and internal audit but far 
fewer raising coordination and 
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communication and accounting technical matters. Each of these influences as 
they were identified in Phase 2b is now considered in turn. 
The future working relationship 
The Phase 2b analysis highlighted 14 partner interviews which discussed 
the future working relationship. This category includes the softer areas of 
personal interaction as part of the audit as compared to the specific aspects of 
work design. 
In five cases the partners spoke generally about how they thought 
companies were looking for positive relationships. In two further cases partners 
said explicitly that friendship was a selection influence. In two other cases 
references were made to other specific aspects of the relationship being sought; 
one partner felt hands-on support was important, another that a company was 
looking for a business partner. 
Most commonly however partners talked about companies looking for 
people they could work with. There were eight interviews with comments 
related to this. In half of these interviews partners felt it was important that 
companies felt they could work with the individuals and teams put forward. In 
one case a partner expressed this as it being important for the proposing team 
to fit with the company’s culture.  
In three cases partners went further. The first thought it was  important 
not only that people felt they could work with the teams put forward but that 
they actually wanted to. The second suggested that, in an environment of high 
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work pressure and a culture of long working hours, one company would want an 
audit team that it would be fun to work with. Lastly one partner felt that: 
“They would enjoy having us as their auditors, that’s my personal view of 
what we were trying to do. You will like working with us, we’ll enjoy working 
together” 
As noted in Section 5.3.3 there are of course connections here with 
personal chemistry and the quality of personal interaction which are discussed 
further below in relation to behavioural influences during a proposal process. 
IT systems and controls 
IT and systems and controls as an influence on auditor selection was 
identified in eight interviews. The comments made by partners were split 
between the importance of firms being able to provide informal advice as part of 
the audit and recommendations as to how companies might improve their 
systems and controls as well as the audit approach to systems and controls.  
Where partners thought input to improving systems and controls was 
influential to the selection decision in three cases, this related to the presence on 
the audit team of a specialist in the relevant accounting system being used by 
the company. In one of these cases where the company had a relatively 
immature systems and control environment, the ability to build a specialist 
review of systems as part of the audit was considered one of the critical areas 
underpinning the successful tender. In the other case the comment was made 
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more generally that helping a company to improve its systems and controls was 
one of the discussion points during the proposal meetings. 
Where the audit approach was considered important, in two cases partners 
talked generally about the companies’ desire for the audit to rely on their 
systems and controls. In one case however, a partner talked about it being 
critical to the selection decision and mentioned that it had been discussed in all 
of the meetings that took place as part of the proposal process. In this case the 
company was particularly dissatisfied with the approach that its incumbent 
auditor had taken and was determined to use the proposal to explore different 
approaches in this area. 
Coordination and communication 
Coordination and communication were mentioned in six of the partner 
interviews although some of the comments were also quite short. Three 
potential influences on auditor selection were identified. 
Firstly, companies were looking for the lead partner as the single point of 
contact for the audit and all of the service interactions that occurred. Secondly, 
in two cases, companies wanted effective global coordination. In one of these 
cases the particular issue was coordination in one of their specific global regions 
where they had meaningful operations across a number of different territories. 
Lastly in terms of communication, two partners talked about companies feeling 
communication was an important selection criterion and in one of those cases 
specifically continuous communication. 
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The relatively low levels of discussion about coordination and 
communication contrast with Phase 1 where this area had been considered 
problematic by companies and therefore influential in at least some selection 
decisions where companies had overseas operations. 
Accounting technical 
In a similar vein there had also been substantial comment about 
accounting advice in Phase 1 (where comments related to problems that 
companies experienced in this area and how it affected their auditor selection 
decision) and in Phase 2a (where inter alia the need for discussion and the value 
of advice on the companies’ annual reports were discussed) . In Phase 2b there 
were only four interviews which discussed accounting technical matters. 
In one of these cases the partner described the discussions about 
accounting that took place during the proposal and how they felt the client 
valued the advice and perspectives provided. In two cases however a negative 
influence on the auditor selection decision was perceived to have occurred when 
partners were unclear in their discussions about accounting areas of concern to 
companies. In one further, case firms had offered different advice in relation to 
specific matters of concern to one company and it became influential on the 
selection decision when the incumbent’s view was eventually agreed by all the 
firms to be the most appropriate one. 
There is overlap here between accounting issue resolution being 
considered important by the partners and the testing of competence discussed 
in the behavioural influences on decision making sub section considered below.  
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Working with internal audit 
Lastly in relation to facilitating services, partners talked about aspects of 
the relationship with internal audit and their influence on the selection decision. 
There were five interviews where partners referred to this. In one case it arose 
as a reference to general comparisons being made about how well the firms’ 
proposals supported internal audit. In another case a partner mentioned that an 
audit committee chair had expressed frustration in a meeting that one firm had 
not put forward proposals that he felt adequately supported and integrated with 
internal audit. 
In three interviews, the discussion had been about the situation where one 
of the Big 4 firms was providing internal audit services as part of an outsourcing 
agreement. Auditors are generally not permitted to deliver external and internal 
audit services to the same company so, where a firm provides such internal 
audit services and proposes for the external audit, this is a matter that needs to 
be resolved. In one case, and related to the comments made about knowledge 
under relationships in Section 6. 2.2, the provision of the internal audit 
provided that firm with a strong base upon which to build and the company 
foresaw no difficulty in selecting that firm for external audit. This view prevailed 
even though their appointment would create a need for another internal audit 
outsourcing partner.  
Elsewhere however, the internal audit outsourcing arrangement was 
problematic when that firm proposed for the external audit. The firm involved 
had attempted to extol the benefits of an integrated approach, but the company 
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wanted completely independent firms and so the incumbent outsourced internal 
audit became a negative influence for that firm in the external auditor selection 
process. 
That concludes the consideration of facilitating services identified from the 
interviews with those involved in auditor selection. The next section considers 
the important supporting service identified and that is ideas and insights from 
the audit. 
6.3.4. Supporting services: ideas and insights from the audit 
In Chapter 5 the high proportion of Phase 2a interviews which identified 
companies looking for ideas and insights as 
part of the audit was noted. The 
issue was also present frequently 
in Phase 2b. In this phase 10 
interviews discussed it. Again it is 
important to stress that these were ideas 
and insights which were being sought as part of the audit service as opposed to 
additional fee paying services. 
In three interviews partners recognised that value could be defined in 
different ways and was also likely to vary over time. In two of these cases 
partners felt that it was the act of identifying areas where ideas and insights may 
be valuable that was most important. 
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There was a variety of areas where insights and ideas were part of the 
discussions. In four cases partners talked about sharing ideas or best practice 
from other clients or sectors and in two further cases benchmarking against 
other companies not necessarily in their industry. In a further case one firm 
facilitated making new contacts between a finance director and their peers. 
In seven cases partners spoke more about providing ideas and insights into 
specific areas of concern to companies, including helping them to improve risk 
management and regulatory compliance, supporting companies on key issues or 
global expansion and in one case sharing ideas about cost optimisation. 
Lastly under ideas and insights in two cases partners talked about training; 
in one case pertaining to updates for an audit committee and in another 
accounting updates for a finance team. 
The evidence from the Phase 2b partner interviews therefore accords with 
that from Phase 2a which concluded that companies had expectations of the 
experience and talent that their perspective auditors could offer and were 
looking to receive the benefits of this as an integral part of their audit. 
6.3.5. Commercial arrangements 
In Phase 2b there were fourteen interviews which identified consideration 
of fees as an influence on auditor selection.   
In this phase fee negotiation was also present in more interviews than 
other influences albeit only five compared to the eight in Phase 2a. The evidence 
suggests that fee negotiation can take place before the final presentation as was 
Chapter Six 
Research Findings Phase 2b 
In-depth Semi-structured Interviews with Bi 4 Firm partners 
June 2010 to September 2012 
 
353 
 
evident in two cases, or after it at the end of the process, as was the case with the 
other three. The nature of the negotiation also varied. In one case the company 
sought to negotiate fees down before the final presentation using other lower 
quotes they had received as a threat that the issue could become critical. In 
another case, where negotiation took place after the presentation, there was a 
more specific discussion about the fee the company expected to pay and a clear 
indication that if that fee were offered the audit would be won. In two cases a 
preferred firm was invited to reduce their fee so as to close the deal. One 
interview identified that the firm had prepared the initial fee quotation with the 
expectation that the company would negotiate.  
Lastly in relation to negotiation, one interview identified that it was the 
willingness of a firm to negotiate which was critical as it signalled a keenness to 
win the audit rather than the overall quantum of the fees per se. 
Four interviews identified that partners felt fees were important and a 
further four discussed the influence of price competition in the market with 
instances of firms quoting much lower fees than had previously been paid. In 
one case an incumbent was retained with a substantially lower fee and a partner 
thought the fee reduction was part of justifying for the company that the tender 
had been a success. In another case however, the incumbent firm’s existing fee 
was considered very low for the company of the size and complexity to that 
conducting the tender and the fees proposed by all the firms did not reduce. 
Although therefore fees were identified as an important influence, in three 
cases interviews identified the audit was won by the firm with the highest fee 
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and in two cases partners felt that fees were not a major influence on selection 
decisions as long as they fell within an acceptable range or ball park. In one 
interview a partner explained how a company director had explained that he 
was looking for a fair fee for a proper job and in another, that a fee quoted by 
one firm was too low to be credible. 
There was also discussion about the detail of the fees being proposed. In 
one case a procurement official sought clarification of details about the fee and 
elements of the service delivery and in two other cases there were also 
clarifications about what was included in the fee.  
In one case fees were confirmed for three years and in another a partner 
felt that the fees quoted initially ought not to cloud the fact that an audit 
appointment could be for many years. 
In relation to fees therefore there was evidence that they could be 
important to the auditor selection decision, but not in all cases. In some 
situations fees were less or not influential because of a focus on service, because 
the differentials between the fees quoted by the firms were not substantial or 
because negotiations prior to or after final presentations took place with the 
firms or at least the preferred firm to ensure that fees were acceptable after a 
preference made on other factors had been identified. 
This concludes the consideration of Phase 2b interviews as they relate to 
the second higher order category service design assessment. The next section 
now considers interview evidence related to capabilities and competences. 
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6.4. Capabilities and competences 
 
The analysis of the Phase 2b partner interviews produced results which 
were consistent with the other phases with Capabilities and competences on 
three levels appearing to influence auditor selection. Attributes of the proposed 
team, the lead partner and the firm were identified by partners as influences. 
The number of sources and references for each subcategory are set out in Table 
25 below. 
Subcategory Sources References 
The proposed team 22 127 
The lead partner 18 90 
The audit firms 15 55 
Table 25: Phase 2b Capabilities and competences sources and references by factor 
There were again some differences in the balance of references both 
between and within these levels as the following sections now discuss further. In 
particular the partners talked far more about the team and the lead partner than 
Figure 24: Phase 2b Capabilities and competences influences on auditor selection 
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about the firm.  The team, lead partner and firm considerations are dealt with in 
descending order of the frequency of source mentions. 
6.4.1. The team 
In comparison with Phase 2a there was less discussion of the individuals 
within the teams other than specialists 
but other areas identified showed a 
relatively high degree of consistency 
with that phase.  
This subsection considers the 
auditor selection decision influences 
identified from the partner interviews in descending order of the frequency of 
discussion in relation to capabilities and competences of the teams. It covers the 
main headings of industry audit experience, team specialists, general strength of 
the team, location and geographical depth and experience of working with 
similar FTSE 350 companies. The matters identified in relation to the structure 
of the team are then also considered here. 
Industry audit experience 
Industry audit experience was again the most discussed element of team 
capabilities and competences. Thirteen interviews discussed this. The quality of 
the clients that team members had worked with and their ability to share the 
experience of what others were doing was considered important. The 
reassurance of credible curriculum vitae was also considered a factor. 
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One partner thought industry experience was especially important where 
there were no existing relationships. Because the team could not fall back on 
relationships, they were able to engage the client by discussing common 
industry issues and demonstrating an understanding of the business through 
their relevant experiences elsewhere. The influence of demonstrating 
understanding has been highlighted within behavioural influences and is 
returned to below. 
In most cases relevant industry experience and expertise was present 
through the personal experience of the working team. In two cases however the 
team was augmented by including industry expertise through deep subject 
matter experts who were identified in the proposal process and accessible to the 
team and the client, although not part of the day to day audit delivery team. 
Team specialists 
The influence of specialists as discussed by companies was considered in 
Section 5.4. In that section, IT specialists were most frequently identified. 
Although the level of discussion was less for partners, this type of specialist was 
again most commonly discussed as an influence on the selection decision; being 
talked about in seven interviews. In every case except one this related to 
expertise which was being offered either within the audit team or as a specialist 
advisor to it. This experience appeared to be especially important where it 
related to a key IT system or platform which the company had in operation. This 
seemed to provide reassurance that the audit would be appropriately tailored 
and that the company would obtain specialist feedback on the effective 
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operation of their systems; especially in relation to accounting and internal 
controls in operation. 
In the only other case the discussion was not about expertise in a relevant 
system because the relevant company had a highly bespoke system. In this case 
the perceived positive influence was the combination of specialist IT and 
controls expertise and relevant experience in the industry concerned. The IT 
specialist’s general experience in the specific industry gave reassurance that 
they would develop an appropriate audit approach even though they could not 
have experience of auditing in the company’s unique IT environment. 
In addition to IT specialists the partners identified a number of other 
specialists who had been considered influential in the decision. There were 
three cases where experts in relevant regulatory matters were identified and two 
others each which referred to industry subject matter experts (also referred to 
above under industry expertise) and tax specialists. Other specialists mentioned 
included accounting reporting, an economist and a real estate valuation expert. 
In two cases partners talked about the positive influence of identifying a panel 
of experts combining a range of the types of experiences referred to in this 
section. 
The discussion of the role of specialists in the team is also consistent with 
the influence of ideas and insight identified under service design and 
assessment above as in most cases it was those ideas and insights that these 
specialists might bring which was perceived to be a positive influence. 
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General strength and experience of the team 
In 11 cases the partners talked about the influence of the team’s strength 
and experience in more general terms. In eight of these cases partners talked 
about how they considered a team being strong, very strong, a great team or a 
really good team. In three cases this extended to partners thinking an ‘A’ team 
or a team that was the firm’s best was an important influence. 
In three interviews the relevant general aspect of the team was its 
extensive experience. Twice partners talked about “been there and done it”. It 
was, for them, not just that people had relevant experience and expertise but 
that it was substantial. 
Location and geographical depth 
The influence of the location and depth of the proposing audit teams was 
also again identified and there were two main issues.  
Firstly where companies had their headquarters in UK regions, there was a 
decision to be made as to whether to locate the service team in that region or in 
London. The competing priorities of accessibility set against the broader FTSE 
350 audit experience available in London was the principal dilemma and the 
positive or negative influence of either choice may well be different for different 
situations. 
Secondly where companies had international operations, the influence was 
about strength and depth in key territories and also the connection between the 
partners who had been identified to work on the audit. 
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FTSE experience 
There was generally less discussion about experience of auditing FTSE 350 
companies, perhaps because the partners interviewed had it and took it for 
granted. Six interviews did however discuss it.  Three partners identified that a 
combination of industry experience and FTSE 350 (or for some companies, not 
necessarily those in the FTSE 100) FTSE 100 experience was important and 
influential. A further partner talked about how a company, even in a highly 
specialist industry, was interested not just in industry issues but how other 
major listed companies outside their industry were dealing with issues related 
to this group such as accounting and governance matters that might be 
discussed by corporate boards and/or audit committees. 
Two other partners also referred to the perceived importance as they saw it 
of experience of working in the audit committees and board rooms of listed 
companies. This was referred to above in relation to the lead partner but 
especially in larger teams it was also identified as influential for other key 
partners. 
Team structure 
For the partners interviewed during Phase 2b of the research the principal 
issue in relation to team structure (with only one exception) was whether the 
relationship was headed by one partner or two. As previously discussed the two 
partner model typically involved a more senior partner responsible for 
managing the overall relationship and a working partner responsible for the 
audit. The role of the two partners were however prone to confusion because 
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companies worried about where final accountability and responsibility rested. 
This appeared to be less of an issue when the senior partner also signed the 
accounts.  
In three cases senior partners who had been proposed as relationship 
partners (where the more junior partner was leading the audit and signing the 
accounts) demonstrated that they were acutely sensitive to the issue and 
understood their responsibility to support the lead audit partner, but also to be 
clear about their responsibilities and their empowerment. In spite of this 
concerns still arose about who was doing what. 
To some extent at least, concerns seemed to arise where the proposed 
structure differed from the company’s past experience. Where they had been 
used to a two partner model and it had either worked or it had not they 
appeared to carry this expectation into the proposal. There were examples of 
both models succeeding but partners felt it was important that the companies 
understood how things worked and could understand and accept them 
especially where they differed from their past experience. 
It was also important for the model to be understood at all the relevant 
levels of the decision making group. In one case a partner felt the team structure 
was well understood by the finance team, but failed because it was not 
understood or accepted by the finance director as the preferable option. 
This section has talked about references made to teams as part of the 
selection decision. It has highlighted industry and segment experience, 
geography and team structure as selection decision influences at the team level. 
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The next section now considers partners comments about the influences arising 
from the second level of influence, namely the lead partner. 
6.4.2. The lead partner 
Overall 18 of the 24 Phase 2b interviews (75%) discussed the lead partner. 
Eleven interviews discussed 
elements pertaining to the 
importance of the lead partner 
including six interviews which 
discussed the importance of the lead 
partner generally and four which talked 
about the seriousness with which lead partner selection was considered, offering 
the company options from a shortlist of partners that it may choose between. In 
three other cases the influence of partner rotation on the whole audit 
relationship was discussed (NB: there was overlap with interviews having 
discussed more than one of these three matters). 
Amongst the specific attributes about lead partners industry expertise was 
most frequently discussed. This was identified in 10 interviews. There were a 
range of issues including the benefit which came from industry experience to 
share what others were doing, or how they had approached certain issues. There 
was also discussion about lead partners’ curriculum vitae which appeared to 
provide more general comfort that the audit partner understood how to 
complete the audit effectively. In a parallel case one lead partner’s recent 
experience with one very large client in a related industry was thought 
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important because it affected the way that partner came across as a highly 
experienced and credible auditor and one who had very relevant recent 
experience of the types of issues that that company thought it might face. In one 
case a partner explained how a finance director was concerned about highly 
technical and regulatory topics which could only really be addressed if the lead 
partner had very specific experience in the relevant industry. 
The lead partners’ experience with FTSE listed companies was also 
frequently discussed. This occurred in nine instances. There was also overlap 
with the previous paragraph because in many cases companies were looking for 
listed company industry experience. Most of the discussion was generally about 
the importance of having this experience. In one case however a partner 
explained how he lost confidence when it became apparent that experience with 
larger listed companies was going to be important to a company which would be 
considering the personal reputation of the lead partner as part of their decision. 
Because he did not possess that experience, he felt that influenced his 
confidence and, as a result, his approach to and performance in the final 
presentation. 
In addition to experience within the relevant industry and with FTSE listed 
companies, in four cases partners referred to the importance of the lead 
partner’s selling skills. In two cases this related to that partners’ previous 
proposals experience and in two cases their experience of presenting in 
proposals in particular. 
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As with the company analyses of phases 1 and 2a partners also talked not 
only about experience but also about the importance of a perceived ability of the 
lead partner to deliver the audit service. 
In three cases partners felt that the competence of the lead partner was 
taken for granted based on the partner’s previous experience, including one case 
where a partner thought a specific relevant competence was not tested at all. 
However in a larger number of other interviews, the perceived importance of a 
lead partner’s competence delivering the audit service effectively was discussed. 
This took a number of different forms.  
In four cases the location of the lead partner was considered important. A 
local partner to ensure accessibility was the influence here. 
In three cases, partners thought it important that the lead partner could 
identify and deliver appropriate specialists to work on the audit. In two other 
cases, partners talked more generally about the importance of the ability of the 
lead partner to mobilise resources. 
In two cases it was considered influential that a lead partner appeared 
potent in the sense that they could make decisions. Similarly in one case this 
was manifest in the importance of the lead partner’s ability to lead their team 
effectively (this area is returned to below within the Behavioural influences 
factor group discussion under “Teamwork”). In another case it was felt 
important that a lead partner was actively taking responsibility for the overall 
audit service.  
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Lastly in relation to delivering the audit, in two cases partners felt there 
had been a concern over whether the lead partner had enough time to deliver 
the audit given their other commitments. 
As in the other phases then the experience of the lead partner and their 
perceived ability to deliver the audit effectively were identified as influences on 
auditor selection. Phase 2b did not identify partners’ personal style as an 
influence. 
The next section now considers the third level of competence and 
capability assessment namely that of the firm. 
6.4.3. The audit firms 
Consistent with the other two phases the influence of comparison of firms 
is the third level of influence capability and competence assessment identified in 
Phase 2b. Fifteen interviews 
discussed this area. The balance of 
discussion between various aspects 
of this factor was however quite 
different for the firm as compared to the 
team and the lead partner. Whilst industry 
expertise of the firms and geographical depth were still present (although much 
less so than in phase 2a) there was no discussion of FTSE 350 expertise at the 
firm level, presumably because it was another area where partners in a Big 4 
firm may have considered it as assumed. 
Chapter Six 
Research Findings Phase 2b 
In-depth Semi-structured Interviews with Bi 4 Firm partners 
June 2010 to September 2012 
 
366 
 
The issue of perceived conflicts and independence was however more 
prevalent than in Phase 2a and was discussed in 12 of the interviews. Before 
considering industry expertise and geographic depth influences on auditor 
selection at the firm level, conflicts and independence are therefore considered 
first. 
Perceived conflicts and independence 
The partners felt that the main issue as it related to perceived conflicts of 
interest and independence was in relation to becoming the auditor and 
managing other non-audit relationships. 
Three partners talked generally about the challenge posed of meeting  
independence requirements where their firm provided non-audit services. Three 
others talked about the challenge of becoming external auditor when already 
providing outsourced internal audit services and in another case the potential 
conflict was with the small, but high profile area, of advising the board on 
remuneration. 
For one partner the issue was one of public perception caused by the 
disclosure in the companies’ annual reports of both audit fees and non-audit 
fees paid to the auditor. Where the non-audit fees were high they attracted 
pressure group attention. 
In one case a firm had declined to bid on the basis that their non-audit 
services were so substantial, although in the same case, another firm had been 
strongly encouraged to (and did) bid even though the audit fee was lower than 
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the non-audit fees they were currently receiving. The company indicated or at 
least implied that a no bid decision may have put future service relations at risk 
anyway. 
Industry expertise of the firms 
Industry experience was identified in Phase 2a and in Phase 1 as a 
frequently commented on factor in auditor selection and the balance of 
comment was substantially in favour of it being a positive influence. In Phase 2b 
however there was far less comment on this topic and it arose in only six 
interviews. In addition there was more balance as to whether industry 
experience at the firm level (as opposed to the team or lead partner) was a 
positive influence. 
Three interviews did identify the benefits of industry experience at a firm 
level. These included the firm supporting the team, the advantages of audit and 
non-audit service providers within a firm collaborating, and the potential 
benefits of market share and of marketing efforts. One partner also talked about 
the negative influence of one of the competitor firms in a proposal not having 
industry experience in depth around the world. Only one less interview however 
discussed the negative influence of auditing competitors in the same industry. 
As referenced previously this is consistent with the literature which argues that 
market concentration is discouraged by competitors in the same industry not 
wanting the same auditor (Kwon, 1996).  
In one case a partner felt industry expertise would be claimed by all of the 
firms and would therefore not be influential. 
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Local strength in depth in key UK and overseas locations 
There was relatively less discussion in the partner interviews about local 
strength in depth and the matter arose in only five interviews. In two of these 
cases, the importance related to strength in depth in specific territories in, one 
other the requirement was for broader capability to respond to an expanding 
company’s needs internationally for the future. 
In one case the discussion was about whether a UK regional office had 
sufficient expertise to support a specific company at the Group level. 
This concludes the discussion of the findings from Phase 2b as they related 
to the influence of capabilities and competences on the auditor selection. Phase 
2b again found capabilities and competences of the competing bidders was 
being assessed at three levels; the team, the lead partner and the firm, and 
across industry, technical and geographical requirements. The next section now 
considers the next identified higher order category namely Behavioural 
influences during the proposal process. 
6.5. Behavioural influences during the proposal process 
The two previous phases had identified behavioural influences affecting 
auditor selection. This had been identified in each of the 23 interviews in Phase 
2a. Phase 2b also identified these behavioural influences. Indeed they were 
discussed in each of the 24 interviews conducted as part of this phase.  
Moreover the frequency of mention within those interviews was also high. 
Phase 2a had identified a much richer discussion in terms of number of 
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Figure 25: Behavioural influences on auditor selection 
references per source than Phase 1 (accepting the previously identified 
limitations of that phase). Phase 2b however appeared even more focussed on 
behavioural influences. As well as being identified in all 24 interviews there 
were 608 references. This was almost twice the next highest referenced factor 
past Relationships and past track record. This is discussed further in Chapter 7. 
Within this 
behavioural group 
the nodes created 
in initial coding 
again fell quite 
naturally into the 
four consolidated 
groups drawn out 
in Phase 2a 
namely:  Testing 
and Proving, 
Caring, Quality of 
Interaction and Quality of Response. 
The frequency of mention of the Quality of the interaction and that of 
Testing and proving ideas was in particular very high relative to the others. 
The next part of this chapter concerns itself with the Phase 2b behavioural 
influence findings. The number of source interviews and references identified 
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through coding and analysis from Phase 2b are set out in Table 26 and 
discussed further below. 
Subcategory Sources References 
Quality of interaction 24 212 
Connection and engagement 24 166 
Teamwork 17 47 
Testing and proving 24 194 
Testing ideas and proving ideas and propositions 24 137 
Proving competence and capability 19 57 
Caring 23 144 
Hunger, energy and commitment 18 67 
Listening and understanding 17 78 
The quality of response 20 58 
Table 26: Phase 2b sources and references for Behavioural influences 
The consideration of four subcategories is conducted in descending order 
in terms of the number of source interviews in which the topics were raised. 
This therefore starts with Quality of interaction. 
6.5.1. Quality of interaction  
The most frequently referenced behavioural influence from Phase 2b 
related to the general quality of the interaction that took place during the 
proposal process. This had two 
dimensions: the interaction between the 
company and the audit teams (which is 
considered below under the heading 
Connection and engagement) and the 
teamwork that the audit teams 
demonstrated.  
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Connection and engagement 
The partner interviews provided a rich picture of the level and nature of 
interaction that took place in the proposals that they were involved in. All of the 
interviews discussed this and there were 166 references to it. The interview 
analysis provided evidence of the influence of personal connection and that of 
the nature of interaction. These are now considered in turn. 
Personal connection 
In total, 19 interviews discussed factors related to personal connection. 
This was manifest in comments concerning the partners’ views on relationship 
development as the purpose of meetings, the warmth or otherwise of meetings, 
the presence or absence of liking, the importance of authenticity and of personal 
chemistry and other related comments.  
In terms of the purpose of meetings, eight partners talked about meetings 
or the importance of meetings during a proposal process as relationship 
building activities or as opportunities to get to know the individuals at the 
company. In some cases some of the proposing team knew those at the 
company, while others did not so the meetings were about building 
relationships across the team with the company. 
One partner expressed it as: 
If we filmed it you would have seen a bunch of people getting to know 
each other, learning about each other…Having a discussion about things that 
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mattered and you know it didn’t need to be [tendering company], it could be 
any business you like in that first meeting” 
Six interviews talked about it being important that people at the tendering 
companies liked individuals on the team. One partner expressed that he thought 
liking was critical: 
“If they didn’t like the lead partner and they didn’t have a mechanism to 
change that lead partner I don’t think you’d get the job” 
Six interviews also talked about whether meetings were warm or not. 
Partners were positive about warm meetings and concerned when they did not 
get this sense of warmth, in particular had the person they met had a warm 
meeting with someone else?  
Where there was liking or warmth, partners felt the discussions became 
more open and partners felt they were able to focus on clarifying areas of the 
proposition more effectively. 
Five interviewees talked about how important they thought it was to be 
authentic and consistent throughout a proposal process. Four of these 
interviews talked about partners “being ourselves” as an important part of the 
proposal interaction with the company and “not trying to be something you 
aren’t”. Two further interviews talked about the importance of displaying 
consistent behaviour during the proposal. 
Three interviews spoke specifically about “chemistry”. Whilst accepting the 
influence of prior relationships, one partner thought it was also important to 
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establish personal chemistry during the process by investing time and making 
an impact. Another partner talked about the importance of establishing 
personal chemistry with people across a company. The third talked of his 
concerns when there appeared to be no chemistry between the lead partner and 
the company’s finance director even though they were of similar backgrounds 
and had common industry knowledge. 
Other interviews talked about “engaging”, “gelling” and “attachment”. 
Evidence of interest in individuals as people was also provided by one interview 
which identified an audit committee chair asking the junior team members 
about their personal backgrounds and interests in the final presentation. 
Dynamics of the proposal interaction 
As well as comments concerning personal connection, there was 
considerable evidence of partners considering the influence of the dynamics of 
interaction during the proposal process. This interaction occurred in the 
meetings that took place within the proposal process and in the final 
presentations. There was also evidence of the influence other meetings taking 
place during the proposal period but outside the proposal process. 
In total 18 interviews talked about the dynamics of the interactions that 
took place during the proposal process in meetings and the final presentation or 
presentations and a further six about interactions outside the process but 
concurrent with it. 
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In terms of meetings the most important theme was the importance that 
partners attached to informality and discussion. Informal discussions were 
talked about positively and arose in a number of different but similar 
discussions. There were four interviews that talked specifically about 
informality and four others which talked positively about meetings as a 
discussion. A further two referred to meetings as a working session. One partner 
described the meetings as “grown-ups having a chat”. For him the meetings 
when effective were informal discussions but about the important issues at 
hand. 
The importance of meetings as discussions could be increased further 
depending on a company’s culture. Where companies tended themselves to be 
informal and resolve issues through discussion, it could become especially 
influential for the firms to take a similar approach. The following quote from 
one partner illustrates this: 
“You know we had all these beautiful cardboard stuff produced [meetings 
support materials], all our pictures in and didn’t even get looked at. They just 
didn’t want that style of process. They wanted to sit down and talk and 
communicate. .. That’s just how they are. .. Get your heads together, talk about 
it, sort it, go and deal with it. I think there’s an element of luck that the [Firm’s] 
team was composed as it was and that just fitted straight in” 
In addition to informality and discussion, partners also commented on 
other specific meetings dynamics. In three of the interviews partners talked 
about where people sat. By avoiding taking positions on opposite sides of the 
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table it was felt that formality was reduced and a more constructive discussion 
resulted. A further three interviews talked about the use of technology as a 
facilitator for collaboration in agreeing ideas and approaches with the 
companies (even when initially it went wrong). In two interviews partners 
talked about the importance for them of achieving a reasonable balance of 
talking between the company and the firm’s team. 
Six interviews touched on contact outside the scheduled proposal 
meetings. Where this occurred it was seen positively, providing further chances 
to interact and also to obtain views of those on the periphery of the proposal 
process. In one case this involved regular but informal discussions with the 
Chief Executive of a company who had not been scheduled to be involved in the 
process. This case involved a re-proposal for the partner of an existing client 
where he had a positive relationship with the Chief Executive concerned (NB: 
there can be potential sensitivity about respecting and complying with 
companies’ prescribed proposal process as previously discussed and this is 
returned to in Section 6.5.4 where the impact of breaking the rules is touched 
upon). 
The contact around the proposal process could arise through providing the 
audit or other services, through other impromptu meetings and, on two 
occasions, just as a result of teams arriving early for scheduled meetings and 
getting involved in discussions before the meetings formally commenced. There 
was only one reference to direct social contact outside any process elements 
between those directly involved in the proposal process and decision makers 
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during a proposal, perhaps suggesting partners thought that this was outside 
the bounds of what was acceptable.  
There  was however one example where a company specifically built an 
element of social interaction into the process to provide an opportunity for the 
senior teams and the firms to get to know each other. In this case a dinner was 
held with each of the competing firms and was formally assessed as part of the 
overall proposal evaluation. 
There was also evidence that partners thought discussion and informality 
in final presentations was also a positive influence on the selection process 
although the actual dynamic in those final presentations appeared to be quite 
varied. Whilst some were open and discursive others were more formal 
involving less interaction. 
Ten interviews discussed the dynamic of interaction in relation to the final 
presentations. Whilst in four cases partners again expressed their desire to 
convert the presentations into a discussion or conversation, in practice there 
was a range of dynamics. In three cases there was open dialogue and discussion 
including one case where the panel actively guided the presentation to the areas 
of interest and away from other areas. However in three other cases partners 
described formal processes with a presentation followed by pre-prepared 
questions. In two of these cases they described the audience as cold or “stand 
offish”. Formality was in each case seen to be a negative influence on their 
perception of the selection decision. In other words partners felt that less formal 
discussion was normally more likely to lead to a successful outcome for them. 
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There were also instances of presentations which fell somewhere in the 
middle in terms of dynamics with firms presenting for part of the session largely 
uninterrupted, followed by open and interactive question and answer sessions. 
In four cases, in otherwise formal proceedings, partners talked in positive 
terms about the role of humour in supporting better interaction. 
The variety in the dynamics of the final presentations was also influenced 
by the behaviour of the panels. In one case a team was told they had ten minutes 
to put their case, in another an Audit Committee Chair appeared to rant about a 
particular issue of concern to him, whilst another Audit Committee Chair was 
observed almost to have fallen asleep in the presentation. 
In spite of the variety of practical dynamics the overall theme from the 
partner interviews in this area was that the nature of the interaction in this final 
presentation was important (as well as the content of the presentation and 
question and answer session which will be returned to below) and that 
conversation and dialogue was a positive influence on the selection process. 
This section has considered the dynamic of the interaction which was seen 
to take place in the proposal process between audit teams proposing the 
company personnel involved in the auditor selection process. The nature of 
interaction between the audit team members was however, again considered 
important and is now discussed under “Teamwork”. 
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Teamwork 
The influence of teamwork on the auditor selection decision was discussed 
in 17 of the interviews, which was a much higher proportion of the total than in 
Phase 2a. The analysis identified two influences within this group which were 
the important role of the lead partner in leading the team and the effective 
interaction between team members. 
There were 14 interviews which highlighted leadership as an influence and 
the underlying comments identified a number of different manifestations of its 
importance. In three interviews, partners talked about the importance of 
leadership generally to the team and in two others similarly about the 
importance of the lead partner to the effective operation of that team. In two 
cases partners talked about the importance of the lead partner empowering the 
team to the extent that that person did not need to be at a number of the 
proposal meetings and local divisional partners were able to be seen leading 
their teams. Conversely where the lead partner was present, in two cases, people 
talked about the importance of meetings being effectively led by the lead 
partner. In three cases partners talked about the need to demonstrate global 
cohesion across the international team and the important roles of the lead 
partner being seen to make that happen. In one further case, a partner talked 
about how all communication with a company during a proposal was controlled 
by the lead partner. 
In terms of teamwork more generally, ten interviews were highlighted and 
in six of these instances partners felt it important that the key people on the 
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team knew each other before the proposal and in five cases that people had 
worked together before. In three other cases it was important that partners got 
to know each other during the proposal and twice that it was important that 
teams spent time together. Three further interviews talked about personal 
chemistry between members of the team and three others about the importance 
of relationships within the team. 
It is therefore clear that in these cases partners thought teamwork to be 
important. There is less evidence to support what they thought the impact was 
on the company. It may have been indirect in the sense that good teamwork 
supported other positive influences, although in three cases partners did talk 
about the importance they saw in coming across as a team. 
6.5.2. Testing and proving 
After discussion of the general quality of interaction which took place 
during a proposal process, the second area of behavioural influence identified 
related to the testing and proving activities which took place during the process. 
This again had two elements: the companies testing the firms’ and their 
propositions (and those firms seeking to prove themselves and their ideas) and 
the firms testing their ideas and attempting to prove their propositions. 
Companies assessing teams and their propositions is considered first. 
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Testing and proving ideas and propositions 
There was considerable discussion in the partner interviews about them 
testing ideas and propositions. Very consistent with the ideas of Service 
Dominant Logic (Vargo and Lusch, 2004) and discussed in Chapter 2 there was 
a high level of discussion about partners testing their ideas, receiving and 
responding to feedback and actively seeking feedback and confirmation of their 
teams and ideas. As returned to below, this commonly included the involvement 
of senior partners of their firm outside the proposal team. This area was 
discussed in all 24 interviews and the reference count was also high at 137. 
In 21 cases partners talked about evolving and developing their service 
propositions and tailoring them to the specific circumstances of the company.  
Within this group four interviews 
discussed the meetings purpose as 
information gathering to enable the firms 
to prepare their proposals and in a further 
12 interviews discussed how the firm’s 
proposition was developed and evolved 
during the proposal process.  
In some cases there was more than one meeting. In these cases the first 
meeting focussed on finding out what the company wanted, perhaps organised 
around themes or topics and suggesting ideas and the second became focussed 
on testing the proposition and refining it.  
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Also within this group of interviews, there was evidence of the firm co-
developing the proposition using prepared charts or technology. The 
discussions covered the overall nature of the audit relationship and not just the 
core audit service (so including the facilitating and supporting services 
discussed in Section 6.3.3 and 6.3.4.). Firms were also testing the structure of 
the proposed team and exploring solutions to problems identified by companies. 
The interviews identified examples of approaches and ideas being confirmed 
and changes where the company felt things may be missing or not quite right.  
In addition to the scheduled proposal meetings 11 partners also talked 
about the feedback they got during the process outside these formal meetings. 
In some cases this was limited because of the culture within the tendering 
company however in others very specific feedback was given. In one case this 
was organised as a formal part of the process although in most cases it was 
based on relationships which pre-existed the proposal.  
The important role of a coach within the company being proposed to was 
also discussed in 11 interviews and within this, the role played by alumni as 
coach was identified in four interviews. This was previously highlighted in 
Section 6.2.3.  
What was fed back also appeared to vary from specific comment on aspects 
of the approach and the firm’s performance during meetings, to more general 
comments about the team’s performance relative to its competition. Most 
commonly however the feedback was in relation to individual members of the 
team. This arose either to confirm that individuals appeared to fit the 
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organisation being tendered for or not. Five interviews identified that there had 
been changes in the proposed teams which resulted from feedback being 
received and acted on by the firm.  
Feedback also appears to have influenced behaviour. For example in three 
interviews the motivating influence of getting positive feedback early in the 
process was identified. 
The firms also sought independent feedback using senior partners outside 
the proposed delivery team to check in on progress and performance and 
whether the individuals in the team appeared to be the best fit for the company. 
This kind of independent checking was mentioned in six of the interviews. 
The interviews including references to proposition development and 
obtaining and responding to feedback (so testing and adapting the proposition) 
substantially outnumbered those which talked merely about explaining and 
communicating the proposition, although 10 interviews did discuss the partners’ 
views that clarity was important in communicating their propositions. A need 
for clarity was identified in the context of meetings (six instances) and 
specifically responding clearly to questions and concerns by explaining aspects 
of the approach (as opposed to responding by adapting as discussed above). 
Clarification normally took place in the meetings during the process although in 
one case a partner talked about this taking place in the final proposal document.  
In four cases partners talked about supporting the clear communication of 
their proposals using examples and stories or relevant examples to demonstrate 
the points they were making. 
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Lastly concerning testing and proving ideas and propositions, seven 
partners talked about the importance of consistent messages, in three cases 
expressing frustration that they did not arrive at the messages they wanted to 
deliver until too late in the process. One partner acknowledged the difficulty in 
delivering consistent messages during a proposal process when the necessary 
collaboration to arrive at the right answer for the company was taking place 
alongside. 
Testing and proving capability and competence 
As well as partners highlighting the importance they attached to testing 
their ideas and propositions, the phase 2b interviews also showed that they 
considered the selection process to involve them proving and being tested 
themselves by the tendering companies. This can be broken down into two 
different themes. Firstly partners’ comments in relation to demonstrating 
competence and capabilities during the proposal process and secondly what 
they said about how the companies that they proposed for tested that 
competence and their final propositions. Each is now considered below. 
Capabilities and competences is of course one of the factor groups  
influencing auditor selection as discussed in Section 6.3 and in earlier phases. 
This section reflects that that is not a static assessment but rather is also 
influenced by behaviour during the proposal process. 
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Firms supporting competence and capabilities 
The partners talked about demonstrating their competence and capability 
in support of auditor selection in 14 interviews. In seven of those interviews the 
discussion concerned showing credentials of individuals and the team in the 
proposal meetings. In three of these cases it was about partners feeling it was 
important for the team to demonstrate relevant industry credentials. In three 
others the focus was on the credentials of specialists including systems, treasury 
and actuarial. In two other cases partners talked about demonstrating the 
credentials of key individuals at the presentation and specifically overseas 
partners who may not have met the company’s head office management and 
audit committee members and who therefore were using the final presentation 
to demonstrate their competence. 
Four interviews discussed the influence partners considered from 
generally communicating the strength of the team in meetings, playing to their 
strengths and showing they could do a good job. 
There was only one case where a partner thought a key part of the proposal 
was communicating the strength of the firm (as opposed to individuals or the 
team) in a particular proposal. In this case the issue was about persuading a 
company of the firm’s credentials in an industry where before the proposal that 
company considered another Big 4 firm to be pre-eminent. 
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Companies testing firms and their propositions 
Consistent with Phase 2a most of the discussion about companies 
assessing competence and testing the teams and their propositions was 
discussed in relation to the final presentation. In total 12 interviews discussed 
companies testing teams and exploring their propositions and in ten of these 
cases partners referred to what went on in the final presentation.  
In each of these 12 cases, partners talked about thorough questioning 
during that presentation.  The questioning tended to be orchestrated and led by 
the Audit Committee Chair; and partners thought the questions were specific to 
their proposal rather than formulaic. The questions asked included those which 
sought elaboration on what was said as well as probing on certain areas related 
to the service proposals including: audit approach to specific areas, approach to 
auditor independence, approach to audit transition and testing their value 
propositions. 
In spite of what were, at least prima facie, question sessions there were two 
examples where partners thought they were just completing the process and 
were not really influencing the decision. The implication being that the decision 
had already been taken at least in most part before the presentation took place. 
Four interviews also talked about partners’ experience and their proposals 
being tested in meetings during the process. From the interviews it is unclear as 
to whether this was because these testing conversations were not taking place or 
because partners recalled the presentations as being more important or just 
because they were more recent and or formal. 
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6.5.3. Caring 
The third type of the behavioural 
influence from Phase 2b, Caring includes 
those comments which demonstrated to 
companies that the firms wanted to win the 
audit and were keen to understand what 
would be really important and respond to 
what they heard. 
Consistent with Phase 2a this is now considered starting with the influence 
of firms demonstrating hunger, energy, enthusiasm and commitment. 
Hunger, enthusiasm, energy and commitment 
The Phase 2b interviews again identified influences relevant to the hunger, 
enthusiasm, energy and commitment demonstrated by the firms. In this phase 
there were four themes: firstly the amount of time and effort that the firms were 
seen to have invested in the proposal process, secondly the energy and 
enthusiasm that was exhibited within the interactions which took place in an 
and around the process, thirdly the role played by the most senior partners of 
the competing firms and lastly the overall objective in this area being seen to be 
making the client feel important. 
The time and effort invested by firms in the process was mentioned in 10 
interviews and in half of these specifically in the context of the time seen to be 
spent by the lead partner. In one case a lead partner was described in relation to 
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one company as “almost living in their offices”. In another case a partner talked 
about the negative influence from his perspective on the selection decision of 
being constrained by the formal process from making sufficient contact. In five 
cases partners also talked about going beyond the proposal process and 
producing additional outputs first and foremost to show the effort that they 
were putting in. This included video material, dedicated websites and 
presentational approaches including professionally produced caricatures. 
Energy and enthusiasm was raised in seven interviews. Partners talked 
about their perceptions of a positive influence of demonstrating energy, 
enthusiasm and in two cases passion to win the work. One partner thought it 
had been important that the team had demonstrated to the company that in 
terms of the audit they “wanted it more”. 
Also in seven cases partners talked about the role of  senior partners within 
their firms who were not part of the proposed day to day service team but who 
were involved through meetings or calls to try to demonstrate the commitment 
of the firm to the proposal process. The impact in practice appears to have been 
mixed. Whilst some partners thought it helpful to supplement their own efforts 
in this way and in one case a critical issue was resolved by the chairman of the 
firm, in another case a partner talked about a firm involving very senior 
partners outside the service team in a number of meetings to the detriment of 
their proposal because the company personnel wanted to meet the people that 
they would be working with going forward. 
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In four cases partners talked about how they felt it was important to make 
the company feel an important client and in one case the most important client. 
This related to both the importance of the client to the proposing team as 
individuals and to the firm as a whole. 
Listening and demonstrating understanding 
Lastly under “Caring” there was also evidence of the influence of the 
demonstration of listening and understanding on the selection decision. There 
were 17 interviews which commented on this. 
Within understanding partners talked most commonly about the 
importance of the company seeing that they understood the business (which 
was mentioned in six interviews) and related to that, five interviews talked 
about the perceived importance of understanding the company. 
The way that business understanding was addressed ranged from partners 
taking prepared materials which set out their understanding of the business, 
and in one case specifically its strategy, to discussion which focussed on issues 
relevant to the business. Partners felt it important to share their perspectives on 
relevant issues as they impacted the company and its market. They also thought 
it important that they could demonstrate that they understood the industry 
context. This of course supports the focus on industry expertise and experience 
highlighted under competency and capability above. In one case it was felt that a 
company was very proud of its business and it was important in that case to 
understand and respect the pride that the management team had in it. 
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There were nine interviews which talked about listening. The focus for the 
partners was however slightly different from those expressed by the companies 
in Phase 2a. Whilst most of the comments made by companies related to valuing 
being listened to, the partners talked about listening in the sense of what it 
enabled them to do. Most of the Phase 2b interviews talked about listening 
being important because it enabled them to understand the company and to 
develop responses which were relevant to it. So whilst for companies listening 
was about being listened to, for the partners it was less the act of listening that 
was important rather it was what else it enabled them to do. 
6.5.4. Quality of response 
The partners recognised the 
importance of completing the tender 
professionally, and for them this was 
demonstrated in the quality of the tender 
document, the presentation and in the 
approach to and performance in the 
meetings which led up to it.  
In 11 cases partners talked about the quality of the documents submitted. 
Their comments were quite general and normally about whether they thought 
the documents that they had submitted were of high quality. Twice, however, 
partners mentioned that they thought they had spent too much time in 
document preparation. Two partners also noted the importance of completing a 
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good document so as not to lose the proposal although they doubted that such a 
good document could ensure that a proposal was won. 
Nine interviews discussed the conduct of the meetings that took place 
during the process. In seven cases the preparation of an appropriate or tailored 
agenda was discussed. In three cases partners talked about how they rehearsed 
for meetings. Two partners talked about the need to appear prepared and in a 
further case a partner talked about professionalising meetings. 
In seven cases partners talked about the general quality of the final 
presentation that they had delivered, although in one of these cases the partner 
had had feedback from the target company that all of the firms had completed 
high quality presentations.  
Four interviews discussed the effect of firms breaking the rules of the 
tender. In one case a partner mentioned that a finance director had told him 
that all of the competing firms had irritated him at some stage during the 
process by not following the rules. Conversely two partners talked about the 
apparent advantage achieved by breaking the rules. In the first case this 
involved additional ad hoc meetings with a company’s chief executive who was 
not supposed to be involved in the process. In the second additional information 
had been provided by the firm in its tender submission beyond the prescribed 
limits set out in the invitation to tender. Although the client appeared irritated, 
the material had addressed an area of potential concern and was therefore 
thought overall to be at least neutral in its influence.  
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The findings here in relation to companies’ attitudes to breaking the rules 
appear consistent with the other phases. A certain degree of rule breaking is 
accepted if it is seen as a signal of the relevant firm’s eagerness and enthusiasm 
to win the appointment. 
Finally partners also talked about how they felt it important to be 
organised and professional generally throughout the proposal process as a 
whole and one partner talked about respecting the company. 
6.6. Final decision making 
The final factor group influencing auditor selection by FTSE 350 
companies and included in the conceptual model as in the previous phases 
relates to the Final 
decision making. In 
Phase 2b there was 
relatively less comment 
about which elements of 
the process were 
considered influential. 
Instead partners talked 
more about how they 
saw what was going on 
(including as has been 
outlined above a lot of 
focus on behavioural 
Figure 26: Phase 2b Final decision making influences on 
auditor selection 
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interaction) rather than about the relative influences of any stage.  
Partners would not have seen the discussion that resulted in the final 
decision and so this is not considered in this phase. There was some more 
limited comments on the various stages and the decision makers. 
Consistent with the buyer side view highlighted in the previous chapters, 
the partners thought that companies had invested time and effort to run a fair 
and proper process. The time invested in the process was evidenced by partners 
talking about processes being extensive (five instances), intense (three 
instances) or rigorous (one instance). However processes were also seen to be 
fair or a level playing field (four instances) and well managed and controlled. 
Partners identified access being controlled (four instances) and of processes 
being professional (two instances). There was also reference to companies 
seeking advice from the firms on how to run the process, having a dedicated 
project manager and, in one case, appointing an external consultant to oversee 
the process for them. 
As noted above, because partners were not included in the final decision 
deliberations, this was not discussed, however views, albeit with lesser 
references, were expressed on the importance of the various elements of the 
decision and those involved. The numbers of sources and references for each of 
these areas is set out in Table 27 and then considered in turn. 
Subcategory Sources References 
The decision elements and their weight 18   49 
Engagement and connection 16 33 
Table 27: Phase 2b sources and references for Final decision making 
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6.6.1. The decision elements and their weight 
Partners talked about the relative 
importance of the meetings (ten instances) 
and presentations (eight instances) that took 
place during the proposal process, and to a 
lesser extent the importance of the 
documents submitted (four instances).  
The meetings were explicitly identified as important (four instances) and 
interestingly the partners saw them as an important part of creating momentum 
(three instances). Partners also thought them important as selection influencers 
would be talking to each other and sharing views (two instances). 
Discussion about whether presentations were important or not took place 
in ten interviews. In eight cases partners thought the presentations were 
important; normally because they thought the proposal decision was close up 
until that point or because certain critical issues were resolved in the final 
presentation meeting. In four cases however partners thought the decision had 
already been made before the final presentation and, in four others, partners 
were unsure as to whether the presentation was important or not because of the 
behaviour of the selection panel (appearing disinterested or overly formal). 
There was variable comment about the importance of the proposal 
document. Across the five interviews which highlighted it, partners felt it was 
important not produce a poor document although they did not feel it was 
otherwise important to the final decision. 
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6.6.2. Decision makers 
The partners made observations about 
who they thought was making the decision 
based on their knowledge of the companies 
and on the way that the selection panel 
behaved during the final presentation and 
question and answer session (16 instances).  
The partners observed the Audit Committee Chairs chairing the meetings 
and in some cases strongly, appearing to be controlling and overseeing the 
process. They also however recognised the strong influence of the Finance 
Director and in, two instances, the Chief Executive who was described as in the 
background but nevertheless influential (in one case being seen as decisive). 
An interesting insight was offered by one partner who felt the person 
managing the process was in a powerful position as they would be receiving and 
interpreting the feedback from the various meetings and could decide what they 
thought was important for the main decision makers to focus on.  
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6.7. Relationships between the factor groups 
Phase 2b again highlighted connections between the main decision 
influence factor groups.  
The influence of past relationships and track record on other 
factors groups 
In Section 6.2.1 it was highlighted that partners used the problems 
companies expressed in relation to their incumbent auditors to help shape their 
own services propositions. Section 6.2.2 also identified the important influence 
of previous service relationships and targeting in providing invaluable 
knowledge and understanding to shape Service design. This section also talked 
about the problems where this was not in place and the assumptions that 
otherwise needed to be made; introducing the risk of making mistakes in service 
design. 
Also in Section 6.2.2 the influence of past service problems on the 
behavioural interactions that took place during a proposal process was 
identified. The past services problems were observed to dominate the 
conversations and reinforce the company’s feeling of dissatisfaction. Conversely, 
(as referenced in Section 6.2.2), past positive relationships in non-audit services 
and targeting made meetings easier; with those with existing relationships 
facilitating the introduction of new members of the team. 
Lastly in concerning past relationships, past service experience had 
created expectations about capabilities and competences. 
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The influence of behaviour during a proposal process on service 
design and capability and competence assessment 
Section 6.5 highlighted the testing and proving activities that partners 
observed during proposal processes. Behaviour during a proposal process was 
seen to include teams testing and proving their ideas and so helping to develop 
their service design proposals. There was evidence of a number of changes being 
made during the process to the plans being developed. 
The proposal process was also seen to include firms putting forward their 
credentials and companies testing the capabilities and competences of the 
teams. Commonly using senior partners “independent” of the proposing teams, 
feedback was received which led to changes in members of the team and 
confirmed the companies’ views about the capabilities and competences being 
presented. 
The influence of Service design, behaviour during the process 
and Capabilities and competences assessment on Final decision 
making 
The three phases have confirmed the same five factor groups affecting the  
selection of auditors by FTSE 350 companies which culminate in Final decision 
making influenced by Service design, capability and competence  and 
behavioural factor groups.  
In addition to the influence of behaviour on Service design and 
Capabilities and competences, it also influences Decision making directly 
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through the more affective influences of personal interaction and demonstrating 
that competing firms care . 
6.8. Summary and conclusion on Phase 2b 
This chapter has set out the findings of Phase 2b of the current research 
which involved 24 in-depth interviews with partners of a Big 4 firm who had 
recently been involved in an auditor selection decision. This analysis was 
conducted in accordance with the approach set out in Section 3.2.4 above and 
although Phase 2b used the same grounded approach as in the other two phases 
it supported the conceptual model which was developed in Phase 2a and is 
reproduced below. 
 
The partners focussed especially on behavioural influences. Service design 
was discussed relatively less. 
Figure 27: The revised conceptual model 
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Relationships and track record 
Phase 2b of the current research supported the presence of influences on 
auditor selection arising from the relationship that companies had with the 
firms and the service track record they had experienced. 
There was a high occurrence of audit proposals taking place against a 
background of services problems with incumbent auditors. In addition 
incumbent auditors faced inherent threats to their position from changes in key 
management. Levels of change within an organisation could also pose a threat 
to the incumbent although in other cases companies’ concerns over the level of 
disruption favoured them. Transition of auditor was identified as a concern but 
the non-incumbent firms developed detailed transition plans to help mitigate 
this concern. 
Firms used their non-audit service relationships and targeting efforts to 
build knowledge of companies and relationships with their people which helped 
them to tailor their proposals more accurately. 
Where those on auditor selection panels had past working relationships 
with an audit firm these could be critical to the selection decision especially if 
the same individuals are involved. 
Alumni were seen to be important as coaches to their former employers. 
Trust was considered important by the partners; past behaviour being seen 
as important to consideration of the future service relationships. 
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There was little evidence of the influence of cross-directorships and 
similarly little discussion concerning references. 
Service design 
Although the level of discussion of service design was low compared to the 
other two phases of the research it was possible again to organise the 
consideration of the discussion in this area using the same model as Phase 2a. 
This included the core audit which was associated with rigour and assurance. 
The facilitating services which were discussed were again working relationship, 
coordination and communication associated with the audit, accounting 
technical matters (especially dealing with accounting issues), the approach to 
the audit of IT systems and controls and how auditors proposed to work with 
internal audit departments.  
Partners thought companies were also again looking for ideas and insights 
from their auditors based on their broader knowledge and experience 
The partners thought fees were an important consideration although the 
lowest fee was not always successful. A particular focus of the partner 
discussions was the negotiation that took place around fees. This could happen 
after receipt of proposal documents but before the presentation or  in or after 
the presentation. 
Capabilities and competences 
Three main levels of capabilities and competence assessment were again 
present namely the team, the lead partner and the firm. 
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For the team partners felt industry and FTSE 350 experience and 
geographical strength in depth were important. The important role of 
specialists; especially IT audit specialists was also highlighted. 
Partners also thought the structure of the team especially the leadership of 
the team important. The key decision was whether to lead the team with a single 
partner or two working together. 
The lead partner’s industry and FTSE experience was also considered an 
influence on auditor selection. In addition to their experience the lead partner’s 
ability to deliver the firm and their personal styles were also discussed. 
For the firm a particular focus for the partners was managing conflicts 
with other services and independence. 
Behavioural influences 
Behavioural influences were by far the most discussed influence arising 
from Phase 2b. 
The partners felt that the quality of interaction that went on in the 
meetings and final presentation was particularly important. This included 
establishing a personal connection or chemistry. It was felt informality and 
discussion were critical. 
There was also testing and proving people and their ideas. Whilst the 
partners were testing their ideas and their teams and adapting and changing in 
response to what they heard, companies were testing the competence of the 
teams; especially in the final presentation. 
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Phase 2b again identified the influence of firms showing companies that 
they wanted the audit and cared about the service to be delivered. This was 
manifest in the enthusiasm, energy and commitment that the firms 
demonstrated and also in their listening and in particular responding to what 
they were told. 
Lastly the partners felt it was important to respond to the tender in a high 
quality and professional way. 
Final decision making 
There was much less reference to the final decision during Phase 2b. This 
was consistent with the fact that the partners would not have seen the final 
decision discussion.  
Partners did however feel that the meetings were important as they 
created momentum for the final decision. They also recognised the dynamic of 
formal audit committee responsibility but the influential role of the finance 
director and on occasion the chief executive. 
Relationships between the factor groups 
Phase 2b again highlighted some interesting connections between the 
main decision influence groups. 
The past track record appeared to influence service design. This was 
especially in responding to service problems. The past service experience at 
other companies or of non-audit services and targeting activity at the company 
concerned seemed to influence assessments of the future working relationship 
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and capabilities. In addition past behaviour was seen as an indication of likely 
future behaviour. 
Behavioural influences affected service design. Firms evolved their 
propositions by testing their ideas and listening and responding to what was 
told to them. Companies tested capabilities and competences especially in the 
final presentation. 
That concludes consideration of findings in Phase 2b which was the third 
and final stage of the analysis. The next chapter now discusses the findings 
across all three phases. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
7.0. Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the findings and the contribution 
to knowledge made by this thesis. 
This discussion is structured around a conceptual model which evolved in 
the three phases of the research following the approach explained in Chapter 3 
to respond to the principle research question which is: 
What are the factors affecting the auditor selection decisions of 
FTSE 350 companies in competitive tenders? 
Auditor selection is an 
important decision given the 
critical role of audit in supporting 
the effective operation of financial 
markets and yet there is little 
previous literature on this topic. 
The most relevant UK literature 
in relation to auditor selection 
(Beattie and Fearnley 1995; 
1998a; 1998b) predates much of the change that has occurred in the regulatory 
and competitive landscape in the FTSE 350 statutory audit market leaving a 
research gap in this important area. 
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7.1. The conceptual model 
The current research has explored how FTSE 350 companies have been 
making auditor selection decisions using an exploratory social constructionist 
research approach and based on interviews and interview records covering three 
research phases. These cover a period in excess of ten years of audit tendering, 
and include both buyer and seller perspectives. A conceptual model of auditor 
selection has been proposed. This conceptual model was introduced in    
Chapter 5 following the analysis of semi-structured in-depth interviews with 
those who had recently been involved in a tender on the buyer side. It was also 
supported by independent analysis following interviews adopting the same 
approach on the sales side and set out in Chapter 6. For convenience the model 
is set out again below and is discussed in the sections that follow. 
In Section 7.1.1 the five selection factor groups, which are central to 
the conceptual model, are considered within the context of existing 
research and indications concerning interrelationships between them (as 
identified by the numbers above). Then, Section 7.1.2, looks at each of the 
factors within the factor groups in more detail, including for each, their 
inter-relationships. A summary of the overall contributions of this 
research within the context of the literature is then set out in Section 7.2. 
The Discussion continues with consideration of the implications of 
this research for theory and practice and concludes by highlighting the 
limitations of this research and opportunities for future research. 
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7.1.1. The five factor groups in the context of existing research 
The current research has identified that  FTSE 350 companies within the 
context of the auditing, regulatory and market background and subject to 
independent contextual and individual / company background and individual 
circumstances (outside the scope of the research) have been selecting their 
auditors in competitive tenders as set out in the conceptual model in Figure 28. 
 
The research discovered five important influences on auditor selection 
(factor groups): Relationship and past track record (at the start of the proposal 
process), Service design, Capabilities and competences, Behavioural influences 
during the proposal) and (the dynamics of) Final decision making. The 
conceptual model sets out these decision influences and also illustrates a 
Figure 28: The revised conceptual model 
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number of relationships between each one and which also emerged from the 
research. 
The same five factor groups were present in each of the three phases and 
with one exception (Final decision making in Phase2b as discussed further 
below) were all present in over 90% of the interviews and interview records; 
providing consistent evidence of their influence on the auditor selection 
decision taken by FTSE 350 companies across the 111 interviews and interview 
records included in the research. Each is now discussed in turn; firstly at an 
overall factor group level (Section 7.1.1) and subsequently considering the 
individual underlying factors (Section 7.1.2). 
Relationships and past track record 
This first factor group identified by the research relates to the influences of 
pre-existing relationships and past record on the auditor selection decision. This 
factor group was found to include the influence of those relationships between 
the selecting company and the competing firms which have arisen as a result of 
track records of service at the selecting company. These influences arise either 
through auditor incumbency or through firms providing non-audit services or 
investing in marketing and business development activity (“targeting”). This 
factor group also includes influences which have arisen as a result of service 
relationships at other companies; either in the past or current where cross-
directorships are present. The factor group also includes the influence of alumni 
relationships, which are especially prevalent in the FTSE 350 audit market, and 
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other network influences (for example word of mouth) as explained in      
Section 1.4.1.  
The importance of relationships in purchasing and selling has of course 
been extensively studied and emphasized (for example Berry, 1983; Sheth and 
Parvityar, 1995). The influence of relationships in managing uncertainty caused 
by intangibility and complexity in management consultancy supplier selection 
has also been identified (for example Pemer and Werr, 2014). Perhaps 
surprisingly, given the nature of the auditor’s responsibilities set out in   
Chapter 1 and the typically long periods of tenure which have in the past 
pertained, the influence of relationships on auditor selection is under 
researched in the literature as set out in Section 2.5 and a greater focus has been 
applied to other factors especially professional service competence and to a 
lesser extent behaviour. 
One exception to this is in the area of auditor switching where past service 
has been identified as an antecedent for change (see for example Beattie and 
Fearnley, 1998a). Ironically given the recent regulatory changes highlighted in 
Chapter 1 and in Section 7.4.2 below (initially recommending and then 
requiring audit tenders as a means of improving audit quality), this previous 
research was concerned about threats to auditor independence which might be 
caused by greater levels of tendering and switching (Beattie and Fearnley, 
1998a; Craswell, 1988). Comparison of the research findings with the auditor 
switching studies is returned to below in connection with Service design and 
again in Section 7.1.2. 
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The current research has identified important relational impact on auditor 
selection both directly and, as further explained in Section 7.1.2 through its 
influence on other selection factors. It therefore extends the study of the impact 
of relationships on supplier selection into the professional services and auditing 
situation.  
The focus of relationship management literature (see for example Kalwani 
and Narayandas, 1996; Ryals and Rogers 2007) has tended to be on managing 
direct relationships between supplier and customer; including for economic 
advantage, but also considering matters such as trust  (for example Doney and 
Cannon, 1997) and loyalty (for example Kuenzel and Krolikowska, 2008). Other 
research has looked at other influences such as alumni (Iyer, 1998; Iyer et al., 
2000; Dhaliwal et al., 2014), and cross directorships (or interlocking 
directorates: Davison et al., 1984). Other researchers have considered word of 
mouth influences on supplier selection (for example Berry and Parasuramen, 
1991) and specifically in professional services (Reingen and Kernan, 1986). 
These studies have looked at different aspects of relationships but have not 
looked across all of the relationships which might impact decisions. In the 
highly networked environment surrounding those making FTSE 350 auditor 
selection decisions  the current research has enabled an holistic overview on all 
of these relationships and identified their influences in one decision context; 
namely auditor selection. 
More detailed discussion of the individual constructs underlying the 
Relationships and track record factor is set out in Section 7.1.2. 
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Service design 
The second factor group influencing auditor selection is Service design. 
Even though the underlying audit is defined by law and regulation, the current 
research has identified that companies have still found it possible to 
differentiate between firms based on the core audit (normally associated with 
language such as rigour and assurance), and the facilitating services including 
audit coordination and communication, approach to accounting and technical 
matters, working with internal audit and approach to auditing IT systems and 
controls. Companies are also looking for insights and ideas from audit firms’ 
broader experience.  
These are interesting findings suggesting that customers may perceive 
perhaps surprisingly important differences between suppliers’ approaches even 
in a highly regulated and therefore supposedly undifferentiated industry. 
Generally, Service design in the context of auditor selection is under 
researched. There are studies considering audit quality more generally as an 
influence on auditor choice but these tend to be concerned with issues 
pertaining to auditor competence and especially the difference between the 
major firms and other firms (see for example DeAngelo,1981; Francis and 
Wilson, 1988), rather than the facilitating and supporting services identified in 
the current research.  
Auditor switching research mentioned above provides some inferences as 
to service design by identifying where service breaks down preceding a switch, 
highlighting service problems as a reason to change auditor (for example Beattie 
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and Fearnley, 1998b) and also issues associated with audit fees (Beattie and 
Fearnley 1995; Addams and Davis 1994; Hermanson, 1994). Research has also 
previously identified individual elements which have been considered during 
auditor selection processes. These have included, for example, guidance on 
accounting principles and quality of advice to management (Beattie and 
Fearnley, 1995; 1998a) along with the quality of working relationships (Beattie 
and Fearnley, 1995; 1998a; Eichenseher and Shields, 1983).  Research has not 
however, previously considered the elements of the underlying audit service 
design which may be important to the auditor selection process 
comprehensively.  
The current study has disaggregated what lies within the Service design 
influence. The use of the augmented service model (Gronroos, 2007) has also 
provided categorisation between the core service and especially helped to clarify 
the facilitating services and supporting services.  
The current research confirms that companies are not using models such 
as those associated with the traditional procurement models summarised by 
Huang et al. (2007) and Ho et al. (2010) and focussed on defined factors such as 
quality, performance and price. They are instead evolving their audit service as 
part of the proposal process consistent with the services supplier research (for 
example Ellram, 1990). This also provides support for the extension of Service 
Dominant Logic (Vargo and Lusch, 2004) in the context of auditor selection as 
it identifies Service design as an evolving process throughout the proposal 
process. As will be returned to below in this section under Behavioural 
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influences there is evidence of firms testing their ideas and companies testing 
firms’ ideas and propositions before submission of final documents. 
As with the Relationships and past track record factor group, the detailed 
factors underlying the core, facilitating and supporting services are set out in 
Section 7.1.2. 
Capabilities and competences 
Of the five factor groups influencing auditor selection, the Capabilities and 
competences group has been most widely discussed in the prior auditor 
selection research. This is perhaps not surprising given the high degree of 
expertise of professional services firms (as summarised by Ojasolo, 2007 and set 
out in Table 11) and their credence qualities, giving rise to performance 
ambiguity as defined by Bowen and Jones (1996).  
Within the auditor selection context, there have been two ways of looking 
at capability and competence. The first has involved considering features of the 
selecting organisation which might drive a company to appoint a particular type 
of firm (as described for example in Chapter 2, in relation to companies with 
higher agency influences and outside/non-executive directors seeking to 
appoint major firms (Beattie and Fearnley, 1995; Francis and Wilson, 1988)). 
These have been connected with issues around information asymmetry and 
institutional and non-executive (or “outside”) director influences concerning 
sending signals to the market or protecting personal reputation (for example 
Bar-Yoesef and Livnat, 1984; Blouin, et al., 2007 and Firth and Smith, 1992). 
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The second approach has involved consideration of attributes of the firms 
and these have included assessments of aspects of the firm as a whole, of the 
team and at the lead partner level (Almer, 2014; Beattie and Fearnley, 1995; 
Hermanson et al., 1994; Sands and McPhail, 2003). Across the three levels the 
previous research suggests assessments being made of industry and technical 
expertise and to a lesser extent geographical influences such as international 
reach and accessibility (Addams and Davis, 1994; Almer, 2014; Beattie and 
Fearnley, 1995; Sands and McPhail, 2003). 
The current research lends support to previous approaches also identifying 
different levels of assessment within auditor selection and extends the previous 
research to explain the factors underlying each level. This research also extends 
previous research by identifying that companies are not only focussed on the 
presence of Capabilities and competences, but also on their confidence of 
whether and how they will be delivered, which has generally not explicitly been 
a focus for previous research (see for example Baldacchino and Cardona, 2011). 
These kinds of influences bring in issues of conflicts for firms and teams (which 
would preclude apparently ably qualified bidders) and of style and potency for 
the lead partner (companies wanting assurance that they can deliver the 
resources of their firm). 
As with Service design (above) the current research provides indications 
that the assessment of Capabilities and competences presented by the teams 
evolves during the proposal process as teams are changed in response to 
feedback provided and perceptions are altered. This finding extends previous 
research such as Beattie and Fearnley, 1995; 1998a; 1998b, Eichenseher and 
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Shields, 1983 and Sands and McPhail, 2003 who consider assessments at a 
single point in time. 
The Capabilities and competences factor group will be returned to in more 
detail in Section 7.1.2. 
Behavioural influences during the proposal process 
The current study has identified a wide range of behavioural influences on 
auditor selection which appear to go well beyond compliance with the tender 
process and the submission of high quality proposals and presentations. 
Companies are being influenced by the behaviour of the teams in 
proposals (and teams appear very aware of it). This includes the quality of 
interaction that takes place, the demonstration that the firms actually want the 
work and care about delivering the service that is being sought, and the results 
of activities used by companies to test and prove the people and their 
propositions and as well as firms testing and refining their ideas. This current 
research therefore supports past research by Beattie and Fearnley (1998b) who 
commented that economic theory is deficient in relation to auditor selection and 
that there is a need to incorporate behavioural factors into theoretical 
explanations of the choice process. The emergence of this factor group provides 
further support for previous research finding that personal client auditor 
relationships can be important (Eichenseher and Sheilds, 1983; Beattie and 
Fearnely, 1998b). Beattie and Fearnley (1998b) found that in selecting a new 
auditor the relationship with the proposing team and “chemistry” were 
important and, as noted in Chapter 2, called for in-depth interviews to provide 
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additional insight into the auditor selection process (Beattie and Fearnley, 
1998b). This current research has undertaken that approach and provides 
additional insights as to the nature of behaviour taking place in these personal 
interactions. 
The current study therefore identified a rich set of data providing new 
insights into the influence of behaviour directly on the auditor selection decision 
and, as will be returned to below, through its influence on other factors. The 
study therefore provides a constructive extension to pre-existing research in this 
area. 
This area will again be returned to and considered in more depth in 
Section 7.1.2. 
Final decision making 
Lastly, the current research reveals that outcomes of audit tenders are 
being influenced by the dynamics of Final decision making. This includes the 
weight that is assigned to different stages of the process, the final decision 
discussion and the people involved. 
Although the current research identified companies investing time to try to 
make processes fair and comprehensive they (also as noted above) were not 
conducting statistical or other mathematical modelling or seeking to develop 
algorithms, as the traditional supplier selection literature (explored in Section 
2.1) surrounding the purchase of goods might suggest. Although many used 
checklists and obtained structured feedback this was in most cases used to 
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support decision making rather than drive it. This suggests that the checklists 
and feedback obtained were only part of an assessment and that other factors, 
including intuitive assessments may also be present. This would be consistent 
with Kahneman (2011) which suggests intuitive decision making where 
decisions are more complex than can be processed cognitively. 
The current research also provides support to Kahneman et al.’s (2007) 
identification of a tendency for decision makers to give undue weight to more 
recent problems or phenomena which they refer to as the bias of “recency”  
(Kahneman et al., 2007). In the current research the focus of comment in 
relation to the final presentations is a potential indication of bias of recency 
since, in what is typically a comprehensive process, it seems unlikely that the 
final presentation would add materially to judgements of the auditor’s 
competence or other objective criteria. 
The concept of “satisficing” (Simon, 1997) is interesting in the context of 
an auditor selection decision. As explained in Chapter 1 and considered in the 
discussion of the auditor selection literature in Section 2.5, those making 
auditor selection decisions are typically faced with (at least) four credible 
bidders (“The Big 4”) who could prima facie conduct their audit to a satisfactory 
level. This research however confirms that they nonetheless invest in 
comprehensive processes to identify a preferred auditor. One possible 
interpretation of this is that satisficing is operating at a shortlisting level but 
that final decision making is more complex involving each of the influences 
identified in the conceptual model – including relationship and 
behavioural/experiential influences not always consistent with rationality. 
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The current study extends research into the auditor selection process by 
recognising the influence of the Final decision making process and dynamics 
which had not been previously explored in the context of auditor selection. 
Indications of relationships between the five factor groups 
Although the objective of the research was to identify what were the 
influences on auditor selection decisions by FTSE 350 companies, a number of 
interesting inter-relationships between the five key influences also started to 
emerge from the research and these are reflected in the conceptual model. 
These inter-relationships are identified by the numeric labels on the model 
and are of three types:  
1. The influence of Relationships and past track record arising from 
experience prior to the proposal process.  
a. Past experience was identified as having created expectations of 
Service design. Companies were identified as focussing on recent 
problems and past experiences of good service in helping them to 
ascertain what they wanted in their future service. In the absence of 
perfect information, companies were focussing on only certain 
aspects of service design which occurred to them as mattering most. 
Recent experience was also helping them to frame the decision 
consistent with. Kahneman and Tversky, (1979).  
b. Past behaviour was identified as being interpreted as an indication of 
likely future behaviour. 
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c.  Where Capability and competence had been demonstrated in the 
past this was seen as evidence that these capabilities and 
competences would be demonstrated in the future. 
2. The influence of behaviour during the proposal process  
a. Service design is evolved throughout the proposal process as firms 
test their ideas and listen and respond to what they hear consistent 
with the nature of services procurement identified by Ellram et al., 
(2008) and van der Valk and Wynstra, (2014).  
b. Companies are also testing firms and their people throughout the 
proposal process. Their assessment of Capabilities and competences 
is a dynamic one which evolves during the proposal process including 
the final presentation. 
3. The influence of Service design (3a), behaviour during a proposal 
process (3b) and Capability and competence assessment (3c) on Final 
decision making. Again this is consistent with the services supplier 
selection literature referenced above. 
 The inter-relationships between the five factor groups are considered as 
part of the discussion of their detailed definitions which now follow. 
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7.1.2. Detailed definitions of the five factor groups 
Relationships and past track record 
The relationships and past track record 
factor group  has assembled all the  factors 
affecting auditor selection which arise from  
the relationships and service history 
pertaining at the start of the proposals 
process.  The exploratory grounded approach 
to the research identified relationship and track record influence going beyond 
the individual company and current auditor. There were also influences from 
the company’s relationships with other firms and past and current service 
relationships at other organisations and of influences related to the selectors’ 
prior employment with the firms (alumni relationships). 
The factors identified related to: 
1. The relationship and service history which a company had with its 
incumbent auditor including the influence of service quality (or more 
normally problems) and the feelings and opinions companies had about 
incumbency versus a new auditor or fresh approach. 
2. The non-audit service track record between the company and the non-
incumbent firms either through other service relationships (such as tax 
and consultancy) or marketing activity (targeting as previously defined). 
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3. The past service track record that individuals in the selection committee 
had experienced with the firms or individuals within the firms in their 
previous employments or current cross directorships. 
4. As (as identified in Chapter 1) a high proportion of those involved in 
auditor selection are alumni of the Big 4 firms, the influence of that past 
employment. 
The benefits of collaboration and co-development were identified in the 
traditional supplier selection literature review in Section 2.1.1 and included 
more synergistic and longer term benefits. Although a number of these benefits 
were goods related, more general benefits such as building supplier confidence 
levels (Johnston et al., 2004) better use of customer knowledge (Paulin et al., 
2000), and operational factors (for example non-retrievable investments, 
shared technology and relationship influences such as trust and commitment 
(Wilson, 1995) were also identified.  
The value of long term relationships (Sheth and Parvityar, 1995) and the 
different nature of exchange in an ongoing relationship (MacNeil, 1978) were 
highlighted in Chapter 2, along with their positive impact on sales performance 
and market share (Crosby et al., 1990; Morgan and Hunt, 1994).  
The current research however identified that, in the particular 
circumstances of an audit proposal, a number of factors play against such 
potentially positive influences and help to explain the high levels of switching 
involved with audit proposals identified in Section 1.4.2. 
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For example the current research identified that audit proposals 
commonly take place against a backdrop of service problems with the 
incumbent auditor. This was especially prevalent in Phase 1 and especially 
related to problems in resolving accounting problems but also prevalent in 
Phase 2. These current research findings are consistent with and support some 
of the findings of Beattie and Fearnley (1998a) which found that, in many cases, 
the proposal had been initiated as a result of service problems. 
The current research however also identified other factors which favoured 
change. The research identified that an incumbent auditor faces a number of 
inherent challenges. All three phases of the research identified an inherent 
attractiveness of new ideas and approaches which could occur even where the 
incumbent had a positive track record. Where an incumbent responded with 
proposals for improved services or just new ideas they faced the “Why now?” 
challenge.  This is new a new insight in auditor selection research having not 
been explicitly researched before. 
And in Phase 2 in particular, in an increasingly regulated and high profile 
environment, change appeared more attractive even absent service issues. This 
updates and extends the research of Beattie and Fearnley (1998a). 
The current research also identified that the initiation of the proposal is set 
against a number of other relationships which a company has with non-
incumbent audit firms. These relationships arise from a number of sources 
including; targeting and non-audit services provided by non-audit incumbent 
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firms, past service relationships and current cross directorships at other 
companies, and alumni connections. 
These relationships were discussed in a high proportion of the interviews 
as set out in Figure 29.
 
 
The multi service nature of the Big 4 firms facilitated relationship building 
through the provision of non-audit services and targeting of the audit. And new 
people often brought pre-existing relationships with firms and individuals 
which could exert a critical influence on their decision making. Indeed these 
relationships may have triggered the proposal in the first place.  So relationship 
influences were not restricted to the incumbent auditor.  These broader 
relationship influences are interesting and extend that previous relationship 
literature which has focussed on the buyer-seller relationship,  for example 
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Figure 29: The proportion of interviews and interview records which 
referenced relationship and past track record influences on auditor selection 
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relationship marketing approaches (e.g. Sheth and Pattayar, 1995) and key 
account management approaches (e.g. Ryals and Rogers, 2007). 
Interestingly the current research identified (within those influences 
related to relationships at other companies shown in Table 29) more evidence of 
the influence of past service relationships at the relevant company and past 
experience of directors working with firms at their previous employments. 
There was little discussion of current cross directorships as an influence which 
challenges the findings of Davison et al. (1984) who identified a high correlation 
between companies with common directors and their appointed auditor. It is 
not clear why the current research contrasts with this previous study but it 
might be evidence of directors in such situations compartmentalising their 
relationships; treating appointments at different companies separately and 
distinctly. 
The influence of alumni in auditor appointment had previously been 
identified and in most cases has been identified or implied as positive for their 
previous employer (Lennox and Park, 2007; Iyer, 1998; Kotler and Bloom, 
1984). The current research extends our understanding of alumni influences in 
auditor selection and suggests that the influence of alumni although mostly 
positive can be variable, and that that any such influence is more often likely to 
be a “coaching” influence, helping their old firm to get to the right service 
proposition and feeding back on their performance in the proposal process 
more generally. 
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In relation to more general relationship influences the literature suggested 
an important role of trust in relationship development and in increasing 
cooperation and reducing uncertainty (Morgan and Hunt, 1994; Selnes, 1998). 
The important and trusted role of the auditor was explained in Chapter 1. The 
current research provided conflicting evidence. Whilst in Phase 1 there was very 
little reference to trust, in Phase 2a it was seen both as an important element to 
support a company’s decision to switch and as a desired part of the future 
service relationship. 
The current research however did not generally support the influence of 
auditor/auditee loyalty in auditor selection. Previous research had identified 
bonds in professional services (Kuenzel and Krolikowska, 2008), but there was 
little discussion of it in any other three phases and indeed some evidence that it 
had been deliberately discounted. The presence of problems on the service track 
record as mentioned above may have influenced this although evidence of 
sustaining relationships from past track records at other companies may 
indicate loyalties to other firms based on experience in other companies. In the 
highly networked situation of the FTSE 350 the current research identified 
examples of personal loyalties as a result of past service relationships which in 
some cases appeared more influential than the loyalty to any particular firm. 
Lastly, the current research challenges the influence of word of mouth 
influences in FTSE 350 auditor selection. Word of mouth had been identified as 
having a important influence on purchase decisions (Arndt, 1967: Herr et al., 
1991; Richens, 1993) and especially in professional services (Reingen and 
Kernan, 1996) but the current research identified very little discussion of word 
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of mouth influences and moreover across all three phases, little mention of 
references. Indeed where references were discussed they tended to be post 
decision confirmation. This lack of mention of references is perhaps also 
surprising given the important role which referrals have been seen to play in 
more general customer relationship management (Stahl et al., 2003) both in 
generating new sales and through the positive effects these can create when 
associated with respected brands. In formal processes with so few suppliers it 
appears that referrals played little or no role. It is also worthy of note that each 
of the Big 4 has an established reputation and its audit clients are publicly 
available. This latter fact means that the positive reputational effect of serving 
reputable companies can be achieved without direct contact with them. 
Service design 
The Service design factor group brings together those factors identified in 
the research which related to the influences on auditor selection arising from 
the firms propositions related to how the audit service would be designed and 
delivered. The research suggested that the audit service design could be 
differentiated.  
The individual factors 
underlying Service design have been 
organised following an augmented 
service model based on the work of 
Gronroos (2007) and including three 
factors:  
Chapter Seven 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 
425 
 
1. The core audit – this factor is based on the underlying technical quality 
of the audit.  Following the work of De’Angelo (1981) this would relate 
to the likelihood of auditors identifying and reporting material errors in 
the financial results of a company. Companies might therefore be 
looking for an underlying core audit which is robust and rigorous; 
thereby providing them with assurance that their results are materially 
correct. 
2. The facilitating services which are integral to delivering the core 
service. The current research identified five of these facilitating 
services: organisation of the working relationship, accounting technical 
issue resolution, communications and communication, reliance on the 
company’s IT and systems and working with internal auditor. All were 
present in all three phases of the research except the organisation of 
the working relationship which was absent from Phase 1. The reasons 
for this are not known. 
3. Supporting services which come out of the delivery of the service. This 
was found to relate to insights which audit forms offered to provide 
from benchmarking companies’ practices and offering other ideas from 
similar companies. Importantly this was a by-product of the audit and 
did not relate to the provision of other non-audit services. 
As outlined in Section 7.1.1 (Page 410) companies were not using the sorts 
of models which the traditional supplier selection literature might expect. 
Instead they were evolving their service requirements as predicted by the 
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service selection literature and Service Dominant Logic. In Section 2.5 the 
limitations of that auditor selection literature which had used questionnaires to 
ask companies what would be important to them in auditor selection. The 
current research challenges such approaches as it is unlikely in an evolving 
process that companies would be fully aware of what might influence them until 
they had actually experienced such a process. 
In relation to the individual factors identified, the current research 
validates previous research by Beattie and Fearnley (1995) and Sands and 
McPhail (2003) which highlighted the working relationship with the lead 
partner and the team and aspects of the service (courteousness) as important 
influences on auditor selection. Additional perspectives were however also 
highlighted around the importance of sensitivity and fit with a company’s 
culture and, notwithstanding the regulatory environment, a desire to work in 
partnership including mutual respect. The current research also validated the 
work of these two researchers who had also identified aspects of communication 
and dealing with accounting issues. to be important influences (Beattie and 
Fearnely, 1995; Sands and McPhail, 2003).  
In relation to facilitating services the current research added additional 
insights in relation to the influences that reliance on the company’s accounting 
systems and controls and about the organisation of work with internal audit 
which had not specifically previously been identified as influences on auditor 
selection. Because many of the previous studies had examined drivers of auditor 
change, there was less focus on aspects of service which could be valued but, had 
not been areas of service problem or failure. 
Chapter Seven 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 
427 
 
In Section 2.5 above a preference for Big 4 firms was identified where 
agency costs were high and this was associated with a desire for greater audit 
quality. In some cases (Abbot and Parker, 2000; Beasley and Petroni, 2001) this 
desire for audit quality was linked to the appointment of firms specialising in 
the relevant industry. The current research however identified that audit quality 
is not the only driver for a desire for industry specialists. Companies identified 
that they expected their auditors to share best practice from other companies in 
their industry (and more widely) as part of their audit service. The importance 
of knowledge, experience and expertise sharing in the context of management 
consulting has been highlighted (for example by Lowendahl et al., 2001; 
Sonmez and Moorehouse, 2010). This research supports that desire for access to 
knowledge, experience and expertise in the highly regulated audit environment. 
Where non-audit services are restricted, companies are still looking to benefit 
from relevant knowledge, experience and expertise but as a free by-product of 
the audit service.  
Previous research which suggested that the availability of non-audit 
services from the auditor was an influence (Beattie and Fearnley, 1998a) has 
been overtaken by regulatory change. Rather than this being a positive influence 
there is at least some evidence from the current research that the desire for 
companies to work with key specialists may lead them not to appoint the 
relevant firm as auditor. 
Lastly in relation to Service design, the current research validates Beattie 
and Fearnley’s (1995) research that fees are not critical to auditor selection in 
most cases as long as they fall within and acceptable range (also more recently 
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Almer, 2014) This challenges other research (for example Sands and McPhail, 
2003) which had asserted the importance of fees to auditor selection. Some of 
this may be explained by smaller companies having demonstrated a greater 
sensitivity to fees (Addams and Davis, 1994). The current research identified 
that although audit fees may still be important they are not influential to 
auditor selection either because their quantum is low compared to other 
expenditure of the company, or that the quoted fees are very close, or because 
fees are considered to be something which is negotiated after the preferred 
bidder has been identified based on the assessment of other criteria. 
Capabilities and competences 
 The conceptual model identifies three  levels of assessment with the 
capabilities and competences factor group which were present in each of the 
phases. These levels of assessment 
included both considerations of the 
underlying capability and 
competence being assessed but also 
considerations of how these 
capabilities and competences may be 
accessed by the tendering companies. The three levels of assessment were: 
1. The firm – including general comparison between the Big 4 and  of that 
group compared to the next or Mid tier firms, the industry expertise of 
the firm and geographic spread but also addressing issues such as 
conflicts or perceived conflicts with other clients (normally competitors 
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of the tendering company) and with other non-audit services given 
independence requirement faced by auditors as explained in Chapter 1. 
2.  The team – including assessment of individual members of the team 
(excluding the lead partner) and their experience and also references 
made to the assessment of the teams as a whole. This included industry 
experience, issues related to geographical location and the structure of 
the team; especially the organisation and responsibilities relating to its 
leadership. 
3. The lead partner – including assessment of their experience but also 
their style and the companies’ perceptions of how effective they would 
be in delivering the resources of the firm and leading their teams. 
 Because many of the studies into auditor selection have been conducted 
using a questionnaire approach and in many cases with predefined selection 
criteria, with some exceptions (Beattie and Fearnley, 1998a; Sands and McPhail, 
2003) they have tended to neglect this multilevel assessment. The current study 
validates recent research (Almer et al., 2004) that suggests the operation of 
these three levels of assessment in the auditor selection context. 
The presence of three levels is important to understanding Capabilities 
and competences because assessment appears to being undertaken at all three 
the different levels. And whilst some influences are present across all three 
levels others are specific to one or two. 
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The current research validates the influence of industry expertise on 
auditor selection as identified by a number of previous studies (for example 
Addams and Davis, 1994; Eichenseher and Shields, 1983; Heramnson et al., 
1994) at all three levels. Industry experience was seen both as a positive 
influence when present and as a concern when absent. It also validates previous 
research identifying the need for technical competence (Beattie and Fearnley, 
1998b; Sands and McPhail, 2003) 
The findings in relation to geographical decision influences present a more 
mixed picture. The presence of geography as an influence is supported by the 
current research findings that show international coverage and strength in key 
locations both at a firm and team level being influences on auditor selection. 
There is also evidence to support the fact that consideration of strength in depth 
(including especially experience of working with FTSE 350 companies) can be 
important for UK regional offices where companies are headquartered or have 
substantial operations outside London.  
The current research provided a mixed picture of the influence of 
geographical location on auditor selection. It therefore extends previous 
research by providing insights into the circumstances under which when 
geographical factors may be influential to selection and when not. So, 
companies were found to be looking for strong partners in key territories and 
assessing them; including at final presentations. This might suggest a focus on 
accessibility as identified in some previous research, (Scott and van der Walt, 
1986).  However the current research also identified where companies preferred 
or insisted on their service team led or provided from London. Most FTSE 350 
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companies do now have their headquarters in London and it is therefore there 
that most of the expertise in dealing with issues facing these companies resides 
and for some at least, the staff are considered of higher calibre. A relative lack of 
importance attached to geographical accessibility is consistent with previous 
research by Beattie and Fearnley (1998b) who found geography to be a 
secondary influence and Sands and McPhail’s (2003) who found it to be 
relatively less important than other factors. 
The three levels of assessment however become most differentiated at the 
delivery level. That is to say that the current research has identified that 
companies are not only looking to assess the competing firms on whether they 
have Capabilities and competences, they also want to understand how well they 
will be able to access those capabilities and competences: 
1. At the firm level conflicts of interest were identified as an important 
consideration. Firms may have strong, highly relevant experience and 
expertise, but companies are concerned to ensure that there are no 
perceived conflicts with their competitors (either because of  heightened 
concerns about confidentiality or because of concerns over resourcing) 
or with other non-audit services ( access to audit capabilities and 
competences may preclude access to other services). 
2. At the team level structure and responsibilities and accountability were 
identified as important. This was especially in relation to the structure 
of the lead team and the opportunities and potential complications that 
could arise by having the team led by one partner or two. 
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3. For the lead partner, the current research identified that as well as 
possessing the relevant experience and expertise, companies want to be 
confident that the lead partner will deliver the resources of the firm. 
They are therefore looking for leadership qualities and presence. 
 The current research therefore validates the presence of industry, technical 
and geographical influences on auditor selection generally, but also extends this 
research both by validating the presence of these factors in the FTSE 350 
context and providing additional insights as to how these influences may be 
operating. By examining capability and competence assessment on three 
different levels this research also provides additional richer insight. 
 Lastly, the current research identifies that competence and capability 
assessment evolves throughout a proposal process as firms present and prove 
their credentials and companies test them; and as  firms make changes to their 
teams as they learn more about companies in the proposal process and respond 
to feedback that they are given. This is returned to below under Behavioural 
influences during the proposal process. 
Behavioural influences during the process 
This factor group includes all of the influences on auditor selection which 
were associated with behavioural 
interactions which took place during the 
proposal process. Both companies and 
partners recognised the influence of 
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complying with the invitation to tender and delivering a high quality response. 
However a number of other influences were also identified which go beyond 
merely meeting the requirements of the tender. Additional detailed constructs 
are therefore included within this factor group. These include factors related to: 
1. The influence of the nature and quality of the interactions which took 
place during the proposal process in meetings, presentations and more 
informally. This includes both interactions between companies and the 
proposing firms and the interactions which companies observed 
between members of the proposing teams (teamwork). 
2. The importance of companies feeling that the proposing firms and their 
teams were interested in them and cared about the work. This included 
teams demonstrated that they listened, understood and (importantly) 
responded to what they were told by the companies. It also includes 
other behaviour which signalled how important the audit was for the 
teams involved and their firms including demonstrating hunger, energy, 
enthusiasm and commitment. 
3. The mutual testing and proving which took place during the proposal 
process. This included companies testing and challenging the 
competence of the teams being put forward and their propositions 
whilst the firms were themselves testing their ideas and proving their 
capabilities and competences. 
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Behavioural influences during the proposal process are important because 
they affect the Service design and Capabilities and competences factor groups as 
outlined above and because they influence final decision making directly. 
The existing auditor choice literature (Beattie and Fearnley, 1998b) has 
identified deficiencies in applying economic theory on its own in attempting to 
explain selection decisions and recognised the likely influence of behavioural 
factors (Beattie and Fearnley, 1998b). More recently a range of influences on 
auditor selection has been suggested (Baldacchino, 2011). The influence of 
relationships is recognised (Beattie and Fearnley, 1998b) and inter-personal 
influences identified as desirable in service design (as confirmed by the current 
research and noted above). However the current study identified that auditor 
selection decisions are influenced not only by the existing relationships and 
service design (although these are two of the five factor groups affecting auditor 
selection as previously discussed). 
The influence of behaviour during an audit proposal process has been 
recognised in previous auditor selection research. Davis (1994) identified the 
importance of the relationships developed between competing auditors and 
senior client personnel during the proposal process and, in other professional 
services literature, where behaviour during a proposal process acted as a signal 
for what might follow. This might include good interaction (Day and Barksdale, 
1992); sharing of ideas and examples (Sonmez and Moorehouse, 2010), and 
demonstrating gravitas as a signal of quality (Stock and Zinszer, 1987). The 
importance of behaviour during the sales process is of course also widely 
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recognised in for example adaptive selling (see for example Predmore and 
Bonnice, 1994). 
The current research however has confirmed the influential role of 
behaviour in the auditor selection process but also considerably extends 
previous research in this context by identifying the three different behaviour 
types in operation, in addition to complying with the request for proposal and 
responding with a high quality proposal. 
Some interesting findings also emerged from the current research by 
comparing across the categories using the number of references (as opposed 
sources which has been used consistently so far).  The limitations of Phase 1 in 
this regard were recognised and acknowledge in Sections 3.2.3 and 4.1. 
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Figure 30: Comparison of numbers of references for each factor group across the three 
phases of the research 
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Figure 30 shows the percentage of references identified for each higher 
order category and for each phase of the research. 
The presence of the five factor groups affecting the auditor selection 
decision has previously been discussed and the high degree of consistency 
across the phases also noted. However Figure 30 also highlights two important 
differences. 
The first, relating to Final decision making is unsurprising. The small 
percentage of discussion in Phase 2b of final decision making highlighted is 
consistent with the fact the partners interviewed were not present during the 
final decision discussion. Final decision making is discussed next. 
The other striking difference however is in the proportion of discussion in 
the Phase 2b partner interviews that was concerned with behavioural influences 
on the auditor selection decision. Although such behavioural influences on the 
auditor selection decision were most referenced in each phase of the research 
for the Phase 2b partner interviews they represented almost double the next 
most referenced category (Relationships and past track record) and approached 
half of all the references pertaining to these categories.  
The partners therefore appear to believe that behaviour during a proposal 
process is more important than the companies do. It is not clear why this may 
be the case. It may be that partners are over-emphasising the importance of 
behaviour; perhaps feeling that their performance in a proposal process is able 
to compensate for other potential weaknesses in their proposals. Alternatively, 
companies may be under-estimating the influence of behaviourally related 
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affective influences. So whilst they may feel that they are making decisions 
informed by “harder” assessment of Capabilities and competences and Service 
design, they may be being more influenced than they realise by behaviour. 
Whilst both groups see behaviour as important there is a question for those 
involved on the buyer side and sales side as to the appropriate weight and 
attention to be given to such influences.  
The discovery of the differences in perspectives between buyers and sellers 
in audit proposal provides a new insight and a potentially highly interesting area 
for future research. This area is returned to in Section 7.4 where research 
limitations are discussed. 
Final decision making 
The current study identified that auditor selection decisions made by FTSE 
350 companies are normally made at the end of the proposal process, after final 
presentations by the firms and involve a 
discussion amongst those formally identified 
as being on the selection committee and other 
influences. 
This factor group includes those factors 
which formed part of the final discussion 
process and therefore includes: 
Chapter Seven 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 
438 
 
1. The elements of the proposal process that informed the final decision 
including the meetings during the process, the documents that were 
submitted and the final presentations. 
2. The people that were involved in the presentation and their roles. 
3. The nature of the discussion which took place in arriving at a final 
decision. 
The current research identified that, in Final decision making, companies 
were being influenced by what went on at various stages of the proposal process. 
This included the individual meetings that took place and their overall 
organisation, the documents that were submitted (although in many cases these 
appeared to be of lesser influence) and the final presentations which were most 
influential. This research therefore provides additional insights into decision 
making with respect to proposals. Beattie and Fearnley (1998b) suggested that 
the auditor selection decision process included: initiation of an idea, invitation 
to tender, presentation, evaluation and final decision. Although the current 
research confirms the importance of the presentation in the decision, it also 
challenges models of auditor selection that appear to under estimate the 
complexity of the underlying process. 
It has also been suggested (Frances and Wilson, 1988) that the auditor 
selection decision is taken in two parts. Firstly a decision is decision is taken to 
change auditor and this is then followed by the selection of a new auditor. This 
current research challenges this assertion. Although service problems were 
observed (especially in Phase1) to place an incumbent in a difficult position, and 
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there may also be inherent pressures to change, no decision, at least formally, 
appears to be being made until the end of the process.  
The current research identifies that the auditor selection decision was 
being taken in most cases by a selection committee comprising audit 
committees and management. In the context of an emerging corporate 
governance environment it might have been expected that the dominant 
influences in this process would be the audit committee. This research however 
identified a range of influence.  
Whilst it was accepted that the overall responsibility for the decision and 
the process was laid with the audit committee and in some cases there was very 
active involvement of the Audit Committee Chair, in practice financial 
management and, in particular the Finance Director, remained highly 
influential in many cases. This was identified by Beattie and Fearnley (1998b) 
before many of the changes affecting corporate governance in the UK; however 
it is interesting that this has persisted. The current research suggests that many 
audit committees understand their role in overseeing a fair process and 
ensuring that there are competent bidders once this is achieved they have been 
seen to pass the decision back to management. The continued influence of 
financial management in auditor selection was recently supported in another 
(Canadian) context (Fiolleau et al., 2013) even many years after the passing of 
the Sarbanes Oxley act which, in common with the UK Corporate Governance 
Code, places responsibility for auditor selection with audit committees. 
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The current research also identifies evidence of individuals adopting 
behaviour consistent with their role as identified in another context by Carlson 
et al., (2000). In particular there were distinct roles played by audit committees 
and by management. The current research identified examples of individuals 
behaving differently in different proposals depending on whether they were 
Finance Director or Audit Committee Chair. 
Final decision making, as noted previously, appears to being informed by 
Service design, Behavioural influences during the process and Capability and 
competences assessment (which in turn are influenced by Relationships at the 
start of the proposal process) and influences the auditor selection decision in 
three ways each of which is captured as an underlying factor in the current 
research.  
In most cases the results were seen to be close decisions but that 
consensus could be reached; involving other Board members in the rare 
occasions where this was not the case. Given the research approach adopted it 
proved difficult to gain a deep understanding of the nature of these final 
discussions. This is also returned to in Section 7.4 where limitations of the 
current research are discussed. 
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7.2. Summary of contributions of the research 
7.2.1. Introduction 
This research increases our understanding of the factors affecting auditor 
selection in the FTSE 350 (a summary of the auditor selection research is set out 
in Appendix II).  
The limitations of the existing auditor selection research were set out in 
Section 2.5; Table 28 below sets out how they have been addressed by the 
current research.  
In addition, only two studies of auditor selection have identified which 
examined both the buy side and supply side perspectives as addressed by this 
research , which therefore provides a fuller and richer perspective on auditor 
selection decisions. 
This section first sets out the specific contributions to theory and 
knowledge of the research and then the contributions to practice. The next 
section discusses implications of the research for theory and practice. 
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Previously identified limitations of 
existing research (see Section 2.5) 
Current Research 
Studies have predominantly involved 
questionnaire based surveys. Whilst this has 
enabled responses to specific questions to be 
identified, it provides little evidence as to what 
influences are in play as decisions are arrived 
at and how they might evolve during a process. 
The last UK based interview research included 
only 12 interviews. 
The current research includes 111 interviews 
and interview records enabling a much richer 
picture of the influences on those selecting 
auditors 
Most prior studies have included companies 
who have never conducted an audit tender and 
so they are hypothesising about what would 
happen should they do so. 
Only those who had recently completed a 
tender at the time of the interview were 
included within the research 
Studies have been undertaken in a number of 
different populations and jurisdictions. Whilst 
it can be worthwhile to consider a number of 
different perspectives, auditor choice may well 
be different given the different pertaining 
cultural and regulatory environments and 
especially between different market segments 
(private, smaller public and larger public 
companies). 
The survey population includes only those 
companies which were in the FTSE 350 at the 
time of the tender. 
The empirical research in the United Kingdom 
predates much of the regulatory and market 
activity summarised in Section 1 and in 
particular, the Enron scandal, the collapse of 
Arthur Andersen, developments in the 
regulatory environment and the significant 
focus on the roles and responsibilities of audit 
committees that followed. 
The study covers an important period of 
evolution of tendering in the UK from the 
creation of the Big 4 to the introduction of 
recommended tendering by the Financial 
Reporting Council. 
Table 28: Addressing the limitations of previous auditor selection research 
7.2.2. Summary of contributions to theory and knowledge 
Given the paucity of literature in relation to auditor selection and 
consistent with the resultant exploratory approach undertaken a number of 
references to consistencies, extensions or challenges to prior research were 
discussed in Section 7.1. This section now brings this together under the four 
principal contributions to theory and knowledge of this research. 
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 The contributions are set out in summary in Table 29 and discussed in the 
text that follows. 
Contribution Supporting 
discussion form 
Section 7.1 
Relevant 
literature  
Theoretical/
conceptual 
basis 
Nature of 
contribution 
Contributions to theory 
1. A conceptual 
model of FTSE 
350 auditor 
selection 
 Conceptual model 
of FTSE 350 auditor 
selection 
 Comprehensive 
view of behaviour in 
auditor selection 
 Different buyer and 
seller perspectives 
on behaviour  
 E.g. 
O’Shaugnessy   &   
O’Shaugnessy 
(2005) 
 Pemer (2013) 
 Simon (1997) 
 Kahneman (2011) 
 Payne (2008) 
 
 Rational 
choice theory 
 Behavioural 
decision 
theory 
 Varying 
purpose/ 
nature of 
encounters 
 Challenges rational 
choice and bounded 
rationality 
 Provides some 
support to heuristic 
theory 
 Argues for a 
comprehensive, 
conditional/ 
experiential approach 
2. Relationships 
are contextual 
and based on 
compartmental 
view (rather than 
based on more 
general loyalty – 
trust) 
 Nature of 
incumbent 
relationship at the 
start of the process 
 Influence of cross 
directorships 
 Influence of alumni 
 Sheth and 
Pattawar (1995) 
 Doney and 
Cannon (1997) 
 Kuenzel and 
Krolikowsaka 
(2008) 
 Davison et al. 
(1984) 
 Iyer (1998) 
Lennox and Park 
(2007) 
 Relationships 
 Trust 
 Loyalty 
 Extends existing 
relationships theory 
offering additional 
insights in the context 
of auditor selection in 
the FTSE 350 – the 
influence of  cross 
directorship and 
alumni relationships is 
variable 
3. Service 
definition is not 
static, it evolves 
as value is co-
created  
 Comprehensive 
view of service 
design 
 Evolving 
consideration of 
service  
 Traditional 
selection models 
(e.g. Huang, 
2007; Ho, 2010) 
 Vargo and Lusch 
(2004) 
 Payne et al. 
(2008) 
 Static 
utilitarian 
models 
 Service 
Dominant 
Logic 
 Co-creation of 
value 
 Challenges traditional 
models with 
transaction based 
value constructs 
 Supports and extends 
co-creation of value in 
the auditor selection 
situation 
Other contributions to knowledge 
1. Supporting 
competency 
based 
surrogates for 
service 
confidence but 
highlights 
competences 
tested not 
reliant on word 
of mouth. 
Capabilities can 
be negative 
 Competences on 
three levels 
 Desire for 
knowledge and 
specialist expertise 
 Industry and 
technical  
 Geographical 
coverage and 
accessibility 
 Industry and non- 
audit service 
conflicts 
 Lack of influence of 
word of mouth  
 Almer et al 
(2013) 
 Beattie and 
Fearnley (1995, 
1998 a and b) 
 Hermanson 
(1994) 
 Sands and 
McPhail (2003) 
 Scott and van der 
Walt (1995) 
 None explicit  Supports and extends 
existing research to 
the FTSE 350 in the 
period 2001 to 2012, 
challenges role of 
word of mouth and 
updates to reflect 
regulatory 
developments 
 
Table 29: Summary of contributions to theory and knowledge 
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A conceptual model of FTSE 350 auditor selection 
Utilitarian theory exemplified by previously referenced Rational Choice 
Theory (O’Shaugnessy and O’Shaugnessy, 2005) would suggest that an auditor 
selection decision ought to be driven by identifying and pursuing the most 
valuable outcome. The traditional supplier selection literature attempts to do 
this by identifying criteria of importance (normally including quality, delivery 
and price) and then modelling outcomes which maximise utility against these 
criteria. The current research has identified that this was not happening in the 
research period in relation to auditor selection and so challenges the application 
of such economic theory to auditor selection. Findings related to the relative 
unimportance of fees to the final decision provide further support for this. 
The conceptual model presented illustrates that in the complex auditor 
selection context (as explained in Chapter 1 and considered within the literature 
review in Section 2.5) those selecting auditors are not identifying, ranking and 
modelling desired decision criteria. Rather, given the presence of intangibility 
and uncertainty, they are using a combination of considerations to come to a 
final decision.  
These considerations include past relationship influences as has been 
observed in the professional services literature set out in Section 2.4 (see for 
example Pemer, 2013) although, as will be set out in the next claim to 
contribution, these influences appear to be operating in a complex way for 
auditor selection), dynamic service design (as set out in third contribution 
below) and the capabilities and competences of the firms and their teams. Each 
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of these areas is modified by behaviour during the selection process, which is 
also a decision influence. 
In assessing their auditor selection decisions this research has identified 
some evidence which supports heuristic theory and intuitive decision making 
(Kahneman et al. 2007; Kahneman, 2011)(for example in the focus and 
emphasis placed on recent experience identified in Phase 1) but auditor 
selectors do not seem to be satisficing (Simon, 1997), at least not in their final 
decision making. The research therefore challenges the operation of bounded 
rationality in this context. As set out in Section 7.1.1 there are (at least) four 
firms, all of which could adequately conduct an audit for FTSE 350 companies 
and yet companies still invest substantial resources into auditor selection 
decisions. 
Finally the substantial and varied behavioural influences identified provide 
some support to the work of Payne et al (2008) in this different context by 
highlighting the importance and variety of influences created by “encounters” in 
purchase decisions.  As noted in Section 2.3.3, Payne at al. (2008)  suggested 
different purposes for activities supporting decisions in “encounters”. These 
included “emotionsupporting”, “cognitionsupporting” and “valueexplaining”. 
Similarly the current research identifies elements of relationship and 
behavioural influences, service design and capability assessments (which might 
be aligned to value definition and explaining). 
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Relationships are contextual and based on compartmental view 
 There is considerable literature setting out the influence of relationships 
in supplier – purchaser relationships. These include economic benefits (see for 
example Sheth and Pattawar (1995)) and more intangibles such as trust (Doney 
and Cannon (1997) and loyalty (Kuenzel and Kowlikowska, 2008) . In the 
specific auditor context the positive influence of cross directorship relationships 
(Davison et al., 1984) and economic benefits provided by alumni to their former 
firms has been posited (Iyer, 1998; Lennox and Park, 2007).  
The current research extends our understanding of the complexity of 
relationship influences in auditor selection. The longstanding audit 
relationships highlighted in Chapter 1, seemed to indicate the potential 
importance of trust and loyalty however this research (especially Phase 1) 
supported the previous work of Beattie and Fearnley (1995) that tenders were 
often associated with dissatisfaction which in turn was consistent with high 
switching rates .  This research has however also extended the work of Beattie 
and Fearnley and (especially in Phase 2) highlighted the inherent disadvantages 
faced by incumbent auditors. In an environment of increasing corporate 
governance and greater willingness to embrace change, the attractions of a fresh 
look and other influences related to a new auditor meant that an existing 
relationship might be a factor against an ongoing relationship. Mandatory audit 
firm rotation has codified change since the study was completed (see Section 
7.4.2). 
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 The current research does not deliver a general challenge to the operation 
of trust and loyalty. Indeed the evidence of the positive influence of a track 
record of delivery in other services or at other companies provides some 
evidence of their operation. 
The study does however challenge the presumption of a positive influence 
of cross directorships and alumni relationships (Davison et al., 1984; Iyer, 1998 
and Lennox and Park, 2007). Across the three phases such relationships were 
not consistently positive, rather they may be also be neutral or indeed negative 
given the individual context. 
Service definition is not static, it evolves as value is co-created 
The traditional supplier selection literature set out in Section 2.1 and 
referred to previously in this section typically involves highlighting important 
decision criteria and then maximising utility against those criteria in a 
transaction or set of transactions (See Huang, 2007 and Ho, 2010).  Most of the 
auditor selection literature discussed in Section 2.5 and summarised in 
Appendix II uses a similar approach; namely potential criteria are identified or 
proposed and questionnaires sent to consider the importance of each criterion 
to the decision. 
This research however challenges these static and transaction based 
theories and approaches. Even in the highly regulated and prescriptive auditor 
selection situation (as described in Chapter 1), the research identifies evidence 
of firms testing their ideas and propositions and in turn companies assessing 
and also testing these ideas and propositions. Supporting previous service 
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selection literature (e.g. Ellram, 2007 and 2008) companies are not prescribing 
precise upfront definitions. In the context of typically extensive auditor selection 
decisions, firms and companies are co-creating the audit service with potential 
auditors which supports the operation of Service Dominant Logic (Vargo and 
Lusch, 2004) in this context. 
This is a particularly interesting insight in this context. Firstly the core 
audit is prescribed by law and regulation, secondly the wider service 
relationship is heavily confined by regulations tightly restricting the provision of 
non audit services by auditors and thirdly the auditor selection is still a long 
term purchase where selection decisions take place only infrequently and so 
precise service requirements can’t be known. It is therefore an interesting 
additional insight that even in this environment companies and firms are still 
co-operating to create service designs and working relationships.   
Supporting competency based surrogates for service confidence 
As previously noted in Section 2.5, the importance of capability and 
competence assessments has been widely identified in auditor selection 
literature and (as highlighted in Section 2.4 ) professional services supplier 
selection literature. See for example Beattie and Fearnley (1995) and Sands and 
McPhail, 2003). This is perhaps unsurprising given the expert nature of the 
services being purchased. 
A further contribution of this research is to confirm the importance of such 
factors in FTSE 350 auditor selection but also to extend this work to highlight 
competency assessment operating at three levels; the lead partner, the team and 
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the firm (supporting the recent work of Almer et al, 2014) and in different ways 
at each level. This research also highlights that companies assessments of 
competences can change through the proposal process which typically involves 
testing the firms. There is little evidence of reliance on word of mouth 
challenging previous literature (e.g. Reingen and Kernan, 1986). This research 
also  updates previous auditor selection studies reflecting the changes in 
regulation that have occurred as identified in Chapter 1 Whereas earlier studies 
for example Beattie and Fearnley (1995) highlighted the importance of the 
capabilities of potential auditors to provide other services, this can now be seen 
as a negative influence on selection as access to this capability would be banned 
should the firm be appointed as auditor. 
7.2.3. Contributions to practice 
In addition to these contributions to theory and knowledge the research is 
also informing practice at an important period with more frequent tendering 
following associated with the regulatory developments previously explained. 
The principal contributions have been as follows: 
1. Informing the Big 4 firm – the results from the research formed the 
basis of the firms’ methodology for winning new audits and support 
ongoing coaching on major audit proposals. 
2. Supporting the regulator (The FRC). This researcher discussed the 
findings of this research with the FRC and contributed to two of the 
three round table discussions chaired by it following the issuance of the 
September 2012 corporate governance code. These roundtable 
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discussions involved senior members of the FRC, institutional investors, 
audit committee members, investors and leaders of the Big 4 and Mid 
Tier firms. Subsequently this researcher supported the FRC in their 
preparation of best practice material to assist companies with their 
tenders. 
3. Aspects of the findings from proposals identified by the research have 
been widely disseminated by this researcher with those tasked with 
overseeing and managing FTSE 350 audit tenders. To date discussions 
have taken place with almost 100 officials of those companies. 
7.3. Implications  for theory and practice  
 The lessons from the research provide a model to increase awareness of 
the auditor selection decision which will inform both buyers of audit services, 
those providing them and others such as regulators. 
As previously identified the presence of each of the factors in the 
interviews and interview records (with the exception of the dynamics of final 
decision making in Phase 2b as discussed above) was very high (over 90%) in all 
three phases. 
7.3.1. Implications for theory 
The current research has developed a conceptual model of auditor 
selection for FTSE 350 companies. It identifies the need for a holistic approach 
which considers a broad range of factor groups and their interplay in a dynamic 
intuitive process which, even in a very high profile decision does not follow 
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rational choice theory. This has implications for supplier selection in 
procurement and for decision theory as the next two subsections explain. 
Supplier selection 
The conceptual model recognises complexity in the auditor selection 
decision which is consistent in nature with holistic multi-faceted approaches 
previously suggested in established organisational buying behaviour literature 
(Webster and Wind, 1972) but not previously applied to the auditing context. 
The complexity associated with the multifactor conceptual model 
integrates Service design and Capabilities and competences assessment with 
relationship and behavioural influences on decision making 
Although constructed for the auditor selection decision in the UK FTSE 
350 the model may have implications for other complex selection decisions 
especially other professional services. Whilst the specific context of the auditor 
selection decision is recognised and in particular those specificities related to 
public profile and regulation; similar influences may well underlie other 
purchases in for example legal and consulting services. 
The different circumstances applying in different jurisdictions are also 
recognised but the application of such a holistic conceptual model might also 
extend our understanding of auditor selection in other markets and contexts. 
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Decision theory 
There is very extensive previous research which looks at decision 
influences. This includes: 
1. Literature setting out  normative economic theory including for example 
Von Neuman and Morgernstern (1947) and its potential value in 
decision making (Fischoff et al., 1981). 
2. Behavioural decision theory which challenges the application of 
economic theory in practice; including notably Ramsey (1926), Simon 
(1997), Savage (1954) and Kahneman and Tversky (1979). 
3. Affective and relationship influences generally (for example Sheth and 
Parvitiyar, 1995). Andersen and Kumar, 2006), and specifically 
relationship influences such as trust (Doney and Cannon, 1997), and 
loyalty (in professional services; Kuenzel and Krolikowka, 2008). 
4. Lastly the influences of interaction at a group (Asch, 1951) and broader 
societal level (Etzioni, 1988). 
The current research has identified that in the specific context and 
complexity of the auditor selection decision that companies do not generally 
appear to be using algorithms based on economic theory. Moreover fees were 
not seen to be very influential in the decision for reasons including that they 
were identified as being negotiated after a decision had been made. There were 
however results consistent with behavioural decision theory and aspects of 
relationship theory and group dynamics. In other words, these decisions seem 
Chapter Seven 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 
453 
 
to be less logical/economically rational and more intuitive/emotional/affective 
than might be expected. 
This is perhaps a somewhat surprising finding. In a high profile business 
purchase it might be expected that underlying economic considerations would 
play a dominant part. Yet it appears that even in the context of a high profile 
decision, behaviours rather than economic theory may be determining decision 
outcomes.  
This raises a broader question for decision theory. If a holistic model can 
contribute to our understanding in the specific auditor selection context, could 
this model be more generally applicable to other decision contexts. There may 
be potential for future research to apply the conceptual model in different 
practical contexts in similar ways to that applied in the auditor selection 
decision in the current research. 
7.3.2. Implications for practice 
The conceptual model of auditor selection for FTSE 350 companies 
produced from the current research identifies a broad range of factors which 
those with recent experience of an audit tender considered in coming to the 
selection decision. The findings of this research are relevant to companies faced 
with conducting an audit tender, auditors and regulators. 
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Companies 
For those considering an audit tender it provides an opportunity for them 
to consider these factors and how they may evaluate them in coming to their 
own decisions: 
1. As identified in Chapter 1, the current and recent revolution in 
regulatory scrutiny over the Big 4 has been driven in large part because 
regulators and law makers feel that tendering will increase competition 
and, especially, audit quality. In designing their processes they may 
wish to consider how this is being built into the proposals and how they 
will assess it. 
2. Also in relation to Service design, this research identifies the 
importance attached to constructive working relationships. Companies 
may wish to consider how they balance their desire for such 
relationships with associated personal chemistry, and cultural fit with 
auditor independence and objectivity. 
3. Capabilities and competences assessment of the firm, the team and the 
lead partner has been identified as one of the five factor groups.  The 
importance of the lead partner also seems to be growing if Phase 1 is 
compared to Phase 2. Companies may wish to consider how they are 
evaluating competence in particular. The current research identified 
that much of the comment about testing in this area related to the final 
presentation. Companies may wish to reflect as to whether that is really 
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sufficient and whether lessons could be learnt from other similar 
practice, for example recruitment practice. 
4. The current research has supported and extended previous literature 
identifying the important influence of behaviour during a proposal 
process on the final decision. Some of this behaviour appears to be 
about testing and developing propositions however other behaviour 
seems to be mostly affective concerning general interaction and 
signalling by competing audit firms that they really care about winning 
the work. There is a challenge for companies to recognise these 
affective influences but to place them appropriately within proposal 
processes which are appointing auditors to protect the interests of 
shareholders. 
Auditors 
This research suggests that auditor selection decisions taken by FTSE 350 
companies can be complex and rely on contextual influences, important factor 
groups and the interaction between these factor groups.  This would suggest 
that auditors seeking to respond to clients and potential clients ought to take a 
comprehensive approach starting from a position that each selection process is 
going to be different given the company’s particular situation but then also: 
1. Investing in establishing a track record of service delivery with 
companies but probably not relying on word of mouth influences and 
being cautious about alumni and current cross directorship 
relationships. 
Chapter Seven 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 
456 
 
2. Taking a flexible approach to Service design involving a combination of 
proactive ideas testing and adapting and considering the different 
aspects of the delivery model including the core service, the facilitating 
services and the supporting services. 
3. Planning carefully to identify Capabilities and competences to address 
companies’ industry, technical and geographical needs, but also across 
the three levels of assessment identified during this research; namely 
the lead partner, the team and the firm. In addition firms should focus 
on the way that those Capabilities and competences are made available 
including for example dealing with potency at the lead partner level and 
potential conflicts at all three levels. 
4. Recognising the importance of personal interaction and evidence of 
hunger and enthusiasm. The interactions in a proposal process being 
recognised as an important influence in their own right as well as 
influences on other factors; although perhaps not overly relying on this 
alone given the discussion under Behavioural influences during the 
process in Section 7.1.2 above. 
5. Understanding the likely dynamics of the Final decision making; what is 
likely to be taken into account, who is likely to be most influential and 
the likely nature of the interaction. This latter consideration involves 
weighing up carefully the roles of management who have most contact 
with the auditors and the audit committees with responsibility for 
auditor appointment and retention.  
Chapter Seven 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 
457 
 
Regulators 
For regulators seeking to promote audit quality, there would appear to be 
opportunities to promote better understanding of the influences affecting 
auditor selection by encouraging debate between Audit Committees and others 
involved in these processes.  
Given the complexity identified by this research, there would appear to be 
potential benefits in promoting comprehensive debate about how future 
selection decisions might be organised so as to support the improvements in 
audit quality that are being sought. The current research would suggest that this 
ought to consider each of the factor groups influencing auditor selection. 
7.4. Limitations and opportunities for future research 
7.4.1. Research limitations 
The first limitation of the study related to the quality of the data analysed 
as Phase 1 of the research. The interview records of the Big 4 firm were created 
following post decision proposal reviews conducted by members of the firm’s 
staff who were independent of the proposing teams they could necessarily only 
relate to the proposals that that firm was involved in. In addition the quality of 
the notes was variable. Although some were comprehensive others were quite 
short. The interview records, obtained with the permission of the firm, however 
provided some eight years of valuable data on FTSE 350 audit proposals. In 
terms of the research approach, these interview records provided very valuable 
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background and enabled the preparation of an initial conceptual model which 
stimulated thinking and highlighted potential themes and ideas. 
The final conceptual model was however created following two further 
independent phases of the study. These two phases contained 47 interviews 
considering both buy side and sales side perspectives and either recorded or 
subject to detailed cross checked interview records. The final conceptual model 
therefore is not reliant on Phase 1 although the extent of data provided a useful 
background and cross check against it. 
 The second limitation related to the exploratory nature of the research. 
Given the paucity of literature in relation to auditor selection identified by the 
research, the study was designed to identify the factors affecting auditor 
selection. It was not focussed on investigating the specific influence of any one 
individual factor its weight or the nature of the inter-relationships between 
factors (although some interesting indications of inter-relationships have been 
identified and included in the conceptual model). There is an opportunity for 
further interview based research to explore these aspects specifically.  
 In developing the research design, consideration was given to adopting an 
approach using the repertory grid technique which explores an individual’s ways 
of looking at the world or personal constructs (Kelly, 1955) by exploring what is 
important to the interviewee in relation to an area under investigation and 
making comparisons between constructs. Whilst this is a powerful technique it 
relies on interviewees being able to make comparisons between equivalent 
decisions. In the current research, the majority of those involved would only 
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have participated in a single decision This technique was therefore eventually 
discounted for the current research which adopted semi- structured interviews 
which (for all the reasons set out in Chapter 3) were considered an appropriate 
method and which were also consistent with standard practice in the industry 
for obtaining post decision review feedback. There are however still 
opportunities for future research to use this techniques, for example with audit 
firm partners who have been involved in multiple decisions. 
In addition because of the dynamic nature of the decision and the 
identified importance of behavioural influences there are opportunities to 
further explore the decision with more observational or ethnographic research 
techniques. One of the ways that the behavioural aspects of auditor selection 
might be explored further is through an ethnographic (pioneered in 
anthropology – for example Malinowski, 1935) or an even an action research 
approach. This would involve participation by the researcher in auditor 
selection process, where the interaction and behaviour of both the companies 
and the competing firms could be observed or even the process facilitated.  This 
is potentially being made more feasible because of the regulatory changes 
identified above. One of the features of impending mandatory audit firm 
rotation is that the incumbent auditor will no longer be allowed to participate in 
audit tenders. In addition in some proposals a firm providing non audit services 
has either declined to propose or been excluded from the process. In some cases 
companies have turned to their auditors or the firms otherwise excluded for 
advice as to how to run a tender process and in isolated cases members of these 
firms have sat in as non-voting participants in the selection process; including 
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the final presentations. The precedent for external observation of audit tender 
processes has therefore been set.  
One specific area of the decision making process which was a limitation for 
this study was the Final decision making discussion where the post decision 
semi structured interview based approached did not fully capture the final 
dynamics of the interaction of those involved even thought it was explored in 
the interviews conducted. This could only really be fully achieved by 
observational approaches either by researcher presence at the final discussion 
or potentially by the use of video if this was considered less intrusive. 
7.4.2. Recent regulatory developments and the practical 
application of the conceptual model 
In addition to the research limitations affecting this study, and in the fast 
moving nature of regulation which was explained in Chapter 1, there have 
recently been developments which are likely to influence the application of the 
research to practice in the future.   
Since the end of the research period regulatory change has continued and 
there have been a number of developments. These are summarised in Table 30. 
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Legislation/regulation Principal impact on auditor selection 
 UK Corporate Governance Code, issued by 
the Financial Reporting Council (“FRC”) 30 
September 2012 (effective 1 October of that 
year).   
 FTSE 350 companies should put their 
external audit contract out to tender at 
least every ten years or explain clearly why 
they haven’t done so that subject to certain 
transition provisions) (FRC, 2012, 
paragraph 3.17 page 19. See also page 4 re 
Comply or Explain). 
 UK Competition Commission (“CC”) final 
report on investigation of the market 
statutory audit services for large companies 
in the UK (CC, October 2013).  
 UK Competition and Markets Authority 
(“CMA”) proposals following introduction 
of new European Union legislation (CMA< 
July 2014) (effective 1 January 2015) 
 Mandatory audit tendering for FTSE 350 
companies at least every ten years and 
additional disclosures in annual reports 
where a tender has not been held for more 
than five years (subject to transition 
provisions and currently September 2014 
subject to further consultation) 
 European Legislation (June 2014) 
(effective June 2016) 
 Mandatory audit firm rotation every ten 
years for Public Interest Entities  in the 
European Union ( including FTSE 350 
companies) which may be extended to 20 
years if a competitive tender has taken 
place (subject to transition provisions 
which mean it is effective for most 
companies either in 2020 or 2023). 
Table 30: Certain relevant changes in law and regulation since the end of the period covered by 
the research 
By requiring more frequent audit tendering and periodic mandatory firm 
rotation these changes will significantly increase the level of audit tendering in 
the coming years such that the process is very likely to change and evolve as 
companies and audit firms develop their approaches and lessons are learnt 
about best practice in audit tendering.  
The new regulations will especially affect the nature of the relationship 
with an incumbent auditor. In some cases that auditor will have reached the end 
of their permitted term and be excluded from the process. There will also be 
more cases where a tender is being conducted following regulation against the 
backdrop of a positive relationship between a company and its incumbent 
auditor. This changing dynamic provides opportunities for future research 
although given the changing landscape and because the most far reaching 
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changes associated with these new regulations do not come into force for most 
companies until 2020 0r 2023 it is perhaps too early to assess what their impact 
might be on auditor selection at this stage.  
In addition the new regulations have been introduced with an aim to 
improve audit quality; responding to the events highlighted in Chapter 1. It is 
not clear whether more audit tendering will achieve this especially given the 
findings of this current research which identified audit quality as only one 
factor influencing auditor selection among many, and as part of a much more 
complex decision consideration. Future research might investigate whether the 
new regulations have achieved their aim. Given the difficulties identified in 
relation to credence goods (Darby and Karni, 1973) this will require greater 
understanding and transparency about what constitutes audit quality and that 
poses challenges both for theory and practice. 
7.5. Conclusion 
This study has been organised to answer the research question: 
What are the factors affecting the auditor selection decisions made by 
FTSE 350 companies in competitive tenders? 
It has identified a complex decision process involving relationship, 
behavioural, capability and service design elements all feeding into final 
decision making. The conceptual model produced offers a holistic solution to 
the research question including each of these factors and also suggests the 
nature of the principal interactions between them. This has extended our 
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understanding of auditor selection and offers insights which are likely to be 
relevant for other complex purchasing decisions; such as those in other 
professional services. 
The research has also extended our understanding of the influence of 
relationships in auditor selection and challenged certain previous research 
concerning the influence of cross directorships and alumni. 
In addition the research supports a dynamic service design process which 
supports more recent supplier selection literature and service dominant logic 
and challenges the application of utility theory in this context. 
Lastly the research supports the importance of capability and competence 
assessment in auditor (and professional services supplier) selection and 
provides additional insights into how this is taking place. 
The study has taken place in a period during which the auditing profession 
has changed significantly; since the emergence of the Big 4 following the demise 
of Arthur Andersen in 2002. Greater regulation and more recently new 
legislation and oversight have intervened into the relationship between a 
company and its auditor. Greater pressure for audit tenders and the rotation of 
audit partners, and now audit firms, is being encouraged and required in the 
interests of greater competition and improved audit quality. This makes the 
current research particularly timely for practice. 
The current study however provides mixed messages for those promoting 
audit tenders and audit firm rotation in the interests of improving audit quality 
Chapter Seven 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 
464 
 
and expanding choice beyond the Big 4. The comprehensive and competitive 
nature of proposals and in particular the co-development of new ideas and 
approaches which has been identified would seem to support an environment of 
improving service quality. And auditor tenure periods will shorten.  However 
given the views expressed by those interviewed about the competences of the 
Big 4 and their people compared to other smaller firms it seems most likely that 
tendering will result in moves between the Big 4; rather than outside that group. 
Whilst the current research provides considerable insight into how auditor 
selection decisions are made, it is unclear that future changes will result in a 
wider population of non-Big 4 firms serving FTSE 350 companies. 
A further implication of these findings is that those promoting tenders may  
be underestimating the nature and extent of the network of relationships that 
exist between the Big 4 and FTSE 350 companies. This research has identified a 
range of relationships going well beyond the company and its incumbent 
auditor (including past service relationships). This makes auditor rotation in 
practice more difficult. Perhaps even more importantly they may also be 
underestimating the influence of behaviour during a proposal process, including 
the personal connections that are established. The current research shows this 
to be an essential component of the decision.  A key finding is the strong role 
that interaction/experience and personal connection play; this in turn suggests 
that proposals may well promote the appointment of those who are adept at this 
rather than necessarily giving rise to audit quality improvements. This has 
considerable implications for regulators as well as for companies and their 
auditors.  
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Whether increased proposal activity will improve audit quality or 
encourage a profession focussed on relationship building and salesmanship, the 
next few years will discover.
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APPENDIX I 
PROFESSIONAL SERVICES SUPPLIER SELECTION CRITERIA 
THEMES (EXCLUDING STATUTORY AUDIT) 
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APPENDIX II 
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APPENDIX III: INTERVIEW PROTOCOL 
 
Interview details (to be completed pre interview) as far as practical 
 
Personal Details Role Interview Details 
1.  Name: 
 
 
2. Company: 
 
3.Date and time of Interview: 
 
4. Age (years) and sex (M/F) 
 
 
5. Position and years in role: 
 
6. Address for interview: 
7. Nationality: 
 
 
8. Role in the Proposal: 
 
 
9. Contact Details (preferred):  
 
10. Education and career 
history: 
 
 
 
11. History with other audit 
proposals (if any): 
12. Communication history (pre 
communication etc): 
 
 
 
Proposal details (to be completed pre interview as far as practical) 
 
Process (key dates and 
deliverables) 
Company People Firms Involved 
13.Invitation to tender/request 
for proposal: 
 
 
 
 
14. Selection panel: 
 
 
15. Incumbent firm(s) 
 
16. Meetings held/access given: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
17. People firms met and 
contacted during the process: 
 
 
 
 
 
18. Shortlisted and successful 
firm 
19.Document(s) submitted and 
Presentation(s) received: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
20. Document(s) and 
presentation(s) recipients 
 
 
 
 
 
21. People involved and firm if 
known: 
22.Decision meetings/dates: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
27. People in the decision 
meeting: 
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Introduction 
 Thank you for agreeing to take part in this interview. I appreciate you 
taking time out of your busy schedule 
 
 This interview forms part of research being undertaken as part of my PhD 
at Cranfield University. Any comments you make will be kept confidential. 
Anything that is published in the thesis or academic publications will 
always be unattributable,  
 
 The purpose of the interview is to: 
o  understand your perspective on the recent audit proposal completed 
by your organisation 
o explore a number of specific factors and their importance (which I’ll 
explain later) 
 
 The interview is being taped and I may use the specifics in my PhD but they 
will be always remain unattributed 
 
 Clearly you can choose not to answer any of my questions and indeed stop 
the interview at any stage if you feel that you want to 
 
 I expect the interview to last about an hour 
 
 Does all that seem ok with you? 
 
 
Identifying/objectives and needs 
1. Can I start by asking you to talk me through the background to the tender? 
Potential Prompts: 
o What was the background to the proposal 
o What caused it 
o What were the needs that were to be addressed 
o Specific areas of service? 
o Best Practice 
o Fees 
o What were the selection/assessment criteria set at the start 
o Which were most important and why? 
o How did everyone feel about them? (Interest? Motivation?) 
o How important were they to the proposal? 
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Exploring factors affecting the decision 
I’d now like to explore the factors that affected the decision. 
2. What do you think were the most important factors affecting your auditor 
selection decision?  
Prompts: Exploring the factors generally: 
o Which were most important and why? 
o Who were they important to? 
o What was it about each that was important?  
o What was their relative importance? 
 
3. To what extent were the various factors significant to the decision? 
Prompts: Consider: 
o Individual and firm competence factors? 
o Experience of the competing teams or firms – industry/sector? 
o Approach proposed? 
o Reputation? References? 
o Fees 
 
o Relationships? 
o Trust? 
o Liking/personal chemistry?  
o Personal loyalty?  
 
o What was experienced during selection? 
o Interaction in meetings/generally? 
o Documents presented? 
o Presentations given? 
Decision making 
4. When did the decision take shape? 
 
5. Which elements of the tender process affected the decision? 
 
6. How was the decision made? 
 
7. Who was involved and what was their role? 
 
8. What was the relative importance of relationships, competences and 
performance during the process? 
Conclusion 
9. Lastly – if I ask you to reflect – is there anything that you feel to be very 
significant about the selection decision that we haven’t talked about or that 
you would wish to expand?  
 
Many thanks  
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APPENDIX IV:  
EXAMPLE OF A PAHSE 2a INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPT 
 
Company I – Interview with Finance Director 
Notes from a Post Decision Review on 12 January 2011 
 
Attendees:  
Finance Director FD Company I 
Philip Drew PD  
 
NB the ethical clearances including agreement to use the interview for the 
purposes of research were in this case obtained prior to the meeting. 
Um I guess it works best if I just say are you happy to take it 
from the top and just tell me the story from your point of view 
because that way I guess you’ll talk about what you thought was most 
important to you rather than bombarding you with a lot of 
questions? 
Absolutely, no I will. 
And I’ll just sit and listen and chip in if I may if that suits you? 
No I’ll do that 
I should say at the outset that I saw [previous Finance Director] 
after the last one [tender conducted by the company]. 
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OK, OK (laughter) 
Which was about what 6/7 years ago. 
A time ago… 
I think things have moved on a bit since then. 
I mean the first thing to establish is why did we put the audit out to tender 
in the first place. 
Yes 
And that was, that was mostly because for the last 2 or 3 years we’d 
become increasingly dissatisfied with [INCUMBENT FIRM]. 
Right 
And we’d become dissatisfied with them because of the audit approach 
that they’ve taken and the fact that increasingly it was obvious to us that the 
work that they were doing to mitigate the risks that they said were evident in the 
business, the additional work was giving them any comfort.  So they were 
unhappy that they could rely on the IT systems so they were essentially testing 
quite large numbers of transactions in terms of audit testings, testing 50 
transactions and doing quite a bit of work and doing system walk throughs.  But 
we do millions of transactions a month so the level of comfort …. 
50 a second or something probably? 
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[Laughter] After years of doing this stuff we just began to think that they 
were, that they were just mistaken and there must be a better way 
Right 
to do the audit so, we challenged them on that and they gave us an IT 
remediation plan  
Right 
to complete and at the end of that they then said they would rely on the 
systems and controls, the IT systems and controls 
Right 
So they did the remediation and they, at the end of that said that it was 
almost satisfactory but not quite, so they could rely upon it and that sent the 
[CHIEF OPERATING OFFICER “COO”], who’s quite a powerful figure, senior 
figure that sent him into a real tailspin. 
And from your point of view you’d done everything… 
Yes and it was embarrassing for the previous Finance Director because he 
had said look [COO], I’ve got the solution to this it solves my problem, you do 
this work, the auditors are happy, the non-execs will be happy, the Audit 
Committee will be happy, I’ve got the solution so we did the work and at the end 
of it, they just at the last minute they pulled the prize away so that irritated them 
monumentally 
Yes 
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And that was the kind of, the straw that broke the camel’s back and we 
decided to, given the support we felt we were receiving at partner level which 
was, non-existent, almost non-existent, given the value add, given the expense 
of the audit, given the approach that there was more than enough there just to 
put it out to tender, just to see if anyone could do a better job. 
Right 
And it turned out that all the three firms that pitched could evidently do a 
much better job than the service we were receiving and I say that because 
[FIRM A] were miles better, [FIRM B] were much better than the service we 
were getting and [INCUMBENT FIRM] replaced the people on the audit and 
served up a new team and they were much better. 
Right 
Umm so, through the audit process we put out the challenges, how would 
you audit this IT business, um what comfort would you need, um and how 
would you add value to us in doing the audit? 
Right 
Obviously you’re not, the auditor isn’t our servant but it’s very useful to get 
opinion from an industry expert who’s seen lots and lots of different companies 
and it can’t obviously all be one way I mean we’re very happy to spend time 
developing your business like in this call but we’d like a bit back and it doesn’t 
mean being on the phone for hours and hours just means answering simple 
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questions with reasonably straight answers when you can, when confidentiality 
allows. 
Yes 
And we didn’t have that kind of healthy relationship with [INCUMBENT 
FIRM] we were looking for that. 
Right 
So we set, set quite an um defined process for the proposals. 
There were some factors [in the ITT], you know was that the 
whole story?, You know I guess there were half a dozen points you 
sent out in the ITT was that everything? How much thought was 
behind it. 
Oh plenty because we still regard our business as quite a small business so 
the, most of the execs have been here for at least 10 years and they’re very hands 
on, very operational and they can, within a couple of hours we can set down 
exactly what we would like 
Right 
And it’s all just come through the process of…it did help having the 
document that you guys highlighted but saying the actual specific things if you 
like 
Yes 
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We know exactly what to say, it did help having the [FIRM A audit 
tendering guide].  I had two I had one from [FIRM B] and one from [FIRM A] 
and they were both very helpful. 
I suspect they’re similar too? 
They’re very similar, it’s good common sense and it’s a good discipline and 
I would say that that was very useful in the process because it just gave us the 
discipline to put everything in a, in boxes in the right order and then the 
specifics of what we were asking for we were really clear about. 
Right 
We didn’t want to be deluged with data and information, we wanted to 
keep it quite high level and we wanted certain particular things answered in any 
proposal and obviously we put IT at the heart of it because it was the IT problem 
in the first place that caused a bit of a bust up. 
Right 
And it was the approach that [INCUMBENT FIRM] were taking to IT 
which was dictating the audit approach which meant we had 6 or 7 juniors out 
here doing work that none of us in financial control or risk could deem would 
have any value at all. 
You didn’t understand why they were doing it? 
Could not understand and they couldn’t explain why they were doing it 
either when challenged no one at [INCUMBENT FIRM], the only response we 
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could get is we need it because we can’t place reliance on the controls.  So a bit 
frustrating because you couldn’t really place reliance on testing 50 transactions 
out of 48 million when the risk is that someone will go in overwrite one of those 
transactions for us to get them out. 
Right and did all of the three firms come back with a plan that 
addressed that? 
Yes they did, they basically went um past where we’d got to with 
[INCUMBENT FIRM] so [INCUMBENT FIRM] said do the remediation and 
then we can rely on the controls and then we drew that at the last minute 
because there was one system where we can’t do remedial work because the 
operating software does not allow that. 
Right 
It would need to be upgraded so what we’re doing is we’re planning to get 
off that system so every single one of the firms that proposed looked at the 
controls that we had and asked for us to put compensating controls around the 
areas, the one area that was weak and said that subject to those operating they 
could rely on the controls and they would do a controls based audit. 
Right 
And given the alternative is to do an audit that’s (giggle) and you just add 
cost, very simple thing to agree to and [INCUMBENT FIRM] within a week of 
new people coming on board were agreeable to that. 
Right 
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So our partner was rotating off so the partner that joined from 
[INCUMBENT FIRM] wasn’t completely new to it but they all came along with 
this idea that they would rely on the internal controls subject to you know 
compensating controls over certain areas where we’re weak. 
So in a sense within a week of going to tender you, you kind of 
had the solution to, at least part of the solution to the problem that 
was, that had started it? 
Ummn, yes 
Maybe only … 
Yes we did only part of it because we didn’t feel we were getting a great 
service from [INCUMBENT FIRM] period so there were other things that we 
wanted 
Right OK 
there was kind of the mood that given that they had been quite poor for so 
long they should be punished and we should try with someone else because its, 
it’s kind of, we had communicated that we were a bit frustrated with the 
approach, we communicated a number of things, I kind of fed back to them and 
they had really addressed it um, and you have to be very forgiving to say OK well 
now, now we’ve kicked up all this fuss and kicked off all this work and you’ve 
agreed to change your approach so we’ve agreed to you know give you another 
chance and that would have been an easier thing for us in the finance 
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department to do and we did consider um, staying in bed with them but in the 
end the other firms and [FIRM A] especially did present a better team. 
Right 
So the benefit of moving, in the end was actually quite small, not small 
sorry it was, was um, wasn’t as huge as we thought it would be because we 
thought that after about three weeks it was obvious that the existing 
[INCUMBENT FIRM] team was very poor and both the firms would be miles 
better. 
Right 
But at the end [INCUMBENT FIRM] pulled it round to such an extent it 
wasn’t such a big gap. 
OK.  So having sent the ITT out what, what happened next? 
Ummn, a think it was generally agreed that, that [FIRM A] spent more 
time here and made a greater effort than anyone else to understand the business 
and talk to people so ummn obviously if they hadn’t have got the appointment it 
would have been work hours wasted.  Ummn, it’s pretty clear and I think it was 
universally fed back that they’d probably spent nearly, nearly twice, but 
definitely 50% more time here than [FIRM B] did and [FIRM B] made a pretty 
solid effort I guess in the work, they really wanted the work so the process 
kicked off, it was done very well I think the guys done, it was obviously the 
leader in [FIRM A LEAD RELATIONSHIP PARTNER] that made it so that it 
was very light impact because of the spread around, they just went to see people 
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they weren’t accompanied, didn’t need to be and they just you know, put their 
head around quite a few doors, spoke to everyone, more or less universally I got 
positive feedback.  I didn’t get it from everyone on every occasion but I didn’t 
get that for [FIRM B] or for [INCUMBENT FIRM] who reintroduced themselves 
but you know, 90% of the time very positive feedback 
Right 
Relevant and useful meetings with the people and the guys did all their 
information gathering and we went to the point of sending in the proposals. 
Right and was it, kind of led you a bit because I said what 
happened when the ITT came in but I just wondered, there were 
obviously a… 
When you say the ITT you mean… 
The invitation to tender… 
Oh yes, yes sorry yep 
There was obviously a period between you thinking that you 
might go to tender or even with that in your mind and the thing 
coming in and you know the various firms had relationships with 
you before you had an issue with the tender, to what extent, apart 
from the service issues that you mentioned with [INCUMBENT 
FIRM], to what extent were the previous relationships that you had 
through various services and knowing people over the years, how 
significant was that to the whole thing? 
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Ummn… 
I guess [FIRM A LEAD AUDIT PARTNER] had known you for I 
don’t know 6 months or something like that? 
Less than that, I think, I think the previous finance director was signalling 
to the other firms to people that there was the possibility that the audit would go 
to tender 
Yes 
Because I think he would have liked…you know we should have done it 
maybe a year ago but it was anyway it was well signalled that we would go to 
tender 
Right 
So I think some of the…[FIRM A LEAD RELATIONSHIP PARTNER] 
would certainly have been on notice and the guy at [FIRM B] would have been 
on notice [FIRM B LEAD RELATIONSHIP PARTNER] 
Right 
So those guys were kind of notice and you know wait to hear.  I know the 
people at [FIRM B] because I actually was trained in the financial business unit 
which is the unit that does all [RELEVANT INDUSTRY SECTOR] audits so I 
think if we were going to go tender, naturally because I know that group and 
because they’d been tipped anyway 
Yes 
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Naturally we would have included [FIRM A] because it’s a good firm and 
[FIRM A LEAD RELATIONSHIP PARTNER] did a…the extra mile in that when 
I, because I’m doing this post as an interim, so when I started as interim having 
been out of finance for, for not having been in finance since what for 10 years 
and having just done [DIFFERENT ROLE] since then and then sales and other 
things, he put me in touch with [FIRM A LEAD AUDIT PARTNER] and said 
would you, you know [FIRM A LEAD AUDIT PARTNER] would do like a 
refresher of, kind of FD refresher and that was really useful for me and 
obviously that, you then build a relationship with someone in the audit side of 
the firm 
Right 
So I mean there was as much, obviously there was something in that for 
[FIRM A], there was something in it for me, absolutely from my perspective I 
kind of bit their hand off at that offer because a very, very useful offer. 
Right 
So it gave us, it gave [FIRM A] a relationship with the new FD, it gave 
them the opportunity to introduce me to some of the people there and obviously 
as an FD you’re a buyer of services and it’s good to have that professional 
network and the people were very good, they were very impressive.  So I had 
exposure to those two channels and obviously [FIRM A LEAD RELATIONSHIP 
PARTNER]’s exposure to [COMPANY I] goes back to the relationship on the tax 
side and the relationship that goes back quite a long way 
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Yes 
So he was obviously, [CEO] kept him up to speed and I wouldn’t be 
surprised if [CEO] asked him to, you know had a, see if he could arrange 
anything for me to help me into a new role where I was very unfamiliar. 
Right, so when you kicked off your proposal process, did you 
have any expectation of who you thought would win? 
None, no. 
Right 
We didn’t, we didn’t think that [INCUMBENT FIRM] would win; we 
absolutely thought they had no chance of winning 
Right 
And it actually come as a big surprise in the end that they actually came so 
far back from how we perceived them, I think after kicking off the tender 
process within about a week of seeing representations from the other two firms 
it was obvious they were so much better than what we were getting at the 
moment 
Right 
And it was only late in the process that [INCUMBENT FIRM] came back 
and actually looked very good. 
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You mentioned that [FIRM A] spent more time round here, was 
there much or was there anything about the nature of the meetings 
that the firms were having that was different, you know was anybody 
talking about better, better issues or showing more understanding 
or was it just the question of just pure investment of time? 
Ummn, the feedback I got ummn, especially about [FIRM A LEAD AUDIT 
PARTNER] was very positive because he’s very good at, he’s a good listener 
ummn he often follows up points that are raised at the meetings 
Right 
which impresses anyone, ummn and, I think genuinely none of them felt 
like they were being sold anything which is the only criticism that came through 
from some of the other meetings, not necessarily the [FIRM A] meetings but 
sometimes the conversations in these things move towards other services that 
the firms sell. 
Right 
and obviously if you’re there to talk about the audit, some people objected 
to that.  That wasn’t that’s not kind of [FIRM A LEAD AUDIT PARTNER]’s 
style, that was the only criticism I got back about the meetings. 
Right 
Ummn, I think [FIRM A LEAD AUDIT PARTNER] and [FIRM A AUDIT 
DIRECTOR] their experience is pretty relevant for this business and feedback 
was almost universally positive, there were, no one…I mean this is flattery in a 
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way, but no one felt that their time had been wasted, these audit tenders, you 
know it’s quite hard to engage people in the wider business in audit. 
Yes I can imagine 
So to get no, no complaints that any time was wasted and to have no 
reluctance to give up additional hours, often you know head of [KEY 
FUNCTIONS], they all had three or four hours of meetings with the different 
firms and not one person fed back to me that they’d felt their time had been 
wasted. 
Right, did you think there was much difference between the 
final offer if you like or the propositions that the various firms were 
putting on the table? 
Ummn, I think, I think there was ummn, some different, you would 
be…the whole thing was actually a really good advertisement for the 
professional services firms because all three offers were very good. 
Right 
The difference, the reason for choosing [FIRM A] was because of the team, 
it was because of ummn [FIRM A AUDIT SENIOR MANAGER] and [FIRM A 
AUDIT DIRECTOR] and their evident understanding at, on the day of the 
business issues and their ability to engage the non-execs that were there on the 
day, they were very, very good and that came out of them being better, in my 
opinion it came out of them spending more time here and being better 
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prepared, both [FIRM A LEAD AUDIT PARTNER] and the others and that was 
evident 
Right 
Ummn, unfortunately the [NON PARTNER MEMBERS OFAUDIT TEAM] 
at [INCUMBENT FIRM] couldn’t be at the meeting for circumstances that were 
beyond their control and at [FIRM B] they were significantly more lightweight 
than [FIRM A AUDIT DIRECTOR] and [FIRM A AUDIT SENIOR MANAGER] 
Right 
[FIRM A AUDIT DIRECTOR], [FIRM A AUDIT SENIOR MANAGER] and 
the [FIRM A] IT guy [NAME], they all came across really well and actually we 
made the selection on the basis of the juniors not the seniors because we know 
that at partner level in these firms people are going to be pretty good and you’re 
only going to see them now and then so ummn, [FIRM A LEAD AUDIT 
PARTNER] and [FIRM A LEAD RELATIONSHIP PARTNER] and the 
equivalents here [FIRM B LEAD AUDIT PARTNER] and [LEAD 
RELATIONSHIP PARTNER] were fantastic but you’d expect them to be 
fantastic so it was more about the juniors. 
Right 
It was quite interesting that the risk that and you can feed this back to 
guys, the risk that your, the guys ran, because we gave them the very specific 
brief… 
[Talking together] 
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…much material and they just ignored it and that really annoyed me and 
really annoyed AUDIT COMMITTEE CHAIR but in the end they didn’t get 
penalised for that because the offer was obviously better and the team was 
better. 
Right 
So we were annoyed because obviously they ignored the instruction and 
the other firm [FIRM B], stuck to the brief of writing a very focused response. 
Was that all they submitted just the….[talking together] 
No, they did, they did submit some other stuff and they did a misguided 
kind of aside the presentation this thing which is, they’re kind of, they’re 
accountants not marketing people and they kind of used analogies to deliver the 
presentation and it wasn’t brilliant.  So I mean that type of [laugh] let the 
records show I’m raising in a picture of a cartoon, a cartoon of a car’s journey 
and the analogy was between IT as an IT business and a Formula One car, of a 
racing car you know high performance and tuning and everything and it got a 
bit tiresome and it wasn’t, I don’t think it’s the right way, I actually in my last 
job I’ve seen plenty of marketing pictures and the marketing guys can bring in 
these type of graphical aids and do a really good job but I wouldn’t suggest it 
was the way forward for accountants. 
So was each member of their team some kind of you 
know…mechanic or 
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No (laughter), no but they kept using like motoring analogies and it just 
wore really thin and it wasn’t, you know it wasn’t the reason they didn’t get it 
but I don’t think it was the greatest invention and the thing that, I mean we 
were cross about it[FIRM A SUBMITING A BIGGER DOCUMENT THAN 
PRESCRIBED], annoyed about it but in the end it didn’t really count against 
[FIRM A] and arguably because there’s more detail in here it may have 
subconsciously actually aided them but it was a tiny bit of a risk that by ignoring 
the instruction that could have counted, that certainly would have counted if it 
was closer. 
Yes 
But because it was quite clear that this was the best team 
Right 
The content in here is excellent by the way not really that it wasn’t any 
good it just, it just is a bit too detailed. 
I was going to say was the, was the 8 to 10 pages as good as 
[FIRM B]’s 8 to 10 pages?  Notwithstanding you’ve got an extra 40 
pages on the top… 
[Laughter] it was at least as good but there was some filler in here and 
there was a very detailed audit plan which was excellent but it’s not, we didn’t 
ask for that level of detail and again it’s really tricky this because it did really 
annoy me, it did really annoy [AUDIT COMMITTEE CHAIR] and it, but it didn’t 
cost because it was still so obvious that that was the best offer. 
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Right 
As well as the best offer, the best team, the best you know the whole thing 
so you’ve got a very good partner, excellent team, really well thought out audit 
approach and you didn’t, I couldn’t hand on my heart say excellent team 
although very good partners, well thought out audit approach and this one here, 
pretty well thought out audit approach, the team was absent and the team was 
the same team that has been coming for the last few years, very nice people, no 
issue with them but they’ve been following a really daft approach. 
Right 
And we were a bit upset that they hadn’t challenged it and I can 
understand why it’s difficult to challenge because they take the partner’s lead 
but we had some reservations that however nice they were and competent they 
were why did they do far too much work for two years. 
The point about the team is a very interesting one, how people 
have got in their mind you know, this person was a better, was better 
than that person. 
Right 
You know was it, what they said, was it how they came across 
you know, was it…maybe it’s not evident maybe it’s just you know 
something you pick up I don’t know. 
There’s two things right, in the meetings, [AUDIT COMMITTEE CHAIR] 
asked almost the same questions to both groups, he asked the people at the 
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more junior end but not that junior, down to [FIRM A AUDIT SENIOR 
MANAGER]’s level, manager to level to talk about themselves for a minute and 
it was such an obvious invitation to actually talk about themselves, it wasn’t, he 
wasn’t making small talk he wanted to know a bit about them, what their 
background was, whether they’d been to university, how long they’d been an 
accountant, what they’d worked on 
Right 
And [FIRM A AUDIT SENIOR MANAGER] and [FIRM A AUDIT 
DIRECTOR] answered the question pretty fully.  The guys at [FIRM B] 
misinterpreted the question as some kind of small talk or that we were going to 
go along the table and get to the real big guys where we wanted to hear about 
you know their 25 years in [RELEVANT INDUSTRY] which we’re not remotely 
interested in, we know their good it’s more about you and they kind of, as 
quickly as possible got off the topic and that was just a bad misread, that’s 
unfortunate and that shouldn’t really, shouldn’t have made that much of a 
difference but it didn’t help.  So we didn’t have the information on this side, we 
also had on this side a secondee 
Right 
And some of the non-execs and one or two of our finance team didn’t like 
the fact that they put forward a secondee, I actually disagreed with them 
completely and said that these firms have loads of secondees you know, they 
kind of recirculate new blood around the… 
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So this was an overseas… 
Yes who was going to leave in a year 
Right 
I said you shouldn’t cloud our judgement at all because I think often these 
secondees can be much better than anyone that they’ve got locally and it’s really 
about the job they do and they should be able to hand that over after a year. 
Because you don’t send people on secondment who are idiots or 
not… 
No and I, I was the only person who (hesitating) argued against that being 
a factor but they still didn’t like it.  
Right 
So you know they can make up their own minds but they didn’t like it that 
they had a secondee on this side who didn’t see the people on this side, on 
[INCUMBENT FIRM]’s side again and [FIRM A] ones were very good and they 
came across well and when they’re asked particular questions as well they 
answered them very well because they’d been better prepped. 
Right, in terms of, well you’ve painted a picture of this decision 
being very much driven on the day of the presentation in terms of 
you know the responses people gave and so on… 
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Not, not, it’s not strictly true because I think when we went into the day, 
having seen the proposals, even though we were annoyed this was too long, we 
thought this had the best proposal. 
Right 
The fees were more or less the same, everyone was more impressed 
with….so what I did was I did a round robin before the day to get feedback from 
everyone that the auditors had met… 
Specific or did you say who did you think the best was? 
Everyone who saw all three sets of people was asked to give a verdict as to 
whether they thought; who they thought was the best and why 
Right 
And almost everyone said the people who showed the most understanding 
were the people from [FIRM A]. 
Right 
So I either got back they preferred [FIRM A] or they were indifferent they 
thought they were all good. 
Right 
So the IT guys, who kicked up the fuss in the first place in the end they 
actually said they could work with either one of the teams. 
Even [INCUMBENT FIRM]? 
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Even [INCUMBENT FIRM] which was a great tribute to the IT guy who 
came in from [INCUMBENT FIRM] he was excellent.  I mean I laughed at 
[COO] when he told me he could work with [INCUMBENT FIRM] because I 
never ever thought I’d hear him say it, the IT guy they sent him was really good. 
Right. 
Ummn so we asked so when we came to the decision, the non-execs had 
kind of been briefed that the general opinion was that [FIRM A] were the, had 
presented best, so you had come across best in the meetings but they were the 
people that we imagined it would be easiest to work with and they were the best 
prepared. 
Right 
Most knowledgeable.  That feedback came in not just from the UK but I got 
feedback from [TWO OVERSEAS OPERATIONS] and so we went into the day 
thinking that it’s kind of theirs to lose on the day but on the day the presentation 
was better than anyone else’s anyway so just, it turned into a decision which was 
absolutely unanimous. 
And who, who was driving that decision how did you in the end 
make the decision? 
The decision’s for the Audit Committee 
Right 
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To recommend to the Board so the decision is here is the response to 
[AUDIT COMMITTEE CHAIR] who’s the expert of the non-execs who has got 
an accounting background, so it was him, [A SECOND AUDIT COMMITTEE 
MEMBER] who’s one of the other non-execs, [A THIRD AUDIT COMMITTEE 
MEMBER], they were both there on the day. [AUDIT COMMITTEE CHAIR] 
was involved more closely in the whole process, the Chief Exec was there but he 
was really here on the day he wasn’t involved in the process, there was myself 
and the two guys the financial controllers [NAMES DELETED] and [AUDIT 
COMMITTEE CHAIR], you know I’m not, I think being honest I think he only 
listens to myself [FINANCIAL CONTROLLERS] what our opinion was.  He 
certainly, [CEO] didn’t have a strong view he thought these were better and he 
hadn’t been involved but he was interested,[ AUDIT COMMITTEE CHAIR] was 
interested in what was the poll had said so what the people had said you know 
what the XX had said our IT guys had said, and he was interested in what the 
accountants say because they’d spend more time than anyone with the teams 
and obviously we’d had the opportunity we’d been out for drinks with them, 
we’d had individual meetings here about particular issues.  We’d gone through 
the accounts with them and we’d had a bit more time so it was particularly 
interesting what they think because they are, they should be the most 
knowledgeable about different people’s confidences. 
Right 
So he took all that on board, in the end there was kind of no decision to 
make because he’s asking everyone and they’re all saying the same things. 
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Right 
He’d have been pretty contrary if he hadn’t have… 
I’m just trying to imagine the picture of you’ve had all the 
presentations and then you sit down and you know, what happens in 
that room you know there’s [AUDIT COMMITTEE CHAIR] saying 
OK… 
Well no it really is people just said that was easy wasn’t it?  And we all said 
no one even needed to say who was appointed. 
Right  
Ummn, so [AUDIT COMMITTEE CHAIR] says right so it’s [FIRM A] and 
you’ve got to let the others know and all we did is we wrote down a list of 
reasons to give the others and feedback to back to give the different firms 
about…. 
How did you get to that “it’s obvious…?” 
It just was very obvious I think because, if you think you’re leading into it 
with almost everyone agreeing that they were the best of the pitching firms… 
Yes 
[FIRM A] did a presentation and the best of the pitching firms.  It was a 
pretty obvious thing to appoint.  I think we’d gone into the day with mindset 
down unless these guys really messed up they would end up being an 
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improvement on [INCUMBENT FIRM] and they would be still ahead of [FIRM 
B]. 
Right.  It’s erm… 
The strange thing I mean, it’s not normal, normally we argue over things it 
was literally it didn’t even kind of need to be said when we went into the other 
room who… 
You just kind of look at each other… 
Yes, yes that’s an easy one!  Well we need to get back to the other firms to 
explain, give them some proper feedback as to why they were unsuccessful and 
the easy job is letting [FIRM A] know they were successful. 
Right OK.  One of the things that you know sometimes plays and 
it doesn’t sound like it played here particularly strongly is people’s 
past track record and relationships you know, I guess you could have 
come to the table feeling strongly I know the [FIRM B] guys and…. 
Yes of course I do yes 
And you know I’m and obviously you didn’t… 
Yes, yes, yes 
But others might have…. 
Yes I do know them they’re really good friends, there were good partners 
they were going to stick on this job [FIRM B LEAD AUDIT PARTNER] he’s a 
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friend, I still socialise with all the [FIRM B] guys so I know them well, he would 
have been a great match for me personally because he’s an excellent partner but 
then so is [FIRM A LEAD AUDIT PARTNER]. 
Right 
So obviously in my position I’ve got to be completely impartial, I think you 
embarrass yourself if you’re not these days and I think these days it’s very 
obvious when, if it’s a decision with a big group it’s pretty obvious if you’re 
evidently favouring one for another. 
Yes 
And I think in this situation the margin was such that you couldn’t, no one 
could even introduce a bias because it would have looked completely irrational 
Right 
So if I’d have said after receiving that presentation, reading the reports and 
feedback from all the staff my decision is I think [FIRM B] would be the best I 
think I would have risked really embarrassing myself. 
Right 
So I was very favourable to, ummn, I didn’t know all the guys but [FIRM B 
LEAD AUDIT PARTNER]s excellent, this is actually a pretty good pitch, the 
team wasn’t as good and they spent I think 60 or 80% less time than the [FIRM 
A] guys in getting it right. 
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Right and I mean did you…had you worked with the [FIRM B] 
guys on the client side I mean you know across the table with them? 
No 
Right 
We do a bit of tax with them but I know, I just know them from I mean I 
know [FIRM B LEAD AUDIT PARTNER] from a social group. 
Right, do you think that would have made any difference if 
they’d had a track record with you? 
With working with us? 
With working with you? 
I think it might have helped yes 
Right 
I mean obviously only if it had been (hesitation) a kind of favourable track 
record but it might have helped.  I don’t, I don’t think we’ve had, we didn’t have 
much obviously we had the track record of working with [FIRM A] on tax but 
increasingly on tax we now use [FIRM C -BIG 4 FIRM WHICH DIDN’T 
TENDER]. 
Right 
So the reason that [FIRM C] didn’t pitch for this was because they are the 
favoured tax adviser at the moment. 
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Right 
Ummn, so no I don’t think that would have made a big difference and I 
was absolutely conscious about not favouring one over another, the only times I 
stuck up for [FIRM B] was when I thought there’s a genuine reason to argue 
against a point that’s made against them which is a bit irrational like having a 
secondee which I did think is just a silly thing to object to, you’re going to expect 
to get secondees through the audit firms and I don’t really see how it’s a bad 
thing. 
Right and did you leave FIRM C out, was that your choice? 
Was our choice. 
Chose to leave them out because they were… 
We chose to leave them out because we’d done a lot of our tax planning 
through them and will continue to do the tax planning through all of these firms 
but we’ve currently used them most or had been using them the most and we 
thought three was enough when we went to pitch. 
Right, never thought about bringing a mid tier firm in? 
We did yes but we, you kind of quickly abandon it off when you think 
about the global aspect of it, probably would do a good job but when you say I 
want to come and speak to your person in [TERRITORIES IN ASIA PACIFIC] it 
falls down.  I mean I guess why those mid-tier have issues they do breaking 
through. 
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Yes do you know them at all? 
We don’t, no.  [AUDIT COMMITTEE CHAIR]’s son actually works for one, 
there’s no prejudice against them 
Right 
It’s just that when we talked about it he kind of dismissed it, just said look 
I can’t, I can’t see it, I can’t see them having the breadth. 
Right 
Internationally. 
Didn’t worry about reputation or brand issues? 
Probably there’s that as well but he didn’t say it. 
Right 
I think that would exist, it would have been pretty hard to have got rid of 
[INCUMBENT FIRM] and appointed [MID TIER FIRM]  or, those firms are 
quite big firms now but certainly to go would look really odd. 
OK.   
But no his son works at one of those firms so I can’t think he’s prejudiced 
against them, I just think it’s just, it’s just I think it’s just an unfortunate part of 
business now that you don’t, unless it’s one of the Big 4 firms it looks like you’re 
trying to hide something. 
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Right 
It’s deeply perverse. 
Right, just the House of Lords looking into the Big 4 I suppose 
we’re…. 
Yes, it’s more the, it’s definitely more in our case we didn’t think it was 
credible they could provide service, the same quality across all the locations 
because it’s important for us. 
It is a pretty specialist business… 
Absolutely and it’s quite hard I mean obviously we’ve got a little bit of work 
to be done in [EUROPEAN COUNTRY], some to be done in [THREE ASIAN 
COUNTRIES] so it needs a really robust, global network so that’s why we didn’t 
consider them. 
Right.  Just in terms of the feedback that you got from 
everybody you said that you know that those that did come back 
[FIRM A] those that didn’t said I’m happy with all three, did you did 
that in a very structured way because I guess it’s…. 
Most of them we’ve been working together for such a long time I emailed 
them or if I could go and see them I just went to see them and just asked them 
what did they think and you know I didn’t, if they just said I thought [FIRM A] 
were miles the best, the best prepared we kind of left it at that.  I didn’t prep, 
probe…. 
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You didn’t say oh why do you say that? 
No, no, no, I just got general feedback from them, in a couple of cases I 
asked them why so the Head of [one department] is a really sensible chap, I 
asked him why he thought that [FIRM A LEAD AUDIT PARTNER] had the best 
understanding and the guys that he’d seen had the best understanding of the 
business because of [FIRM A LEAD AUDIT PARTNER]’s background with 
[RELEVANT INDUSTRY SECTOR] and he found the meetings really useful and 
that the guys understood it, the business straight away so a couple of them I 
probed a bit deeper but in most cases you know, to be honest what they know 
about audit and what they think about, what they can remember about three 
meetings that they’ve had when they haven’t been, they’ve been engaged but 
they haven’t been making notes or anything.  It was more just to get their 
impression, it’s about the people fit and the impression they got and it’s that, 
[Name] thing which is your snap judgement is….probably you know, most of the 
time that is as good as information you’re going to get. 
Right – OK thank you!  I think I’m pretty much done.  I guess 
one final question. If you reflect for a moment, do you think there is 
anything we should have discussed about this tender but haven’t? 
….No, I think we’ve covered everything 
OK thank you. 
[TAPE TURNED OFF] 
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